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
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THE LIFE

OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

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




CENERAL WAY TOOKAPAREE



THE LIFE



THOMAS AND WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND STREET,

Paris :

A. AND W. GALIGNANI AND Co., RUE VIVIENNE.

1837.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE general impression, that an impartial and accurate biography of the Emperor Napoleon does not exist, and that Sir Walter Scott, in his "Life of Napoleon Bonaparte," did injustice to his subject, authorises an endeavour to supply that defect and repair that injustice. In the body and appendix of the work, the first volume of which is now submitted to the public, this double object is attempted.

The fame and amiableness of the author of Waverley, since they give importance to his errors and effect to his detraction, are far from alleviating his faults as an historian. His name is less glorious than that of Napoleon; his memory less sacred than truth.

It may be that the causes of his failure in one walk of literature, were the sources of his success in another. But a bigoted and fantastic zeal for the hereditary privileges of rank and royalty, when displayed estentatiously in the light of reason, and mischievously obtruded on the business of nations, is not the less absurd and offensive, that, transmitted through the twilight of romance, it has conduced to the creation or embellishment of unreal characters and fictitious scenes. Their music and innocence, although they qualify the choristers of Rome to fill with harmony the domes of temples, and to touch with ecstacy the forms of devotion, would not exempt them from pity and aversion, should they go forth into the world and meddle with the affairs of bearded men.

Vi PREFACE.

The propriety of annexing to a life of the Emperor Napoleon, an examination of the work of Sir Walter Scott, is enforced by several considerations. In the first place, that work controverts the assertions of Napoleon respecting matters of his personal experience, in the sketches which he dictated of his own life; and so far raises a question, the decision of which is essential to a just estimation of his moral character. In the next place, for an unknown writer to demand of the public the acceptance of his own narrative and the rejection of that of the most eloquent and popular author of his age without demonstrating the fallacy of one and the faithfulness of the other, would be a proceeding as presumptuous as the example of Norvins has proved it to be vain. (1)

An engineer, rather than see his fortress overcrowed and commanded, will not hesitate to demolish a neighbouring edifice, however costly its materials or curious its workmanship; however pompously its foundations may be laid in the earth, or gracefully its spires may spring into the air.

Again; if it shall be found that the scheme of the great novelist embraced such misrepresentations as he could decently repeat, or plausibly imagine, their correction will counteract, in its most imposing form, and by a single operation, a diversified mass of historical falsehood, and establish in the reader's mind, various and important truths. It is observed by Lord Bacon, that "the enquiry of truth, which is the wooing of it; the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it; and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it; is the sovereign good of human nature."

Within the compass of the design here indicated, the task of

(1) Norvins announced (see his preface) his work as expressly designed to refute and discredit that of Sir Walter Scott—an effect which, notwith-standing his zeal and opportunities, he does not appear to have had the slightest agency in producing.

acticing kindred and conflicting errors of lesser writers naturally falls. The author, removed from the influence of national or personal feeling, in relation to his subject, is sensible of as little disposition to respect the follies of French, as the unfairness of British, historians, while he records the actions of a man, whose character, in rising to a level with the noblest examples of any former age, provoked and encountered the vilest prejudices and passions of his own.

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
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TO THE READER.

The lamented death of the author, on the 30th of January 1837, unhappily arrested the execution of his original design to publish a work comprehending the entire life of the Emperor Napoleon. At the time of Major Lee's death the manuscript of the present volume only was prepared; but as the work, as far as it goes, is complete in itself, this volume, with a slight alteration in its title, is offered to the public in the conviction that the reader will regret only the untimely decease of its gifted author and the premature close of his labours.

It may be proper to add that a previous volume, printed in a character which, it was found, would render the work unnecessarily voluminous, has, with its appendix abridged and corrected by the author, been embodied, under a more convenient form, in the present publication.

Consulate of the United States, PARIS, 1837.



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CHAPTER XXI.

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THE LIFE

OF THE

EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

CHAPTER I.

From 1769 to 1785.

Corsica — Birth of Napoleon — His family — Circumstances attending his birth—Anecdotes of his infancy—His father, a deputy of the nobles to Versailles in 1779—Places him at the military school of Brienne—Anecdotes respecting him while at Brienne—Pichegru his comrade and tutor — His admiration for Turenne—His early transfer to the school of Paris — The Chevalier Keralio's opinion and report of him — Admiration of his instructors at Paris — His favourite authors — Anecdotes in regard to him while at the school of Paris — Noticed by the Abbé Raynal—Death of his father—His comrades at school—Examined by La Place—Receives his first commission as second lieutenant of Artillery — Joins his regiment at Valence, in Dauphiné — His character at the time.

The island of Corsica, though known from the earliest ages, of considerable extent, and adjacent to the coasts of Italy and France, had been the scene of few memorable events, when it became the birth place of Napoleon Bonaparte. He was born at Ajaccio, on the 15th of August, 1769 (1). His father was distinguished for eloquence and liberality; his mother respected for the pride of virtue, and the prudence of an independent spirit.

As the exertion of power awakens our wonder, its origin excites our curiosity. After contemplating the actions of great men, we are pleased to trace the course of their parentage; as travellers leave the currents of rivers to explore their sources, in untrodden wilds, in the clefts of rocks, and in barren mountains. In compliance with this general inclination, the following particulars

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respecting the Bonaparte family have, with more or less detail, been before related.

During the wars of the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in Italy, the Bonapartes were among the adherents of the latter, which was the liberal and defeated party. Expelled from Florence, the city from which Dante had been banished, a younger brother of the family found a refuge and a home in Corsica. From this adventurous exile was descended Charles Bonaparte; who, though unprosperous and shortlived, was the sire of sovereigns, and among them of a monarch, to whom Emperors were suppliants, and who prostrated, pardoned, and created kings.

The great grandfather of Napoleon had three sons—Joseph, Napoleon, and Lucien. The first of these had an only son, Charles; the second an only daughter, Elisabeth; the third who was a priest, long survived his brothers, and died in 1791 archdeacon of Ajaccio. The father of Napoleon was thus the eldest in descent, and the sole representative of his name in Corsica. From these circumstances, as well as from the ancient distinction of the family, which had been eminent in the church, had figured in the politics and literature of Italy, and which besides, mingling its blood with the Orsini, the Lomellini, and the Medici, claimed descent from the imperial house of the Comneni (2), great care was bestowed on his education. He studied at Pisa and Rome, and took the degree of doctor of laws.

Returning home, handsome, intelligent, and accomplished, he won the affections of Letitia Ramolino, a young lady of the island, descended from a noble family of Naples, and remarkable for personal beauty and strength of character. They were married so young, that a connection which was deemed eligible in other respects, their friends disapproved as premature. The fruits of this marriage were, besides five children who died in infancy, Joseph, king of Spain; Napoleon; Lucien, prince of Canino; Louis, king of Holland; Jerome, king of Westphalia; Elisa, grand duchess of Tuscany; Pauline, princess Borghese; and Caroline, queen of Naples.

The war of 1768, in which the Corsicans contended against the power of France in vain, found Charles Bonaparte at the head of his island clan (or piece), and a friend and follower of Paoli. His wife, prompted by congenial spirit and the fervour of youthful love, resolved to share, if not his dangers, at least his hardships.

In the disastrous campaign of 1769, accordingly, she followed the head quarters of the Corsican army, throughout that series of mountain marches, which terminated in the battle of Ponte Novo, and the final defeat of Paoli.

Charles Bonaparte at first resolved to accompany Paoli in his voluntary exile, being like him indignant at the subjugation of his country. But the situation of his wife requiring his immediate care and her longer residence in the island, he deferred his departure until a safe conduct was obtained for her from the French commander in chief. Then, while the father of Napoleon repaired to Porto Vecchio with intention to seek an asylum in England, his mother regained her solitary residence in Ajaccio, there to bring into the world, the future Emperor of France.

The period of her pregnancy was approaching, when influenced by distress and apprehension, rather than by the spirit of youth or beauty, Madame Bonaparte attended the celebration of mass on the day of the feast of the assumption (3). The solemn ceremony was not concluded, when the first pangs of childbirth surprised her. Hastening home, she was met by a gentleman who, observing an uncommon glow in her countenance and lustre in her eyes, with a gallantry more natural than seasonable, made these effects of pain and agitation, subjects of compliment and praise. She was just able to reach her house and throw herself on a sofa in the parlour. When discovered by her domestics, the child was born and the mother had swooned. He came into the world as he rose to greatness, without assistance (4).

About this time, Charles Bonaparte, overcome by tenderness for his family, and the expostulations of his uncle the archdeacon, declined his purposed enigration, and returned home.

In conformity with a custom of the family, the second son was christened Napoleon. Of his infancy little is known, as probably little was remarkable. He was healthy, sprightly, inquisitive and wilful; mastered his elder brother who was of a gentle disposition; disobeyed his father who was indulgent; but was submissive to his mother, who, being of a firm and discreet character, united discipline with affection. He said of her, that she never overlooked a good or a bad action of her children; she said of him that, though wild and headstrong, he was a kind brother and a good son. He was the favourite of his father, who by averting sometimes, and sometimes inviting the mother's authority, curbed or licensed

the frolics of his darling boy (5). Thus lightly swayed were the impulses of a mind, which was soon to dazzle and to awe the world.

When he was between five and six years of age, he was placed at a day school with some little girls who were older than himself. Caressed by them all he was most attached to the little Giacominetta. Her companions, jealous of this preference, resented it as graver persons sometimes resent more serious slights, by ridicule and rhyme. When they walked out, he always held her hand, while his stockings often fell about his heels. His arch tormentors followed them, singing,

" Napoleone di mezza calzetta,

Fa l'amore a Giacominetta.''
(Napoleon with his stockings off, is making love to Giacominetta.)

This was the signal for instant battle. With sticks, stones, or whatever came in his way, he invaded the little throng: then, as afterwards, prompt in his attacks and fearless of numbers.

When he was somewhat older, his mother forbade the children climbing the fig-trees in the vineyard. At length Napoleon took it into his head to long for some of the figs. They were ripe and tempting, the opportunity seemed good, and he embraced it. Having satisfied his appetite, he was filling his pockets, when the keeper of the vineyard came upon him. Petrified with terror, he clung helpless to a branch of the tree. The keeper threatened to tie him, and conduct him to his mother. He begged for mercy; fear made him eloquent, and the keeper appeared to relent. The next day, however, his mother expressed an ominous wish to gather some of these figs. They were all gone; and the keeper being summoned, the culprit was exposed and chastised. How difficult to conceive the twice-crowned conqueror, whose frown darkened the face of Europe, trembling in a fig-tree at the threat of a peasant!

It was observed by his mother, that when he first went to school, he was not remarkable for quickness of apprehension; but that having once surpassed his comrades, he was greatly delighted, and never afterwards lost his superiority (6). It would seem that, while his mind refused the influence of ordinary incitements, it was highly stimulated by the consciousness of merit, exercising a degree of free-will, and requiring a certain dignity of motive, even in its infantile efforts.

It is said that his favourite play-thing was a small cannon, and

his chosen retreat, a grotto, formed by an arching rock, and overlooking the sea. The first circumstance is too common to be characteristic; fondness for handling arms betrayed the sex, not the disposition of Achilles. The second, if true, probably expanded his mind with some of its earliest visions; for grand must have been the impression of the sea, even on the infant energies of a soul as boundless and sublime as itself. In manhood, the sight of the desert, which he called a solid ocean, affected him strongly, elevating his imagination with a sense of immensity.

It having been the object of the French government to incorporate Corsica with France, their policy was of consequence conciliating. They established a provincial parliament, thus placing the new conquest on a footing with the old provinces; and, as an additional favour, continued the existing magistracy of the twelve nobles, in whom the local authority resided. Charles Bonaparte was a member of this magistracy; and although he had resisted to the last, both in the army and in a convention which was held after the battle of Ponte Novo, the domination of France, he was induced to acquiesce in the new order of things, by these and other favourable measures. He was soon gratified by the appointment of assessor to the Royal Court of Ajaccio; a situation which, besides increasing his influence, augmented his income, scarce adequate, in consequence of sacrifices and losses in the war, to his liberal-babits and growing family.

In 1779, the parliament of Corsica sent a deputation to Versailles. Charles Bonaparte, who, besides his other qualifications for such a mission, was an eloquent and enlightened advocate. was chosen deputy for the nobles, as was the bishop of Nebbio for the clergy, and one of the Casa Biancas for the commons. was time to provide for the education of his two sons, Joseph and Napoleon, the first being eleven, and the second near ten years of age; and as a situation in France was now preferable to one in Italy, for that purpose, he determined to take them with him to He passed through Florence, where his name and the rank of his family, were remembered. The Grand Duke Leopold gave him a letter of recommendation to his sister, the Queen of France. He was graciously received by that unfortunate princess, and was aguest at the banquets of Versailles. Having discharged his public duty, he proceeded to dispose of his sons. Their inclinations probably determined their destination. Joseph was placed in a

classical seminary at Autun; and the policy of the government facilitating it, admittance was obtained for Napoleon, in the month of April, as a King's scholar, at the royal military school of Brienne.

At this period there were two French generals in authority in Corsica, whose conflicting pretensions created two parties. M. de Narbonne Pellet was haughty and violent; M. de Marbœuf was mild and affable. The former, being of high birth and superior interest, was likely to prevail over his rival. Fortunately for M. de Marbœuf, the deputation, with Charles Bonaparte at its head, arrived at the moment when this competition was under consideration. He was consulted by the minister, and made representations which effectually sustained M. de Marbœuf.

The nephew of Marbœuf, who was archbishop of Lyons, and minister of ecclesiastical affairs, acknowledged this act of well-timed justice; and, learning that M. de Bonaparte was conducting his son to the school of Brienne, introduced him by letter to a noble family of that name, residing there. This was the commencement of that kindness which the families of De Brienne and De Marbœuf extended to young Bonaparte, and which, from sportive malice or disappointed emulation, was ascribed by his school-fellows to a different cause. The aspersion being nourished by the press, and the policy of England, outlived the usual date of such ephemera. The manly beauty and graceful accomplishments of Charles Bonaparte, the advanced age of M. de Marbœuf, and the character of Madame Bonaparte, were circumstances which rendered the story ridiculous, while they proved it to be untrue.

At the school of Brienne, the young Corsican was not long in showing a disposition and ability to excel. He seemed to abound in sensibility and genius. If the last obtained him triumphs, the first exposed him to mortifications. His preceptors praised, but his comrades persecuted him. They ridiculed his Italian accent, mocked his imperfect French, and derided his comparative poverty; they called him a foreigner, the brat of a Corsican attorney, the bastard of the Count Marbœuf. As love for his parents, and affection for his home, were heightened by recent separation from both, he keenly resented these insults; and his spirit in combating boys, his superiors in age and in size, associated in a cabal against him, soon secured him friends. It was observed that, even when worsted, he never succumbed nor complained; and, though pro-

valed and injured, could not be induced, when in the routine of day he became superintendant of the class, to report the miscondact of the boys by whose annoyance he himself had suffered. Rather than swerve from this point of honour, he preferred enduring imprisonment, which he submitted to on one occasion, for the space of three days (7).

These injuries and mortifications, though manfully supported, as they were felt to be unjust and found to be unavoidable, sunk deep into his youthful heart, which was disposed to overflows of feeling and ardent attachments. Their influence on his temper soon discovered itself by a change in his habits. From being sprightly, confident, and joyous, he became quiet, sensitive, and solitary; fonder of his books than of his schoolfellows (8). He naturally associated, in the same resentment, the wrongs inflicted on his native island with the sneers aimed at himself, and uncontiously infused the merit of public grief into his own puerile vexations. Thus was kindled that intense patriotism which animated his whole life; which warmed his boyish indignation; directed his youthful studies; inspired his greatest actions; and sanctified the dignity of his last request.

He was too capable of acquiring knowledge to be long insensible of its value. His application accordingly seemed less a matter of duty than of choice; and his attention to discipline to be directed more by a sentiment of order than by the force of rules. Studious and reserved, he was rather respected than popular in the school; but when he did engage in the sports or enterprises of the little republic, his strength and fertility of character made him at once its dictator.

The following anecdotes, relating to this period of his life, are accounted authentic.

Soon after his arrival at Brienne, with all his natural vivacity about him, he was shown into a hall in which was a portrait of the Duke of Choiseul. The sight of this minister, who had defrauded Corsica of independence, excited his indignation so strongly, that he indulged it in epithets of abuse, in defiance of the rank and power of its object, and in spite of the reprehension and menaces of the professors.

The first time he dined at the table of the principal, that person, with a view of trying the spirit of his guest, spoke ill of Paoli. The young Corsican interrupted him instantly, stoutly exclaiming —

"Paoli is a great man, he loved his country, and I shall never forgive my father for consenting to the union of Corsica with France. He ought to have followed the fortunes of Paoli."

When some of the boys were reproaching him with his Corsican birth and accent, he expressed warmly to a friend this comprehensive menace—"I will do these French of yours all the harm I can:" a sense of power thus early quickening within him. His

threat expired with the flash of temper which prompted it; for he befriended with unequalled liberality the companions of his early days: his only revenge consisted in excelling them.

In the severe winter of 1780, he persuaded his comrades to construct a fortress of snow; and applying rules drawn from the science of their common study, protected the work by regular fortifications. Passing from the duties of an engineer to the functions of a general, he divided the stripling band into two parties, and had the fortress attacked and defended with a degree of vigour and skill, which besides evincing his proficiency, was thought to exhibit a remarkable power of rousing and directing the energy of others.

On the days of the fêtes of Brienne, for the purpose of preventing an influx of strangers into the school, guards were mounted. with orders to admit no person without a pass. It happened once, when Bonaparte was thef officer on duty, the portress, who was in the habit of selling milk, fruit, eggs, cakes, etc., to the students, counting on her personal consideration among them, presented herself without a pass; and, upon being stopped by the sentinel, loudly insisted on admittance. The sergeant of the guard reported the fact to Bonaparte, who, though only thirteen years of age, did not besitate between the inclinations of the boy, and the duties of the officer; but, with that firmness of character, and aversion to disorder, for which he was always remarkable, called out in a tone of command,—"Remove instantly that woman, who is bringing here the license of a camp." This woman, who was named Hauté, he afterwards established with her husband comfortably at Malmaison.

A fair was to be held in the vicinity of Brienne, and the students were desirous of attending it; but, as they had quarrelled with the country people on a previous occasion, the professors issued an order confining them on the day of the approaching fair, within the gates of the college. This painful restriction excited the enter-

pris and invention of young Bonsparte. Under his direction the students undermined a segment of the wall, conducting the operation so secretly, and adjusting it so nicely, that the saped space tambled down on the morning of the fair; which, by this stratagem, they were enabled to visit without violating the order.

His superiority of genius and efficiency of character, while they secured his ascendancy in the school, and, generally, the respect of the faculty, seem to have been considered as reprehensible fervardness by illiberal observers. Accordingly, one of the teachers, taking advantage of some slight irregularity, condemned him to wear a penitential dress, and to dine on his knees at the door of the refectory. He uttered neither complaint nor supplication, yet felt the indignity so acutely, that, at the moment it was about to be inflicted, he fell into convulsions; distress overcoming the strength of his body, but not the fortitude of his mind. The principal of the school happening to pass by, and father Patrault, prefessor of mathematics, warmly interposing in behalf of his favourite pupil, he was rescued from the undeserved punishment, and the brutal pedagogue.

It is worthy of remark that Pichegru, who was a charity scholar at Brienne, was his tutor in the mathematical class, and that France was rearing together in one of her schools, the conqueror of Holland, and the dictator of Europe—the patriot who was the terror of Bourbons and foreigners, and the traitor who was a tool in their hands.

In matters of principle he manifested, even at Brienne, an infexibility so striking that it made a lasting impression on Pichegru. In 1796, when this last was conspiring to betray his country, being consulted by a royalist agent upon the expediency of attempting to gain over the commander of the army of Italy, he bore unwilling testimony to his former comrade's integrity and firmness. "It would be a waste of time; I knew him at school; his character is inflexible; he has taken his side and will never change it."

The studies in which he excelled were those chiefly pursued in the school, and directly embraced in the profession of arms—mathematics, history, and geography. But as the instinct of power is the early consciousness of a vigorous mind, a desire of influence was probably one of his primary motives; and it is therefore reasonable to infer, without reference to his subsequent career,

that he might have been at Brienne, as ardent and successful in the study of eloquence and politics, as he was in acquiring the rudiments of war.

A lady who was conversing with him on the subject of his studies, mentioned the name of Turenne, reproaching the memory of that great general with having laid waste the Palatinate. "And why not, madam," eagerly demanded the future victor, "if it was necessary to the success of his designs?" This anecdote in the spirit of which may be discovered the embryo of that gigantic decision which was exemplified in his raising the siege of Mantua, as well as his ardent admiration of Turenne, shows how soon his understanding was capable of combining the extended reasoning of military policy, with the technical conclusions of the art of war (9).

From observations which dropped from him at St. Helena, it appears his powers of reflection were so active and strong in the season of early youth, that the sentiments of religious faith which the affection of his mother, and the piety of his uncle, had instilled into his childhood, became disturbed in the course of his four-teenth year, by those doubts of reason, from which ordinary minds are free, until they are infested by the pride of manhood.

In 1784, the Chevalier Keralio, who, as inspector-general of the military schools, was charged with the selection of pupils for promotion to the school of Paris, selected Bonaparte, though he was rather under the proper age, as one of the number to be sent from Brienne. As he was better acquainted with the sciences than the languages, the masters of the school proposed detaining him a year longer, in order that he might improve his knowledge of the classics, alleging that he was not yet fifteen. "No." replied M. de Keralio; "I know what I am doing; if I transgress the rule respecting age, it is not from favour to any particular family, for I am not acquainted with that of this lad; it is solely from regard to his merit. I discover in him a spark of genius which cannot be too carefully cherished." The chevalier, who was an author on tactics, had conceived a great affection for the young Corsican. Soon after the examination, this inspector of the school was advanced to other employment; but his successor adopted his decision, and Bonaparte, with four other students, was transferred in October, 1784, from the Royal school of Brienne, to that of Paris (10).

Marshal Ségur, was then minister of war. Among his official papers, there exists a minute under the head of the school of brisme (a transcript of the report of M. de Keralio to the king), which shows that scientific acquirements were much less esteemed in the French army, when Bonaparte commenced, than when he ended his military life. For, after noting his age, size, and assiduity, and remarking, that he was tractable, honest, and grateful, the writer of the minute adds—"would make an excellent seaman." It is remarkable that, when Washington was about the same age, a midshipman's warrant in the British navy was obtained for him; and he was prevented from becoming "an excellent seaman," solely by the timid objections of his mother (11). Had both or either of these suggestions been effectuated, how different from what it now is, might have been the state of the civilized world!

His faculties being developed by growth and strengthened by exercise, Bonaparte's superiority was more marked and impressive at the school of Paris even than it was at that of Brienne. celebrated Monge, who was his instructor in geometry, formed a high opinion of his capacity. M. de l'Eguille, the professor of history, declared he would become a great man, and to his name in the class-book affixed this note, "A Corsican by birth and character; he will distinguish himself if favoured by circumstances,"—alluding probably to his vivacity of genius, ardent sensibility, and passionate application, which gave an unsocial cast to his character, and an oriental warmth and splendour to his elocution. The professor of belles lettres was so forcibly struck by this property of his style, that he at once imitated and described it, by calling his original and vivid amplifications, "blocks of granite issuing red hot from a volcano." As Bonaparte discovered no aptitude for the German language, the German teacher was no believer in his extraordinary intelligence, affirming, when told that he was already undergoing his examination for the artillery, that he "always thought mathematicians blockheads."

Study, the labour of most young minds, was, to his, recreation and seemed now to engross his faculties with the absorbing force of a passion. His preference for history continuing to prevail, Polybius and Arrian, but more especially Tacitus and Plutarch, were his favourite authors; one presenting to his mind admirable

portraits of heroes and legislators; the other enriching his judgment with profound maxims of political wisdom—both inculcating lessons of patriotism and virtue, contempt for weakness, and abhorrence of vice. His application was as fruitful as strenuous, for though his succeeding years were too active to admit of much reading, he displayed through life, a familiar and accurate acquaintance with ancient history. There are probably few exercises in which mental vigour is more readily discovered, than in imbibing and assimilating historical knowledge.

Macpherson's Ossian, which was then sanctioned by the Scotch critics as a collection of genuine translations, and had been recently rendered into Italian, he read like most youths of his time with curiosity and admiration, and as it was really an ingenious compound of the finest thoughts, expressions, incidents, and characters to be found in Homer, Virgil, Milton, and Tasso, and was recommended to his taste by the beauty of Cesarotti's version, it was one of the poetical works in which he most delighted.

The boast and glory of his native tongue also shared his youthful admiration. In the dreadful campaign of 1814, he observed a tree near Brienne, under the shade of which, in the days of peace and boyhood, he had read the Jerusalem Delivered, and mused on thoughts and actions less noble than his own.

During his stay at the school of Paris two occurrences have been mentioned which appear characteristic, one of the reach of his mind, and one of its readiness. The archbishop of Paris held a confirmation at the military school. At the name Napoleon, he expressed surprise, and said there was no saint of that name in the calendar; "That is no objection to him," promptly observed the youth, "since there are a host of saints, and but three hundred and sixty-five days to dispose of among them."

The expense of education and living maintained in the royal school he found very great; proportioned rather to the habits of the rich and the luxuries of the capital, than to the expectations of the students, or the value of the instruction imparted to them. He prepared a memoir on the subject, pointing out the disadvantages of sumptuousness, as well to those who could, as to those who could not afford to continue it. In this remarkable paper, after insisting that this expensive living tended to render the students frivolous and self-sufficient, he recommended that they should be made to eat coarse bread, to brush their own clothes,

and clean their own boots, adding that frugal allowances and simpleare would make them "robust, able to support the inclemencies of weather and the toils of war, and fit them to inspire the soldiers with respect and attachment." Remarks like these, while they must be allowed to show a surprising range of observation and maturity of judgment, in a youth of fifteen, discover also how soon the self-exalting spring of his genius was beginning to act, elevating him above his own situation, and enabling him to look down on that of others.

About this period also he is said to have formed liberal political opinions, which he indulged so far as to express himself in a letter to his parents, disrespectfully of the kingly office. The letter being submitted, according to the regulations of the school, to the professor of belles lettres, this sentiment was of course reprobated, the letter was destroyed and the writer rebuked. Afterwards when he was first consul, having occasion to employ a preceptor for his brother Jerome, he sent for his old instructor and reverting kindly to their former acquaintance, reminded him of the fate to which he had doomed his unlucky epistle.

In the course of one of his lectures, the professor of history at Paris introduced the revolt of the Constable of Bourbon, and enlarged, with loyal emphasis, on the enormity of his fighting against his king. This view of the subject did not satisfy the mind of Bonaparte, whose finer feeling and nicer sagacity discriminated at once between patriotism and loyalty. The Constable's crime, he justly apprehended, consisted not in fighting against his king, but in uniting with foreigners to make war on his own country. A mind like this, it was not in the power of temptation or adversity to degrade to the part of Bernadotte or Moreau.

His reputation soon reached beyond the limits of his school, and attracted the notice of the Abbé Raynal, who paid him flattering attentions.

While he was thus enlarging the circle of his knowledge, and unfolding the rich promise of his character, his father died of a cancer of the stomach, at Montpellier (12). In this son were centered his hopes and affections—so strongly that, although Joseph was the attendant of his sick bed, his dying thoughts were fixed on Napoleon. On his name he was heard frequently to call, and in moments of delirious agony, to invoke the succour of his mighty sword; as if the clouds which darkened the death-bed of the pa-

rent, were tinged with prospects of the greatness and glory that were to descend upon his son. As it does not appear that Napoleon had visited Corsica from the time of his entering the school of Brienne, his last interview with his father most probably took place when the latter came to Paris for medical advice, on the first access of his disorder. Of course he knew very little of this parent.

Among his fellow students, two individuals are mentioned, whose names are eventfully connected with his own. Philippeaux, who, at Acre, under hostile banners, contributed to arrest the course of his Syrian conquests; and Lauriston, his favourite aidede-camp, whose protracted and ineffectual negotiations with Katusoff contributed not to shorten his delay at Moscow.

In September 1785, his diligence and aptitude having again accelerated his examination, he received his first appointment in the army; a second lieutenancy in the regiment of La Fère, or the 1st artillery (13). His success on this occasion was the more creditable, as his examination in the important branch of mathematics was conducted by the great La Place. He is said to have been transported with joy at finding himself an officer; an emotion proportioned less to the inconsiderable event itself, than to the vast career which it opened. He joined his regiment forthwith at Valence in Dauphiné, and there first did duty as an officer.

Pausing to contemplate him, when thus emerging from the restraints of adolescence, it will appear that he was a youth fit to be loved with devotion by a friend, and with pride by a parent; that he was sensitive yet ingenuous, grateful but not vindictive, and though obstinate against injury tractable to kindness; capacious of knowledge, and ardent in pursuing it, not as a badge of boyish superiority, but as an instrument for intellectual purposes. The progress of his understanding though rapid was steady, propertioned, not only to the strength of genius in which its impulse originated, but to the extent of advancement which its maturity was to reach. It was natural that his preceptors should have entertained, with affection for his person, anticipations of his greatness; and it is probable they were not more gratified at seeing their predictions fulfilled, than surprised at the degree to which they were surpassed by his exploits.

CHAPTER II.

From 1785 to 1793.

Naceleon in garrison at Valence in Dauphiné -- Madame Colombier's kindms and esteem for him - In love with her daughter - His success in society-His comrades in the regiment-His prize essay successful in the academy of Lyons - His history of Corsica - Commended by the Abbé Raynal - In garrison at Auxonne - Near being drowned in the Saône -Prince of Condé - Bonaparte's public letter to the Corsican deputy Buttafece - Kindness to his brother Louis - Promoted to a first lieutenancy in the regiment of Grenoble - Returns to Valence - Anecdote - General Dutheil-Bonaparte's liberal political opinions-Rescues a brother officer -Visits Corrica-Death of his father's uncle-Anecdote-Promoted to a captaincy - Commands a Corsican battalion, and suppresses a riot at Ajaccio-The first slander against him - Goes to Paris-Remarks on the horrors of the 20th of June, and 10th of August - Reflection - Interest about his sisters - Returns to Corsica-The expedition against Sardinia-Paoli - Anecdote - Refuses to join Paoli - Paoli's cruelty to the Bonaparte family - Civil war in Corsica - Bonaparte active on the side of France - Paoli calls in the English - Corsica subdued by England -Madame Bonaparte takes refuge on the continent, and settles at Marseilles -Bonaparte joins the army of Italy-Writes and publishes "Le Souper de Beaucaire."

At the head of the society of Valence, when Lieutenant Bonaparte joined his regiment, was Madame Colombier, a lady of amiable character and penetrating mind. The officers of the garrison were invited to her parties, where she soon noticed and liberally encouraged the strong and brilliant faculties of young Bonaparte. She introduced him to her acquaintances and recommended him to her friends, especially to the Abbé de St. Rufe, by whose hospitality he was associated with the most distinguished persons of the province. His mother supplied him with an allowance which, added to his pay, placed him above the inconveniences of a

narrow income. He became a favourite with his commanding officer, was of an age to feel the allurements of society as well as the attractions of knowledge, and entered its circles with pleasure and success. His slight elegant form, classical expressive face, original conversation, in which flashes of genius incessantly appeared, excited general admiration; and being new to life and its fashions, he pleased without the rules of pleasing, and therefore pleased the more.

Mademoiselle Colombier was about his own age. It was natural that he should see the graces of his friend's daughter, that she should perceive the merits of her mother's favourite; and a sentiment of tenderness arose between them. Having established the usual intelligence of lovers, they met one morning by day-break in an orchard, where their passionate indulgence consisted in eating cherries together. This was his first love; pure as the dew on the cherries, it proved to be as transient, and appears to have been as cool.

It was not without incurring the envy of his comrades, that he led this life of privilege and pleasure in the kind and happy society of Valence. This feeling does not appear to have disturbed his enjoyment at the time, nor to have stood in the way of their future good fortune; for, of his mesmates at Valence, six lived to receive marks of his particular favour; viz., Lariboissière, Sorbier, Desmazzis, d'Hedouville, Roland, and Mabille.

Madame Colombier died soon after the commencement of the revolution, in the success of which she is said to have taken a warm interest. Her enthusiastic esteem for young Bonaparte continued to the last. Though he had left Valence, she mentioned him in her last moments, and told those around her, that if he was not prematurely cut off, his career in life would certainly be glorious. He always spoke of her as his benefactress, and when he had more than verified her predictions, testified his respect for her memory by making a munificent provision for her daughter. If Madame Colombier deserved his gratitude, she demands the notice of his biographer, as being the only person to whom his infant fortune was indebted.

Society, its charms and flatteries, the envy of young men and the favour of young ladies, did not allay his thirst for knowledge or for fame. He chanced to be quartered at the house of a bookseller who allowed him the free use of his miscellaneous assortment of volumes. Most of these during his stay at Valence, he read over and over, pushing his studies beyond the limits of his profession and the taste of his class, into the distant regions of ecdesiastical history and papal government. Even from this irregular reading he appears to have gleaned a fund of sound and arplicable knowledge. At the age of eighteen he became a competitor for literary honours. The academy of Lyons offered a prize for the best essay on the following question by the Abbé Raynal: "What are the principles and institutions, the application of which is most conducive to the happiness of society?" A subject so abstract and comprehensive, it required boldness to undertake, and ability to manage. Bonaparte it seems, though but a stripling, was deficient in neither prerequisite, and his anonymous essay not only gained the academical prize, but general applause. Cast in a liberal political mould, it coincided with the literary spirit and popular feeling of the time, and to that circumstance doubtless, owed in some degree its success. But there was a force of logic, and an energy of feeling and expression in the essay, which under any circumstances must have been admired. The upward progress of its author, soon left this small title to credit beneath him. When however he had risen high in the firmament of power and glory, it was retrieved by the officious flattery of Talleytand. The Emperor, with a fastidiousness proper to his elevation, and common to men of great genius, saw, in his juvenile essay, nothing but its imperfections, and threw it into the fire. A copy, it seems, had been taken by his brother Louis, and the essay is now in print.

About this time too, actuated by a noble veneration for the place of his birth and the land of his fathers, he undertook to compose a history of Corsica. He made some progress in the work, which, with a proper feeling of respect, he dedicated to the Abbe Raynal. But though thus early and strongly inclined to authorship, the disposition appears to have proceeded more from the abundance of his resources, and the creative ardour of his mind, than from a predilection for pursuits so meditative. His essay towards a history of Corsica was read and commended by the Abbe Raynal, who in vain advised its publication. The production itself is lost, but the familiarity which its preparation had given its author with the subject, no doubt furnished his remative memory with the materials out of which was constructed

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the clear and succinct account of Corsica, which he dictated at St. Helena.

In consequence of popular disturbances at Lyons, in the year 1788, his regiment was ordered to that city. From Lyons it was transferred to Auxonne, and it was while there that he was near being drowned in the Saône. In swimming, he was seized with the cramp, and sunk so suddenly, that his companions thought he was diving. After struggling some time he lost his recollection, and drifted to a distance by the current, was lodged on a sand bank. Here his comrades, after giving him up as lost, recovered him before it was too late.

In 1790, while he was stationed at Auxonne, the Prince of Condé announced his intention of inspecting the school of artillery at that place. The name, as well as the rank of this personage, rendered his visit an important occasion for the garrison. The Commandant therefore, determined to place the most accomplished, instead of the cldest, officer, at the head of the battery, and Bonaparte was of course the officer selected. His comrades, to revenge their being postponed to him, secretly spiked his guns the night before the review. But the military glance of the future conqueror, was already too quick and pervasive to be surprised. Before the prince came upon the ground, he had detected and frustrated the scheme, and, at the appointed hour, was in full readiness to receive him.

Little could the prince have foreseen that in the youth before him stood the chief, who was to eclipse the renown of his name, and to shorten its succession.

The young officers of the garrison, who were *ilères* of the royal seminaries, were associated in the exercises of the school at Auxonne. A mathematical problem of great difficulty having been proposed for their study, Bonaparte, in order to accomplish its solution, confined himself to his chamber seventy-two hours without intermission. His power of application, in truth, seems to have been as remarkable as his genius.

It was during his residence at Auxonne, that he wrote and published his letter to Buttafoco, the Corsican deputy of the nobles in the national assembly. Besides force of invective and reasoning, this letter exhibits a patriotic spirit, and a sense of popular rights, which must have removed all doubt as to the political inclination of the author, with regard to the revolution. It concludes with

an apostrophe to the great patriots and orators of the assembly, which would alone be sufficient to show that, like Cæsar, had Bonaparte cultivated rhetoric, he would have rivalled the greatest masters of eloquence. The effect of this letter was equal to its intrinsic excellence, and greater than any expectation which the age or station of its author could have excited. It was adopted and republished by the patriotic society of Ajaccio, who, under its influence, passed a resolution, attaching the epithet infamous, to the name of their noble deputy. About this period, he was in treaty with M. Joly, a bookseller of the neighbouring town of Dôle, for the publication of his history of Corsica. But, partly from diffidence, and partly from the indecision occasioned by his approaching transfer to another regiment, he seems to have dropped the project, without putting the last hand to his work, or completing the agreement.

The office of chaplain having been abolished by the government, the clerical ornaments and sacred implements of the regiment, were deposited in Bonaparte's care at Auxonne. He showed them to M. Joly, and expressing himself respectfully with regard to religious observances, said: "If you have never heard Mass I can repeat it to you." The functions of his uncle and his mother's example had made him, from his childhood, familiar with the forms of the Catholic church.

That course of protection, which he extended so liberally and so constantly, to the members of his family, he seems to have commenced when a simple lieutenant. At Auxonne, his brother Louis, then but ten years of age, was under his care and instruction, shared his meals, and occupied a room in his quarters [1]. It was by his care that Louis received the religious information necessary for a communicant, and by his exhortations, that he took the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; conduct on the part of Napoleon, which was not only kind and considerate as a brother, but affectionate and respectful as a son.

In consequence of his promotion to a first lieutenancy in the regiment of Grenoble, or the 4th artillery, he left Auxonne in 1790, and returned to his old station of Valence, where the regiment of Grenoble was quartered. Here he became acquainted with young d'Hedouville who was an officer in that regiment. They were in the same mess, and sat beside each other at table. Among their rules was one imposing a fine on any member who.

at meals, should introduce a professional subject. Bonaparte's fondness for his profession made him, it was observed, the most frequent infractor, and a constant victim of this rule (2).

Attended by his friend and comrade Desmazzis he made an excursion from Valence into Burgundy as far as Mont Cenis, a town, famous for its manufacture of chrystal. On his way, he stopped at Nuits and was invited to sup with Gassendi, a captain of his regiment, who had married the daughter of a physician residing there. Gassendi was a royalist, his father-in-Their opposition was displayed by a warm law a patriot. discussion at supper, in which Bonaparte's superior intelligence and logic were so efficient on the side of the doctor, that he visited his guest next morning in his chamber, and thanked him in flattering terms for his interposition. The eloquence and patriotism of the young officer, became the subject of conversation in the town. It was Sunday, and when he walked out. the people in the streets pulled off their hats to him as the champion of their cause. But the triumph of the morning was overcast at night. He was invited to pass the evening at the house of Madam Mery, a lady of wealth and fashion, who entertained all the aristocracy of the district. Here having expressed some of his opinions, they were assailed and reprobated with the utmost violence. He attempted a war of words, but overpowered by noise and numbers, was able to extricate himself only by the assistance of his hostess, who gracefully parried the blows which he could not resist. This incident, though it mortified him for the moment, contributed still farther to connect his name and feelings with the cause of the people. Of this trip, in which his curiosity and friendship were both gratified, and which appears to have been the last as well as the first he ever performed from mere motives of pleasure, his recollection was so agreeable, that he conceived for the moment an idea of writing a description of it after the manner of Sterne, and spoke of it in after life with peculiar complacency, calling it his sentimental journey.

Though reflective in the general bent of his mind, it would seem that, when under the influence of professional duties and pleasing recreations, the shade of early mortification having passed away from his temper, he was become companionable and cheerful. His success in society at Valence, has been mentioned already,

and, at St. Helena, he himself recorded various little anecdotes. indicative of the sportive disposition of his youth. As a sample of these anecdotes, this may be repeated. An octogenary general undertook to exercise the young officers in gunnery, and was very intent on tracing the balls with his spy-glass. Bonaparte persuaded the young men to fire blank cartridges. The veteran could not of course discover where the balls struck, and reproached the wags with taking very wide aim. Their amusement consisted more in fun than in wit; in witnessing the general's eagerness in looking out for balls which were not fired, and asking the bystanders where they struck. After five or six rounds, he suspected the trick and ordered the balls to be counted. He laughed heartily at the joke, but notwithstanding, had its prepetrators put under a momentary arrest. This veteran was General Duthiel. for whose memory, evidence of respect and a title to honour are found in Napoleon's will.

The revolution was now decisively in progress, and the political dissensions by which it eventually distracted the nation, were making their way into the army. The soldiers, having the soundest feelings, were first affected by the patriotic spirit. Gradually it spread from them to the officers, and after the famous and comprehensive oath of allegiance "to the nation, the law, and the king" was prescribed by the national assembly, officers of superior rank and aristocratic connections, espoused the popular side of the question. Bonaparte who had given early and frequent evidence of this disposition, and who was confirmed in it by the promulgation of the oath, acquired in addition to the authority conferred by professional talent, the influence arising from political sympathy with the men. In consequence, he and his adherents were able to manage the corps, although a preponderance of offirers in rank if not in number was against them. This control he exercised with generosity, and rescued from a military mob an officer who had excited the fury of the soldiers, by singing, at the window of the mess-room, the famous rovalist song, "Oh Richard, Oh my King!" a song, which was one day to be proscribed on his Thus, though deeply imbued with the liberal principles by which the revolutionary party was actuated, he was not tainted by their cruelty, nor even their intolerance. Indeed in reference to the motives of the opposite parties, he made subsequently this sound and just remark; "Had I been a general officer, I might

have adhered to the king; a young lieutenant, I sided with the revolution."

It appears that about this time he was in correspondence with the celebrated Paoli, on the subject of his history of Corsica, and on the prospect of a more liberal state of things, which by the enlightened labours of the national assembly, was dawning on the nation. Paoli, in consequence of the success of Mirabeau's motion for the recall of the Corsican exiles, left England in 1790, and after being received with signal honour at Paris, was hailed on his arrival in Corsica with joyful demonstrations of general respect. The Corsicans placed in his hands whatever power they had to confer; the confidence of the Government was not inferior to the attachment of the people; and Paoli was appointed Lieutenant General in the army, and Commander in chief of the military division which comprehended the island.

This was the state of things in Corsica when, in September 1791, Bonaparte, after an absence of more than twelve years visited his native town on furlough. He had left it a wild, sprightly boy, he returned to it an accomplished officer, with powers of conception and expression singularly strong, and with a name already known in politics and letters. He joined his family in time to witness the last days of its second father, the good archdeacon, who had bestowed on it a parent's care. This venerable relative was so firmly persuaded of Napoleon's worth and genius, that on his death-bed he called the children around him, and accompanied his last blessing with this advice: "Joseph, you are the eldest of the sons; but remember what I say, Napoleon is the head of the house." As Joseph was by no means deficient in promise, the spirit of the injunction could not be misapprehended. It seems to have made a deep impression on the mind of Napoleon, and to have influenced his conduct as well as the expectations of his family.

His power in the circle of his brethren, was the same which he exerted in the world at large, and the judgment of the secluded and expiring prelate, was confirmed by the devoted obedience of armies, and the deliberate confidence of a great nation. The feeling of the relative was directed by sagacity, the judgment of the people was actuated by affection, so that the ascendancy of Napoleon, whether viewed in its domestic or public character, may be said to have arisen from those legitimate sources, which

through life.

nature implants and reason consecrates; the light of man's understanding, and the warmth of his heart (3).

Her protecting son being in the army, Madame Bonaparte assumed the personal superintendence of the family affairs. These were by no means prosperous; for although the archdeacon left some ready money, his ecclesiastical income of course ceased with his life, and the costly and unsuccessful experiments of Charles Bonaparte in reclaiming an extensive salt marsh, had seriously impaired his estate (4). In these circumstances, however, the fortitude and good sense of his widow effected much. She managed her property with care and economy, and her children with that prudence and affection, which evinced through a long and eventful life the excellence of her character.

In February 1792, a general promotion, which was accelerated by the emigration of many officers, raised Bonaparte to the rank of captain. The divisions generated by the revolution had extended themselves to Corsica, where, modified by circumstances peculiar to the history of that island, they appeared in the shape of a party in favour of maintaining the union with France, and a party opposed to it. For the purpose of preserving the public peace, and supporting the legal authorities, a corps of local troops was raised in Corsica, and the provisional command of one of the battalions was intrusted to Bonaparte. The insurgents, or antiunion party, had at first the sympathy, and finally the countenance, of Paoli; and Ajaccio was the focus of its proceedings. Hence it happened that Bonaparte's first act of war, was exerted in opposition to the sentiments of his father's commander and in the suppression of a tumult in his native town. Peraldi, a popular leader of a rival family and the opposite party, who breathed hereditary eamity to the Bonaparte name, was at the head of the discomfited rioters; a circumstance which was not likely to soften the inveteracy of a clannish feud. Accordingly, he denounced Bovaparte to the government, as the secret instigator of the disorder which he had openly quelled. This accusation, prompted by vengeance, was unsupported by truth. But it rendered a journey to Paris advisable, where, though the sanguinary temper of power was beginning to encourage delation, Bonaparte found no difficulty in vindicating his conduct.

This slander of Peraldi is memorable as being coeval with the

earliest of Bonaparte's public services, and as the first in that long succession of falsehoods, which under the warmth and lustre of his merit, were exhaled from the disorder, malice, and corruption of his age. Though frustrated in its aim, it was not without effect in his history, as it was the occasion of his witnessing the outrages of the populace on the 20th of June and the 10th of August. On the first occasion, it is said that, upon seeing, from the river terrace of the garden of the Tuileries, the King present himself at a balcony of the palace, wearing the red cap of liberty, which, intimidated by the rabble, he had clapped upon his head, Bonaparte expressed indignation at the monarch's weakness, and exclaimed: "How could they suffer the mob to enter the palace? It was only necessary to sweep off a few hundreds of them with cannon. and the rest would have been running now." His contempt for a rout of this kind, originating in his love of order and pride of discipline, and his confidence in the application of military force, were both strengthened doubtless by his recent experience in Corsica.

He was still more shocked by the sanguinary excesses of the 10th of August. The brave and immolated Swiss guards, their bodies lying in heaps on the pavement of the court, and their heads paraded about on pikes by demons in human shape, struck him with horror, and presented a spectacle which he remembered as "hideous and revolting." Instinct with heroic fire, his soul shuddered at scenes of cruelty and murder, and his just understanding regarded the violence of a mob as the ferocity of a monster.

But he was not in a position to reflect that the fault, instead of being in the infuriated populace, was in the oppression which had maddened them. They were born with natures as kind, with sensibilities as generous as the rest of mankind, but a bigoted and dissolute priesthood, a privileged and rapacious aristocracy, and a line of cruel and voluptuous kings, had driven them through all the extremities of persecution and shiftings of servitude, to the rage of despair. The great body of the French people had been treated like brutes until they were become brutal. Their mental vision had been so long obscured in depths of degradation, that the light of liberty affected them with blindness, the air of relief with convulsions. Exhausted by ages of oppression, a nation, renowned for generous devotion to ungrateful monarchs, was ex-

cited to paroxyms of frenzy by the first sensations of freedom. But is this an argument in favour of divine right and legitimate monarchy, or a motive for distrusting the capacity of the people for self-government? The people of France were no more to blame than is the solitary maniac who, escaping from unrighteous chains, kills a stranger under the belief that in that stranger he is destroying the oppressor, whose cruelty tortured his limbs and distracted his brain. The objects of their fury were not the victims of popular rage, but of the royal vices which engendered it; and the axe which beheaded Louis XVI. was raised, not by his subjects, but his ancestors.

Through all the violence of the revolutionary struggles, the people had but one object of desire, freedom; but one subject of dread, tyranny; and their great leaders, the patriots of the revolation, pursued the noblest aims of human ambition, the liberty of their fellow-citizens, and the independence of their country. That the good which was desired and proposed was not all effected, and that unforeseen misery and crime could not be avoided, was their mutual misfortune, not their common fault. He, therefore, who stigmatizes the revolution because of its incidental atrocities or unexpected catastrophe, might consistently reproach a miner, whose enterprise and labour afford comfort to millions, because the fire-damps of the earth explode, when touched by the flame of his useful torch. And he who can lament over the downfall of a throne, and the suffering of the individuals connected with it, without execrating the tyranny of which it was the seat, might be expected to sympathize with the murderer, against whom the blood of his victim rises in judgment, without feeling indignation for the cruelty with which that blood had been shed, or pity for the pangs which sent forth life in its current. The truth of these observations is too plain to be contested. They show that, as the excesses of the French revolution were the natural consequences of hereditary rule, the votaries of that system have no right to complain, when the vices of one king descend in vengeance on his successors. They also show that, if long-continued submission strengthens the hands of the oppressor, it makes his ultimate accountability the more perilous, by perverting the nature and the energies of the oppressed.

Of no great political event have all the consequences been beneficial. The struggle which emancipated the United States was

not unattended by the sorrows of innocence, and the sufferings of virtue. Unmingled advantages were not to be expected from the French revolution, of which, however, while the horrors were confined to France, the advantages redounded to mankind. That these were important, may be conceived by reflecting on the probable condition of Europe, had the first coalition against France been successful. Those who rail against the French revolution, and describe its excesses as effects of the natural propensity of the people and the press, would do well to compare them with the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the acknowledged offspring of the altar and the throne, since it was perpetrated by the order of Charles IX., and eulogised by the thanksgiving of Gregory II. The virtuous Sully records some of the horrors of this legitimate reign of terror, in which seventy thousand French protestants were massacred in the course of eight days.

While Bonaparto was on this occasion at Paris, he seems to have felt the weight of the inheritance which his dying uncle had turned aside from Joseph, and devolved upon him. His mother, though not in affluence, was in possession of comfort and independence, and for his own wants, his pay as captain of artillery, constituted adequate, though not ample provision. But his younger brothers and his sisters were to be educated, and the latter provided for. About these last he felt most anxiety, for in writing at this time to his uncle Paravicini, he observed:—"Allow yourself to feel no uneasiness concerning your nephews; they will be able to take care of themselves." Accompanied by Bourrienne, ho went from Paris to St. Cyr, to visit his sister Eliza, who was then at school there; and it is said, in speculating upon the means of making money, formed the momentary project of renting a number of houses in Paris, and subletting them at profitable prices.

Returning to Corsica, and resuming the command of a local battalion, he was directed in January 1793, to join the expedition of Admiral Truguet, against the neighbouring island of Sardinia. A second battalion was added to his corps, which constituted a part of the land force of the armament. The expedition sailed, the main body under the admiral to attack Cagliari; and the Corsican detachment to make a diversion on the opposite side of the island. Bonaparte, with his militia force, executed his part of the enterprise so far as to get possession of several islets and forts, in the straits of Bonifacio. But the principal attempt under

Tragget having failed, in consequence, as was alleged, of Paoli's machinations, Bonaparte's subordinate success was unavailing. Consequently, he abandoned the positions he had taken, and rembarking his men, returned to Ajaccio; where the spirit and ability which he had displayed were applauded, in spite of the inefficacy of his exertions, and the failure of the expedition.

Paoli, who had for some time given reason to suspect that his former enmity to France was reviving in his mind, was completely alienated by the outrages of the 10th of August and the 3d of September. He had been much caressed in England during his exile, and had conceived admiration for the leading men and principal institutions of that country. His discontent with the state of things in France, exaggerated by these inclinations towards ber enemy, induced him to form a design, and finally to take measures, for separating Corsica from France, and annexing it to the possessions of the crown of England. At length being denounced to the French government by the popular societies of Provence, he was summoned to the bar of the Convention to justify himself, under the penalty of being punished as a traitor. Whatever had been his motives, his conduct, he was conscious, had placed him in a position in which success could alone justify or protect him, even before a temperate tribunal. He declined compliance with the fearful summons, under the pretext of age and infirmity, and then throwing off the mask with which he had hitherto veiled his proceedings, invited the assistance of England, and raised the standard of revolt (5).

Before taking this final step he communicated his intention to Bonaparte, who was already a person of influence in the island, and commanded, as we have seen, a corps of Corsican militia. As he had engaged the personal regard of Paoli, his cooperation was desirable from the double motive of policy and friendship. The Corsican chief was a man of venerable age, imposing appearance, and elegant conversation; skilled in war, and sagacious in government. He discoursed much with his young friend on the distracted state of affairs in France, enlarged on the advantages of Corsican independence, referred to the united efforts of himself and Charles Bonaparte in support of it; and, riding over the ground of their campaigns, pointed out its memorable spots, and explained its military positions. Bonaparte, though pleased with his anecdotes, and probably instructed by his experience, was far from agreeing in

his political conclusions. He admitted that the condition of public affairs in France was frightful; but with his characteristic judgment argued that whatever is violent in degree is short in duration; and urged that, as Paoli was possessed of extensive authority and great influence in the island, it was his province to maintain the laws, and preserve tranquillity, until the fury of the convulsions in France should subside. He added, that Corsica belonged geographically to Italy or France; that religion, language, and position, rendered its cordial union with England impracticable. and that as Italy was insignificant by reason of its subdivisions, the most natural and advantageous connection for Corsica was with France; a connection which, in good policy, no temporary inconvenience should be allowed to disturb, and, in sound patriotism, not even great calamities should be permitted to sever. It was during one of these conversations, that Paoli, struck by the force of Bonaparte's logic, and the dignity of his sentiments. exclaimed-"Oh, Napoleon, you are not a man of modern times: your opinions belong to the men of Plutarch. You will rise to greatness." These expressions, it appears, Paoli often repeated.

Their last and decisive conference took place in the neighbourhood of Corte, a town in the interior, and the ancient capital of the island, the date and tone of which rendered it evident that they must part either as consederates or enemies. Paoli persisted in his shortsighted designs in favour of the English connection; Bonaparte adhered to the country of his father's adoption, and his own birth and allegiance. Their separation shows a remarkable diversity of conduct in two great men disposed to act from honourable motives, and placed on the same stage of affairs. But Paoli had recollections of pride and power to look back upon, which though definite, and converged to the microscopic scene of Corsican history, were magnificent and endearing to the memory His original hostility to France, though soothed and tranquillized by the homage and confidence of the leading men in Paris, had not been converted into hearty attachment. parte, on the contrary, was born a Frenchman, and educated in France; was young, passionate for glory, vivid with hope and talent, and naturally looked forward to the undefined future, and the ample theatre of France, for opportunity and distinction. His professional pride and instinctive feeling were affected, as he says with antipathy for the treasonable project of Paoli, and as

vigorous plants shoot upward to the sun, his genius, which would have been imprisoned in the contracted circuit of his native isle, gravitated towards the important events of France, and the powerful emotions which produced them.

Paoli, persevering in his unjustifiable project of delivering up Corsica to England, temporized with Bonaparte not a moment after this last interview; and accordingly, the latter in retracing his steps towards Ajaccio, found himself surrounded and made prisoner by the partisans of Paoli at a place called Boccognano situated in a pass of the mountains. Escaping by a singular stratagem, he reached Ajaccio, whence, with the assistance of a friend, he succeeded in joining the force which the committee of public safety had by this time assembled at Calvi, under the direction of the representatives of the people, Salicetti and La Combe St. Michael.

A civil war now broke out in the island. Paoli having failed in the attempt, first to mislead Bonaparte's judgment by persuasion. and next to secure his person by force, now resorted to threats, and warned him by letter that, if he continued to support the French authorities, he would treat him and his family as public enemies. This menace being disregarded or defied, the exasperated veteran proceeded to execute it with vengeful severity. The French party was driven from Ajaccio; the house in which Bonaparte was born was given up to pillage, and converted into a barrack for British troops; the farm laid waste, and in the blind impotence of rage and wrong, a decree of banishment was issued against Napoleon and his brother Joseph. Salicetti and St. Michael made several ineffectual descents, in which Bonaparte either commanded or engaged; but the English forces having interposed, and the mountaineers of Paoli joining them in numbers, the French cause was lost in the island.

On one occasion Bonaparte was sent from Calvi to surprise Ajaccio. He embarked in a frigate, and landing on the north side of the gulf with a party of fifty men, took possession of a fort called the Torre di Capitello. He had no sooner carried this point, than the frigate was driven to sea by a gale. While thus insulated and unsupported, the insurgents attacked him with great violence, by land and water. He defended himself with spirit, and with such pertinacity, that he and his heroic little garrison were reduced to rations of horse-flesh. During the siege, he called

out from the walls to a party, and harangued his misguided countrymen in a strain of eloquence so impressive that he made many converts. After five days of conflict and starvation, the frigate returned to her station, and he reembarked, having first partially blown up the fort.

He himself mentions, that in one of his landings, he got a few guns ashore, and with a round or two of grapeshot, dispersed a body of the insurgents who opposed him. They returned to the attack however, and mixed reproaches with their warfare, expressing indignation that he, a Corsican, should be fighting for France. In order to make themselves both seen and heard, they ascended the neighbouring hills, and even mounted up into trees. Bonaparte had a gun loaded with ball, and aimed it so well, that he cutoff a limb on which one of those exclusive patriots was perched. His fall, which created a general laugh, was followed by the instant flight of his party.

These partial efforts, however spirited, were of no avail against the united force of Paoli and the English. The French representatives, accordingly, determined to abandon the contest, and withdraw to France. Bonaparte contrived to communicate with his mother. Under his protection, she withdrew from the storm which overwhelmed Corsica, and sought shelter on the continent, stopping first at Nice, and settling finally in Marseilles, with the dependence of a large family, and the remnant of a small fortune.

This expulsion of his father's family from their home, and of himself with circumstances of odious solemnity, from the place of his birth, was probably the first occasion on which he felt the iron pressure of calamity. The severity of the blow was not lessened by the reflection that it was dealt by the hand of his paternal friend. Yet it neither embittered his affections, nor discouraged his enterprise, nor damped his liberality. After providing for the temporary establishment of his mother, he made immediate preparations for joining his regiment, which was then at Nice. He preserved to the last a warmth of affection for his native isle, and an affectionate respect for Paoli; while the Corsican Phænix, languishing in the cold and compulsive caresses of England (6), expressed paternal joy at the deeds and triumphs of his youthful friend (7).

Before he joined his regiment, his services in several delicate operations, the precise nature of which has not been explained,

were required by general Dugear. This general, who commanded the artillery of the army which, encamped around Nice, was called the army of Italy, although it had never crossed the Alps nor tasted the waters of the Po, had obtained authority from the war department to employ young Bonaparte, upon his return from Corsica.

About this time, the insurrection of Marseilles broke out, a movement consequent upon the arrest of the leaders of the Girondist party, in the Convention, on the 31st of May and 2d of June; and which extended with violence into departments of the south and west. The insurgents of Marseilles organized a force of six thousand men, with which, in order to cooperate with the makeontents of Lyons, they took possession of Avignon, and thereby intercepted the communications of the army of Italy. greatly embarrassed the commanding general, who found his convoys of provision and ammunition seized upon by the insurgents. in the emergency, which threatened to uncover the frontier on the side of Piedmont, the intelligence and address of Bonaparte were relied upon. At the instance of general Dugear, he was despatched on a mission to the insurgents, in order to prevail on them to allow the convoys of the army to pass. He repaired to Marseilles and Avignon, conferred at both places with the leaders of the insurrection, convinced them that it was against their interest, whatever might be their sentiments respecting the convention, to provoke the hostility of the army, and succeeded in persuading them to offer no further interruption to its communications and convoys. From a statement made incidentally by himself it may be gathered, that while he was employed in reasoning with the rebellious leaders at Avignon, general Cartaux appeared before that town, with a body of conventional troops; a display of force which probably lent to, and borrowed from, his arguments, additional weight.

His observations during this excursion, of the weakness, violence, and mismanagement of the insurgents, as well as of their lawless and unattainable objects, furnished the occasion and materials for his "Supper of Beaucaire;" a political essay thrown into the shape of a dialogue, and published during his stay at Marseilles, explaining the causes of the revolution, justifying the motives of its leaders, and deprecating the proceedings of the insurgents. After reminding them of the superiority of disciplined

battalions to untrained multitudes; of light artillery in field operations, to their heavy cannon; and suggesting that, although poor mountaineers or starving peasants might well afford to run the hazard of rebellion, the citizens of an opulent town, stored with the fruits of industry and commerce, had reason to support the authority of government, he warned them that perseverance in their lawless project would result in failure, disgrace, punishment, and misery. Of this piece, the principles and object of which were consistent with the language he held to Paoli, and the conduct he pursued in Corsica, the doctrine was patriotic, the topics persuasive, the reasoning sound, and the style vigorous. It contained no metaphysical cant nor jacobinical violence. The author spoke in the character which he really bore, that of a soldier; and endeavoured to dissuade his countrymen from proceedings, which had the double effect of plunging the nation into civil war, and exposing it to foreign invasion.

His essay was well adapted in time and form, to the occasion. and accordingly is represented to have contributed in no small degree, to allay the violence, and restrain the misdirection, of the popular excitement, by which the army he belonged to was annoyed. This useful production, although it deserved to be remembered and preserved, he cast upon the tide of events, and after it had answered its purpose, abandoned to oblivion. was recovered at a riper season of his fortune and judgment, by those who prized it as a plume from the eagle's wing. neither the discretion of his patriotism, nor the fastidiousness of his taste, was to be disarmed by flattery. He justly argued, that a work composed expressly for the crisis of a civil war, and bearing the weight of his name, would be out of season, and probably mischievous, in time of domestic concord; and doubtless felt that a hasty and juvenile pamphlet, might add nothing to his mature and majestic fame. Influenced by these considerations he directed, it is said, the work to be suppressed.

These special duties, upon which he was employed by the order, or at the instance of general Dugear, by separating him from the army of Italy, until the month of August, prevented his taking part in the two unfortunate actions with the Sardinians, of which, while he would have been exposed to the danger, the extreme subordination of his rank, could hardly have afforded him the opportunity of altering the issue.

It was during this visit to Marseilles, that he became acuainted with the family of M. Clary, a rich banker. His broter Joseph married, a few months after, one of the daughters, and he himself seems to have paid rather flattering attentions to eather, who subsequently became the wife of Bernadotte, and now the queen of Sweden (8).

CHAPTER UI.

From August 1793, to March 1794.

Siege of Toulon-That place betrayed to lord Hood-Situation of Toulon-Strength of the allied garrison - Measures of the committee of public safety - Their plan for the siege - Bonaparte chief of battalion - Appointed to command the artillery of the siege-General Cartaux - Bonaparte's plan - Rejected by Cartaux-Folly of that general-Vigour and activity of Bonaparte-Council of war-Bonaparte's plan adopted-Its execution commenced - Little Gibraltar - Battery of the convention -Mischievous interference of the deputies-Sally and capture of General O'Hara - General Doppet - His cowardice and incapacity - General Dugommier—His courage and experience—Discouragement of the besiegers— Confidence of Bonaparte — His batteries play on little Gfbraltar — Advises the storming that place - Little Gibraltar carried by assault - Bravery of the garrison - Swaggering of the deputies - The allied squadrons we anchor-The town, forts, and barbour plundered and evacuated-T French fleet, arsenal, and magazines set on fire - Dreadful conflagration -Distress of the Toulenese-Anecdotes - Junot-Humanity of Bonaparte -Duroc-Affection and admiration of Dugommier for Bonaparte-Bonaparte brigadier general - Is ordered to join the army of Italy - Prescribes a system of fortifications for the coast - His horror of the cruelty of a mob — His respect for the memory of Gasparin, and of Dugommier.

HITHERTO, the genius of Bonaparte had been manifested chiefly in the shade of schools, the confidence of friendship, or the circles of society, by brilliant but aimless flashes, which disappeared like meteors bursting in the air. An event now occurred, which was to be the occasion of elevating him permanently to public view, and of displaying the strength and lustre of his mind, while dealing a decisive blow in his country's defence.

The overthrow and arrest of the Girondists in the convention, events which, as was before observed, took place on the 31st May and the 2nd June, 1793, were the occasion of popular disturb-

ances in the south of France. Lyons and Marseilles became the seats of open insurrection, which spreading to the neighbouring towns, resulted in the treason of Toulon, and in the delivery of that superb naval station, with its forts, fleets, crews, arsenals, magazines, and stores, to a combined English and Spanish squadron then blockading it, under lord Hood. Having negotiated successfully with the malcontents, and effected an understanding with the naval officer in command of the port, this Admiral took possession of Toulon on the 29th of August, in the name and on behalf of Louis XVII (1).

This disaster was felt by the French nation, as the most severe and shameful calamity of the war. Their chief naval force and finest station on the Mediterranean, were delivered up to their most powerful maritime foe. To England and her allies, was surrendered by French citizens, with an immense squadron, an apparently inexpugnable position, in the heart of a strong and populous country, deeply infected by a rebellious spirit, and partially in arms against the national government. The flag of France it was naturally apprehended, would be exiled from the Mediterranean, and her extensive coast on that sea, exposed to all the evils which the arms and intrigues of her inveterate enemies and emigrant princes could inflict, by civil war or foreign invasion. The pride and the safety of the nation both required instantaneous and strenuous exertions for the recovery of Toulon. On this occasion the government could but feel like the people; and the deputies composing the committee of public safety, which had not as yet failed in daring plans and energetic measeres, bent the whole force of their means and counsels to the important task. But their preparations however prompt, and their efforts however earnest, seemed not commensurate with the difficulties of the crisis.

General Cartaux, having succeeded in suppressing the insurrection of Marseilles, was ordered to advance with a column of
eight thousand men from that side against Toulon, whilst general
La Poype with six thousand drawn from the army of Italy, was
directed to approach it from the east. The former general was
attended by the deputies Albits, Salicetti, and Gasparin; the latter
by Fréron and Barras, who having escaped from the malcontents
of Toulon, had taken refuge with the army of Italy. With these
were speedily, associated Ricord and the younger Robespierre,

who had been attached to the army of the Alps. These preliminary measures could only be expected to annoy the enemy, and straiten their communications with the surrounding country, until vigorous and decisive operations could be undertaken.

Toulon is situated at the head of a capacious harbour, stretching in a southern direction, to the sea; and at the foot of the mountains of Pharon, which recede in successive ridges to the north. It formed thus the middle point of an extensive barrier, which separated the two divisions of the French army, rendering their communication difficult, and cooperation precarious.

The allies on the other hand held their force collected, possessed the power of directing it entire against either division of the besiegers, occupied the fortifications of the town, the line of forts on both sides of the harbour, and the works and passes in the adjacent mountains. Their fleet, which covered the harbour, commanded the Mediterranean, and enabled them to collect reenforcements and supplies from all quarters. Detachments of Spanish, Sardinian, and Neapolitan troops were speedily brought to their aid; and lieutenant-general O'Hara, an officer who had been distinguished under lord Cornwallis in the American war, and was at the time governor of Gibraltar, arrived with a reenforcement of British troops, and took command of the allied forces, amounting, exclusively of a formidable fleet, a population of twenty thousand inhabitants, and bodies of insurgents from Marseilles and other disaffected towns, to fourteen thousand men (2).

A garrison thus strong, supported and supplied, felt little apprehension from the divided and inconsiderable forces of Cartaux and La Poype. Accordingly, lord Hood, after disarming the French fleet, manning the fortifications of the town, and occupying the forts which protected the harbour, as well as the various mountain passes contiguous to Toulon, employed himself in fitting out a squadron of four French ships of the line, with French crews and royalist commanders, which he sent round to Brest and Rochefort, with the double object of reducing the strength of the French force in Toulon, and of spreading treason and exciting revolt along the Atlantic frontier of France(3).

But the committee of public safety, were busy in concerting preparations, on a scale of adequate extent and vigour. By their direction, general D'Arçon, an engineer of high reputation, in conjunction with the board of ordnance at Paris, drew up a

plan for the conduct of the siege, which presdrihed a series of regular approaches against the town, a succession of attacks against the surrounding forts, and the erection of works of protection. against the broadsides of the fleet. It also required the former tion and supply of an army of sixty thousand men, at a time when men and money were of difficult collection, and in the midst of a disaffected and exhausted country. Thus operose, regular, and progressive, the plan of the government promised success, only . at the expense of much time and toil, and proceeded on the direct and obvious system of warfare; that of employing a greater portion of physical force in the attack of a given position, than can, be exerted in its defence. However unexceptionable it might be, therefore, in a technical point of view, this ministerial plan for the siege of Toulon, was not adapted to the critical nature of the eperation, nor to the urgency of public affairs. But the choice mander for the artillery of the siege, though a matter, shtless, of secondary importance in the eyes of the functionaries who made it, was destined to supply the defects, and compensate the errors, of their means and calculations.

Shortly after his successful negotiation with the insurgents of Marseilles, Bonaparte had been promoted to the rank of chief of battalion (4); and some occasion requiring such a mission, he was sent by general Brunet, the commander of the army of Italy, with written despatches, and verbal communications, to Paris, The committee of public safety was employed, in organizing a force for reducing Toulon, and had required of the committee of ordnance the designation of a regular officer, well qualified for commanding the artillery of the siege. It was the humour of the time to overlook age and rank, in search of zeal and talent, as in the cases of Hoche and Marceau. The decided patriotism of Bosuperte was evinced by his writings, and signalised by his firm opposition to Paoli. Of his professional abilities and personal merit, the files of the war-office, furnished ample testimony, which his reputation in the garrisons and corps he had served with, completely sustained. These facts, enforced by the pressure of public danger, arrested the attention of the committees, and determined their choice in his favour. Neither interest, patronage, intrigue, nor solicitation, was employed. His own merit was his sole recommendation to a post, in which that merit was to become conspicuous.

Having received his orders, he left the capital without delay, and reached the head quarters of the besieging army, on the 12th of September.

General Cartaux was a painter of Paris, who by popular caprice and accidental success, had been raised from the adjutancy of a municipal battalion to the chief command of a regular army; being thrust by the force of these causes, in one day's advancement, through the degrees of brigadier and major general. He had the ignorance incidental to this career, and the presumption natural to that ignorance.

When the young commander of the artillery, presented himself to this aspiring dignitary, whom he found glittering in lace and embroidery, he was told, in accents of disdainful benevolence, that although his services would not be required in the recovery of Toulon, he was welcome to share in the glory of the operation! He was invited to sup that evening with the general, and early the next morning, to accompany him in visiting the posts of the besiegers, who were preparing, he was informed, to open a cannonade, which was to burn the allied squadrons. His astonishment may be conceived, at finding that the few guns which had been awkwardly mounted, were at least two gunshots from the harbour, and that the balls which were destined to destroy the fleet, were sent to be heated in the neighbouring country houses. as if their reconveyance was likely to be easy, or their glow unremitting. A suggestion of the last mentioned difficulty, having somewhat perplexed the general and his staff officers, the commander of the artillery proposed, that a few cold balls should be fired in order to see, whether the hot shot when produced, would be within point blank range. After some difficulty the experiment was made, and the balls fell half way short of the mark. A Upon this, the general found fault with the powder, and execrated the aristocrats, for having purposely damaged it. This excessive ignorance prevailing at head-quarters, was owing as much to the great emigration of the well educated officers, as to the inconsiderate manner in which demagogues and their retainers had been appointed in their places. In the midst of the confusion, the deputy Gasparin rode up to the spot. Being a man of sense, zeal, and of some military experience, he was readily convinced of the absurdity of the measures in progress, and of the propriety of confiding to the commander of the artillery, the uncontrolled

direction of the siege. With this view, he desired Cartesia to issue direction of the general conduct of the operation, leaving the details to be devised and executed by Bonaparte; a request, which the general complied with, in the following fulminating order. "The commander of the artillery will batter the town with that and shells, for and during three days, at the end of which time, I will attack in the columns, and carry the place." Such was the state of affairs—so ill disposed and desperate on the part of the French, so formidable and encouraging, on that of the English—when Bonaparte joined the army of Cartaux.

It may be proper to remind the reader, that he had but just completed his twenty-fourth year, and with exception of the slight and unsuccessful service in which he had been engaged in Corsica, was totally inexperienced in war; that the means of attack which he was to direct, or cooperate with, were slender and separated, while the resistance to be overcome was formidable and united, consisting of a fortified town, a powerful attacken, a defended harbour, connected forts, and mountain these. These, as they had been hitherto regarded, whether by the scientist plan of D'Arçon, or the ridiculous order of Cartaux, and been considered, simply, as a mass of obstruction, presenting a certain force of registance, which could be overcome only by the application of greater force; and under the obvious view of converging the means of attack upon the place is dispute, that is apparathe town itself, contemplating this as the cardinal point of attack point of the position.

Dut Bonaparte, though thus young, inexperienced, and sublighted, had no sooner cast over the ground, that glance which the direct the current of future battles; had no sooner looked thinnd upon the fortifications, the harbour and the fleet, than he penetrated the complexity of the position, and traced the relation of its component parts. He discovered at once, that the point to be attacked; that, in a military view, it was a dependent resistion, instead of being the essential one. Perceiving that the hethour was divided by two opposite and approaching promonties, into the outer or great road, and the inner or little road, and that the western promontory was crowned by an eminence, he comprehended instantly, that batteries established on the

pletely both roads, and either destroy the hostile fleet, or drive it out to sea; and that, in either case, Toulon must be abandoned or surrendered. This fine conception, which, considering his want of acquaintance with the ground and of military experience, could only be the offspring of the highest genius, he immediately communicated to general Cartaux, recommending at the same time the occupation with a force of three thousand men, of the eminence in question, which as yet the English commander had neglected. But general Cartaux could not comprehendits importance.nor the probability of reducing Toulon, by taking up a position so remote from it. Yet with that perverseness of incapacity which omits all the good, and does all the mischief practicable in a given case, he sent general Laborde with four hundred men to take possession of the promontory; a measure which had the effect of apprising the enemy of its value, causing Laborde to be dislodged, and the position to be seized upon and fortified by the English commander. Bonaparte's suggestion, which was above rules, being thus worse than disregarded, the toilsome plan of approaches against the town, which was according to rules. was persisted in.

The commandant of the artillery it appears, did not on this act count relent in his zeal; but was as bold and skilful in executing the project of others, as he had been prompt and sagacious in the invention of his own. His first care was to select and employ of ficers, upon whose zeal and capacity he could place reliance. Among these were Muiron, whom he made his adjutant, and his former comrade at Valence, Gassendi, whom he placed in command of the arsenal at Marseilles, from which his military incl plies were to be drawn. His next object was to collect a park artillery; and so active and well directed were his exertions; 1 in less than six weeks, he had two hundred guns, completely furnished. Urging on the operations, he advanced his batteries placed them on the most advantageous points, and opened a fire so effective, that he soon dismasted several ships of the lines burned some smaller vessels, and forcing the squadron to withdraw to a distant part of the harbour, relieved his batteries from its broadsides, and broke ground yet nearer to the enemy.

Referring to this operation some years afterwards he observed
—"With six twenty-four pounders, two furnaces for heating
balls, and forty cannoneers, I contended for fo days against the

Registrand Spenish squadrons and after purpling one frigate and several bomb ketches forced them to draw off (5)."

Still-le was not free from the interference of general Cartaux, and the embarrassments of his ignorance. On one occasion, his limited insisted on his planting a battery against the walk of a limit where there was no room for the guns to recoil; on another, upon an insulated hillock, which, as he alleged, would enable him to fire on several forts at once. Nor was he convinced of the felly of this order, by the deservation that, if this point was in spach of these forts, it would be exposed to their concentrated fire. At this period of the siege, there can be little doubt that; had the English commander acted on the offensive and assailed with his whole force, either division of the French army, he must have succeeded in relieving the place. He however remained of the defensive contenting himself with manning and strengthening the fortifications, and gave time for reenforcements to the besiegers.

sparte, while engaged in executing a plan which he could Eapprove, thus submitting the inspiration of his own mind to the yoke of inferior judgments, and in obviating the blunders of a general whom he could but despise, exhibited a degree of soldiership and gallantry, which gained the attachment of the men. He elept by his guns, assisted in aiming them, was present whereever danger appeared, headed parties in taking ground in advance, foremost in repelling the enemy's sallies. The troops d up to him with admiration, and regarded him as their general, calling out for the commander of the artillery, whenwas attack was determined on, or a sortie was apprehended. **Le had thus secured the devotion of the army, and the good** ion of the deputy Gasparin, when, on the 15th of October, deputies convened a council of war, for the purpose of deliting on the plan of the siege, which had been sent down by overnment, and of deciding whether it should be executed brackions on the west or the east side of the harbour. council, of which Gasparin was president, and Cartaux and Bomembers, decided at once, that the principal operations of the siege should be prosecuted on the west side of the harbour; her were greatly embarrassed when they came to consider the disproportion of their force, to that which the plan of general Martin acquired. It was then that the young commander of artillery submitted to the council the suggestion which he had previously made to general Cartaux, and explained the certainty of its success, even with the means already at their command. He showed that the position on the western promontory commanded the entire harbour; that batteries erected on it would force lord. Hood, either to abandon the garrison to an unavoidable surrender, or to withdraw it; and that consequently the time, the expense, and the army, necessary to the success of the ministerial plan, might, in a great measure, be dispensed with. He expressed his conviction that the garrison would be withdrawn, rather than abandoned, and concluded by assuring the council, that in two days after they should get possession of the promontory, Toulon would be in their power.

Though clearly stated, and cogently explained, his proposition was not received without much hesitation, nor adopted without long discussion. It was hard to turn the minds of men, suddenly, from a direct to an indirect mode of attack; or to make them believe, that so simple a measure as taking possession of the height alluded to, would be attended by such important and decisive consequences as were assigned to it by the commander of the artillery. When at length, upon the earnest recommendation of Gasparin, is was adopted, it was only in the light of a preliminary and partial operation, and in consequence of the statement of the engineers, that the occupation of the promontory would effect a blockade. an operation indispensable, according to the maxims of their art, to a regular siege. This was the opinion of general Marescot, who was then a major of engineers, and did not participate in the grand and confident inferences of Bonaparte. Perhaps invention in so young a man, and instruction from a subordinate officer, were not acceptable to men of higher rank or greater pretensions. Probably the result of the proposed measure was less evident then, than it seems now. But, at any rate, an operation which was decisive and final was resolved upon only as an incipient

Before however this resolution was taken, the English general, become apprized of the importance of this position, had constructed on it a fortress, consisting of a main work with the flanking redoubts, which was rendered so strong and complete, that although it was named fort Mulgrave, it was called Little 1

was unanimous.

conducive one. Considered in this point of view, the vote for it

Gibraltar. It was defended by three thousand chosen troops, with forty-four pieces of heavy artillery. The officer in command of it, considering his post impregnable, derided the demonstrations of the French, exclaiming—"If they take this fort, then I'll turn Jacobin."

Bonaparte who had in vain urged Cartaux to reenforce Laborde, and drive the allies from this important point before they were firmly established, was even at this late stage of the contest, of a different opinion from the British commander, and commenced his operations against it, with that energy which confidence inspires. He ordered six batteries of twenty-four pounders, and platforms for fifteen mortars, to be raised immediately against Little Gibraltar, and at the same time, directed a battery of eight twenty-four pounders and four mortars, to be constructdagainst Fort Malbosquet; astrong, though less formidable work, situated higher up the harbour. To render this latter operation noreefficient, he selected a position for his guns, which was masind by a clump of olives; and directed that the fire of this battery should not be opened, until his attack on Little Gibraltar, should be commenced; so that the effect might be augmented by surprise. It happened however that, before this proper time arrived, the representatives of the people visited this work, which was called the battery of the convention. From the cannoniers they learned it had been finished for eight days, and that, although it was expected to do great execution, no use had as yet been made of it. In perfect ignorance of what they were about, these deputies, without consulting the chief of the artillery, ordered a fire from his battery to be instantly commenced; an order which the gunners with alacrity obeyed.

General O'Hara was greatly surprised at this sudden attack on one of his principal defences, and feeling the importance of ridding himself of so serious an annoyance, prepared for storming this battery next morning. Accordingly, about an hour before day, he sallied out at the head of a column of six thousand men (6), and succeeded without much difficulty, in carrying the battery, and paing the guns. The alarm meanwhile was sounded at head parters. General Dugommier, the new commander, rallied the troops, who, having been disposed in line, were not capable of rithstanding, on the sudden, so heavy a column. Bonaparte, the directing several field pieces to be turned against O'Hara's

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force, which threatened, by its farther advance, his grand park near the pass of the Ollioules, hastened to an eminence, on which he had established a depot of ordnance, and from which, an arm of the trench communicated with the captured battery. Behind this eminence was stationed a battalion of infantry, and with this, he determined to make a vigourous attack on the enemy. He led his party along the trench unperceived, and emerging from it behind a screen of brambles, surprised O'Hara by a close and destructive fire. His attack was so spirited, and the surprise so complete, that the Neapolitain troops fled, as if they had been assailed by overwhelming numbers; while the English officers supposed that a party of their own men, in the obscurity of the morning, were firing by mistake. The panic of one party, and the confidence of the other, were equally unfounded. General O'Hara himself, under this false impression, advanced for the purpose of stopping the fire, when he was wounded in the hand with a musket ball, and taken by a French sergeant, who pulled him suddenly down into the trench. Thus it happened, that the commander in chief of the allies, was a prisoner to Bonaparte, while his own troops were ignorant of his fate, and while the French general was unaware that Bonaparte was engaged. In this conflict, he received a bayonet thrust in the left thigh, which, though a serious flesh wound, he did not suffer to withdraw him from duty in the trenches.

General Dugommier having brought up the reserves, had now taken a position which threatened to intercept the retreat of the sallying party. Already disconcerted by the vigour of Bonaparte's attack, this movement threw them into confusion. The English followed the example of the Neapolitans, and fled in the utmost confusion. They were pursued to the walls of the town, which they entered, not more discouraged by the unexpected failure of their sally, than by the strange disappearance of their general. The allied officers, who had already become jealous of the English commanders, and suspicious of their good faith, expressed an apprehension that general O'Hara had given himself up to the enemy, for the purpose of negotiating an advantageous surrender of the place. Thus internal discord was added to the military disasters of this abortive sally.

The French on the contrary had reason to exult. The commander of the artillery who, by energy and promptness, had repaired the mischief occasioned by the folly of the deputies, had offered the chief opposition, and occasioned the principal loss, to the enemy. In consequence he was promoted to the rank of colonel.

Previously to this affair, the incapacity of Cartaux had become so evident as to cause his removal, and the committee of public safety had given the command of the siege to general Doppet; a physician, who had been thrown up from noisy insignificance to military rank, by the whirls and eddies of popular excitement, and at the siege of Lyons had obtained a reputation, which concealed for a moment his real demerit. To the faults of ignorance he added the vices of cowardice and envy. His arrival, which soon made the army regret the departure of Cartaux, was near being followed by an event equally surprising, and more momentous. The French troops on duty in the trenches before Little Gibraltar, had one of their comrades taken by a Spanish company on guard in the fort. This unfortunate prisoner, the Spaniards beat and abused in sight of his brother soldiers, whom, at the same time, they insulted by provoking shouts and indecent gestures. Irritated beyond endurance, the French, by a spontaneous impulse, resembling such as we read of in the Roman legions, seized their arms, and in a paroxysm of fury, rushed to the assault. Bonaparte, whose vigilance let nothing escape his observation, hastened to report this affair to the general, and saying, as the wine was drawn, it was better to drink it, assured him it would be more difficult to draw off the troops in safety, than to follow up the attack with success. Doppet consented: the reserve was put in motion, and Bonaparte at its head. But while he was in the act of moving to the support of the assailants, who, having driven in the enemy's light troops and reached the gorge, were on the point of forcing their way into the body of the work, an aide-de-camp of the general was killed by his side. At so dangerous a symptom, the doctor was panic struck, and instantly retiring, ordered This palpable poltroonery could not but rouse the They complained aloud, that, instead of indignation of the men. having generals to lead them to victory, they were thwarted and disgraced by painters and doctors. In consequence, the committee recalled Doppet, and felt at last the necessity of employing a military man. Their choice fell upon general Dugommier, a veteran with the scars of fifty campaigns, and a courage as well-tempered as his own good sword (7).

The garrison being strengthened by fresh supplies and frequent reenforcements, the hopes of the besiegers began to decline, and the dissatisfaction of the public to be manifest. The prudence of directing the chief operations against a remote and apparently unimportant work, was again denied, and the necessity of turning their principal efforts against the town itself, loudly insisted on. The popular societies denounced the ill-directed and tardy progress of the siege, in terms of crimination, which the people of Provence, distressed by famine, reechoed. Even the deputies became alarmed; and Fréron and Barras, although in the council of war they had concurred in the qualified adoption of Bonaparte's plan, now despaired of its success, and wrote to the committee of public safety, proposing that the siege be abandoned and the army withdrawn to the strong and plentiful country north of the Durance. This counsel they enforced by observing that after constant operations of three months, Toulon was not yet even attacked; that the garrison was receiving strong and constant accessions; that, in all probability, the besiegers would soon be compelled to retreat with precipitation; whereas, it was now in their power to retire in good order and without loss. To this, they added that the English would be placed under the necessity of providing sustenance for the population of Provence during the winter; and that, in the approaching spring, the army, recruited, refreshed, and supplied, could undertake the siege with renewed vigour and every prospect of success. Happily for the safety of France, before this sinister counsel had time to make an impression at Paris, Toulon was in possession of the French army.

In this season of dejection and discontent, when the chief authorities themselves were blind to the efficacy of the operations in progress, the commander of the artillery remained unshaken in his opinion and unceasing in his activity. Repeating to General Dugommier the assurance which he had given his predecessors, that, to take Toulon, it was only necessary to carry Little Gibraltar, and infusing his confidence into those around him, he pushed on the works with unabated vigour. On the 14th December, when his batteries were ready, he opened a rolling fire of round shot and shells from thirty twenty-four pounders and fifteen mortars upon that fortress, and maintained it incessantly, for sixty hours. The guns being well posted and well aimed, the cannonade was destructive. The enemy's pieces were dismount-

ed, their palisades destroyed, their bastions demolished, and their men forced to withdraw from the fort and take shelter behind the crest of the hill.

Bonaparte, attentive to the effect of his fire, perceiving that the time for an assault had arrived, proposed preparing for that final operation. The deputies consented, and midnight of the 17th, was fixed on for the attack. But when the moment approached the rain fell in such torrents, that General Dugommier was inclined to defer the assault twenty-four hours longer. At this suggestion, the deputies manifested both impatience and indignation, and protesting against it, offered, in a conference with Bonaparte, to suspend Dugommier, and confer the chief command upon him (8). He refused to supplant his gallant general, but undertook to convince him that the rain was not an obstacle to success, as the bayonet was the weapon to be chiefly employed; and apprising him of the extreme discontent of the deputies, prevailed upon him not to delay the assault. Accordingly the infantry and reserves were moved forward to a position in attacking distance, and every preparation for the onset made. But now the deputies, either grown cautious from the approach of danger, or wishing to shift the responsibility of failure from themselves to the general, or deterred by the arguments of certain officers, who contended that the place could not be stormed. proposed calling a council of war, and deliberating afresh on the propriety of an attack. But Dugommier had become as determined as Bonaparte. He rejected their proposal, ridiculed their doubts, and refused to hesitate a moment longer. Dividing his force into two columns, he himself took command of the first, and placed the second under the conduct of Bonaparte. this order, supported by light parties on their flanks, they advanced through rain and darkness to the assault.

As it was known that the body of the garrison was sheltered behind the hill, the assailants hoped to reach the fort unperceived and unresisted, and to force an entrance without much opposition. But in this conjecture they were deceived; for the English commander had stationed a dense line of light troops at the foot of the eminence, who receiving the leading column of the French with a volley of small arms, recalled the garrison to their guns. Their fire, which was rapid and constant, was chiefly of grape shot, and did great execution. After a dubious and

bloody struggle, the brave Dugommier, who had at one time forced his way into the work, was driven back. In despair, and expecting to expiate on the scaffold misfortune in the field, the aged warrior exclaimed, "I am a lost man."

Rallying the fugitives, Bonaparte, whose horse had been killed under him, and who was severely bruised by the fall, pushed forward undismayed by his leader's repulse, prompt to revenge, and skilful to retrieve it. Perceiving that the enemy continued their fire directly in front, he detached a battalion of light troops under Captain Muiron, who was well acquainted with the ground; ordering him to ascend the hill circuitously and under cover of certain inequalities in its surface. Muiron conducted his party, so adroitly that he reached the fort undiscovered, and rushing in through an embrasure with a small party, threw the garrison Bonaparte, who followed in supporting disinto confusion. tance, and had been joined by Dugommier in person, attacked with his column at this critical moment, and overpowering all resistance, carried the fort. The garrison though vanguished was not disgraced; the English and Spanish cannoncers vied with each other in valour and pertinacity, and, resisting to the last, were cut down to a man at their guns. Bonaparte was slightly wounded; Muiron, Victor, and Laborde severely. The enemy being reenforced from the two fortifications at the foot of the hill, made three spirited attempts to retake the important post, but their own guns were turned against them, and they were repulsed with considerable slaughter. Their loss including prisoners exceeded two thousand men; that of the French in killed and wounded amounted to one thousand. About three hours after Dugommier and Bonaparte were in quiet possession of Little Gibraltar, the deputies, who had first encouraged, and then dissuaded the assault, came gallantly forward sword in hand, lavishing praise, with the warmth of witnesses and the confidence of fellow labourers, upon the victorious troops. This swaggering was contemptible; but the vanity, assentation, and injustice which followed it, were infamous.

The commander of the artillery, having thus gained the position to the possession of which he attached such decisive consequence, lost no time in employing its advantages, and bringing his plan of proceeding to the test of experiment. At the dawn of day, he directed an attack to be made upon l'Eguillette, and Balaguier, as

the forts at the two extreme points of the promontory were called. These though they were commanded by Little Gibraltar, more immediately commanded the two roads, and menaced the fleet, than even that fortress itself did. Their garrisons however evacuated these places without waiting to be driven out, as they must have been by the guns of Little Gibraltar. Bonaparte then ordered up the heavy artillery from his own batteries with a view of mounting them in l'Eguillette and Balaguier, of closing the communication between the two roads, and opening a fire upon the allied squadrons, which were now in their turn blockaded. But upon examining the works he discovered that they were constructed of masonry, and that close in front of each was a tower serving for a lodgment and a redoubt. These towers were also of stone, and so incommodiously situated that rebounding shot and splintering stones would glance from them upon the gunners in the forts. He therefore determined, at the emense of a delay of some hours, to throw up batteries of earth on the surface of the hill. In the mean time he was so confident of success that he said to Dugommier, and repeated to the officers-"Tomorrow night, or the night after, you shall sleep in Toulon."

But already began to be manifested the efficiency of his plan of operations, and the magnitude of its results. Lord Hood had no soonerdiscovered that the fortsonthe summit and at the base of the promontory were in possession of the French, than he made signal to the fleet to weigh anchor and get out to sea. A council of war assembled in Toulon, at which, it is said, he proposed an instant and powerful effort to recover possession of Little Gibraltar, and the fortified points which it commanded. This proposition, which did credit to his spirit, was rejected by a majority of the council, who decided that the place, being no longer tenable, should be immediately abandoned.

In the course of the evening the evacuation was commenced, in the midst of increasing dismay and confusion. Although the allies had obtained possession of Toulon upon the assurance of protecting its inhabitants, and of preserving and restoring its vast military and marine establishments, sensible of their danger and of their force, but forgetful of their faith and honour, they resolved to carry off as prizes whatever ships they could get to sea, to burn the rest, to destroy the forts and arsenals, and then to convey into banishment such of the citizens as had been tempted by

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the promise of Lord Hood, into a degree of guilt which exposed them to the utmost rigour of justice, and had been plunged by its violation, into a depth of responsibility, which placed them beyond the reach of mercy. Orders for destroying the fleet and arsenals were given accordingly; and their execution entrusted to the conrage and activity of sir Sidney Smith. But the French army was approaching on all sides. General La Povpe had got possession of fort Pharon; Bonaparte from the promontory which he had stormed, and from Malbosquet which the English had abandoned, was throwing hot shot and shells into the harbour and the town; and the rapacity of the allies, unallayed by considerations of justice or humanity, was restrained by their fears. Many of the ships, most of the arsenals, and the principal fortifications were preserved. The French galley slaves broke their chains and extinguished the English fires. Four ships of the line and several frigates were loaded with stores and carried off; nine ships and four frigates were burnt; but thirteen ships which had been dismantled, were left undestroyed in the harbour. The allied fleet, eager for pillage and intent to escape, offered but a tardy refuge to the distracted inhabitants, who hurried in the midnight conflagration to the wharfs, and rushed into the boats, as they were directed by chance, or driven by terror. Suddenly the floating magazines which had been fired, not sunk, exploded with a shock and a glare that illumed and suspended the surrounding horrors. But Bonaparte soon revived his cannonade and continued it with fury throughout the night. Some of the English ships were injured, and several boats loaded with emigrants were sunk. After a night of terror, violence, and confusion, the hostile squadrons were seen at day break just clearing the harbour, freighted with plunder, ignominy, and grief.

Lord Hood, who was the principal agent in this transaction, sacrificed to the passions of his government, the honour of his flag. The rage and rapine of his last hold upon Toulon, threw a dark colouring on his cautious entrance, and his hasty retreat; aggravating the insidious aspect of the first, and giving a corsair appearance to the second. In this spirit, the war, in which Bonaparte had now effectually entered, was commenced by the allies, and in the same spirit it was concluded.

The joy of the public at the event of the siege, was the greater. because the success was unexpected. The people classed it with the greatest triumphs of the republic, and, a proceeding upprecedented in the history of France, it was celebrated in conformity with a decree of the Convention, by a national festival of careful ostentation and elaborate pomp. But neither in the report of the deputies, nor in the solemnity of the Convention. was the name of the real captor of Toulon even mentioned. merit, though slighted, could not be suppressed. General Dugommier, upon reading the minutes of Lord Hood's council of war, which that assembly had left behind, was lost in wonder at the precision with which the proceedings of the enemy had corresponded with the conclusions of Bonaparte. His admiration was increased by the reflection that, as he owed the capture of Toulon to the skill of that officer, so he was indebted to his disinterestedness for the command of the siege. Therefore he not only included his name in a list of officers whom he recommended for promotion, but assured the committee of public safety, that, his merit and talents were so great, that, if he was neglected by the government, he would advance himself. The officers confessed his excellence, the soldiers were loud in his praise, and the clubs of Marseilles extolled his services; so that military candour and popular feeling counteracted the silence of the deputies, and the indifference of the government. Even Madame Cartaux, who had witnessed the altercations between the general and Bonaparte, applauded those talents which made the folly of her lord more conspicuous. At a public entertainment, she praised the young officer of artillery, and observed that he had too much sense to be a sans culotte. "Then," said the indignant husband, "we must be blockheads, all of us." "Not at all," replied the lady; "I don't pretend to say that; but he is not one of your class, that you may be sure of."

Bonaparte appears to have been indifferent to the praise, and insensible to the neglect of which he was the object. But he doubtless felt great satisfaction at vindicating the safety and reputation of his country, and at imbodying, in an exploit so useful and glorious, a ray of that genius whose untried force and impatient consciousness, he had felt amid the clouds of fortune, and the fluctuations of hope.

Anecdotes of his personal conduct have been related, which repetition can hardly render trite. On one occasion, when he was superintending the erection of a battery under the enemy's

fire, being anxious to despatch an order, he called for the attendance of a soldier who could write. A handsome young sergeant stepped forward, and, resting the paper on the parapet, wrote as he dictated. A ball struck the parapet, covering the amanuensis and his paper with earth. "Very good," coolly remarked the sergeant, "we shall not want sand this time." The eye and favour of Bonaparte were attracted by a courage thus playful on the brink of death, and the unknown sergeant was transformed eventually into general Junot, governor of Paris, and Duke of Abrantes.

Soon afterwards, while throwing up works against Little Gibraltar, the besiegers were exposed to a destructive fire, which was so fatal at a particular battery, that the gunners refused to stand by it. It was of importance to serve these gund; since, however exposed, they were in a position to do great execution. Bonaparte neither punished nor reproached his men, but, resorting to that magic by which genius subjects to its authority the impulses of mankind, directed his favourite sergeant to post up conspicuously above the deserted guns a card with these words: "The battery of men without fear!" The appeal flew electrically through the ranks, and the soldiers, instead of avoiding the dangerous post, contended for the honour of serving at it. To confirm their spirit, the commander of the artillery took his station upon this battery, and ordered "the men without fear" to open their fire. Thus out of discouragement he created heroism.

So great was the slaughter at this post that one of the guns was left without its complement of men. Bonaparte seized the rammer of an artilleryman who had just fallen, and assisted in loading and firing repeatedly; and thus contracted a cutaneous complaint, with which the poor soldier had been affected. By unskilful treatment its tendency to the surface was repelled, with effects from which his constitution was not perfectly relieved, until after his Italian campaigns, when he was able to take the advice of Corvisart.

The milder virtues of justice and humanity he also displayed at Toulon. When the besieging army entered that place it was attended by the deputies, two of whom, Fréron and Barras, had been compelled to fly when it was delivered up to the public enemy, and consequently were disposed to exceed in their pun-

ishments the ordinary rigour of the Convention. The popular societies and volunteer companies of the surrounding country and neighbouring towns, soon followed, with tempers averse to mercy or moderation. But when the destruction of public property came to be viewed in all its extent of vastation; when the remains of the magazines, the ruins of the forts, the halfburnt arsenals and half-saved ships, were seen yet smoking with hostile fire; when it was considered that the traitors of Toulon had given up to the enemies of their country, property which belonged to all France; which fed her pride, nourished her strength, and contributed to her safety; and when the troops beheld or remembered the number of their dead and wounded comrades; then indeed were the army and the people excited to furious indignation and unqualified revenge. A revolutionary tribunal was established by the deputies for the punishment, rather than the trial, of offenders. But it was found that the principal agents in the treason had fled with the allies. who remained, few were culpable but in a venial degree. Nevertheless upwards of a hundred victims were selected and sentenced to be shot. General Dugommier discountenanced this ill-directed severity, and Bonaparte lost the favour, and braved the resentment of the government, by refusing to order the execution of the sentence, which was carried into effect by a detachment of the revolutionary militia.

Thus the wretched Toulonese suffered not only for the crime of their fellow-citizens and their own guilt, but for the bad faith of the allies. A melancholy but wholesome example of that retribution which awaits those who, in time of war, direct the dagger of the enemy against the bosom of their country. The indiscriminate sacrifice of these unhappy men was doubtless cruel, but every lover of his country must confess, that the popular resentment which overwhelmed them was natural, and that its effects were salutary, as they had a direct tendency to destroy the connection which had been formed, between the foreign enemies of France and her domestic factions (9).

It was at this siege that Bonaparte conceived a regard for Duroc, who rose so high in his confidence and favour. On the same occasion Victor, Suchet, St. Hilaire, and Marescot, first felt that ascendancy which they were destined so often to witness and solong to obev.

In effecting the reduction of Toulon, the commander of the artillery not only performed a most important service at a most critical moment, but, young and subordinate as he was, displayed the qualities of a consummate general; personal intrepidity, professional skill, humanity which neither interest could tempt nor power overawe, efficiency in collecting the means of warfare. and genius in kindling the enthusiasm of the troops, and in detecting in a complex and extended position the true point of These qualities, which rank him with great captains, entitle him to the praise of history; but what is especially memorable in a record of his life, is that sublime judgment which enabled him to foreshow, with perfect accuracy of discernment, the consequences of a proposed operation, in the fears and necessities of the enemy. This crowns the glory of his success at Toulon, and associates it with all his subsequent victories, in which judgment bore so great, and fortune so small, a part.

The account of his conduct at this siege might be deemed unfaithful, were the offer of personal civility to his prisoner, General O'Hara, omitted. "All I ask," replied the latter, "is to be left alone, and to owe nothing to pity," with a dignity of mind, which, though obscured by a surliness of temper, was perceived and respected by Bonaparte (10).

General Dugommier, after completing the reduction of Toulon, was appointed to the command of the army of the eastern Pyrenees. He was desirous that Bonaparte should accompany him, and with a view of ensuring so important an acquisition, issued an order, directing that officer to follow him to the neighbourhood of Perpignan. But the committee of public safety, though tardy in acknowledging, and penurious in rewarding Bonaparte's services, were prompt and free in employing his talents. This they did by sending him in the opposite direction, and by assigning to him a duty, which, though it promised no accession of glory, was likely to be attended by unpleasant responsibility and vexatious difficulties. During its performance he received his promotion to the rank of brigadier-general, and instructions, after its completion, to rejoin the army of Italy, and take command of its artillery.

The recovery of Toulon, with the exile or punishment of its misguided inhabitants, although it had humbled the spirit of insurrection in the southern departments, had not extinguished it.

The English had been forced to relinquish their hold on this important station, but they had not done so without augmenting their own naval power, and impairing essentially that of France. Their fing in consequence ruled the Mediterranean, and the French territory on that sea, vulnerable from the factious temper of the population, was exposed more than ever to insult and aggression. It became therefore a matter of pressing importance to supply by fortifications on land, that protection to the coast which the fleets and forts of Toulon had formerly afforded. This task was entrusted to Bonaparte. It was barren and deterring; yet he performed it in a manner which was in the highest degree useful, and gave striking evidence of the analytical power of his understanding.

At that time, no rule had been observed in the construction of fortifications on the coast of France. Their numbers, situation. and strength, had been determined, not by the nature of the ground, or the degree of its exposure, but by the caprice of the government, or the interest or apprehensions of the local authorities. This gave rise to frequent altercations between the magistracy of the maritime towns and the officers of artillery, and left the coast but feebly defended. Bonaparte proceeded on a system, which was to leave nothing to the chances of ministerial humour, or to the effects of local importunity. Dividing the positions of this coast into three classes, of which the great naval stations were the first, important commercial harbours the second, and capes or promontories favourable to sudden descents the third, he prescribed, for each class, fortifications adapted to its importance and exposure. Supposing a scale of the expense of constructing them, to denote with sufficient accuracy the relative force and magnitude of these batteries, it may be observed that a fortification of the first class was to cost sixty thousand francs; one of the second, forty thousand; and one of the third, six thousand.

It appears that he assigned to these works ordnance of a calibre proportioned to the danger they were intended to repel, and embraced in his regulations the angle of elevation proper to be provided for in the gun-carriages at the various stations, according to the range which was expected to be covered by their pieces. The observations on this subject, which he dictated at St. Helena, must be useful to the engineers of all countries which are exposed to the annoyance of a maritime foe.

While engaged in superintending these fortifications, he was an unwilling witness of the barbarous excesses of the populace and their leaders, at Marseilles. They seized upon a rich merchant named Hughes, whose age and infirmities would have entitled him to mercy, had he not been innocent. He was accused by these brutes, and by them pronounced guilty, of conspiring against the republic, although he was eighty-four years old, feeble, deaf, and almost blind. His real crime in their eyes was his enormous wealth, which was estimated at eighteen millions of francs. This the unhappy man offered to resign, only entreating that half a million might be spared to him, urging that, in the course of nature, he could enjoy it but a very short time. But neither his bribe, nor his tears, nor his age, nor his innocence, could soften the ferocity of the butchers around him, who thirsting for his blood as well as for his money, hurried him to the guillotine. The pain with which Bonaparte witnessed this murder, he expressed at St. Helena by exclaiming, "Truly I thought myself at the end of the world;" a form of speech which he employed to denote the strongest detestation and horror. It seemed that the nerves of his body as well as the feelings of his soul, shuddered to the quick at spectacles of cruelty.

It appears he always deemed the support he received at Toulon, first from Gasparin, and afterwards from Dugommier, instrumental in opening his way to fortune and to fame. The value of his services not only to the country but to themselves, greatly overpaid the general and the deputy; nevertheless, in his will, he left substantial memorials of his respect and gratitude for their names; thus, by a magnificent retrospect, looking from the melancholy end of his career, to its bright beginning.

CHAPTER IV.

From March 1794, to October 1795.

Besaparte joins the army of Italy as general of artillery—His first aides-decamp-General Dumerbion - Position of the two armies - Strong camp of the Sardinians- Bonaparte's plan for dislodging them-Adopted by a council of war-Massena-Bonaparte's active operations-Their rapidity and success-Beats the Austrians-Takes Oneille, Ormea, and Garessio-The Sardinians dislodged and Saorgio taken by Massena, who drives them from the Col de Tende-Positions occupied by the French army-Their sufferings—Bonaparte's plan for uniting the armics of Italy and the Alps— Prevented by the events of the 9th Thermidor-Preparations of the allies-Plan proposed by Bonaparte for counteracting them -- Carries it into execution—Its effects—End of the campaign—His chief occupations in setumn and winter - Madame Thurreau - Bonaparte's infatuation - Its probable effect on his fortune-Robespierre the younger-Anecdote-Bonaparte put under arrest-Released without trial-Zeal and fidelity of Junot - Bonaparte summoned to the bar of the convention, on a charge which is withdrawn - Attached to the armament prepared for an attack upon Rome-By his advice that project abandoned-Mob at Toulon-Saves two deputies of the assembly - Rescues the Chabrillants - Rejoins the army of Italy - Ordered to take a command in the infantry - Is dissatisfied and proceeds to Paris-Visits his mother on his way and stops at Chatillon-sur-Seine-Anecdote-His interview with Aubry, the minister of war-His retort-Tenders his resignation-It is not accepted-Appointed to command the artillery of the army of the West-Kellermann's disasters -Danger of the Italian frontier-The committee of public safety consults Bonaparte -- He draws up instructions which are sent to Kellermann -- Is employed in the war office in directing the operations of the armies - His reputed idea of obtaining orders to seek a command in the army of the Grand Signior-Independent in his circumstances, though not rich-His disposal of his time while at Paris-His impression in society.

Having digested the order, arranged the position, and prescribed the structure of suitable fortifications along the coast of France, from the Rhône to the Var, general Bonaparte proceeded in March, 1794, to the head quarters of the army of Italy, which were established at Nice. He was preceded by the reputation he had acquired at Toulon, and accompanied by his first aides-decamp, Muiron and Junot. The commander in chief, general Dumerbion, was a veteran, who by hard service had gained high rank. He was intrepid, upright, and well informed; and having served the two previous campaigns on this frontier, was acquainted with its positions. He was severely afflicted with the gout, but as he discovered the merit and relied on the counsels of the young general of artillery, his efficiency was by no means impaired by his infirmities. Macquart, d'Allemagne, and Massens, were his generals of division.

The French army was stationed in the county of Nice, which is situated on the Mediterranean side of the maritime Alps. and between the rivers the Var and the Roya. On the declivities of the Alps overhanging this territory, the Sardinian army, of twenty thousand men, occupied the camp of Fourches; a formidable position resting on the strong fort of Saorgio, which commanded the principal route from Nice to Turin. Fixed on this beight, unassailable on his flanks from the nature of the ground, inexpugnable in his front as experience had demonstrated, and fortified both by nature and art in his rear, the Sardinian commander menaced the French frontier, communicated by his left whith that of Genoa, and with the line of Austrian posts which were extended across the mountains from the valley of the Bormida to the harbour of Oneille; and with the English cruisers and privateers, which, intercepting from that port the commerce between Genoa and Marseilles, interrupted the alleviation and supply afforded by it, to the French army and to the famine of Provence. The importance of dislodging the enemy from this effective position had been felt so sensibly by general Brunet that, on the 8th and 12th of the previous June, he had assailed it with a superiority of force and with persevering vigour. His efforts were vain and his With the government which he served, as loss considerable. suspicion and proof were equivalent, failure and guilt were identical. General Brunet, unfortunate in battle, was charged with treason and punished with death. General Dumerbion who was to contend with equal difficulties, was subject to similar misfortune, and exposed to the same fate, for neither the interest of the nation nor the temper of the convention would tolerate an inactive campaign. Thus circumstanced, he must have regarded his astagonist, with feelings akin to those of the shepherd who sees the eagle that preys upon his lambs, perched upon an inaccessible rock, where neither his shouts can alarm nor his missiles reach her. But a hunter approached, from whose daring footsteps and uncerting eye, the only security was in instant flight.

The first care of the general of artillery after his arrival, was to make himself acquainted with the station and force of the several divisions of the army. The performance of this duty gave him an opportunity of studying the ground, of observing the enemy's position, and of tracing on the spot the unfortunate operations of general Brunet. He perceived that the camp of Fourches was too strong to be carried by a direct attack, however skilfully or gallantly conducted, and felt convinced that, if general Dumerbion repeated the attempt of his predecessor, he would meet with no better success. The same military penetration which had revealed to him the mode of expelling the English from Toulon, now aggested to him the method of dislodging the Sardinians from Saorgio.

His plan was projected on a scale of sagacity and enterprise, which was as yet new and unattempted in this army, whose head quarters during two campaigns had been stationary at Nice. proposed extending the right wing divided into two columns, along the precipitous and narrow slope, between the sea and the Alps, as far as Oneille and Loano; separating the Austrian and Sardinian armies from communication with the British squadron; passing with the further column across the crest of the mountains and seizing Ormea and Garessio, two Sardinian forts on the sources of the Tanaro; ascending with the nearer column to the heights of Tanardo and Tanarello, and occupying the route from Nice to Turin at a point in the rear of Saorgio. This movement, if successfully executed, would expel the English cruisers and privateers from Oneille and Loano, protect the French coasting trade, cut off the enemy's communication with the sea; by endangering his retreat, compel him to abandon the camp of Fourches, from which, after sanguinary efforts it had been found impracticable to force him; and would place the French army on the summits of the Alps, where, while their posts could neither be turned nor commanded, they would disquiet one member of the coalition for the safety of his country, and the security of his capital.

If the Sardinian general should attempt to counteract this opc-

ration by assuming the offensive and attacking the French in their positions on the Var, besides that these positions were in themselves strong and capable of being maintained against a superior force, his advance would place the French right more completely on his flank and rear, and render the movement proposed by Bonaparte still more efficacious and successful. Or, should he, which was not probable, detach a corps from his left in time and strength sufficient to arrest the progress of the French column, he must thereby expose his main position at Fourches, to a direct and victorious assault. So that whether the enemy remained quiet or moved forward, his eventual retreat was equally certain; he would lose all the advantages of superiority of ground, which, independently of other favourable consequences, would result in their full force to the French (1).

In forming this plan, Bonaparte appears to have reasoned on principles deduced from the nature of mountain warfare; in which strength of ground becomes a consideration so preponderating, that, even in the conduct of an offensive campaign, an able general endeavours to conquer his enemy by positions. By these he forces him to fight to disadvantage or to retreat without fighting, losing in the first case the moral impulse and physical momentum of attack; in the second, relinquishing the command of territory which otherwise he might have held (2).

To this mode of commencing the campaign there was no serious military objection, while it was easy to remove the political one which was suggested. It involved the necessity of violating, or to use an equivalent for the softer French term, of borrowing the neutral territory of Genoa. But in the previous campaign, a detachment of Sardinian troops two thousand strong, that been permitted to pass in martial array, with drums beating and colours flying, through the territory of the republic, and to embark at Oneille as a reenforcement to the allied armament in Toulon. About the same time, so domineering was the influence of England on that coast, while she held possession of Toulon, that a British squadron had been suffered to attack and take, with circumstances of outrage and cruelty, the French frigate La Modeste while at her moorings in the harbour of Genoa (3). The neutral rights of this once proud republic, thus prostituted, were entitled on principle to no respect from France. It was true that the importance of the commerce, which, under the Genoese flag, was maintained with the south of France, had impressed on the policy of the convention a character of unusual forbearance, from which it was not expected, that the commander would deviate. But the operation in question would free that commerce from obstruction, would establish a French force on the Genoese frontier, and be more likely to overawe than to irritate, so small and so mercantile a state.

General Dumerbion yielded full attention and a ready assent to the plan proposed by the general of artillery, and submitted it to a council of war, composed of his principal officers and the deputies of the convention. It was no sooner explained than it was adopted; its intrinsic advantages concurring with the fresh and rising reputation of its author, to obviate unreasonable doubt and pertinacious discussion.

To carry this bold plan into execution, Massena, on the 6th of April. crossed the Roya at the head of fourteen thousand men. with the first division of which, after taking the small castle of Vingtimilia, he turned to his left, penetrated into his native mountains, and took post on Mont Tanardo and Monte Grande, inferior elevations of the Alps; thus beginning his career of glory in the rough cradle of his infant sports. Bonaparte, who conducted the second division, taking a wider range between the English fleet on his right, and the Austro-Sardinian posts on his left, passed rapidly the Nervia and the Taggia, routed a strong body of Austrians at St. Agata, and taking possession of Oneille, put that seaport in a condition of repelling hostile cruisers, and sheltering French trading vessels. Ardently prosecuting his movement, he ascended from Oneille to the pass of Ponte di Nave, where an Austrian force waited to oppose him. This he defeated on the 15th of April, and driving it over the mountains before him, compelled the neighbouring garrison of Ormea, consisting of four hundred men, to surrender. Twenty pieces of artillery, several thousand muskets, and a quantity of military clothing, of which the troops were in want, fell into his hands (4). His next object was Garessio which, being instantly attacked, fell an easy conquest. From Garessio, the ultimate point of his invasion, while he threatened the plains and capital of Piedmont, he secured his communication with the sea at Loano, by occupying, on the 18th of April, Monts St. Bernard and Rocca Barbena.

Thus, in the short space of twelve days, Bonaparte had advanced the position of the French army a distance of about eighty

miles, through a tract of the most difficult country in Europe, driving the British cruisers from the coast on one side, dislodging the Austrian army from the mountains on the other, and had gained a position which overlooked the plains of Piedmont, and menaced that kingdom with invasion.

Massena, meanwhile, had conducted his operations on a line nearer to the enemy's camp, and in a manner equally vigorous and successful. Pushing onward from Tanardo, he reached the higher position of Tanarello, and posted himself, after several conflicts, on the route from Nice to Turin, and in conformity with the indications of Bonaparte, at a point in the rear of Saor-The effect of these daring movements, on this skilful plan. was as decisive and complete as that which attended the storming of Little Gibraltar at Toulon. The Sardinian army, its flank turned and its retreat endangered, evacuated in haste the camp of Fourches, and leaving behind numerous cannon and immense stores, retreated higher up into the Alps to a pass called the Col de Tende. So great were the alarm and precipitation that Saorgio, though strongly garrisoned and regularly fortified, surrendered to Massena, after a show of resistance, on the 29th of April; and the intrenched camp of Fourches, which had been so triumphantly defended the year before, was now resigned without resistance, and taken without an attack.

On the 8th of May, Massena having refreshed his troops by a few days of repose, passed the Col Ardente, and moved upon the left and rear of the Sardinians in their new position in the Col de Tende; while Dumerbion, no longer apprehending a counteracting effort of the enemy, directed the division of Macquart against their front. This combined attack succeeded, and general Dumerbion becoming, in consequence, master of the maritime Alps, extended his left into communication with the nearest post of the army of the Alps, which, in emulation of his success, had lately dislodged the Sardinians from Mont Cenis.

Thus the army of Italy, which, after repeated change of commanders, and frequent bloody actions, had been unable, in the space of two years, to advance a step beyond the valley of the Var, was empowered, by the bold and original combinations of Bonaparte's judgment, in a single month, to surmount and to hold the frowning barrier of the Alps, from the Col de Tende to the Appennines; to rend as under the tenacious connection of the allied

forces; to expel the Sardinians and Austrians from the mountains, and the English fleet from the coast; with inconsiderable loss, to take three thousand prisoners, an intrenched camp, three mountain fortresses, a numerous train of artillery, with large stores of provisions and ammunition; and, cutting off the enemy's communication with the sea, to transfer the danger of invasion from the frontiers of France to the Sardinian capital (5).

The court of Turin, no longer supported by intercourse with the British fleet, was thrown into the greatest consternation upon finding that frontier of the kingdom, whose natural obstruction was its greatest strength, overpassed without difficulty or delay by a powerful and active enemy. The king, in his alarm, ordered a levy, en masse, of his subjects. Nor could the cabinets of London and Vienna regard, without serious apprehension, a rapidity of conquest which was then unexampled in the French armies, and which, if not counteracted, seemed likely, by placing the Sardinian monarch at the mercy of the French Republic, to create an important alteration in the state of the war.

Such was the outline, and so great were the effects of this second stroke of Bonaparte's military genius. Though his glory was again shaded by superior rank, though a secondary station still kept his name unknown to the annals of Europe, and his subsequent exploits soon outshone the lustre of his present deeds, this expedition in the Alps, in the boldness and rapidity of its movements, and in the exact correspondence between its result and its conception, must be admitted to bear impressions of the same originality and excellence which distinguish his greatest campaigns. It ought to be mentioned, in justice to General Dumerbion, that, so far from desiring to suppress the merit of his general of artillery, in his despatch to the government describing his successes, he said, "It is to the talent of general Bonaparte that I am indebted for the skilful plans which have assured our victory."

The positions of the army of Italy on the Alps, though safe and formidable, were attended by many disadvantages. The air and water of these snowy regions were both unwholesome, and the routes so difficult that the posts were insulated and the supplies irregular. The men fell sick, the horses perished, the guns were left behind, and the cavalry dismounted; so that the strength of

the army rapidly diminished, while its expense was greatly increased. On the other hand, the rich plains of Piedmont which reposed and refreshed the Sardinian army, tempted the French forward to plenty and conquest. The committee of public safety, emboldened by the success already gained, were impatient of delay, and directed that offensive operations should be incessantly pursued. But as his adversary was now in connection with his fortresses and reenforcements, general Dumerbion, whose sickness probably damped his enterprise, did not think himself, reduced as he was in artillery and cavalry, in strength sufficient to invade Piedmont, and meet the enemy in the plain. fore, endeavoured to procure the cooperation of the army of the Alps, and for that purpose authorized the general of artillery to confer with general Dumas and his principal officers. Bonaparte, on this occasion, submitted a plan for invading Piedmont, by uniting the two armies in the valley of the Stura, which was approved by the deputies Ricord and Robespierre, and by the committee of public safety, to whom it was transmitted. But a difference of opinion, on the part of the deputies employed with the army of the Alps, which could not be reconciled, and an insufficiency of means, especially in regard to cavalry, which could not be provided for, retarded its execution until the events in the convention of the 9th Thermidor prevented it altogether (6). In September, however, the preparations of the Austrians and the English put an end to this state of irksome inaction. An Austrian corps, under general Colloredo, was assembled on the Bormida, which, by establishing magazines as high up as Dego, near the source of that river, indicated a movement towards the sea coast, and a design of reopening a communication between the Austro-Sardinian army and the British fleet. Corresponding with this demonstration, the English, it appeared, were to effect a landing at Vado, a Genoese port, and uniting with the Austrians, take possession of Sayona, and force the republic of Genoa, straitened by sea and land, to abandon her gainful neutrality, and declare war against France.

In forming this project, the allied powers, who were now strengthened by the renewed accession of Prussia to the coalition, with an army of sixty-two thousand men [7], proposed taking advantage of their own wrong. Having first violated, as we have seen, the neutrality of Genoa, they were making the lawful consequence of that outrage, a pretext for further encroachment and oppression upon the rights of that feeble state; thus unjustly continuing a course of injury which they themselves had wantonly commenced.

To counteract this dangerous and lawless scheme, which, besides its military consequences, would have had the effect of catting off all relief to the scarcity which still prevailed in the south of France, Bonaparte advised general Dumerbion instantly to advance his right wing, take possession of the heights above Vado, and establish a communication across the mountains, between that point on the coast, and the positions which the army aready held on the sources of the Tanaro, by the way of St. lacques and Montenotte. He would thus be in a situation to countenance the friends of France in Genoa, to prevent any direct attempt of the allies on that city, in case it should be meditated; would assure the neutrality of that republic, place the French in command of the entire coast from the frontier of France to the neighbourhood of Genoa, protect the French commerce, maintain the separation between the Austro-Sardinian forces and the British fleet, and disconcert completely the projects of the allies on this theatre of the war (8).

General Dumerbion and the deputies having considered and approved this suggestion, a column of eighteen thousand men. with twenty pieces of light artillery, was put in motion to execute This force, from the impregnable nature of the French posts on the great chain of the Alps, could be detached without danger. Bonaparte, who advised, directed the movement, although the commander in chief was present. He first penetrated through the pass of Col de Bardinetto, into Montferrat. along the road which borders the Bormida, and on the 5th of October, having left the heights of Biestro, descended rapidly into the plain. His intention was to get into the rear of Colloredo's corps of Austrians, amounting to twelve thousand men. But by retreating upon Cairo, and thence upon the fortified town of Acqui, Colloredo prevented the full success of this attempt. Nevertheless, the French vanguard, under general Cervoni. maintained so active a pursuit, that the Austrians, besides abandoning their magazines, sustained the loss of a thousand

General Dumerbion was not in a condition to prosecute his vol. 1. 5

movement in this direction, or in other words to invade Italy. Want of forage had compelled him to send his horses to the pastures on the Rhone; so that he had no cavalry, a force indispensable in the plain; and no heavy artillery, without which a country strong, populous and studded with fortresses, could with difficulty he deemed be conquered. Moreover the authority which had been given by the government for uniting the armies of the Alps and of Italy, at the suggestion of Bonaparte, in the valley of the Stura, had been revoked, not without expressions of suspicious displeasure. Declining to expose himself to the frowns of a jealous authority, and to the Austrian and Sardinian forces which had been united in the neighbourhood of Acqui, he withdrew to his positions on the head waters of the Tanaro, and completed the object of his expedition, by taking possession of Savona, and fortifying the heights which command the town and harbour of Vado.

Thus the French were placed in command of a still greater extent of the coast and of the impending mountains; and had their advanced parties securely established within a forced march of Genoa. While the allies; their formidable projects both by sea and land completely frustrated, the English expelled from the coast and their confederates driven beyond the mountains, appeared the mortification of their common defeat, by mutual suspicion and reciprocal censure (9). This ill humour though not among the military effects, was a desirable consequence of the successes of the French, as it might, it was hoped, loosen the ties of the coalition.

So ended this active and victorious campaign of the army of Italy.

The leisure of autumn and winter, Bonaparte employed in completing the fortifications of Vado and Oneille; in inspecting the line of maritime forts from the Var to the Rhone, which were in the progress of construction under his superintendence; and in perfecting his acquaintance with that part of the grand chain of the maritime Alps, in which he had not been personally employed. So intent were his observations that, in company with general St. Hilaire, he passed a night in January on the top of a mountain near the Col de Tende; whence, at surrise, in the gorgeous light of the eastern horizon, he descried the lovely plains of Italy, and the distant waters of the Po. So strong was his

emotion that he was tempted to exclaim, Italiam! Italiam! his ardent genius prophetic of future glories, and dazzled by the visions which itself inspired.

But his time was not altogether engrossed by the toils of war or the rude grandeur of mountain prospects. Scenes less inclement and softer contests occasionally engaged him. Among the members of the convention in attendance on the army of Italy, was M. Thurreau; a gentleman whose personal insignificance in the deputation, was redeemed by the wit and beauty of his wife. This lady was not insensible to the merit, nor unkind to the devotion of the young general of artillery, who proud of his success, ventured to manifest his adoration, by ordering for her amusement, as they walked out on the great theatre of the Alps, an attack of the advanced posts stationed below them.

The French party were victorious, but they lost some of their number, and as the affair could lead to no result, it was in every sense of the term a wanton sacrifice of brave men's lives. In his youth, his infatuation, and the compunction with which he remembered and confessed this criminal folly, indulgent readers may find some excuse for it. The incident is worthy of being recorded, because the faults of such a man are sacred to history, and because the intimacy out of which it sprung was the means probably of saving his life (10).

Robespierre the younger, who with his colleague Ricord, had joined the army of Italy after the siege of Toulon, became a great admirer of Bonaparte's talents, and a steady advocate for the plans he recommended. The character of this deputy it appears, was very different from that of his infamous brother—he was capable of feeling and inspiring a virtuous friendship (11). Being recalled to Paris by the elder Robespierre a few days before the \$\frac{2}{3}\$th Thermidor, he earnestly invited the general of artillery to accompany him, his instances proceeding probably from a desire to promote Bonaparte's professional advancement. That the latter resisted, at this inactive period of the campaign, these imposing solicitations, and thereby escaped being sacrificed in the unlooked for catastrophe of Robespierre and his partisans, was owing doubtless, in no slight degree, to the force of his attachment for Madame Thurreau.

Years had revolved; the general of artillery filled the imperial throne, whilst the fair one whose attractions had pleased and pre-

served him, was become a poor and faded widow. After many petitions which failed to pass the barrier of indifference that environs power, Madame Thurreau obtained, by accident, an interview with the Emperor. "Why," said the sovereign kindly "have you not before made known your situation; many of our former acquaintances at Nice are now personages of the court, and in constant intercourse with me." The answer of the widow is yet another proof that friendship is faithful only to prosperity. "Alas, sire, since my misfortunes, they have ceased to know me." He felt for her distress, and, if he remembered her former weakness, he felt also that he was certainly not the proper person to chastise it. Her wants were instantly relieved, and her future comfort liberally provided for.

Before the downfal of Robespierre, while the army held its positions on the higher crest of the Alps, Bonaparte had been directed by secret instructions which bear the signature of Ricord, to visit Genoa, to notice the state of the fortifications of that city. to penetrate, if possible, the political intentions of the republic with regard to the belligerent powers, and more especially to observe the conduct of Tilly, the French chargé d'affaires, respecting whose fidelity or fitness, some doubts were entertained. after the 9th Thermidor, Ricord being superseded, and Robespierre the younger guillotined, Albite, Salicetti, and Laporte, who had previously been in attendance on the army of the Alps. succeeded them in superintending the army of Italy. Heated by the passions of the new government, and acting on its principles of distrust towards the agents of the defeated party, they interpreted this mission to Genoa into an act of secret correspondence with the enemy. The plan which Bonaparte had proposed, and which, the younger Robespierre, shortly before his death had approved and transmitted to the government for their adoption. they affected to think a scheme for placing the army of France in the power of the enemy. About the same time they were informed, by an anonymous letter from Genoa, that a million of francs had been sent from that city to corrupt one of the French generals. As Bonaparte was the most conspicuous among these. and was known to have planned and conducted the successful operations of the campaign, they believed, or pretended to believe. that he was a mercenary accomplice of Robespierre the younger and Ricord, in a scheme to betray the army into the power of

the allies. Early in August accordingly, these deputies ordered the arrest of general Bonaparte, and the seizure and examination of his papers. Instead of finding evidence of his guilt, they found such strong proofs of his innocence that, in the course of a fortnight, he was released without trial.

Junot, his aide-de-camp, who was faithfully attached to him, had, with other military friends, determined, rather than he should be transferred to the dreaded tribunals of Paris, to rescue him from confinement by force and convey him beyond the French territory (12). In effecting this design they would have experienced little difficulty, inasmuch as general Dumerbion who bew and had confessed his merit, and the troops, who here, as they had done at Toulon, looked up to him as the real commander, were indignant at his arrest. Junot made known to him the project which had been formed in his favour; but he mildly rebuked his friendly zeal, interdicted every thing like forcible interference, observing calmly that he would trust for safety to his innocence, and that Junot's interference might commit him (13). It appears nevertheless, that he wrote a letter of very bold remonstrance which Laporte having rejoined the army of the Alps, he addressed to Albite and Salicetti. From the personal acquaintance of the last two deputies, of Salicetti more particularly, with his services at Toulon, he regarded Laporte as the real author of his arrest. In the despatch of Albite and Salicetti to the government, mentioning the release of general Bonaparte from arrest, they not only admit that there existed no foundation for the charges which they had made against him, but they allege, that his talents were too great, and his services too important, to justify at so critical a period of the campaign, his longer suspension from duty (14). The officer, by whom he was released, found him poring over a map of Italy.

During the succeeding winter, in one of his visits of inspection to the fortifications along the coast, Maignier the representative of the people at Marseilles, expressed to him an apprehension that the popular societies of that city, which was then agitated by violent tumults, would attack and plunder the magazines of powder and arms, established in the dismantled forts of St. Nicholas and St. John. On the requisition of this representative, Bonaparte stetched a plan for protecting these magazines, by a wall with battlements, on the side next the town. This plan was sent to

Paris, and denounced by the successors of Maignier, as a project for reconstructing those fortresses, in order to bridle and oppress the people: for it often happened in this season of political passion, that conduct which appeared laudable to one deputy or at one moment, would be held culpable the next, by another deputy. The convention, countenancing the charge of their colleagues, directed, by a special decree, the commander of the artillery at Marseilles to repair to Paris and justify himself at their Bonaparte who was attached to the army of Italy, had returned to his post, and colonel Sugny, being actually the chief officer of artillery at Marseilles, was designated by the terms of the decree. Sugny accordingly proceeded to Paris, and, as the thirst for innocent blood was in some measure allayed since the overthrow of the reign of terror, satisfied the convention that he was not the author of the project in question. In the course of the investigation it was readily discovered that the plan had been furnished by Bonaparte; and a decree was pronounced requiring his appearance before the convention, in place of colonel Sugny. From the violence of the reaction which the thermidoriens, in the tide of their ascendancy, directed against all who were suspected, in the remotest degree, of having been partisans of Robespierre. there was just ground to apprehend that the convention would deal with severe injustice toward a general who, after being recently arrested as an accomplice of the tyrant's brother, was again involved in an offensive charge. Fully comprehending the danger of his position, Bonaparte was unwilling to encounter a prosecution, in which, it was probable, innocence would constitute but a feeble defence. He exerted himself therefore to procure a repeal of the decree, and the enemy happening to make serious demonstrations at the time, he was successful. The deputies, upon whom rested great responsibility, became alarmed, and wrote to the government that the presence of general Bonaparte with the army was indispensable. By their exertion, the accusation which had been transmitted to the convention was withdrawn, and the decree revoked (15).

These were the principal dangers to which he was exposed from the fury of the revolutionary government (16). In every situation through which he had passed, it appears that, whether the balance of his fortune inclined to depression or turned to advancement, he was indebted to the force of merit alone for safety

or preferment. His proficiency as a student antedated his transfer from Brienne to Paris. His attainments there, accelerated his promotion to a lieutenancy. The same causes produced his selection for the command of the artillery at Toulon; where his services protected him from the rage of the terrorists at his fearless humanity; as his commanding talent at Saorgio, shielded him from the blind reaction of the thermidoriens. And it may be added that, while the firmness of his principles exposed him to the umbrage of both parties, neither was able to fix a stain on his integrity.

The English, under the guidance of the unfortunate Paoli, having succeeded in subduing Corsica, and etablishing a government in that island, and the Holy See having perpetrated a variety of insults, besides permitting the murder of Basseville, the French mivister at Rome, the committee of public safety, actuated by just indignation, prepared, in the early part of the year 1795, for sending an expedition to Corsica, and then for making an unexpected attack upon Rome. With the ships of war which had been rescued from the English at Toulon, they composed a squadron of sixteen sail of the line, to which were attached a hundred transports, having on board ten thousand select troops. This fleet, commanded by Admiral Martin, was lying in Toulon, while a British squadron of equal force cruised off the harbour. The French government, after some fluctuation between the two objects, finally determined to direct their first effort against Rome, and a member of the convention, Letourneur, was sent down to Toulon invested with extraordinary powers, and with authority to equip the expedition, and conduct it, without delay, to the capital of the Catholic world. This deputy, upon his arrival, held a council of war, which he acquainted with the intentions of the government, and consulted upon the best mode of executing them. Bonaparte, whose reputation for patriotism seemed to have been corroborated by repeated and abortive accusation, had been selected to command the artillery of the armament, and, in this capacity, had arrived at Toulon and was summoned to the council. His opinion was adverse to the expedition, and to the wishes of the deputy Letourneur. He argued that the squadron would probably be worsted, and the transports taken, if attacked by the unincumbered English fleet, and insisted that the expedition could not be safely attempted, unless the French were massters of the Mediterranean. He moreover affirmed that it would be sacrificing ten thousand troops to land them in the neighbourhood of Rome without cavalry and without artillery horses, to convey which an augmentation of the convoy, of the delay, and the risk, would be necessary. His arguments were the less palatable to the deputy, as they were perfectly convincing to the other members of the council. In pursuance of his advice, Admiral Martin leaving the transports in the harbour, sailed on the 1st of March with the deputy on board, for the purpose of engaging the English fleet, and gaining the mastery of the Mediterranean. The hostile squadrons came in sight of Leghorn, when Letourneur thought it prudent to retreat, and the English admiral to chace.

Admiral Martin, after capturing a single ship, the Berwick, on going to sea, and losing two the Ca Ira and the Censeur in retreating, took shelter under the Iles d'Hyères (17). Any doubts which the deputy might have felt respecting the opinions of the general of artillery, seem to have been removed by the experimental terrors of his voyage. The ill-judged expedition against Rome was abandoned, and the ten thousand troops marched back to the camp near Nice.

The party which had triumphed in the convention on the 9th of Thermidor had not yet obtained predominance in the cities of the south. In Marseilles and Toulon the impulse of that movement had been felt violently, but the Jacobin leaders, animated and abetted by the existing resentment at the treasonable proceedings of the opposite party in 1793, had been able still to maintain a control over the passions of the populace. At Toulon, the thermidorean deputies, Mariette and Cambon, were extremely obnoxious to Jacobin hatred, and were accused in their societies of being disposed to lead back the revolution to legitimacy. In this state of things; a French privateer had brought in a Spanish prize, on board of which were twenty French emigrants, consisting, for the greater part, of the family of Chabrillant. They were conveyed to the jail of the town, and there confined. In the course of the succeeding tumults, a crowd collected at the arsenal, and rushed to the jail for the purpose of murdering its unhappy tenants. The deputies interposed, harangued the populace, exhorted their leaders to desist from violence, and promised to have these unfortunate emigrants brought to trial in twenty four hours. But being

themselves already suspected, instead of allaying the tumult, their exertions only served to inflame it. It was late in the evening, they were lighting the lamps, and a voice answered the harangue of the deputies by shouting, let us hang up to the lanterns these protectors of emigrants. At this dreaded signal, the outcry became more furious, and deep calling unto deep, the disturhance more extended and stormy. The military guard being summoned, approached, and was instantly repulsed. Bonaparte, who was present, recognized, among the leaders of the mob, several cannoniers who had served under him at the siege of Toulon, and calling out to them, at this awful moment, mounted a pile of timber. The cannoniers caused their general to be respected, and his voice to be heard. He calmed the infuriated crowd in the arsenal, and the deputies were permitted to withdraw in safety. In the streets, however, the uproar continued with fearful violence, and the prison guard were upon the point of being overpowered by the mob. Thither Bonaparte hastened, and there his interference was again successful.

The populace soothed and controlled by his address and manner, retired, and in the night he had the unhappy emigrants concealed in ammunition waggons, conveyed out of the town, and safely embarked in the road of Hyères. Thus bold and active was he in the cause of humanity, at a time when mercy seemed banished from France (18).

About the end of March general Bonaparte rejoined the army of Italy in the maritime Alps. It was soon afterwards incorporated with the army of the Alps, and the command of the united. force given to general Kellermann. This arrangement was accompanied by a new classification of general officers, which restored to active service, those among them, who, in consequence of personal imbecility or political disaffection, had estranged themselves from the cause of their country from the moment of the overthrow of the monarchy, in the year 1792. Its effect was to exclude from employment a number of generals of artillery, and, in application to Bonaparte, who was the youngest on the list, to place him in the infantry. His command of the artillery in Kellermann's army being thus annulled, he set out for the seat of government, with a view of applying for other and suitable employment. On his route he visited his mother at Marseilles, to whose heart his safety from danger, and his rising fame, must have com-

municated the tenderest pleasure. He found too his brother Joseph happily married, and the comforts of the family, which had been seriously impaired by the cruelty of Paoli, in a great measure renovated by his mother's prudence. At Marseilles he met general Kellermann, on his way to Nice, and communicated to him much information respecting the theatre of war, on which the hero of Valury was not destined to gain laurels. Then adopting his brother Louis, whose education he had particularly superintended, as an extra aide-de-camp, he proceeded on his way to Paris. At Chatillon-sur-Seine, he met intelligence of the insurrection of the 1st of Prairial, in which the Jacobins were, after temporary and terrible success, again overcome. The father of his aide-de-camp, Marmont, resided at Chatillon; and, to gratify this officer at whose instance he had then Chatillon in his route, as well as to wait the return of publicarder in the capital, having been sufficiently disgusted with popular tumults, he remained there several days. The father of Marmont, a knight of St. Louis, was a rich proprietor of iron works in Burgundy. His son who felt a strong inclination for a military life, after failing to obtain entrance into the royal artillery, had been contented to join a provincial regiment. He was recommended to the friendship and protection of Bonaparte by an uncle who was a schoolfellow of the latter at Brienne. and his comrade and friend in the regiment of La Fère. A royalist, this uncle for sook his country to follow the emigrant princes, and bespoke of Bonaparte that care of his nephew, which he himself could no longer bestow on him. It is needless to say that this confidence of the exile was not misplaced. Marmont's father, though avaricious, was profuse and extravagant in entertaining the hero of Toulon and Saorgio, and the liberal patron of his son. Though the weather was warm, his hearths blazed with fires, so that his hospitality amused more than it comforted his guest (19).

Upon arriving in Paris, Bonaparte presented himself at the war office. In the changes which had followed the revolution of parties of the 9th of Thermidor, and had succeeded more recent convulsions, Aubry, an ancient captain of artillery who, as an indifferent patriot and a spiritless officer, had been, though not an emigrant, aloof from service throughout the war, was elected to the convention, chosen a member of the committee of public safety, and entrusted with the management of military affairs. To this minister, who was moreover a secret enemy of the revo-

lution, the character and services of Bonaparte could not fail to present an unpleasant contrast with his own. Accordingly when, in applying for active employment, Bonaparte represented that he had commanded the artillery at the siege of Toulon; had superintended the work of fortifying the coast and harbours of Provence; had ever since commanded the artillery of the army of Italy; and added that it would be extremely painful for him to leave a corps in which he had served from his very infancy; Aubry coldly observed that there were a great many artillery generals, that Bonaparte was the youngest of the number, and could not be employed out of turn. As Aubry had not been on duty during the war, and nevertheless had the effrontery to promote himself, from a retired captaincy, to the rank of general of division, and inspector of artillery, this observation was reteived and retorted as unjust and impertinent. "Officers soon grow old on the field of battle," was the mixture of irony and logic, with which Bonaparte abashed and irritated the inexperienced veteran. A few days afterwards, more in punishment than reward, he was ordered to join the army of the west engaged in the Vendean war, and take command of a brigade of infantry (20). The service was unpleasant to his feelings, the destination an outrage to his pride, and actuated by a proper feeling of dignity, he sent in his resignation. This was not acespted, nor was it at once refused.

In the meantime Aubry's selfish and reacting system, by which a number of officers, who like himself had been out of danger and service from the beginning of the war, were put in the place of those who had been constantly in the field, excited violent dissatisfaction and provoked a number of remonstrances. Of the persons thus displaced not a few were officers of science and merit, while many the those who attended general Cartaux at Toulon, were the mushrooms of popular clubs, noisy, imbecile, and ignorant. They all however, by referring to Bonaparte's case, as the most glaring example of their common oppression, furnished the best evidence of his undisputed superiority. Unwilling to lose such m officer, the committee of public safety corrected very soon the procedure of Aubry, so far as to restore general Bonaparte to the corps of which he was the acknowledged ornament, though not to the army in which he wished again to serve. The order to command the brigade of infantry was revoked, and he was nominated to command the artillery of the army of the west; a destination which, though not agreeable, was not degrading. But, from this crisis of displeasure and embarrassment, he was extricated by causes which had often relieved him before; the public danger, and his professional excellence.

General Kellermann, whose abilities were not so high as his reputation, had been driven on the 27th June from the positions in which Bonaparte had placed the right of Dumerbion's army; and had written to the committee of public safety that, if he was not speedily reenforced, he should be compelled to abandon This intelligence excited great alarm, as Kellermann's defeat opened that vulnerable frontier again to invasion. The committee of public safety convoked and consulted such of the members of the convention as had been on mission to the army af Italy, who, instead of presenting any opinions of their own, with an unanimity like that of the dissatisfied officers, concurred in referring the committee to general Bonaparte as the individual most capable of affording them information and giving them advice, in this unwelcome emergency. He was immediately ordered to attend the committee of which Sieves, Ponte-Coulant, Jean-de-Brie, and his former acquaintance Letourneur, were members; after several conferences with whom, he drew up instructions for Kellermann, which the committee adopted. They are preserved in his memoirs, and show his perfect comprehension of the ground on which Kellermann had been beaten, of the means by which that disaster might have been avoided; the position which it was now advisable to take, and those to be taken in case of farther retreat, as well as the total incapacity of the hero of Valmy to act upon the exact and extended combinations which had led to the successes of the previous campaign (21). When received at the head quarters of Kellermann, the military skill which they displayed excited surprise; but the officers who had served with Bonaparte soon recognized the hand of their author. Under these instructions, on the 7th of July, Kellermann, at the persuasion of his adjutant-general Berthier, took up the line of Borghetto, his right touching the sea at an eminence which commanded the plain and port of Loano; his left on a steep and insulated rock, upon which Massena had erected a strong fortification. This line, the Austrian general attacked several times, but not with much vigour, as he had no hopes of success. The committee of public safety were so

well satisfied with the first fruits of Bonaparte's labours in the war office, that they revoked the order appointing him to command the artillery of the army of the west (22) and, by a special decree, attached him, until further orders, to the department of war, with his rank of general of artillery, and charged him with the special duty of directing the active operations of the forces. This station which he held until October, was important and pleasing, as it ascertained his proper rank, gave scope to the exercise of his talents, and enabled him, though he could not command the army of Italy in person, to guide its movements, and light its way to success. In November, general Scherer, who superseded Kellermann, attacked and defeated the Austrians at Loano, cut off their communication with the British fleet, reestablished his own with Genoa, and retrieved that command of the coast and of the Alps, which the skill and enterprise of Bonaparte had gained, and the incompetence of Kellermann had lost.

It has been asserted, and with some probability that, in the interval of eight days, which elapsed between his conference with Aubry and his restoration to suitable employment, Bonaparte conceived for a moment the design of obtaining authority from the government to offer his services, as general of artillery, to the Grand Signior, who was at that time disposed to enter into the European war as an ally of France. It was natural that his imagination, all passionate for glory, when forbid the heroic fields of Italy, should spread its classical wings, for the shores of the Hellespont. And the idea once implanted in a mind so rich and ardent, might well shoot forth into a luxuriance of brilliant details and illustrious fortune. The likelihood that he did conceive and entertain this spirited project, is strengthened by the fervid activity of his intellect and habits. For, as the youthful reader will do well to observe, from his entrance at the school of Brienne, in 1779, to the moment which our narrative has now reached, comprehending the entire season of boyish folly and juvenile effervescence, his exertion of mind and body appears to have been strenuous, voluntary, and unintermitting.

Against all probability, it has been pretended that, during his residence in Paris on this occasion, he languished in professional destitution and personal poverty; a friendless object of casual pity and uncertain assistance. As his resignation was not accepted, he was never deprived of his commission; and his pay as

a general officer, independently of other rese ces, renders it certain that he could not have been exposed to greater incoaveniences of this sort than such as were common we men of his rank. To suppose that, in a season of goneral scarcity, and under the pressure of a depreciated currency, he was exempt from ordinary discomforts, would be to form an hypothesis at variance with his admitted superiority to all mercenary considerations. In the French revolution, as in the American, few that were honest were rich. But from Bonaparte's prudent habits and simple tastes incessant application to duty, and long absence from the capital it may be safely inferred that' in this crisis of national difficulty he was subjected personally to but slight annoyance. For, although it appears that he sold his carriage and a set of book soon after his arrival in the metropolis, it is certain that, abou the same time, he placed his brother Louis at a provincial military school, and at his own expense maintained him there.

His time was chiefly devoted to official duty and professions studies; his hours of recreation to the society of his early friends and the entertainments of the theatre. Private circles felt the energy of his language; public men, the scrutiny of his look His conversation was remarked as picturesque and original. His demeanour, which was generally sedate, sometimes indicated in tense meditation. For he looked into himself, and lingured to contemplate the glorious inspirations of his genius; as a beauty gazes with secret pride on the reflection of those charms which are to delight, she feels, and to subdue mankind.

CHAPTER V.

From October 1795 to March 1796.

The convention adopt the constitution of the year III-Its principal provisions-Likely to be acceptable to the nation-The additional acts engrafted on it excite dissatisfaction-Wisdom of those acts-Combined opposition of the royalists and jacobins-The people of Paris stirred up to opposition-They vote for accepting the constitution and for rejecting the acts-A majority of the nation and the armies give their suffrages for both-Resistance and insurrection of the sections of Paris-Violence of the section Lepelletier-Measures of the convention-General Menou commander in chief of the army of the interior-He attemps to disperse an armed body of insurgents - Hesitates and fails - Danger of the crisis - Bonaparte an accidental witness of Menou's miscarriage—Repairs to the gallery of the convention-Agitation of that assembly-His conference with the executive committee-Protests against being fettered by commissaries of the convention - Is appointed by the committee to command the troops - Barras made nominal commander in chief-Bonaparte's prompt and judicious measures - Gets possession of the cannon and occupies the bridges-Danican, commander in chief of the insurgents, summons the convention to dismiss their troops - Bonaparte furnishes the members with arms -Movement of the insurgent leader Lafond, upon Pont-Neuf-Cartaux abandons that post, and falls back to the Louvre-The insurgents close in and fire upon the Tuileries-Bonaparte orders his troops to act-Spirit and success of his operations - Courage and repulse of Lafond - The insurgents defeated at all points-Humanity of Bonaparte-The insurrection quelled - Exultation of the convention - Meanness of Barras - The appointment of Bonaparte, as commander of the army of the interior, confirmed by the convention—Their moderation—Trial and danger of Menou -Saved by the influence of Bonaparte -Bonaparte disarms the national guard, and executes other unwelcome but salutary measures - Scarcity in Paris-Discontent of the populace-Anecdote-Recomposes the legislative guard for the new government-Organises a legion of police, and a guard for the directory-Becomes acquainted with Madame Beauharnais

and her son—Interesting interview—The Italian frontier again in danger—Bonaparte consulted by the directory—Furnishes a plan of campaign—Appointed commander in chief of the army of Italy—Marries Madame Beauharnais—State of his fortune and his probable reflections—Leaves Paris and takes command of his army.

In the summer of 1795, while General Bonaparte was employed in the war department at Paris, the Convention discussed and adopted the constitution of the year III. By this plan of government, which was a manifest improvement on the one it was intended to supersede, the executive power of France, under certain limitations, was lodged in a directory of five members: the judicial power in a body of elective magistrates, whose seatence, in criminal cases, were to be founded on the verdicts of juries; and the legislative power, in two houses, the upper, or council of ancients, consisting of two hundred and fifty members. and the lower, consisting of twice that number, and called the council of five hundred. The legislative bodies were to appoint the members of the directory, and to reappoint one out of the five every year, and were themselves to be chosen by electors delegated for that purpose by the people in their primary assemblies. One third of each council was to be elected annually, so that the entire legislature was to be triennially renewed by the popular will, and the entire directory quinquennially, by the will of the legislature. There was not only a proper separation of the great branches of power in the state, and an approved subdivision of the legislative branch, but an approximation to unity in the executive, and to independence in the judicial departments. The advantage of a single executive magistrate, like the President of the United States, was not overlooked in the deliberations of the Convention; but a long line of paternal princes had created such a natural horror of monarchical power, that a nearer approach to unity than five, had it been proposed by the Convention, would have been repelled by their constituents (1).

Although, in this form of government, there was much to recommend it to the nation, it was modified by two supplementary decrees or additional acts, which, after an animated debate, the Convention thought fit to adopt, and which exposed their work and themselves to mischievous misrepresentation and violent resistance. By these decrees, the one engrafted as an unavoidable sanction (2) on the other, and both made inseparable parts of the constitution, the delegated choice of the people was to be so restricted, on the first occasion, as to compose two thirds of the new legislature of members of the existing Convention (3). So that, by this constitution, five hundred members of the assembly which framed it were to enter, by privilege, into the composition of the legislature which it proposed to create, while two hundred and fifty members, only, were to be drawn, by right of election, from the nation at large.

Whatever might be the motives of prudence, or prospects of advantage, by which this arrangement was dictated, it could starcely be expected to escape exceptions, even from a consting tuency united in political concord. The people, it was true, in their primary assemblies, might reject both the constitution and the additional acts incorporated with it. But the necessity of a better ermained government than the rule of a popular assembly, in which all the authority of the state, in spite of theory and experimes, was accumulated, was generally felt and acknowledged. In this state of things, when the heaving of recent convulsions, and the pressure of foreign war, rendered hesitation in domestic. councils critically dangerous, to submit to the nation a form of government which, desirable in itself, was clogged with offensive. conditions, was a proceeding tending to place the prejudices of the people directly in the way of their judgment. But a faithful physician offers to the lips of his patient the salutary draught, although it may disgust his taste and nauseate his stomach.

This natural irritation of public feeling it was the business of the existing parties to increase. The jacobins were smarting under the severity of the thermidoriens, while the royalists had profited by their indulgence. These were grown bold; those desperate. Both parties saw, in the tranquil vigour of public affairs, likely to follow the adoption of the new constitution, the defeat of their hopes and projects. Thus, while their opinions differed, their interests coincided and their passions combined, and they readily cooperated in reprobating the additional acts, and opposing the adoption of the constitution, as well as in exciting resistance to it after it was accepted and proclaimed. The jacobins adhering to their theories, and the royalists speculating on the accidents of domestic confusion and foreign aid, insisted, with

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equal violence, on leaving with the people the unlimited choice of their representatives, and denounced the supplementary decrees as acts of gross usurpation, of self-created privilege, and incipient tyranny. But the motives of these parties were as foul as their professions were fair; while the conduct of the Convention, though to appearance selfish and absurd, was really founded on considerations of foresight and caution, which prudent and patriotic men could not well disregard.

In 1791, the constituent assembly, acting upon a principle of disinterestedness, in which there was more of prudery than wisdom, had decreed the exclusion of its own members from the legislative assembly. By this respectable but inconsiderate delicacy, the new republic was deprived of the services of her most enlightened and experienced statesmen, at a season when she most needed them; when howling factions were to be chained down with one hand, and rapacious kings to be held off with the other. To this error of the constituent assembly, many of the military miscarriages, financial blunders, and political crimes which ensued, were generally and justly attributed. therefore, a downright defiance of experience, and a violent sacrifice of the public good to popular humour and personal reputation, the members of the convention, it is plain, could not have repeated a measure, which, in the moment of transition from one form of government to another, was not likely to be less mischievous in its second trial than it had proved to be in its They determined to serve their countrymen faithfully at the risk of offending them; not only to avoid the indiscretion of their predecessors, but to profit by their example; and, instead of debarring the men who were already in power from participation in the new government, to render their exclusion, for a limited time, impracticable.

The wisdom of this determination, had it not been sanctioned by recent experience, and by regard to the newness of the French people in the duties of self-government, was demonstrated by its effects on the two factions, to the hostility of which the real friends of the republic were exposed. The royalist and jacobin leaders were sorely disappointed to find they would still have to contend against the resolute, experienced, and incorruptible men, who had abolished monarchy, overthrown Robespierre, could neither be bribed nor terrified, and, in the midst of civil discord

had kept more than half the European world at bay. In the agitation of a general election, in the disaffection of untried men, or in the folly of inexperienced counsellors, both parties hoped for the destruction of liberty; one sighing for the despotism of clubs and demagogues, the other for the rule of concubines and kings. Although the operation of the additional acts was expressly limited, and with decreasing force, to the two first years of the proposed government, it was not the less objectionable to these parties. For it was precisely in this early stage of its existence that they hoped, the royalists with the help of foreign gold, the jacobins by the effect of declamation and turbulence, to introduce into the two councils a majority of members opposed to the new government.

The opposition, thus compounded, was felt, more or less, in various parts of France, but in Paris it became overwhelming; so that the timid, the imitative, and the idle of the capital, followed in its train and swelled its numbers. The convention, however, reintained a firm tone; submitted their work fairly to the judgment of their countrymen, and waited the decision with becoming confidence.

In Paris, the focus of the factions, as well as the centre of the government, the result was of course to be first known, both to the convention and its leading adversaries. Orations in the halls, essays in the journals, the arts of intrigue, and the force of intimidation, were all employed by designing or intemperate malcontents, to embolden and augment the opposition. At first, their efforts were more successful than they deserved to be. Of the forty eight sections into which the population of the metropolis was divided, forty seven voted for accepting the constitution, but rejecting the decrees. This decision was pronounced at the expense of the most scandalous injustice and violence. In some sections, the friends of the convention were turned away by force from the polls, and in others they were deterred by threats from approaching them. However, the ill got triumph was short lived. The returns from the departments exhibited a great majority for the constitution and the decrees; the returns from the armies on the frontiers an enthusiastic unanimity. Having been formed by the requisition of 1793, or by subsequent conscriptions, the armies were composed of the soundest part of the population. Their camps, or their battle plains, reschoed their acclamations in favour of the constitution and additional acts. The army of Jourdan, the victors of Fleurus, sent to the convention, from beyond the Rhine, sixty thousand suffrages in favour of the new government.

In some of the departments, strong minorities voted for rejecting the decrees, while, here and there, individuals proposed a king instead of the directory. These exceptions to the general and decided approbation of the country were fortunate for the convention, as they manifested the perfect freedom with which public opinion had been expressed. The votes having been all received, the result, importing that the constitution and the additional acts had been ratified by the people, was proclaimed by the government on the 23d of the September; and the constitution with the acts was declared the fundamental law of The convention, acting with a prudent despatch, next the state. decreed that the people, in their primary assemblies, should nominate their electors by the 2nd of October, that these should complete the election of members of the two councils on or before the 21st, and that the legislature, under the new constitution, should assemble on the 6th of November (4).

The factious leaders of Paris questioned the accuracy of the returns, and demanded of the government a formal inspection of the registers. These were submitted to them, and, to their chagrin, were found faithful and exact. In this situation of affairs, their only expedient was seditious violence, and their final resource a general insurrection of the capital, in hopes of destroying the actual government before the proposed one could get into operation.

The section Lepelletier was particularly active and violent. At their instance, a number of the electors appointed by the people of Paris, in conformity with the new constitution, instead of waiting until the time prescribed by the decree of the convention for exercising their functions, met at the theatre of the Odeon on the 2nd of October, under the protection of several battalions of the national guard. The police attempted to disperse them, but were themselves easily and shamefully driven away. An armed force, under general Menou, was then employed, but it did not arrive until after night, when the crowd had separated, and the assembly retired.

In the course of the night and the next morning, the govern-

ment delivered arms to the few well-affected citizens of all parties who volunteered their services, and placing them under the command of general Berruyer, attached them to general Menou's regular force. During the same time, the section Lepelletier, in conjunction with seven others, declared itself to be in a state of rebellion, and took instant measures for rousing the whole city to arms. Its leaders despatched emissaries, and sounded the tocsin throughout Paris; and the people, inflamed and deluded, seized their arms, and hastened to the places of rendez-vous.

The convention, upon this, decreed their session to be permazent, and charged their appropriate committees with the maintenance of public order. The executive committee, composed of the committees of public safety and general security, then proceeded to direct that the section Lepelletier should be instantly disarmed by military force. About eight o'clock, in the evening of the 3d, general Menou, who commanded the army of the interior, accompanied by the three representatives of the people who were in attendance as commissaries of the convention, proceeded, at the head of a strong force, with a detachment of cavalry and two pieces of cannon, to carry this order into execu-The force of the section was drawn up in the court of the convent des Filles St. Thomas, at the head of the street Vivienne. where the Exchange is now situated. Their parties occupied the windows of the street, and the interior of the convent. entering this street from that of St. Honoré, marched towards them, and got his troops wedged into this long and narrow space, where neither his horse nor his infantry could act to advantage, Afraid to advance, and ashamed to retire, the general and the They summoned the insurgents to deputies resorted to words. obey the order of the government, to deliver up their arms, and retire to their homes. But they gained as little by parley as by force; for Delalot, the leader of the rebels, not only refused obedience to the summons, but delivered an inflammatory harangue to the troops, in which he boldly declared that force alone should deprive the citizens of Paris of their arms. Instead of ordering a charge, Menou and his council of deputies, were glad to enter into a compromise, by which the insurgents agreed to disperse themselves, if Menou would first withdraw his troops. This capitulation enabled the regular troops to retreat, and the

insurgents to maintain their ground, continue their violence, defy the government, and proclaim their triumph. •
Fortunately for the convention, the taste of Bonaparte for dra-

matic entertainments, had led him that evening to the theatre Feydeau, which is close by the head of the street Vivienne. Informed of the threatened conflict, he left the theatre for the purpose of observing this more important scene. He witnessed the unfortunate check of the government force, and, by a natural movement of concern and curiosity, hastened to the gallery of the convention to see what would be done to repair it. He found that assembly in the greatest agitation; the commissaries, who had accompanied Menou, in order to shift the blame from their own shoulders, were accusing the absent general of treason. On their representation, Menou's arrest was decreed; and, of consequence, a successor was to be appointed. The danger was great; and the intelligence of every moment proved that it was Various members proposed different commanders, increasing. some Barras, some Bonaparte; the leading thermidoriens the former, because of his activity in the defeat of Robespierre; the commissaries of the army of Italy, and the members of the committee who were in daily intercourse with him, the latter, because of his military talents, and energetic but moderate character (5). Attending in the gallery, he heard these suggestions, deliberated whether he should accept a service, which, from Menou's fate, was not inviting, might prove more distasteful than the war of la Vendée or the mobs of Toulon, might bathe him deep in civil blood, and blight for ever his hopes of serving his country. But, reflecting, that if the insurgents succeeded in overturning the government, the proposed improvement in the constitution of the country would fail to be effected, and the royalist, or foreign party, would gain the ascendancy, and surrender France to the coalition, he resolved, if he could, to defend the convention (6).

Having come to this decision Bonaparte repaired to the executive committee, told them he had been a witness of the affair in the street Vivienne, and that the deputies were more to blame than Menou was; assuring them it would be impossible for him, should he be appointed to command the troops, to execute their orders on this critical occasion, with his hands tied by a commission of deputies. The members of the committee, struck by his confidence, were convinced by his representation; but it was not

in their power, without exciting a debate, for the issue of which there was not time, to procure a decree of the convention innovating their long established custom so completely, as to send forth a general in chief unattended by a deputation of their own body. In this exigency they devised an expedient, which, while it conformed to their rule, obviated its inconvenience. They resolved to nominate their colleague Barras as general in chief of the army of the interior, and to appoint Bonaparte second in command; so that, while Barras was to have the attendance of the deputies, Bonaparte was to take the direction of the troops.

This being agreed upon, Merlin de Douai, an active member of the committee, at half past four in the morning, reported the project of a decree appointing Barras, provisionally, commander in chief of the army of the interior, and the deputies Delmas, Goupilleau de Fontenay, and Laporte commissaries to attend him. Bonaparte, who was immediately appointed by the committee second in command, had, in consequence of this arrangement, previously entered on his duties. It will be readily conceived as he had controlled the warlike veteran Dugommier, when he was only lieutenant colonel, and had, as fifth in command, actually conducted an important campaign, that Barras, though nominally his superior officer, was really nothing more than his aide-decamp (7). His actual independence in command, on this occasion, becomes still more evident, when we reflect that, having just refused to subject himself to the supervision of the deputies, he would naturally have rejected the authority of Barras as an equal incumbrance.

Having undertaken this service with deliberation, he proceeded to perform it without delay. From Menou, who was detained in an adjoining apartment of the Tuileries, he procured information respecting the force upon which he was to rely. This consisted of five thousand troops. The artillery, composed of forty pieces, was at the camp of Sablons guarded only by twenty five men. With promptness, quickened probably by his familiarity with this instrument of war, he despatched Murat, then a lieutement colonel of cavalry, with three hundred horse, to secure these gams and convey them instantly to Paris. The insurgents, not inattentive to this object, had sent a battalion of national guards to seize the artillery. But the distance being considerable, Murat arrived first, and the insurgent party not daring to

face his horse, by five o'clock in the morning, this active officer had the cannon safe at the Tuileries.

The insurrection was now too deeply rooted and too widely spread, to be suppressed by effecting the measure which Menou The section Lepelletier was in concert with had attempted. nearly all the other sections, and the insurgents were capable of collecting a force of forty thousand national guards. A plan of operations was to be adopted suited to this new state of things: and this Bonaparte determined to make a defensive one, of which the safety and independence of the convention, the palladium of his party, was to be the main object. His measures accordingly were taken to repel any attacks that might be made on the Tuileries; to collect a supply of provisions and ammunition; to protect and encourage, as far as possible, the well-affected part of the population, and to keep open a line of retreat to the country, should that be necessary, in order to obtain support from the departments and the armies. For this purpose, he seized the bridges over the Seine and defended them with cannon; and occupied in a similar way the issues leading to the Tuileries and the river from the street St. Honoré, which is long and parallel to the Seine. Thus on one side he was defended by a long range of houses, on the other by the river. The place Vendôme and the place de la Concorde, he also occupied with infantry and artillery. placing his reserves to which all his cavalry was attached, in the place du Carrousel, and the garden of the Tuileries. He sent a detachment to hold the heights of Meudon, as a point to retreat upon, and another to guard the road from St. Germain, so as to intercept any cannon that might be sent from that place to the insur-He ordered all the ammunition and provisions that could be collected, to be brought to the Tuileries, and sent a supply of small arms to the section des Quinze Vingts, the only one which had voted for accepting the decrees.

It is only necessary to examine a map of Paris, in order to be satisfied of the advantage of occupying these positions. As long as they were held, the Convention, inaccessible on all sides, was safe even from insult, and a line of retreat through the Champs Elysées, and the plain of Grenelle, free for the operation of cavalry and artillery, and out of reach of fire arms from barricades and windows, was open for them and their troops, to the friendly population of the country and the approaching support of the

armies. Each position was in itself strong, the troops were concentrated under the eye of the commander, and within reach of immediate reenforcement and direction. Having made these dispositions, and placed in command of the several posts, officers, who from rank or character were entitled to confidence, Bonaparte, in conformity with the recommendation of the government. ordered his troops to wait the attack of the insurgents, and in no case to provoke it. This was politic, as it cast the blame of aggression on his adversaries; and it was prudent, as it held his force collected, which was too small to be risked in narrow streets, and exposed to be overpowered or seduced while in the pursuit of separate parties. For, with the addition of the volunteers under General Berruyer, the gendarmes and police, his aggregate force did not exceed eight thousand; and as the passions, when carried to extremes, are apt to run into their opposites, the best mode of striking a panic into the multitude, was to allow at first a free indulgence to their audacity (8).

Meanwhile, the insurgents, who had not been idle, had assembled, on the morning of the 4th of October an armed body of twentyseven thousand men. Their committee, which renewed its meeting in the convent, at the head of the street Vivienne, had issued a decree of outlawry against the executive committee, and established a tribunal for passing sentence on all persons found in arms against the sovereign people of Paris. Several generals had offered them their services, among whom were Danican and Duhoux, who had commanded the republican troops against the royalists in La Vendée. By a strange association, Count Maulevrier, a Vendean chief, and an emigrant royalist Lafond, young, enthusiastic, and daring, were also among their military leaders. Danican, who had been a friend of Hoche, was not without talent, and being restless and declamatory, took with the factious leaders, and was appointed their commander in chief. They intercepted the arms destined for the section des Quinze-Vingts, as well as a quantity of provisions which was being conveyed to the Tuileries. Their troops were well armed, and being composed of the national guard, had been in regular training since the 9th Thermidor, the year before. In addition to the corps of twenty seven thousand men, which was already imbodied, they had, in reserve, about half that number. The women of the lower classes were all in their favour, and were

busy in their efforts to shake the fidelity of the troops of the Convention. So that, if Bonaparte had adopted the most skilful plan of defence, the means of attack in possession of the insurgents, whether consisting of force or seduction, were truly formidable.

One division of his artillery Bonaparte had placed under the command of Muiron, many of whose friends and intimates happened to be of the insurgent party. Observing that they made strenuous efforts to inveigle this favourite officer, Bonaparte, laying aside his authority as commander, addressed him with the frankness of a friend—"Can the government count on your services to-day, Muiron?" A reply in the affirmative removed from his mind every shade of doubt, and Muiron returned his confidence by exhibiting the utmost gallantry and zeal.

The executive committee, as the danger thickened around them, debated various propositions, but came to no effective resolution. Some members proposed that they should district their forces, and receive the insurgents as the Roman sensors did the Gauls. Some advised that they should retreat at once to the camp of Cæsar on the heights of St. Cloud, and wait for reenforcements from the army of the west. Others recommended the appointment of commissioners to make propositions of accommodation to the different sections—a suggestion, which, though it was adopted, led to no important result.

While these vain discussions were prolonged, Lafond, at the head of a column of the insurgents who had intimidated Menou. marched, about half past two o'clock, from the section Lepelletier to the bridge called Pont Neuf. At the same time, another column from the Place de l'Odéon approached in the opposite direction, and formed in the Place Dauphine, on the island by which that bridge is divided. General Cartaux, Bonaparte's former commander at Toulon, had been stationed at this bridge with four hundred men and four pieces of artillery, and with orders to defend both ends of it. But unwilling to come to blows, he retired down the quay to the railing of the Louvre, and allowed Lafond, without obstruction, to join in triumph his friends in the Place Dauphine. The insurgents, at the same time, took possession of the Jardin des Infants, and occupied, in force, the front and steps of the church of St. Roch, the Theatre Français, and the hotel de Noailles, so as to hold possession of the Palais Royal. and the great street of St. Honoré, and to close in upon the posts of Bonaparte as nearly as possible. Women were sent forward at all points to tempt the men from their colours, and even the popular leaders themselves advanced, with flourishing and fraternal gestures, in the hope of corrupting them.

Thus the day was passing away, one side threatening to attack, the other resolved on defence, when, about half past three in the afternoon, the rebel commanders, apprised of the state of feeling in the mass of the nation and the ranks of the army, saw the necessity of precipitating matters. To cover their violence with the respectability of peaceful forms, and probably in hopes of overawing the Convention, they summoned the government by a flag of truce to remove the troops, whose presence menaced the good citizens of Paris, and to disarm the men of terror, as they denominated the volunteers, who were arrayed against them. Their herald was conducted blindfold to Bonaparte, by whom he was introduced to the executive committee, as to the council of a besieged garrison. His threatening language agitated them sensibly, but did not overcome their resolution. The shades of evening were now approaching, and parties of the insurgents had glided from house to house, so as to get into windows within gun shot of the Tuileries. Bonaparte, with a view of strengthening his reserve, had eight hundred muskets and a supply of cartridges, conveyed to the hall of the Convention; a measure which, although it alarmed some of the members, by showing them the full extent of the danger, committed all irretrievably in the contest, and enabled the resolute, in case of need, to give the modern Gauls a warmer reception than their ancestors had experienced from the senate of Rome.

About half past four, when an orderly dragoon had been already shot in the street St. Honoré, and a woman wounded on the steps of the Tuileries; and when the head of Lafond's column was seen approaching the palace on the opposite side of the river, Bonaparte determined to put forth his strength. Sending orders to his posts on the Seine, to open a fire of artillery on Lafond, he hastened to the street Dauphin, where one of his detachments was menaced by a large body of the national guard, drawn up in front and on the steps of the church of St. Roch, and preparing to force their way to the Tuileries. To run forward his pieces, and pour upon this party repeated discharges of grape that; to drive them with general Berruyer's volunteers from the

front and steps of the church into its body; and then, pointing his cannon up and down the street, to clear that important ave nue of the enemy, was the work of a few minutes. Leaving tha post and a very guarded pursuit, in charge of an approve officer, he galloped to the river. Danican and Maulevrier base united themselves by this time with Lafond, and they were a three, with about seven thousand men, advancing in close column and at the charging step, along the quay upon the Pont Royal which emboldened by Cartaux's indecision at the other bridge they hoped by one determined effort to carry. With the batter at the Louvre, that at the Pont Royal, and with pieces planter at intermediate points along the quay of the Tuileries, Bonapart directed a rapid discharge of grape shot on the front, flank, and rear, of this dense mass. The effect was of course murderous The insurgents shewed no want of courage, and though the several times wavered and broke, were as often rallied. Lafon proved himself a hero. Remembering the weakness of Menou and impelled by his own fierce valour, he collected his braves followers, and while his main body fired from the quay, twice threw himself upon the bridge, attempting to seize the guns am force the pass by a headlong charge. But Bonaparte was then in person, and twice repelled him by volleys of grape and musketry. The undaunted zealot, who had been a subaltern is the royal guard, rushed a third time to the charge, and desisted not till the fire of his adversary had by death or terror, destroyed At this point and at the church of St. Roch, the

At six o'clock, the insurgents after an action of an hour and a half, were defeated in all their attacks, and their cannon sent from St. Germain being intercepted, had lost all hope. Bonaparte, is taking in his turn the offensive, with a sentiment like that of Casas at Pharsalia, ordered blank cartridges only to be fired, justly in ferring that, when such crowds, after the indulgence of confidence and a desperate exertion of courage, were once put to flight, the sound of a gun would keep up their panic (9). This forbearance saved many lives. During the night, he cleared the streets o barricades, patroled the rue Royale and the Boulevards, dislodger a party from the church St. Roch, and surrounded with detachments of infantry and artillery another party in the Palais Royal The next day it was easily dispersed, as was a body who had

collected in the convent at the head of the rue Vivienne. By noon on the 5th of October, the insurrection was suppressed, and tranquillity perfectly restored. The killed and wounded, of which rather the smaller number belonged to the troops of the convention, amounted to between four and five hundred. Bonaparte had a horse shot under him. The deputies Sieyes, Louvet, and Fréron, behaved with remarkable firmness.

This victory, which caused infinite satisfaction to the real friends of the republic, who saw in it the defeat of Bourbon hopes, foreign intrigues, and domestic treason, renewed and augmented the authority of the convention, very seasonably for the establishment of the new constitution. The members of that assembly were sensible of its value, as well in regard to the imminence of danger from which it rescued themselves, as to the series of convulsions from which it saved their country. report from the committee of public safety, which was adopted by the convention in the sitting of the 5th, it is described as, "a victory gained over a coalition of royalism and anarchy, the most glorious of the revolution, and also the most fortunate, as it was likely to close that great struggle." As in spite of Barras's efforts to appropriate the credit to himself, it was known to be the work of Bonaparte, this report placed him by the hands of the government itself before the eyes of the nation, as a great public benefactor, and in consequence of the nominal superiority but real insignificance of Barras, brought more clearly into view his The invidious previous services at Toulon and in the Alps. meanness of Barras, it appears, he disdained to notice.

On the 9th, Barras having formally declared to the convention that public order and tranquillity had been reestablished, Bonaparte, with the officers who had fought under his orders, was received at the bar of that assembly. As his extraordinary authority conferred by the committee of public safety, might be considered liable to terminate with the suppression of the insurrection, his appointment, as second in command of the army of the interior, upon the reluctant motion of Barras, was confirmed by the unanimous vote of the convention, with a knowledge that the chief command, nominally held by Barras, was, in a few days, to be resigned, and, in the midst of acclamations attending the avowal that the convention was indebted to Bonaparte for its safety (10). In conformity with this arrangement, Barras re-

signed his nominal command on the 26th of October, having held it, in conjunction with his incompatible office of deputy, for the short space of three weeks.

The government, loathing the exterminating punishments of the reign of terror, used their victory with the utmost moderation. The ringleaders of the insurgents were, of course, capitally condemned, but Lafond alone was executed. He avowed and exulted in his offence, with such defiance and pertinacity, that, although a disposition to spare him was felt, it could not be pradently indulged. A different sentiment prevailed towards Menou, who had exhibited weakness, and was accused of treason. The triumph of his successor, contrasted with his failure, exposed his weakness, and aggravated his disgrace. The government was disposed, and the witnesses were interested, to sacrifice him. But the influence which Bonaparte had acquired, by repairing the consequences of Menou's indecision, was generously exerted to save his life. He declared to the members of the court, whom he assembled for the purpose by an invitation to breakfast, that, if Menou deserved death, the three representatives who had directed the military operations, and parleyed with the insurgents, deserved the same punishment. This opinion, coming from the vanquisher of the insurrection and the protector of the convention, awakened a sentiment favourable to Menou. The members of the court, seeing no reason that, in a parity of guilt, death should be the lot of the military officer, and impunity the privilege of the civil agent, acquitted Menou.

As commander in chief of the army of the interior, Bonaparte had to keep down the slumbering factions, of which, one having root in the gold of England and the intrigues of emigrants, and the other in the ambition of demagogues and traitors, neither mercy nor severity could effect the extinction. He had also, in the infancy of the new government, to execute the rigorous measures of disarming the obnoxious sections, and of disbanding and reorganising the national guard. The task, which required energy and address, was increased in difficulty by an extreme scarcity of money and food, a grievance which could not but excite discontent, and embarrass authority. Nevertheless, he succeeded in executing the orders of the directory, and maintaining the tranquillity of the capital. He was sometimes obliged to intimidate the clubs, at others to harangue the populace. On one occasion, he was sur-

rounded by a mob, menacing in their gestures and language, and clamorous for bread. A large fat woman was particularly violent. "These dandy officers" (épauletiers), said she 'laugh at us; so that they can and get fat, they care not if we starve." "My dear," replied the general, "look at me, and say which of us is the fatter of the two." He was then so very slender, that the striking contrast and the seasonable jest excited the mirth of the crowd at the women's expense, and separating peaceably, they made way for Research. In these collisions with the inhabitants of Paris, it was his own remark that the population of the faubourg St. Anteins, composed principally of the poorer people, was the most esceptible of reasonable impressions and generous impulses: a fact, which shows that he possessed that true elequence which, while it might be lost upon artificial classes of society, such as noles or priests, fell with irresistible force on the common people. where feelings flow fresh from the fountains of nature, and whose interests are inseparably connected with the general good.

Among the least unpleasant of his duties was that of securing the members of the new government, from a repetition of those outrages to which their predecessors had often and recently been exposed. For this purpose, he recomposed and strengthened the constitutional guard of the legislature, and formed one for the directory. After organizing the national guard, which consisted of a hundred and four battalions, and of the volunteers who fought so bravely under general Berruyer having created a legion of police, he established a camp of discipline and exercise in the plain of Grenelle. In executing these various duties, he was brought into intimate relation with the people of Paris, who, together with the military corps which he constituted, felt and retained the impression of his plastic hand.

It was while he commanded the army of the interior, and some time after he had excuted the decree for disarming the sections, that he formed the acquaintance of the lady who became his first, his most amiable, and his devoted wife. She was the widow of general Beauharnais, one of the last victims of the guillotine. The incident which led to this acquaintance was marked by the most interesting emotions of our nature; and the account which Bonaparte has left of it, shows how deeply sensible he was to their influence.

"The measure of disarming the sections had been carried into

execution, when there presented himself one morning at the head quarters of the commander in chief, a boy, ten or twelve years of age, who intreated to have the sword of his father restored to him. This boy, was Eugène de Beauharnais, afterwards viceroy of Italy. Napoleon, touched by the nature of his application, and the graces of his youth, granted his request. On receiving the sword of his father, Eugène burst into tears. The general, affected by the emotion of the son, treated him with so much kindness, that Madame de Beauharnais felt herself under an obligation to wait on him the next day with the expression of her thanks. It is unnecessary to speak of the extreme grace, the soft and enchanting manners of the empress Josephine. Their acquaintance thus commenced, soon became intimate and tender, and resulted, without much delay, in marriage."

It would be difficult to conceive circumstances more natural, feelings more affecting, or language more artless, than are found in this domestic memorial; the personages a graceful boy, a lovely woman, and a youthful hero; the sentiments, of which it may be said with truth,

"He best can paint them who shall feel them most;"

filial piety, manly benevolence, maternal gratitude, and generous sensibility. The altar of love never burned with a purer flame; nor does ancient poetry furnish any thing of higher interest than this scene of actual life, which, it is surprising, the pencil of modern art has not yet consigned to the canvass. In producing it, fortune seems to have decided that the history of Bonaparte's love, should be as simple and as grand as the progress of his glory. As this was the exclusive effect of his services and merit, so that was the independent result of his taste and affection; interest and indirection, the usual instruments of successful ambition, having been utter strangers to his public advancement and his marriage tie (11).

The winter passed away, the capital was quiet, the government through all its departments, in unobstructed operation, and the season for military operations approached. The plans of the directory were enterprising, and their project on the side of Italy particularly bold. But general Scherer, instead of profiting, as it was supposed he might have done, by the victory of Loano, had remained inactive, and demanding urgently supplies and

reenforcements, expressed apprehensions of retreating behind the Var before the formidable preparations of the allies. The directory displeased and disconcerted, did what they had done when they were members of the convention, and when Kellermann instead of Scherer was the inefficient general: they consulted Bonaparte, whose claims to their attention, continued personal acquaintance, and recent events had strengthened. In January, 1796, he furnished in writing the plan of an offensive campaign on that frontier, which, added to their own conviction, and the well-known confidence of the army of Italy, in regard to his talents, determined the directory to trust for safety and conquest on that oft-contested frontier to general Bonaparte. In the beginning of March he was appointed commander in chief of the army of Italy; and, on the 9th of that month, was married to Madame de Beauharnais.

This, it may be supposed, was one of the happiest periods of The woman of his choice was the wife of his bosom, and the field of glory, in which he longed to shine, was now expanded to his enterprise. Around him were the pleasures of love; before him the prospects of honour: and within him the impatience of a martial spirit fretted with the reluctance of an enraptured heart. In the pauses of hope and joy, if he looked back on the growth of his fortune, from its infancy when he was an orphan scholar of Brienne, to the vigorous promise of its present state, his reflections must have been fraught with pure and solid satisfaction. In a season of faction, strife, selfishness, suspicion, and cruelty, he had passed from subordination to eminence, without swerving for a moment from the path of independence, openness, and honour: had condescended to no solicitation, stooped to no compliance, mixed with no intrigue, contracted no obligation, participated in no injustice. Persecuted by the deputies, he had not sunk into submission; flattered by the army, he had not been inflated with self love: so that he escaped the guillotine without propitiating the government, and more difficult still, excelled his own commanders without disobliging them. His opportunities, which were common to officers of his rank, had, in every instance, been surpassed by his exploits, while his advancement always lagged behind his services. Conscious of being indebted to no man, he felt that to him generals owed their fame, armies their success, individuals their lives, and the government

its existence. Such may well have been his reflections at this dawning season of his fame; for nothing is more remarkable in his history, than the direct, unassisted, and undesigning steps by which his elevation was accomplished (12). Filled with such thoughts as these, and "snuffing the battle from afar," upon the difficulty of succeeding where older generals had failed being suggested to him, he said, "in one campaign I shall be old or dead;" meaning that he would have gained immortality or lost his life.

A few fleeting days were given to Josephine; when, in an evil hour for his country's foes he left Paris, and, paying a brief visit to his mother at Marseilles, proceeded by rapid journies to Nice, where he arrived on the 20th of March; and, on the 27th of that month, took command of the army of Italy (13).

CHAPTER VI.

From March 1796, to May 1796.

haly-The valley of the Po-The states and forces by which it was defended -The instructions of the directory to Bonaparte-The folly of those instructions-Comparative numbers and condition of the hostile armies-Sufferings of the French-Their want of food, money, horses, and artillery -Bonaparte relieves general Scherer-His appointment acceptable to the troops-Not so altogether to Massena and Augereau-The force and ascendancy of his character-Anecdote-Transfers the head quarters to Albenga-Mutiny of the 29th regiment-Royalist emissary-The mutineers punished, and the emissary arrested-Efficacious attention of Bonaparte to the subsistence of his troops-His march to Albenga-Disdains to return the cannonade of Nelson-Address to his army-Its character and effects-His generals and aides de camp—The high spirit of the army—Bonaparte's plan of invasion—His object frustrated by the advance of general Laharpe -Stations of the several divisions of his army-Beaulieu opens the campaign—His activity and plan of operations—He advances upon Voltri— Directs Argenteau upon Savona-Bonaparte resolves to detain Beaulieu at Voltri, and to attack Argenteau-Combat of Voltri-Of Monteligino-Good conduct of Cervoni-Heroism of Rampon-Battle of Montenotte-Defeat of Argenteau-Advance of the French-Beaulieu and Nelson disconcerted-Battle of Millesimo-Gallantry of Joubert-Surrender of Provera-Passage of the Bormida and storming of Dego-Defeat of Beaulieu and further advance of the French-Surprise of Dego-Retaken by the Austrians—Countermarch of Bonaparte—Battle of Dego—Heroic conduct and death of general Causse-Promptness and activity of Bonaparte-Gallantry of Lanusse and of Lannes-Sanguinary defeat of the Austrians -Recapture of Dego-Bonaparte prudent after his surprise-Sends to reconnoitre Voltri-The Austrians and Sardinians completely separated-Libarpe's division posted on the Belbo-Serrurier's divison advanced against the Sardinians-The action of the army reversed-March of the French upon Ceva - They reach the commanding height of Mentezemoto-The plains of Italy in view-Feelings of the troops-Emotion and remark of Bonaparte-Attack upon Ceva-The Sardinians driven with loss from

their intrenched camp-Alarm of the court of Turin-The French pass the Tanaro-Their active pursuit-General Colli retreats behind the Corsaglio-Serrurier passes that river-Driven back-Bonaparte's dispositions for advancing-Directs Augereau to march down the right bank of the Tanaro-With Serrurier and Massena passes the Corsaglio-Battle of Mondovi-Defeat of the Sardinians-Pursued by general Stengel with the French cavalry-His death and character-Gallantry of Murat-Rapid advance of the French army towards Turin-Serrurier enters Fossano, Massena Cherasco, and Augereau Alba-Bonaparte fortifies Cherasco-His preparations for strengthening his army—The king of Sardinia saes for peace—His general proposes a suspension of arms—Answer and coaditions of Bonaparte—His frankness and moderation—Armistice of Cherasco-Sufferings of the French troops for food-Their plandering-Discontent of the officers-General Laharpe tenders his resignation-Firmness and equity of Bonaparte—His measures to supply food to his troops, to repair his losses, and to strengthen his position—He equips his cavalry and prepares a park of artillery-His victories celebrated by the French legislature—His conduct approved by the directory—He resolves to invade the Italian possessions of the house of Austria.

The country which General Bonaparte was about to invade, nature and time had rendered strong and magnificent. Its mountains, rivers, and lakes, constitute barriers of formidable opposition, and objects of the utmost beauty and grandeur. In the bosom of its loveliest plains a foreign despot ruled its people with a leaden sceptre. It was a field tempting to the ambition of a youthful warrior, who drew his lineage from princes of the land; but, whether for the purposes of subjection or deliverance, it was not to be entered but by the boldest efforts of enterprize and skill (1).

Bonaparte has left a description of Italy, which, as a specimen of geographical painting, and statistical fullness and precision, is unrivalled. This it would be useless to transcribe, and is dangerous to abridge. That portion of Italy which, as distinguished from its peninsular and insular divisions, he calls the continental part, the great valley of the Po, embraced between the Alps and the Appennines, and stretching eastward to the Adriatic Sea, was to be the theatre of his first campaigns. Through the centre of this vast and fertile plain rolls the stately current of the Po, increased on each side by the tribute of numerous rivers. Those from the Appennines are short and rapid, and except, when

swollen by the rains of winter, are generally fordable. Those from the Alps are longer and more copious, spread into frequent lakes, and fed by melting snows, are at their full in summer. This charming country, comprehending Piedmont, Lombardy, the duchies of Parma and Modena, the Roman Legations and Venetian States, thus fortified by mountains and intersected by streams, contained many proud cities, much wealth, and a dense population. Supposing it reduced within the outlines of a regular figure, its extent might be adequately defined by stating its length from west to east at three hundred miles, and its breath at eighty. It was defended against Bonaparte not only by its mountain ramparts, but by the forces and fortresses of the king of Sardinia, the well known and wily porter of the Alps; by a powerful army under a distinguished general of the Emperor of Austria; by a contingent from Naples; these active adversaries, supported by the less direct, but not less effectual cooperation of the other states of Italy, Tuscany and Venice excepted, and by the fleets and subsidies of England.

As the instructions of the directory to their general bear a date anterior to his departure from Paris, there is reason, from that fact, to suppose they were prepared after a full consideration of his own suggestions. This inference, which is confirmed by his affirmation, arises from the character of the instructions themselves (2). They are contained in a letter dated the 6th of March, and consist of a series of military subtleties, interspersed with inconsistent directions and counteracting exhortations and restraints, superinduced upon a bold and sagacious design. This design is divided into two stages; the first comprising a detailed and, himited plan of invasion; the second sketching an extensive and undefined project of conquest. The object of the immediate and chaberated plan was to compel the king of Sardinia to abandon the coalition against France, and to force Austria to enter into a treaty of peace with the republic. The drift of the vague and elterior project was, to uproot the Austrian ascendancy, and to the native governments, in Italy.

he prosecuting the first design, the general was instructed to give an alternate direction to his blows; that is, he was first to best the Sasdinians, that he might aim an unimpeded stroke at the Austrians; he was next to beat the Austrians, that he might detach the court of Turin from the coalition; and was to detach

the court of Turin from the coalition, that he might follow up his assaults upon the Austrians with such active and undivided vigour as should force the Emperor, notwithstanding the mercenary and inveterate stimulants of England (3), to postpone his abhorrence of amity with a popular government, to the prudence of accepting terms of peace.

In pursuing this vibratory course of operations, the general was recommended, with scrupulous emphasis, to limit his advance in the direction of Turin, in the first instance, to the taking of Ceva and the observation of Coni; then to operate exclusively by his right, and with such boldness, as to drive the Austrians beyond the Po, and disquiet them by a serious demonstration against Milan. This movement, which is enjoined with earnest repetition, had it been executed, would have placed Bonaparte between the Austrian army under Beaulieu, at least equal to his own, and that of Colli, reenforced by draughts from numerous and powerful garrisons, and by detachments from the army of the duke of Aoste, who, at the head of a superior force, was opposed to the army of the Alps under Kellermann. The perilous tendency of this sinuous and attenuated scheme, makes its conception wonderful, and its folly plain (4).

The inaccurracy of data, both political and military, upon which the directors proceeded in developing their plan, is not less remarkable, and shows how difficult it is for a secretary in his closet, and more especially for a cabinet of coordinate ministers. to prescribe the movements of an army in the face of the enemy. For example, the directory argued on the assumption that Ceva was a first-rate fortress, whereas it was a secondary one, and that Tortona, a place of great strenght, would, if attacked, offer but slight resistance. They assumed that the court of Turin was held in the coalition, not by inclination and interest, but by the force of Austrian predominance and English treasure, was disposed to prefer an alliance with France, and would be likely to embrace that connection, provided an equivalent for the succours of England, and protection against the power of Austria, were furnished by France (5). Upon this conclusion they projected a negotiation with the king of Sardinia, in virtue of which, and in return for the promise of indemnity in the Milanese territory, they were not without hopes that he would unite his forces with the French army, and relinquish, by treaty, all title to the duchy of Savoy and the county of Nice, which, in the previous campaigns had been wrested from him by conquest.

But nothing could be more fallacious than this speculation upon the policy of the king of Sardinia, who was prompted by feelings grounded in family connection, by the instincts of royalty and self-preservation, to resist the progress of the French arms, and to cut short the existence of the French republic.

With singular inconsistency, the general was directed to undertake sieges in the heart of Piedmont and Mont Ferrat, and in the presence of superior armies, without exposing to the chances incident to a reverse, his battering cannon; was to encourage the subjects of Sardinia to form a political fraternity with the French, and yet was to exact from them heavy contributions to support his army; and was to separate the court of Turin from the coalition, but was not to consent to a suspension of arms, without receiving special authority from the directory. These pragmatical instructions, while they ostensibly sent forth the general to gain victories and conquer dominions, really withheld from him the power of carrying on the war, or of bringing about a peace (6). He was bound, therefore, to be guided by the great principles of military prudence and duty, and to conform to the current pressure of circumstances and the evident interests of his country, rather than to the confused and impracticable commands of the directory. He was, in short, to navigate the sea of danger, upon which, in defending the independence of his country, he boldly launched, not upon the track laid down in his chart, but upon a course adapted to the object of the voyage, and to the force and direction of the winds and tides.

The state of his army was not more satisfactory than the stature of his instructions. His force did not exceed thirty-five thousand men, while that of the enemy, well fed, supplied, and appointed, with a full proportion of cavalry and a train of two handred cannon, amounted to seventy thousand (7). Rations of meat, had for some time ceased to be distributed in the French camp, and even the supply of bread was precarious. On the cold and snowy Alps, the republicans had wintered, half clad, ill shod, and without tents. Hunger and frost, which thinned their ranks by disease and desertion, had forced the troops into habits of plunder and insubordination. They lived by a system of marauding, which leading them often into the chemy's country,

was, besides its other inconveniences, not unattended with danger and loss. Upon mountains of rock and ice, the horses of the army had sunk down and perished; so that the cavalry consisting of two thousand four hundred men, was for the greater part dismounted, and even many of the staff officers were afoot. The arsenals of Nice and Antibes contained abundant stores of ordnance; but five hundred mules which constituted the sole means of transport remaining to the army, admitted the employment of but thirty light pieces. The military chest was empty, and the financial efforts of the government had been able to supply the new general with no more than two thousand crowns in gold, and one million of francs in bills, half of which were protested. So low in short were his means, and so desperate the poverty of the army, that when, soon after his arrival, he directed a payment, which distributed according to rank gave each general of division three Louis d'or (8), it was received as a gratification, while the proportionate fraction, paid on account to the privates, produced more surprise than satisfaction, and more satisfaction than comfort. This latter payment he was enabled to effect only by his personal influence with a zealous contractor (9).

His reception by general Scherer, and his relief of that officer, seem to have been marked by every circumstance of propriety on both sides. On the day after assuming the command, Bonaparte thus expressed himself in a letter to the directory: "I am particularly gratified with my reception by general Scherer; who by his honourable deportment and readiness to supply me with all useful information, has acquired a right to my gratitude. His health appears to be really somewhat impaired. To great facility in expressing himself he unites an extent of general and military knowledge, which may probably induce you to deem his services useful in some important station."

To most of the regiments, the new general had been known, either at the siege of Toulon, or in the campaign of Saorgio; and even to the division which, upon the conclusion of the Spanish war, had been led by Augereau from the Pyrenees to the Alps, as they had fought under Dugommier in 1794, his name was familiar. He was received therefore as commander in chief with satisfaction by the army; although it appears that Augereau, and, with better pretensions, Massena, at first regarded his appointment as in some sort derogating from their rank and reputation (10). But this

partial discontent was of momentary existence, was suppressed immediately by the superiority of his character, and speedily removed by the events of the campaign; while its temporary prevalence, by inducing these generals to elevate the standard of their own merit, may have had the effect of inciting them to extraordinary hardihood and prowess.

His personal appearance was, at this period of his life, very different from what it subsequently became. His face was so fleshless, that the chiselled form and fine expression of his features, were overcast with a look saturnine and severe. According to the fashion of the time, his hair which shaded his forehead, was tied behind, and fell in what were called dog's ears down his temples and cheeks. His figure was light and slender; and his rounded limbs terminated in feet and hands of such feminine proportion and delicacy, that it was evident his power of physical exertion and endurance was supplied by the energy of his mind. On the other hand, his mental faculties were in a great measure independent of the influence which variations in the health or tension of robust and muscular frames, frequently exercise upon the intellect.

Having been accustomed to command even when he was legally subordinate, it was easy for him to control, when he became chief in authority. The force of that ascendancy, which even at this stage of his career he exerted over those who approached him, was exemplified as he passed through Toulon, in the person of Decrès, his future minister of marine. This naval officer, who had known him at Paris before his appointment, believed himself on a footing of perfect familiarity with the general of the army, of Italy. Under this impression, upon hearing that Bonaparte was to pass through Toulon, he proposed to introduce several of his brother officers, with a view of obliging them, and of showing off the intimacy which he enjoyed with a commander in chief. Attended by his comrades, he hastened to present himself, and was advancing, with the utmost cordiality, to salute the general, when the attitude, the look, the voice of the latter, stopped him short. There was nothing repulsive, injurious, nor even stern; but there was a magical something that prescribed a limit, which Decrès confessed to a friend, he never afterwards dared to overstep.

Upon relieving general Scherer, Bonaparte's first care was to break the attachments of custom which held the head quarters of

the army of Italy inveterately stationary at Nice. They were ordered to be transferred immediately to Albenga, a town on the coast, about seventy miles in the direction of Genoa, for which town the troops cantoned around Nice were directed to march. To such a degree was the discipline of the army on this frontier depraved by long suffering, fruitless combats, and frequent change of commanders, that certain companies of the 29th refused to obey the order. With this insubordinate spirit, political malcontents and royalist intriguers, who, under the corresponding direction of Pichegru and the prince of Condé, were then in full activity on the frontiers, had managed to infuse into that corps a tendency to Bourbonism so successfully, that one of the companies called itself the company of the Dauphin, and two of the officers had ventured to shout long live the king! At the same time, and, as if in concert with these dangerous manifestations, a French emigrant presented himself at the advanced posts, in the character of a Sardinian officer, with a flag of truce and a communication from From the coincidence of these events, Bonaparte general Colli. naturally and justly apprehended a correspondence between his mutineers and the agents of general Colli. He determined, therefore, to be prompt and stern, if not rigorous, in dealing with this threatening disorder. In spite of Colli's remonstrances, and the ostensible character of the Sardinian emissary, he was detained (11), while both the disobedient and the royalist officers were arrested, the companies disbanded, the men sent into the rear, and distributed in another regiment. This energetic correction humbled the mutineers, and contributed to establish habits of obedience and the force of discipline. These, it was the great object of the general to restore, not by unjust severity, but by removing the causes of disorder; for, as he wrote to the directory. the sufferings of the men extenuated their misconduct; and, "without discipline, he could not hope for victory."

Looking closely and severely into the errors and abuses of the commissariat, he commenced at once a system of productive economy, active control, and inexorable correction in the departments of subsistence; and, seconded by the zeal of one of the contractors, he succeeded, in less than a week, by employing his limited means to the best advantage, in furnishing the troops with salt and fresh meat alternately every day. This addition to their diet had as good an effect upon the health as upon the temper of the army.

On the march from Nice, along the rugged and precipitous shore of the Mediterranean, the head quarters, with the rear and baggage of the army, were exposed to the cannonade of Nelson's squadron. Their fire, though incessant and not harmless, Bonaparte received with such bold contempt, that he would not allow the columns to halt, either for the purpose of avoiding or returning it (12).

Arrived at Albenga, he reviewed his troops, and, for the first time, addressed them in those accents, which, whether grave or animated, never failed to awaken transports of enthusiasm in the soldier's breast. On this occasion his words were few, and not flattering. "Soldiers! you are naked and hungry; the government owes you much, but can pay you nothing. Your patience and valour in the midst of these rocks are admirable, but they cannot win for you martial fame. I propose to lead you into the most fertile plains on the globe. Rich provinces, great cities, will be in your power; there you will find honour, glory, and wealth. Soldiers of Italy! can you be wanting in courage and perseverance?"

There was boldness of promise in this address; but, at the same time, hard conditions, and plain truth. The soldiers were told that they were to serve their country without food, clothes, or pay, and were to procure these, as well as wealth and glory, only at the expense of hardship and peril. If they were to gain homourable rewards, they were to submit to unexampled privations, and to accomplish prodigious undertakings.

Had these propositions been balanced in the measured phrases, and veiled in the studied sophisms of a rhetorician, they would have produced discouragement and irritation, rather than the impulse of military ardour. But, in Bonaparte's direct and simple expressions, there was a tact more exquisite than art, which genus only could inspire, and the firmest valour could the best feel. Accordingly, this short and stern address, roused and elevated the gallantry of the army, as the freshening wind swells and directs the billows of the sea. Impelled by its energy and truth, their courage rose above the sense of suffering and injustice. The instinct of the soldiers, more perspicacious than the judgment of satesmen, felt the glorious spirit of their leader: they answered his address with eager acclamations, and gave him at once their entire confidence. Generous men! they complained no more of

injustice, penury, or want; and sighed only for battle, victory, and fame. In the character and effect of this address, when they are attentively considered, may be discovered the germs of those wonders which the campaign unfolded.

The divisions were commanded by Massena, Augereau, Serrurier, and Laharpe; the cavalry, by generals Stengel and Kilmaine, and the artillery, such as it was, by general Dujard. Among the generals of brigade some of whom had served at Toulon and in the campaign of Saorgio, were Victor, Joubert, and St. Hilaire, names soon to be famed in war. Berthier, an officer of peculiar qualifications for the post, was adjutant general of the army. Murat, Muiron, Junot, Marmont, Duroc, Lemarrais, and Louis Bonaparte, were aides-de-camp to the commander in chief. The regiments had been trained in the best school for military virtue, in penury and hardship, and had been steeled to danger in battles on the Pyrenees and the Alps. The moral feeling or military tone of the army, was therefore greatly superior to its numerical force or material condition.

The plan of Bonaparte's invasion of Italy differed from those of former conquerors who, in ancient or modern times, carried their victorious arms beyond the mountain ramparts of that beautiful He determined to enter Piedmont, not by either of the passes of the Alps, which, owing to their immense altitude are blocked up with snow eight months in the year, and are besides guarded at their outlets by numerous and strong fortresses; but through the pass of Cadibone, where the chain of the Alps declines to its lowest point, and the Appennines rise from their least elevation. To use his own descriptive phrase, instead of forcing the Alps, he resolved to turn them. The western outlet of this pass, about thirty miles south of Albenga, terminated at the port of Savona, a place suitable for the depot of the army; while, to the eastward, it issued from the mountains between Ceva and Acqui, two of the least formidable of the enemy's fortified places, and at a point threatening equally the Austrian and Sardinian camps.

Adopting this line of invasion, it was necessary to assemble the army on its right. This delicate operation, as the passes of the Alps were yet obstructed by snow, he counted on effecting with—I out interruption from Colli; and as the positions of the Austrians were more distant, without interference from Beaulieu. To provide against the more probable annoyance of , former, he

strengthened the connection betwen the left of Augereau and the right of Serrurier, by occupying with a detachment of Rusca's brigade, the position of La Sotta, which commanded one of the passes in that quarter, and the importance of which his previous acquaintance with that region of the Alps, enabled him at once to comprehend. His hope was to appear suddenly in the plains of Italy, to attack the Austrians or Sardinians separately, and with the mountains in his rear to manœuvre against Turin or Milan as he should judge more feasible.

The left division under Serrurier was posted at Ormea and Garessio, on the eastern slope of the Alps, and the head waters of the Tanaro, in observation of Colli; who, with the Sardinian army which constituted the right wing of the allied force, was encamped and intrenched around Ceva. The centre divisions under Massena and Augereau, were stationed at Loano, Finale, and Savona, towns on the sea coast. Laharpe with the right division, was advanced toward Genoa, having his vanguard under general Cervoni, pushed forward as far as Voltri (13).

This disposition of Laharpe's corps had been made before Bonaparte's arrival, in concert with the proceedings of the French agent at Genoa; who in order to intimidate that feeble state, and extort from its fears, a loan to the French treasury, had demanded a passage for troops through the Genoese territority, and anmounced that the French were to penetrate into Lombardy by the pass of the Bochetta. This inopportune step, which, though founded on the outrage permitted on the French flag and the frigate La Modeste, gave naturally offence and alarm to the Genoese government, being instantly communicated to the Austrian general, induced him to draw his troops from their winter quarters, and commence the campaign.

Beaulieu, though old, does not appear to have been inactive, or, on this occasion at least, hesitating. Conjecturing from his information, that the French commander was determined to take possession of Genoa, and to convert the resources of that neutral republic into means of carrying on the war, a design which he was aware the allies had previously entertained, he took his measures with promptness and vigour. Dividing his army into three torps, he directed Colli with the right to keep Serrurier in check, while himself with the left, and Argenteau with the centre were to push through the mountains, each by the pass in his front, and

unite their forces on the left of the French, in the basin of Savona. Argenteau was to march by the road of lower and upper Montenotte (14), and then to force his way by Monteligino, directly to Savona. Beaulieu whose head quarters were at Novi, was to take the route of the Bochetta, interpose between the French army and Genoa, communicate with the British squadron on that coast, drive Cervoni back upon Laharpe, Laharpe upon Massena, and forming a junction with Argenteau in the basin or plain of Savona, was to fall, with overwhelming force, upon the front and left flank of the French army.

Bonaparte on the 9th transferred his head quarters to Sayons. Being apprised that the Austrians were in motion, and perceiving that, instead of issuing unexpectedly upon the plains of Piedmont. he should have to fight his way through the mountains, he observed vigilantly the bold and forward movements of his adversary. Aware that he could overcome his vast superiority of means and numbers, only by rapid marches, well directed attacks. and skilful choice of ground, he discovered with pleasure that Beaulieu, by advancing upon Voltri, while Argenteau was only at Montenotte, had interposed the broad ridge of the Appennines between his left and centre, and that consequently Argenteau was more within reach of attack than of support; while three of his own divisions being all on the same side of the mountains, and in connected positions, could be expeditiously collected for a single operation. Combining these perceptions promptly into a system of action, he resolved to detain Beaulieu by a detachment at Voltri, and to fall with his principal force upon Argenteau.

Here at once may be seen the difference between a good general and a great commander. Upon the approach of Beaulien's formidable columns, a good general would have called in his detachments, concentrated his force in some strong position, and risked his life and reputation in its defence. Defeated he would have been compelled to retire; victorious he would have been unable to advance, against the still overwhelming numbers of the allies. But a great commander, facing danger with promptness and sagacity, disables the giant as he lifts his ponderous arm to strike. Acting upon this bold and skilful determination, Bonaparte sent orders to Cervoni to maintain himself obstinately at Voltri; while, to encourage his resistance as well as to protect his retreat, when it should become necessary, he posted two battalions

in his rear on the heights of Voraggio. In the gorge of the pass through which Argenteau proposed to descend upon Savona, and at a point where several routes entering the mountains from Piedmont, unite, stands Monteligino, a rocky eminence which the French had slightly fortified. This post was confided to Colonel Rampon, with the thirty-second regiment, consisting of about one thousand men, which, for its defence of Monteligino, got the surname of the brave, and which became as famous in the campaigns of Italy as the tenth legion was in the army of Cæsar. The occupation and defence of this position, while it afforded additional protection to the retreat of Cervoni, was intended to answer the more important purpose of holding Argenteau back, so that Bonaparte might execute his meditated attack on the centre of Beaulieu's army, while it was completely out of support from his left.

These dispositions were not completed before Bonaparte foresaw their success. Confident of victory, while his generals were measy and apprehensive, he wrote to the directory on the 8th of April in the following sanguine terms-" I have just caused the important position of La Sotta to be occupied. When you read this letter we shall be already engaged in battle. The treasury has not kept its word. Instead of five hundred thousand francs, it has only sent us three hundred thousand, and we have as yet no tidings of the six hundred thousand, which sum was announced. But in spite of all this we shall advance." On the same day, Massena, in a letter to the commander in chief, thus expressed himself:-"I do not know what are your intentions in leaving the troops (of Cervoni) longer at Voltri. I must not conceal from von that our line is too much extended to be defended with so small a force." In a letter of the 9th which General Mesnard addressed to Massena, informing him of the advance of the Austrian centre, he observes, "General Roccavina commands this force. His design is to cut off the retreat of our troops from Voltri, and to make them prisoners."

On the 8th the advanced parties of Beaulieu attacked the corps of Cervoni, amounting to four thousand five hundred men, and were repulsed. On the 10th the Austrians renewed the attack with a force estimated at ten thousand; but Cervoni, although his right was cannonaded by the English squadron, and his left turned by the Austrians, held his ground manfully the whole day. On the 11th he retired to a strong position on the mountain of

Le Fourche, and according to the orders of Bonaparte, fell back at night secretly and rapidly upon Laharpe, at Madona, situated about four miles in front of Savona, on the route to Montenotte.

While Beaulieu with the left wing of his army was thus engaged at Voltri, Argenteau with the centre, which besides a division in the rear connecting it with the army of Colli, mustered fifteen thousand men, advanced from lower to upper Montenotte (15). In the forenoon of the 11th his light column, two thousand five hundred strong, under general Roccavina, attacked the post of Monteligino, but was vigorously met by Colonel Rampon and repelled with loss. In a few hours, Argenteau came up with the division, when a heavier column of attack was formed and a fresh assault made upon Rampon. This was also repulsed. The Austrians prepared a still stronger force for a third assault, indignant at being worsted by a corps so inconsiderable. intrepid Rampon at the same time, who was without water, food or ammunition, proposed to his men a solemn oath, to die rather "Let us die first!" was their herois than yield their post. answer. The Austrians advanced a third time, and reached the breast work of the redoubt, when Rampon with his self-devoted regiment rushed upon them with the bayonet, and with such determined courage, as to drive them with slaughter down the mountain. Upon this reiterated defeat, Argenteau finding his men fatigued and disheartened, drew off and encamped on upper Montenotte, intending to turn the position of Rampon in the morning, and to reach Savona in spite of him. But Bonaparte had prepared for the ill-fated Austrian very different employment.

Laharpe, already at Madona de Savona, was pushed forward on the night of the 11th, to support and supply Rampon, with whom he was united by break of day. Augereau was ordered to cross the Alps from Loano, in the direction of Millesimo, so as to maintain his connection, be in readiness for ulterior operations, and intercept any aid from Colli to Argenteau; and Bonaparte in person, marched at midnight from Savona with Massena's division, to which the brigade of Joubert was united, and placed himself by the dawn of day near upper Montenotte, upon the right and rear of the unsuspecting victim of his celerity and skill.

On the morning of the 12th, while Beaulieu was victoriously establishing himself at Voltri, and opening a communication with commodore Nelson; while Colli was amused near Ceva, by false

attacks which Serrurier was instructed to make; and Argenteau himself was preparing to deal with Rampon alone, he was at once assailed in front by Laharpe and Rampon united, and by Massena in flank and rear. Notwithstanding the suddenness and combination of the French onset, Argenteau seconded by Roccavina, received it with firmness. On this trying occasion, he exhibited intelligence and decision. His plan was to act on the defensive against Laharpe, and to extricate himself by attacking Massena with his principal force. But he was not allowed time nor opportunity; for Bonaparte had posted himself in the centre of Massena's division, and, from a commanding height, gave impulse and direction to his columns (16). Laharpe was ordered to attack the Austrian front at Monteligino, Massena with the brigade Mesnard to dislodge their right from the heights of Montenotte, while Joubert was to penetrate into their rear. These movements nicely combined and vigorously executed, quickly decided the battle : the Austrians, their front overpowered by Laharpe and Rampon, their right driven from Montenotte by Massena, and their rear at the same time assailed, were thrown into confusion, and in spite of the exertions of Argenteau and Roccavina, fled precipitately, with the loss of fifteen hundred men, killed and wounded, two thousand prisoners, five field pieces, and several stands of colours. loss of the French was inconsiderable. Such, succinctly, was the battle of Montenotte, famous for being the first of a long series of victories, of which though not the least brilliant, it was, in consequence of the want of cavalry, among the least decisive. to the skill of Bonaparte's manœuvres, and the rapidity of his onsets, the Austrians were so completely routed, that they must have suffered severely had there been a rapid pursuit. fugitives, the greater part who were Austrians, retreated upon Dego in the direction of Acqui. The Sardinian detachments with difficulty made their way to Millesimo, on the road to Ceva. The former position while it defended the route towards Milan, was in thefine of Beaulieu's countermarch from Voltri, and of the advance of reenforcements from Lombardy. The latter connected the Sardinian detachments with Colli's left wing, and commanded the road to Turin (17).

Although on the morning of the 12th, Beaulieu, who was anxiously concerting with the English commodore, a plan of operations against Savona, heard the distant sound of battle upon

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his right, it was not until the morning of the 13th, that the overthrow of his centre was made known to him. This intelligence fell like a thunderbolt in his path, severed his connection with Nelson's squadron, and dashed to pieces their mutual hopes of victory, invasion, and conquest. He returned in haste to Acqui where he arrived that night; having directed Sebottendorf with the main body of his corps to retrace his march by Sestri and the Bochetta to Dego, and Wukassowich who had been pushed forward with a division of grenadiers on the left of Cervoni, to take the more direct route for the same point, by the way of Sassello. But the route in one case was difficult and rough, and in the other so circuitous, that Sebottendorf's leading battalions only, arrived in time to participate in the next battle.

Bonaparte was not less keen in prosecuting his success, than he had been bold and skilful in gaining it. On the day of the battle of Montenotte, he advanced his head quarters to Carcare, a point at which the springs of the mountains turn their waters to the Po. Laharpe with the right division was ordered to pursue the Austrians on the route towards Sassello, with a view of driving them further upon their left, and of menacing an Austrian detachment of four battalions stationed at that place. He was then suddenly to wheel to his left and march in the direction of Dego. in order to cooperate with Massena in an attack on that fortified position. At the same time, Massena was directed to advance by the main road to Dego, while Augereau's division, which, as Serrurier was yet stationary at Garessio, now formed the left of the line, moved upon Millesimo. At this point the Piedmontese had been joined by Colli, with as many battalions as he could venture to draw from his camp at Ceva and his main position in front of Serrurier; and, at Dego, Argenteau was reenforced by Beaulieu with all the troops which had been able to come up from Thus the Austrian general profiting by his numbers, notwithstanding the defeat and dispersion of his centre, was able to oppose to his adversary more than an equal force, which, though it occupied an extended line, rested on intrenchments on the heights of Dego, and was strongly posted on those of Cairo and Here, covering the two great roads leading into Piedmont and Lombardy, he hoped to maintain himself until the arrival of the troops from Milan and the return of all his divisions from Voltri, should enable him to resume offensive operations, and retrieve the loss and discredit sustained by his lieutenant. But the battle of Millesime, which again disconcerted his plans, gave Bonaparte his second victory.

The enemy had strengthened his right at Millesimo, by occupying a mountain called Cossaria, situated between the two branches of the Bormida, and commanding the valleys of both. They had also availed themselves judiciously of the nature of the ground in front of Millesimo, and had posted a strong detachment in a narrow, defile, through which an approaching force must pass. daybreak on the 13th, Bonaparte, with highest division, attacked the enemy in the defile before Millesimo. Augereau, who had not wat been engaged, and was burning with emulation of the glories of Montenotte, led this attack, forced the pass with the impetuosity efatorrent, and supported by the Brigades Joubert and Mesnard est off the corps of general Provera from Colli's main body, and mility surrounded it on the mount of Cossaria. The strength and value of his elevated the being felt by Provera, he intracked himself with his two thousand men in the extensive ruins of an ancient chateau on its summit. Here, though he had little ammunition, and neither water nor food, he resolved to hold out as, from his lofty strong hold, he could see the Sardinian army preparing to come to his rescue.

On the other hand, Bonaparte, whose personal activity in these battles was incessant, had, in the night, before he joined the division of Augereau, sent orders to Massena and Laharpe to expedite their movement upon Dego, so as to attack in the morning. Consequently he was under the impression that his brave lieutemants were engaged in a struggle for victory, with which the division of Augereau ought to cooperate. He first therefore summoned Provera, and that proving ineffectual, resolved to assault him, in the hope of clearing away all obstruction to an immediate attack on the force under Colli. But while the columns were forming for this perilous attempt, a brisk firing was heard in the direction of Cencio, which drew the commander in chief towards the centre of his line, which was held by the brigade Mesnard.

To Augereau's direction was consequently entrusted the assault open Provera. This officer was so confident in the prospect of relief, and the strength of his post, that he would consent to reliequish it only upon condition of a safe retreat to his friends, with his troops, their arms, and baggage. As the mountain, which

was steep and rocky, presented three faces, Augereau formed three columns of attack. They were commanded by generals Banel, Joubert, and Quénin, and were supported by a proper reserve. Each column ascended a side of the mountain, with a view of distracting the fire of the enemy, and of meeting, in an attack, on the chateau. The assailants advancing, with determined spirit, in the face of a constant discharge of musketry, the heads of the columns were more than half way up, when Joubert, coming to a depression in the surface of the hill, which afforded a degree of shelter from Provera's fire, halted in order that his men might breathe, and make their attack with collected vigour. Banel and Ouénin, it appears, being apprised of his halt, imitated his example, and likewise suspended their progress. This result of discretion or accident, the enemy conceiving to be the effect of fear, took fresh courage, and while they continued their fire. rolled down huge stones from the ruinous walls upon the French columns, into which bounding rocks and showering bullets carried overthrow and slaughter. Generals Banel and Quénin were among the first and bravest of the slain. The exertions and intrepidity of Joubert not only sustained the courage of his men, but jed them to the foot of Provera's intrenchment, into which, with brave followers, he was forcing an entrance, when he was prostrated by a stone from the walls (18). He rolled senseless down the precipice, and, though but momentarily disabled, was believed by his men to be dead. Before so many obstacles, the columns deprived of their leaders, recoiled, the men scattering, and sheltering themselves, as they could, behind the few trees, slender brushwood, and rocky projections of the mountain, until night, which was now approaching, favoured their retreat. The loss of the French in killed and wounded has been estimated at little short of a thousand, in which number they lamented two generals and other gallant officers slain. Thus severely foiled, Augerean became circumspect, and established posts close around the foot of the mountain. These, by order of Bonaparte, who returns to this point in the evening, and was apprehensive that Provera might attempt in the night to cut a passage to the Sardinian army, he fortified, as well as he could, with artillery, and prepared to maintain, by directing his men to sleep on their arms.

During the 13th, Massena finding his troops fatigued by a long march, and his numbers insufficient for an attack on Dego, had waited for the function of the brigade Bommartin, and for the support of Laharpe, so that, on that day, the cooperation projected between the two wings of his army by Bonaparte could not have taken place, even had the assault on Provera proved successful. But, in the course of the morning of the 14th, these accessions reached Massena, and the two armies were in presence along the whole line; from Millesimo, where Augereau and Colli were confrested, to Dego, for the possession of which Bonaparte and Baniles were to contend. On the left the allies, on the right the French, were the assailants. The former confided in their numbers and position, the latter relied on their enthusiastic courses and their general's skill.

Leaving Angereau to deal with Colli, and to reduce Provera, Imparto repaired, on the morning of the 14th, to the right of his ins, with a view of superintending, in person, the storming of Dom. On his way, after the nessing the gallantry with which listered defeated an attempt of the enemy, by piercing the French to tarn their left and relieve Provera, he directed him to to his right, so as to support the attack of Massena and Laharpe. For this important operation, the division of Laharpe was formed into three close columns, under the orders of generals Causee, Cervoni, and Boyer; that of Massena into two, under Lasalcette and Monnier, which last column, destined to turn the coamy's left, was attended by Massena in person. The Austrians were posted in a grand redoubt on the commanding height of Dego, and in intrenchments on a chain of contiguous but less elevated hills, extending to their right. These were to be carried by the division of Laharpe, who was then to unite with Massena in the attack on Dego. About one o'clock, the preparations were completed, and the general ordered the troops to advance. At this moment, Junot arrived with the capitulation of Provera, and with intelligence that Colli, after being repulsed by Augereau, in remated efforts to rescue Provera, had been finally compelled to retreat. This information stimulated to a higher degree of fervour the courage of the troops. They crossed the rapid Bormida under a plunging fire of artillery; the columns of Laharpe fording the torrent, Massena passing on a rude mountain bridge. with impetuosity and concert, they soon came into close action. The Austrians resisted bravely, but were overpowered by the vigour of the French. So complete was their success, that on the right, Massena, after taking the Austrian artillery, intercepted their retreat.

The corps stationed in the great redoubt of Dego, had a prospec not unlike that of Provera, but a different fate. When attacked in front by the columns of Causse, Cervoni, and Lasalcette, the could see Argenteau hastening up in the rear of the village, with a reenforcement of four battalions to their relief. They there fore stood firm, when they might have retreated in comparative safety. But Massena continuing his active progress on their left opened a fire on the flank of Argenteau, who felt himself en dangered and instantly retired. At the same moment, Cause Cervoni, and Lasalcette, assailed them in front, broke into their works, and fell upon them with the bayonet. The Austrian fought with a courage worthy of a better fate, but overwhelms by their enemies, and unsupported by their friends, they wer cut to pieces. Argenteau was censured for having too readil sacrificed these brave men to his own safety. Thus, from rief to left, along the whole line from the heights of Cossaria to the of Dego, Beaulieu's defeat was complete. The action closed with the close of day. The vanquished fled to the camps her ha left; the victors slept on the hills they had won.

The loss of the allied army in prisoners, amounted to six thou sand, among whom were one lieutenant general, one brigadie and twenty-four field officers. Thirty pieces of artillery, a quar tity of ammunition, and fifteen colours fell into the hands of th conqueror. As the French had mounted four hundred cavalr and pursued the imperialists hotly from Dego, where the resis ance was obstinate, and the fighting severe, their loss in kille and wounded, which was computed by Bonaparte at two thou sand five hundred, was doubtless considerable. The conduct of Provera, in surrendering without a determined effort to disease himself, presents an obvious and inglorious contrast with the h roism of Rampon. In the hope of entailing upon the enemalt services of a general so inefficient, Bonaparte, in releasing Pre vera on parole, bestowed on him words of commendation, which it appears in the sequel, had the effect they were designed to pre duce.

The victory of Millesimo, by driving Beaulieu back upon Acqui, and forcing Colli to withdraw to Ceva, completely dijoined the Austrian and Sardinian armies, and effectually divide

the motives of the two commanders. Beaulieu became sollicitous to protect Lombardy, and Colli anxious to cover Turin.

Not a moment was lost in following up these well-earned advantages, and in overpowering the enemy by incessant rapidity as well as daring enterprise. With a view of favouring the junction of Serrurier who had been directed to approach from his position at Garessio, Augereau was ordered to incline to his left, and to take possession of Montezemoto. Laharpe was to support Angereau, while Massena with his division, forming the right of the line, was to advance in a corresponding direction, and to cooperate, by turning their left, in dislodging the Sardinians from their fortified camp at Ceva.

Meanwhile, Wukassowich, after a painful and devious march across the mountains from Voltri, by way of Sassello, arrived at three o'clock in the morning of the 15th in the rear of the post at Dego, where, it will be remembered he had been directed by Beaulieu to form his junction with Argenteau. his astonishment, he found French instead of Austrian troops before him. Taking counsel from courage, he attacked them at day break, fatigued with the toil of the late battle, and oppressed with wine from the neighbouring village. In spite of the exertions of their officers, the French offered but a slight resistance, and Wukassowich with little difficulty took six hundred prisoners, and recovered the positions as well as the artillery which Argenteau had lost. Intelligence of this disaster created great alarm at the French head quarters; for the surprise was not only complete, but inexplicable, as the French generals it would seem could not conceive the possibility of an attack on Dego, while their parties on the roads to Acqui and Ceva were undisturbed. Massena being first apprised of this rude assault upon the extreme right of his division, hastened to the spot, and putting himself at the head of the disordered battalions and such troops as were at hand, attempted to drive the successful Austrians from their ground, before they could fairly establish themselves. But his men, who had not recovered from their consternation, attacked feebly, and were quickly repulsed. At this moment, Bonaparte galloped up, leading Laharpe's division, whose march upon Ceva he had promptly countermanded. Under his direction, efficient preparations were instantly made for fighting over the battle of theday before, and regaining the heights and redoubts, which had been so gallantly won, and so suddenly lost. The grand redoubt of Dego was again to be carried by assault; a task which was confided to general Causse, with the 99th regiment. General Mesnard with his brigade was charged with dislodging the enemy from the surrounding heights, a service which Massena, where privilege of rank was the post of danger in person superintended. Causse finding his column dreadfully galled in climbing the hill, placed himself at the head of the grenadiers, and sprang forward in hopes by accelerating the issue, to diminish the expense of the A deadly discharge of musketry from the redoubt, deprived the assailants of their daring commander, and driving this party back upon the column, threw the regiment into disorder. At this critical moment, the Austrians rushed down the hill; attacked, routed and pursued the French. Bonaparte however, displaying the 39th, which had just reached the ground general Victor, received and broke the shock of the imperialists; and directing the officers of his escort to rally the 99th, with the united corps, forced them to retreat to their post on the hill.

The conflict on this point was severe and doubtful. The tant general Lanusse took command of two battalions of light troops and determined to repeat the effort of Causse. The Hungarian grenadiers of Wukassowich, no less resolved to renew the successful charge, met and engaged him. Three times the French were forced to recede, as often the Hungarians were compelled to retire. The last time, Lanusse placed his hat on his sword, and calling on his men who bravely followed, rushed up the and decided the action. In the meantime, Massena had cleared the inferior heights, and gained the front of the grand redoubt, while Cervoni was scaling the precipice on its flank. Upon this Wukassowich, his grenadiers discomfitted, and his post in danger of being surrounded, had no resource but flight. The pursu like the battle, was fierce and bloody. The Austrian division was nearly destroyed, and all the artillery retaken. The intresid conduct of Lanusse, which passed under the eyes of the ci mander in chief, was like that of Rampon at Monteligino, rewarded by promotion to the rank of general of brigade. Lannes, the famous Duke of Montebello, who commenced the campaign as a chief of battalion, participated in this glorious struggle. On the same ground, the day before, his gallantry had so engaged the attention of Bonaparte, that he promoted him on the field to a full colonelcy; a promotion which was the measure of the first degree of that merit which afterwards became colossal. These were the earliest occasions on which Bonaparte as commander in chief, enjoyed the congenial pleasure of rewarding courage displayed on the field of battle. Owing to the closeness and desperation of the fighting, the French lost many officers, among them generals Causse and Bonnel. The former who fell mortally wounded, upon seeing the commander in chief advancing in the heat of the action, could only articulate, "Is Dego retaken?" the love of glory being the last emotion of his noble heart.

The surprise of the French at Dego, although it was promptly and gallantly retrieved, discovers a want of that prudence for which their commander was subsequently distinguished. His plan of operations was founded on the advantage which the movement of Beaulieu upon Voltri, and the time necessary for that general's reunion of his divisions, would be likely to give him over the Austrian centre. From his report of the victory of Millesimo, it appears he was aware of an Austrian corps being stationed at Sassello, and that he overrated it at eight battalions. Yet, with these pressing reasons for vigilance in respect to the security of his rear and right, he allowed Wukassowich, who actually marched by the way of Sassello, and united the troops there with his own division, to reach his bivouacs unobstructed, and fall upon his men in their sleep.

The consequences of this imprudence might well have been fatal. For had Bonaparte's attack on Dego, which formed the leading operation in the battle of Millesimo, been postponed from the afternoon of the 14th to the morning of the 15th, or had the attack of Wukassowich been as many hours earlier than it was, the failure of the French would have been inevitable, and their expulsion from Piedmont not improbable.

If we censure the French General, because, in the hurry of incessant fighting and pursuit, his judgment declined, for a moment, from its comprehensive elevation, we cannot fail to admirethe active vigour, and easy celerity, with which its equipoise was recovered. The second capture of Dego was more glorious to the French than the first; and the personal prowess which Bonaparte combined with his military skill in conducting the operation, shows that, while he felt its critical importance, he perceived and employed the best means of ensuring its success.

But neither the genius of Bonaparte nor the spirit of his troops in the opening of this campaign, can be adequately admired, without bearing in mind that the first six days, from the combat of Voltri to the victory of Dego, with pauses of but a few hours, were filled up by one widely extended and continued battle, in which the French infantry were victorious, at all points and against fresh troops, over superiority of ground, numbers, and equipment.

While the shattered remains of Wukassowich's division pursued by the light troops of Massena and the cavalry of Stengel, fled to Acqui, increasing the consternation of their comrades, and the confusion of their general, Bonaparte, prompt, victorious, and persevering, renewed his interrupted movement against the Sardinians. Attentive to the great object rather than the special instructions of the directory, he determined to operate vigorously with his left and centre; and prudent from experience, to protect his rear from a repetition of surprise or annoyance. Accordingly while Victor. with one brigade, was posted at Cairo, Laharpe was thrown directly in front with instructions to take post on the river Belbo, at the late Austrian camp of St. Benidetto, to observe Beaulien, to restrain his detachments, and hold him separated from Colli. General Cervoni also was despatched to Savona, to ascertain whether the enemy had completed the evacuation of Voltri. To Serrurier, orders were sent to come into connection with Augerean, who was advancing toward Ceva, and to cooperate in an attack on the Sardinian intrenchments at that place, which Massena, by a corresponding movement on the right, was commanded to turn. combined movements were speedily performed. Thus the action of the army was reversed. The right division which hitherto had been incessantly engaged in marches or combats, was now left stationary on the Belbo, while the left, which as yet had been inactive on the Tanaro, was placed in advance, and in close pursuit of the enemy. Serrurier descending the left bank of the Tanaro with the main body of his division, by means of detachments on the right bank, cooperated with general Rusca in dislodging a Sardinian corps from the heights of St. Murialto and in establishing the desired connection. The divisions advanced upon Ceva; Serrurier, by the way of Batifolo, Bagnasco, and Nucetto; Augereau on the route of Montezemolo and Montezemoto. Serrurier's light troops driving in the outposts of Colli reached the town of Ceva, as Augereau's advance crowned the summit of Montezemoto.

From this commanding height, the republican troops enjoyed the wide and sudden prospect spread out before them; the plains of Italy, so long regarded as the land of promise, glittering with the domes of distant cities, shining with the currents of wandering rivers, and waving with harvests of abundance and glory. This scene so sublime and delightful, they contrasted with the sterile rocks and wintry precipices over which they had burst with impetuous conquest; and looking round on the icy range of the Alps that had ceased as if by magic to forbid their invasion, their bosoms throbbed with a sense of irresistible valour and invigorated hope. The general himself was not unmoved. Gazing at the huge rampart of mountains he said to his officers, "Hannibal forced the Alps, but we, we have turned them;" a phrase which happily depicted the grandeur, skill, and success of his enterprise.

But the tide of invasion rolled swiftly along; the political sympathy of the inhabitants adding momentum to the progress of the victors, as they penetrated into Piedmont, and entered like a broad wedge between the shattered allies. On Colli, in his camp at Ceva, Bonaparte, now freed from the Austrians, directed his strength. Augereau descending from the heights, and Serrarier passing down the banks of the Tanaro, attacked on the 17th, the latter the right and the former the front of the Sardimin intrenchments. Massena on his side pushed forward with a view of crossing the river below Ceva, and getting into the enemy's rear. In the front, where the brigades Beyrand and Joubert made and repeated vigorous assaults upon his exterior works, Colli, with his heavy artillery and a disposable division of eight thousand men, opposed a very resolute resistance. on his right, Serrurier, whose turn to court danger and distinction was now come, had pushed a brigade as far as Montbarsilico on the road to the widges over the Corsaglio. The Sardimian general finding, from this movement and the progress of Massena, his position no longer tenable, and fearing a catastrophe which he had been unable to extricate Provera, was forced to retire, although he thereby increased his distance from Beaulieu. Availing himself of the night to repass the Tanaro, he gained the bridges over the Corsaglio, and selected a position on the left bank of that river, at its confluence with the Tanaro. Upon retreating from Ceva, he strengthened the garrison of that fortress, but was not able to bring off the artillery from his camp, his expulsion from which spread consternation among the provincial authorities, and alarmed the court of Turin. In this affair of Ceva, the Sardinians, besides their killed and wounded, lost four hundred prisoners.

Serrurier, already on the left bank of the Tanaro and reenforced by the impatient cavalry of Stengel, pursued closely in the rear of Colli. Bonaparte placed himself with this division and established his head quarters at the castle of Lesogno, situated near the right bank of the Corsaglio and its point of junction with the Tanaro. Massena, who had passed the Tanaro lower down, now formed the centre of the line, and leaving a rearguard at the bridge of Ceva in order to observe the garrison and to maintain a communication with Victor's brigade at Cairo, directed his march for the general's head quarters. Augereau, on the right moved down the east bank of the Tanaro in the direction of Castellino; Beyrand's brigade forming his rear; Ruscas escorting the captured artillery; and Joubert's thrown upon the left, in order, by finding a bridge or effecting a passage below the mouth of the Corsaglio, to keep open a communication with the other divisions and to assist in the attack on Colli.

In the angle formed by the two rivers there was sharp fighting between the French light troops and the rear of the Sardiniana On the 19th, Serrurier forced the passage of the Corsaglio, at the bridge of St. Michel, and, after taking several pieces of artillery, established the brigade Fiorella in that village. But his troops, who, in consequence of continual movements for several days, had received no rations, dispersed themselves in quest of food, and in this situation were suddenly attacked by Colli's rear guard, and driven, with loss and disorder, out of the village and over the bridge. On the same day, Augereau, with Joubert's brigade, reached the bank of the Tanaro, a deep and rapid stream, which here augmented by the Corsaglio, and cleaving its way through clustered hills, presented in alternate opposition steep and shelving banks, which admitted only a long and diagonal passage. Parties of the enemy, who were drawn up on the left bank, had destroyed the bridge. Nevertheless, in order to make a diversion in favour of Serrurier, an effort was made to gain the opposite shoreJoubert, although lately wounded, urged his horse into the river, and, taking an oblique direction, succeeded in landing with a small party. But the current was found too strong and deep for the grenadiers, and Augereau was therefore compelled to recall Joubert, and withdraw his brigade out of reach of the enemy's fire.

On the 21st, the rear of Massena's division having come up to Lesogno, preparations were made for forcing a passage of the Corsaglio at several points. Serrurier forming the left, was directed to ascend the stream, and crossing at the bridge of Torre, to fall upon Colli's right flank, while Massena was to effect a passage at the bridge of St. Michel, in the face of the enemy's batteries. The general in chief, with part of Massena's division, and with Joubert's brigade, was to cross by a ford above, and a hastily constructed bridge below, the confluence of the rivers. Colli. though hoping for support from Beaulieu, was intimidated by these preparations, and withdrew from his positions on the bank of the river, to more elevated and contracted ground immediately under Mondovi; where, if disappointed in receiving reenforcements, he might have time to fortify himself, and to remove the ample magazines of that important town. But, on the 22d, while he was thus employed, the French, whose passage of the river had been accelerated by being unopposed, came upon him. Serrurier who led the pursuit, first came into action, assailing the enemy's centre with the brigades Dommartin and Fiorella, while the brigade of Guyeux attacked his right. At the same time, the columns of e commander in chief and Massena were gaining his left flank. rengthened by several redoubts, Colli resisted manfully. In the centre. Dommartin was at first repulsed by the exertions and gallantry of general Dichat, but theing supported by Serrurier with Fiorella's brigade, the attack was renewed with vigour. In this conflict, in which general Dichat was mortally wounded the structle was severe, and the slaughter dreadful. Serrurier, however, succeeded in carrying the principal redoubt which covered the Sardinian centre. His success decided the action. General Colli finding his centre thus exposed, and that Guyeux who had driven in his right was on the point of entering Mondovi, ordered a retreat behind the Ellero, a movement which soon degenerated into flight. He lost three thousand men killed and wounded, fifteen hundred prisoners, among whom were three generals, eight pieces of cannon, and eleven stands of colours. In addition, the

fortified town of Mondovi, with its artillery and magazines, was surrendered to the victor.

As the weight of this battle had been sustained by Scrrurier, it resulted that all the divisions and each commander, had proved their courage and conduct in this short campaign, of ten days and incessant action: Massena and Laharpe at Montenotte and Dego; Augereau at Millesimo, and Serrurier at Mondovi. Notwithstanding the roughness of the ground, it appears that the general's aide de camp Murat, made a successful charge with the 20th regiment of dragoons.

General Stengel, a brave and accomplished officer, had omitted no opportunity of securing horses and mounting his troopers. so that, as the army beween Montezemoto and the Corsaglio was reaching suitable ground, he had thrown his cavalry occasionally in front, and was eager to compete with the infantry in service and glory. On the retreat of the Sardinians from Mondovi. he pursued them ardently beyond the Ellero, and attacked a superior body of Colli's horse. In the charge, which was not successful, the French were repulsed by the queen's regiment of dragoons, and Stengel surrounded and killed. The brave Murat. rallied the broken squadrons, and putting himself foremost in a desperate charge, routed the Sardinians and renewed the pursuit. Bonaparte deeply regretted the loss of Stengel, in whose character he said were united, besides various accomplishments. the fire of youth and the judgment of age. His death was owing probably to his defect of vision, his breast being reached by sword-thrust, which with a clearer sight he might have parried. He fell a captive and almost a corpse, into the enemy's hands (19).

The French general, neither stopped by resistance, nor delayed by success, advanced rapidly upon the traces of Colli, and directly towards the heart of Piedmont. Serrurier on the left pursued in the line of the enemy's retreat, by the road of Brealongo upon Fossano, from which town, situated on the left bank of the Stura, after a sharp cannonade with Sardinian guns, he compelled Colli to retire. Bonaparte in the centre with Massena's division, marched down the left bank of the Tanaro, and took possession of Cherasco, a fortified place between the Stura and the Tanaro, and immediately at their confluence. Down the right bank of the latter river, Augereau led his division by the way of Dogliano and Novetta to Alba, an important town on the Tanaro,

about fifteen miles below Cherasco. By keeping Augereau on the right bank, while the faculty of supporting Laharpe in case of an attempt on the part of Beaulieu to overwhelm him by numbers, was maintained, a larger space for collecting provisions for the army was commanded, and the necessity avoided of conveying heavy artillery across a river without bridges. These movements were so expeditious and well regulated that Serrurier entered Fossano, Massena's division took possession of Cherasco, and Augereau made himself master of Alba, all on the 25th of April.

Thus in a fortnight after the commencement of active operations, the republican general, having defeated numbers doubling his own, reduced the Austrians to inaction and the Sardinians to despair, and left the Alps and Appennines, with the exterior fortresses of Coni and Ceva far behind him, had established his army in three strong positions, embracing eight leagues of an important water-course, in the centre of Piedmont, and within thirty miles of its capital.

Meanwhile Beaulieu, who had received from Colli and the Sardinian court, urgent solicitations for assistance, marched from Acqui with a part of his force to Nizza de la Paglia, in a direction tending to support Colli, who had fallen back behind the Po to Carignano, ten miles in front of Turin. Counteracting this movement, which was too late and indecisive to be useful, Laharpe, left has position on the upper Belbo, and drew down to Niella with a view of keeping in front of Beaulieu, and in closer connection the right of Augereau. At the same time, as intercourse between the rear of the army and Savona had ceased in consequeace of the shorter line of communication, from Garessio and Oneille to Nice, being now in possession of the French, general Victor was directed to break up from Cairo and join Laharpe. Orders were likewise sent to generals Dallemagne and Macquart, who had remained in their positions on the extreme left, with a few skeletons of battalions, destined to guard the Col de Tende and maintain a connection with the army of the Alps, to advance into Piedmont and in conjunction with one of Serurrier's brigades To give further security to his position, as well as to invest Coni. to increase his power of annihilating the resistance of Sardinia, and carrying on the campaign against Beaulieu, Bonaparte requested general Kellermann to send forward, to his support the, right wing of the army of the Alps, which was now likely to be unemployed.

Cherasco, where his head quarters were established, thou fortified town, being remote from the frontiers, was indiffere armed and provided. But its magazines contained a great quantity of artillery, and no time was lost in putting it in a state defence. After this was effected, the main body of Masse division was advanced in the direction of Turin as far as little town of Bra, five miles in front of Cherasco, and but fif from general Colli's camp.

Thus posted, the French general seemed to be prepare strike the last blow at the Sardinian monarchy, and with aid of the disaffected population around him, to overwhelm king himself in its ruins.

As early as the day after the battle of Mondovi, general had proposed a cessation of hostilities, in the hope of suspen the tempest, which, powerless from defeat, and unsheltere Beaulieu, he felt unable to withstand. The court of To alarmed at the loss of their intrenched camp at Ceva, had nished the occasion, by sending plenipotentiaries to Genor open negociations with the French agents under the mediation Spain; which court, since the treaty of Bale in July 1795, the chosen intercessor for the worsted coalitionists. Colli posed an armistice, to continue until the result of these neg Bonaparte, though inexperience tions should be known. diplomacy, was too sagacious not to discover in the nakedhe this proposition, an indirect appeal to his mercy; in other we an application prompted by the helplessness and trepidatic the Sardinian monarch. These he determined to turn & count; not for the sake of wresting exorbitant concessions Victor Amadeus, but for the purpose of weakening the pow Austria in Italy, which was the great object of the camp His answer to general Colli, considered as a piece of diplome remarkable for being perfectly void of finesse or duplicity; regarded in reference to his situation as a victorious comma is commendable for delicacy and moderation. He replied the directory had reserved to itself the power of making pe that consequently the commissioners of the king of Sar would be under the necessity of proceeding to Paris, or of ing at Genoa for the arrival of French pelnipotentiaries; considering the relative situation of the two armies, a simple unconditional cessation of hostilities was out of the question that although, as a private individual, he had reason to believe the French government would consent to peace on terms honourable to the king of Sardinia, he could not, on the mere presumption, suspend the progress of his army. But he added, that if the king would surrender to him two of the three fortresses, Alexandria, Coni, and Tortona, he would agree to the desired suspension of arms. By this fair and direct proceeding he consulted the main object of the campaign, and the safety of his army, without humiliating the court of Turin, or appearing to remember either its characteristic duplicity, or its concern in the occupation of Toulon. With these conditions Victor Amadeus, in spite of the intrigues and instances of the Austrian and English envoys and partizans, complied without hesitation; and on the 28th of April, the armistice of which they formed the basis, and which comprehended the armies of Kellermann and the duke of Aoste, was signed at Cherasco.

In conformity with the terms finally agreed upon, by virtue of which the king of Sardinia engaged to separate himself totally from the coalition, and to discontinue harbouring French emigrants of all ranks, Coni and Tortona, with the artillery and magazines appertaining to them, were surrendered to the French; a line of demarcation between the two armies, coinciding with the limits of their actual possessions, was defined; Ceva, situated greatly within that of the French, was evacuated by the Piedmontese garrison; military routes affording a direct communication with France were established; the Sardinian militia disbanded; and the Sardinian army disseminated among various and remote stations, so w to relieve the French, of old acquainted with the faithless character of the court of Turin, from apprehensions of annoyance in their rear. It was also stipulated, at the instance of Bonaperte, that Valenza, a fortified town on the Po, above the mouth of the Tanaro, and in the direct route from Cherasco towards Milan, should be evacuated by Beaulieu's Neapolitan troops, and surrendered to the French general, to be held by him until he should have effected the passage of the former river. This artide, though apparently of secondary importance, had great inforce on the succeeding operations.

Murat, colonel of cavalry and first aide de camp of the commander in chief, was despatched to Paris to deliver to the directory, with a copy of the armistice, twenty-one stands of colours,

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trophies of the victories which had led to it; a mode of announcement as novel as the exploits themselves were then unrivalled. The aide de camp, Junot, had been sent from Millesimo with a report of that important battle, but being obliged to pass by Savona, and along the route of the Corniche, Murat, who crossed the Alps at Mont Cenis and travelled post from Turin, reached Paris before him, and produced consequently greater sensation and rejoicing in the capital. The legislative bodies of the new government, which, at its birth in the previous autumn, Bonaparte had protected from the fury of domestic factions, were now occupied in solemnizing his triumphs over foreign foes. Repeatedly during one week in April, they decreed that the army of Italy had deserved well of their country. It need scarcely be mentioned, that the victories thus celebrated bear the immortal names of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, Ceva, and Mondovi.

It is worthy of remark, that the despatch of Bonaparte and nouncing the armistice of Cherasco, was dated precisely one month after his first report from the head quarters at Nice.

The French general remained at Cherasco only three days after the signature of the armistice. During this time, besides attending to the execution of its conditions, he was employed in providing subsistence for his troops, and in repressing the habits of plunder into which they had relapsed. The rapidity of their movements since the 11th of April, the scarcity of money, the insufficient transport and mountainous country, had rendered it impracticable to furnish a regular supply of rations. The consequence was, that the men, after fighting all day for their country, had at night to plunder for food. This of course, was attended always with waste, sometimes with license and cruelty. To the reproaches of their officers they answered, that their behaviour was better than their fare, and to threats they opposed indifference or defiance. This state of things was productive of numerous complaints from the field officers to the generals, and from these to the commander General's Laharpe's correspondence teems with indignation at the conduct of the men, with rage at the failure of the contractors, and with an inconsistent anxiety to punish both. The letters of the generals exhibit a situation of affairs, which under any other commander of the age, would have led to mutiny sooner than to conquest. In a letter of the 7th of April, general Rusca says, "I have but few cartouches at Bardinetto. You must

forward a supply of them, as well as rations of brandy, the troops being in bivouac without blankets or shoes, and the cold is severe." On the 14th Massena wrote, "My troops have received no bread, and I know not whether any can be found in the rear at Vado." Serrurier the same day, "There are no provisions in the magazines of Ormea and Garessio; we live from hand to mouth." And Laharpe also on the 14th, "In spite of your promises, general, the troops are still without bread. They sink from fatigue and inanition; send us, at least, a little bread and brandy, for I fear proving a prophet of ill; yet, if we are attacked to-morrow, the men will behave badly for the want of physical strength." On the morrow they had to fight the battle of Dego. The 17th Augereau wrote, "I learn, by an order of the day, that shoes are to be served out to the divisions of generals Massena and Laharpe. But no mention is made of my division, which is in great want. I beg you to send me as soon as possible, a supply of shoes, of which I stand in need. Provisions destined for my division are received with difficulty." On the 20th, Laharpe, after reiterating his complaints and declaring that the 69th had received but two rations and a half in a week, concludes, "bread, bread, and again bread." On the 22d, this brave officer, whose troops, left in the exhausted country on the Belbo, were exposed to the greatest suffering, thus expressed himself, "The soldiers are culpable, but those who expose them to the necessity of dying of hunger, or of living by pillage, are much more so. In the name of humanity, in the name of that liberty which they are assassinating, come to our relief. Send us wherewithal to support our wretched existence, without committing crimes. Who would have believed that the brave troops of the army of Italy, would be rewarded with the cruel alternative of dying with famine, or living as brigands."

These disorders, so grievous in themselves, and so dangerous in their consequences, Bonaparte saw might be alleviated by the laws of discipline, but could be corrected effectually only by the removal of their cause. While, therefore, he denounced punishment against those who should transgress the rules of subordination, or seize without authority the property of the inhabitants, he refused to sanction, except in one or two cases of excessive aggravation, the infliction of capital punishment; using at the same time, his utmost exertions to stimulate the activity of the contractors, and to expedite the conveyance and delivery of provisions.

CHAP. VI.

It is needless to observe that this letter neither altered the conduct of Bonaparte, nor the position of Laharpe, although it exemplifies the degree of embarrassment to which, from this source of suffering and disorder, the former was exposed (20).

However, the halt made at Cherasco, the armistice concluded there, and the establishment of direct routes of transportation between France and Piedmont, soon enabled the general to apply an effectual remedy to these distressing inconveniences; that is, to remove their cause. The troops being furnished with abundant food ceased to plunder, and returned under the influence of military rules and subordination, which afterwards were strictly enforced. Volunteers from the depots, and convalescents from the hospitals, attracted by news of victory and plenty, made their way to his camp and repaired the losses which his victories had cost. Sixty pieces of artillery were put in order for service, and by adding to the horses taken from the enemy, those which,

with the consent of the government of Sardinia, were purchased in Piedmont, the greater part of the troopers were mounted: so that the condition of the army of Italy became worthy of its spirit and prowess.

At Cherasco Bonaparte was visited by the minister and the son of the king of Sardinia, who expressed, and probably felt great admiration for the young conqueror. The delicacy and good faith of his proceedings in relation to the execution of the terms of the armistice; and his forbearance to countenance the revolutionary projects of the inhabitants, in the province within which his principal force was encamped, gave peculiar satisfaction to the court of Turin, and made their military misfortunes less painful. His moderation in this instance was the more remarkable, as it was in opposition to the counsels of some of his generals, and to the letter of his instructions.

It will not escape the reader's observation that this was not the only point in regard to which Bonaparte had deviated from the instructions of the directory. Instead of acting principally against the Austrians, he had directed his force chiefly against the Sardinians. Instead of penetrating to the right towards Tortona, he had advanced to the left upon Turin. And in place of refusing an armistice, he had granted one. This line of conduct, although it argued a fearlessness of responsibility, and a generous disdain like that of Alexander, to steal a victory, may at first view appear insubordinate and unwarrantable. To this conclusion, however, are opposed the contradictory nature of the instructions themselves, the effectual manner in which had been accomplished the success of the French arms, and more than all, the consideration, that in every position in which Bonaparte had been previously employed, his ability to serve his country, had been proved to transcend the limits of his authority. At Toulon, though only a chief of battalion, with the sanction of Gasparin and the acquiescence of Dugommier, he commanded the siege. In the campaign of 1794, with the approbation of the deputies, though he was only a brigadier general, he directed the operations of general Dumerbion and his whole army. At Paris, in 1795, in the presence and with the applause of the convention, he treated their commander in chief and their commissaries as mere nullities, while he defended themselves against the insurgents. So that if he exceeded his instructions in the campaign of Montenotte, he had usurped command in the insurrection of Vende miaire, in the campaign of Saorgio, and at the liege of Toulor On each of these occasions he had overflowed the ordinar channels of duty with a flood of courage, patriotism and talent and on all of them, an exuberance of public good had sprung from his excess of authority. Hitherto this prodigality of service has been accepted by the government as the bounty of genius; not were the directory in the present instance so unjust as to adop a new rule of construction, and pronounce his conduct to be the encroachment of ambition.

At this time, as neither the settled animosity of factions nor the organized enmity of governments, had breathed malignant also ders on Bonaparte's name, his character and exploits commands the admiration of all Europe. And having, as we have seen, in the short space of fifteen days, shaken and upheld one kingdown humbled and spared one monarch, established the subsistence renovated the discipline, equipped the cavalry, supplied the autillery, recruited the strength, and fortified the rear of his army he resolved to carry the war into the heart of Lombardy; and single handed, to brave the utmost might of that imperial home whose hatred was destined to be an instrument of his elevation and whose love, to be a cause of his downfal (21).

CHAPTER VII.

From the 28th of April to the 14th of May 1796.

Objects of Bonaparte—Doubts and opinions of his officers—Proclamation of Cherasco—Its effect—He confers with his officers—Overcomes their objections—Puts his troops in motion—Repairs to Tortona—His courtesy—Remarkable letters to the directory—His brother Joseph—Movements of Beaulieu—He passes the Po at Valenza—Stratagem, secrecy, and prudence of Bonaparte—Positions of Beaulieu to defend the passage of the Po—Bonaparte's march to Placentia—Passes the Po—Measures of Beaulieu—Combat of Fombio—Affair of Codogno—Death of general Laharpe—Armistice of Placentia—Combat of Casal Pusterlengo—Beaulieu retreats to Lodi—Bonaparte defeats his rear guard—Battle of Lodi—Capture of Pizzighitone—Surrender of Cremona—Serrurier guards the line of the Adda—Augereau occupies Pavia—Massena marches for Milan—Reflections—Anecdote of a Hungarian captain.

Had it accorded with the personal disposition of Bonaparte to extort immoderate concessions from the king of Sardinia, it would not have suited his military plans. To expel the Austrians from Italy, to revive the national spirit of that country, and interpose its amity or independence as a safeguard to the oft endangered frontier of his own; to "bear to a distance the glory of the French people," were his great objects. Intent upon these, upon the instantaneous pursuit of Beaulieu, the passage of the Po, and the possession of Mantua, he was disinclined to waste his time or his strength, in wringing excessive advantages from a minor prince, whose destruction was not necessary, and whose despair, both the position and the history of his country, proved might be dangerous.

But a spirit less adventurous and a temper less forbearing, prevailed to some extent in his army. While the conferences of Cherasco were yet unfinished, several of his generals took occasion to suggest, that before a further advante into Italy was

attempted, it would be prudent to complete the subjugation of Piedmont. They likewise intimated a conviction that their force was not adequate to a successful invasion of Lombardy; an enterprise, to the proposal of which, the soldiers, though elaied by a succession of victories, listened with surprise, but not with enthusiasm.

These appearances of doubt and hesitation were too much at variance with Bonaparte's determined spirit and extensive views, not to engage his prompt and earnest attention. Wherefore, to infuse fresh ardour into his men, to counteract the cautions opinions of his officers, and at the same time to eradicate from his army all tendency to insubordination and license, as well as to confirm the prudent and pacific inclinations of the cabinet of Turin, he issued, the day before the armistice was signed, the following proclamation. Its vivid style and stimulating topics, the persuasive warmth of its exhortations, the haughty vehemence of its threats, so different from the cold and technical language of other modern generals, will remind the reader of those classical harangues, by which, under the same Italian sky, the Roman Consuls are represented, to have controlled the turbulence or exalted the courage of their legions.

"Soldiers! In fifteen days you have gained six victories, taken twenty one stands of colours, fifty five pieces of artillery, several strong fortresses, and conquered the most fertile part of Piedmont; you have made fifteen thousand prisoners, and killed and wounded more than ten thousand men. Before this campaign, you contended for barren rocks, which though illustrated by your courage, were unprofitable to your country. Your services now make you rivals of the victorious armies of Holland and the Rhine. You were destitute of every thing, but your valour has supplied all deficiencies. You have won battles without cannon, passed rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without liquor and often without break None but republican phalanxes, soldiers of liberty, could have endured what you have undergone. For your fortitude, thanks are due to you; to you and to her other conquering armies, your grateful country will owe her prosperity; and if, by wresting Toulon from the foe, you gave an earnest of the immortal campaign of 1794, your recent exploits foretell one still more glorious. The two armies which lately attacked you with so much

confidence, fly affrighted before you. The unprincipled men who ridiculed your distress, and secretly rejoiced at the fancied triumph of your enemies, are now confounded and trembling with fear.

"But soldiers! it is not to be concealed, that since much remains to be done, you have as yet done nothing. Neither Turin nor Milan is ours; and the assassins of Basseville still trample on the ashes of the conquerors of Tarquin.

"At the commencement of the campaign, you were totally unprovided; you are now furnished with every thing you want; for a number of the enemy's magazines have fallen into our possession, and our heavy artillery is brought up. Your condition being thus improved, France has a right to expect from you great services. Will you justify her hopes? The greatest obstacles to your progress are already doubtless surmounted. But you have still battles to fight, cities to capture, and rivers to traverse. Is there one among you whose courage fails, who would prefer returning to the summits of the Alps and Appennines, there to suffer the aggressions of a slavish soldiery? No; in the ranks of the victors of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi, there is not one so spiritless. You all burn with a desire to bear to a distance the glory of the French people; you long to humble the proud kings, who dared to threaten us with chains; you are impatient to dictate a triumphant peace which shall compensate France for her immense sacrifices; and each of you desires, when returning to his native hamlet, to be able to my with a just pride, I belonged to the army which conquered

This conquest, my friends I promise you; but there is one condition with which you must swear to comply. It is to respect the people whom you deliver from bondage, to repress the horrible practice of pillage, in which certain wretches, instigated by our enemies, have indulged. Unless you abstain from this practice, you will be the scourge, not the deliverers of Italy; the reproach, not the pride of France. Your country will disown you, and your victories, your valour, your success, the blood of your brother soldiers who have fallen in battle, all will be lost, even your honour and fame. As to myself and the generals who enjoy your confidence, we shall blush to command men, without discipline, without self-denial, and who acknowledge no right save that

of the strongest. But invested with the authority of the nation, and supported by justice and law, I shall know how to enforce respect for the duties of humanity, upon the small number of men who now tread them under foot. I will not suffer your laurels to be tarnished by a parcel of robbers. I will cause the regulations prescribed in my general orders, to be strictly put in force. Pillagers shall be shot without mercy or exception. Already several offenders have suffered death, and I have observed with satisfaction, the zeal with which on these occasions, deserving soldiers have assisted in carrying my orders into effect.

"Inhabitants of Italy! The French army approaches to break your chains. The French people are the friends of all other people; advance with confidence to meet them. Your property, your religion, and your customs shall be respected. We make war as generous enemies, and are foes only to the tyrants who enslave you (1)."

This spirited and judicious address, although it exerted a wholesome restraint upon the license of the troops, and at the same time excited their enthusiasm to a state of martial rapture. failed to produce unanimity among the officers, whose rank or intelligence entitled them to offer advice to the commander in chief. Even after the signature of the armistice, several of them were still disposed to complete the overthrow of the Sardinian monarchy, before the invasion of Lombardy was hazarded. Insisting on the difference between a truce and a peace, they asked. "Will it not be more prudent to avail ourselves of the advantages already gained, by revolutionizing Piedmont and Genca, before we go farther? Our government which has the right of refusing to enter into negotiations for peace, may declare its will in the shape of an ultimatum. Will it not be imprudent to increase our distance from France and to pass the Ticin, without being secure as to our rear? The Kings of Sardinia, whose alliance. has proved so useful to France in previous wars, while they remained faithful, have more than any other potentates, contributed. to her reverses when they changed their policy. At this moment the cabinet of Turin is too well aware of the disposition of the French government, to be deluded by any hopes of our moderation. The priests and nobles, whose influence predominates in the court of Victor Amadeus, are inveterately hostile to our republic. If we advance into Lombardy and experience a defeat,

what may we not apprehend from their hatred and vengeance. Genoa ought likewise to occasion serious inquietude; the oligarchy of nobles is still absolute there, and however numerous the partizans of France may be, they are destitute of political influence. The common people can declaim in the streets, but with that their power ends. The nobles govern, they command the troops and control eight or ten thousand peasants of Fontana Bona and the other valleys, whom they can summon to their aid at pleasure.

But after all, if we pass the Ticin, where are we to stop? Must we go on and cross the Adda, the Oglio, the Mincio, the Adige, the Brenta, the Piave, the Tagliamento, the Isonzo? Is it wise to leave so large and ill-disposed a population in our rear? The best way to advance with speed, is to proceed with caution; to create points of support in the several countries we may occupy, by changing the governments, and putting power into the hands of persons whose principles and interests coincide with our own. Were we to enter the Venetian territory, should we not compel that republic, which has an army of fifty thousand men at her disposal, to declare war against France?"

To these dissuasive arguments Bonaparte replied. "We ought to take full advantage of our victories, and not to stop until we occupy the best line of defence which the country presents, against the approaching inroad of the Austrians from the Tyrolian and Frioulian mountains. This line is the course of the Adige, which covers the whole valley of the Po, intercepts from the reach of German invasion, middle and lower Italy, and cuts of Mantua from relief. In all probability, should we at once gain the line of the Adige, this fortress will fall into our hands, before the enemy's army can be in a condition to succour it. only because Marshal Villars overlooked this great feature in the military geography of Italy, that he missed the principal object of the war in 1733. He commanded fifty thousand men, assembled in the camp of Vigevano in October, and having no army opposed to him, he possessed the power of moving in any direction be pleased. He limited his operations to placing his troops in posts of observation on the Oglio and on both sides the Po, Josing thus an opportunity of conquest which he could never regain. For three months afterwards, Merci arrived with an army under the walls of Mantua. In the same manner Marshal de Coigny,

in the next campaign, although he was at the head of a superior force, and was victorious in two pitched battles (those of Parma and Guastalla), failed to secure the fruits of these great advantages, and did nothing more than manœuvre from one side of the Po to the other. If these generals had comprehended the topography of Italy, Villars would have taken a position on the Adige, as early as the month of November; and de Coigny, profiting by his victories, would have marched directly thither with the utmost speed (2).

"Once posted on the Adige, we shall be able to provide with ease for all the expenses of the army, since the burthen will be divided among a large population; the inhabitants of Piedmont, Lombardy, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, the dutchies of Parma and Modena.

"But it seems to be apprehended that Venice will declare war against France. The best way to prevent that inconvenience, is to carry the war into the midst of her states. She is not prepared against such decisive conduct, has not had time to raise troops, or to mature her plans; and we ought to anticipate her deliberations. If our army remains on the right bank of the Ticin, the Austrians will force Venice to make common cause with them; or, influenced by party spirit, she will throw herself into their arms. The King of Sardinia is no longer to be feared; his levy en masse is disbanded; the English will discontinue their subsidies, and the internal affairs of his kingdom are in the worst possible condition. Whatever policy he may adopt, the malcontents among his subjects will increase in numbers. After the excitement of a feverish struggle, the weakness of languor succeeds. The King of Sardinia has not more than fifteen or eighteen thousand regular troops remaining, and these disseminated in a number of different towns and garrisons, will scarce suffice to maintain public order. On the other hand, the dissatisfaction of the court of Vienna with the cabinet of Turin, will grow more and more violent every day. The Emperor will reproach the King, with having abandonned the common cause upon the loss of the first 'It was not thus,' he will tauntingly say, 'the first Victor Amadeus conducted himself after the battle of Cassano; when Vendome defeated Prince Eugene, and hemmed him in on the shore of the lake of Iseo; when three French armies invaded his states, and whon Turin was all that was left in his possession. Notwithstanding this degree of adversity, he adhered firmly to his alliance with Austria; and the year following, was rewarded for it by the battle of Turin; a victory which Prince Eugene gained by a march so bold, that fortune delighted to crown it with the greatest success.

"With respect to the oligarchy of Genoa, they are far from being formidable. An effectual guarantee against their hostility, is to be found in the enormous profits of their neutral commerce.

"But a desire is entertained by some of you, that we should patronize liberal opinions in Piedmont and Genoa. In order to do that, we must kindle civil war in those states, stir up the people against the nobles, and thereby make ourselves responsible for the excesses by which such conflicts are attended. On the other hand, by taking ground on the Adige, we shall be masters of all the Austrian possessions in Italy, and of those of the Pope on this side the Appennines; be in a position to proclaim the principles of liberty, and to excite the national spirit of the Italians against foreign domination. There will then be no occasion for instigating divisions among the different classes of the Italian people; nobles, commoners, peasants, will all answer to the call, and unite in a general effort to establish the independence of their country. sacred word, Italiam, Italiam, if proclaimed at Milan, Bologna, or Verona, will produce a magical effect; pronounced on the right bank of the Ticin, the Italians will say, Why do you not come on?"

As the proclamation had rekindled the ardour of the troops, this reasoning, founded on observations so sagacious and original, dispelled the doubts, or at least overcame the objections, of the officers. The arguments on both sides, which are remarkably appropriate to the persons (3) and occasion of the conference, as they are here transcribed, were recapitulated by Bonaparte at St. Helena; and as his memory, which was singularly retentive, must have frequently renewed the impression of subjects so interesting and important, we may safely confide in the epinion that they were accurately reproduced (4). His own discourse can hardly fail to attract particular attention. It shows that even then, on the threshold of his conquests, his acquaintance with the military geography of northern Italy, was as perfect as if he had already made war in that region, or as that which ordinary generals are enabled to acquire of the spot on which they encamp. It exhibits a distinction between the art of

fomenting discord betwixt different orders of the same people, and the policy of rousing all classes to a combined struggle for national independence; not only noble and wise in itself, but peculiar to Bonaparte as a conqueror; from the beginning of his career interwowen with his sentiments, and gloriously contrasted with the practices of his enemies. But it is still more remarkable for the warm idolatry of a kindred spirit, which shines out in his mention of the great exploit of Prince Eugene. In the peculiar turn of the expression, "a march so bold that fortune was delighted to crown it with the greatest success," is perceptible the emulous glow of that matchless enterprise, which produced the Egyptian and Syrian expeditions, the march of a thousand leagues to Moscow, and the triumphal return from Elba.

Having thus animated his army with a spirit like his own, the French general, impatient to pass the second bulwark of Italy, and to sweep from before him his remaining antagonist, on the moraing after the conclusion of the armistice, put his columns in motion. Orders were sent to Serrurier and Laharpe to unite their divisions at Tortona; Augereau was directed to take post on both sides the Scrivia at its mouth; and Massena to march promptly upon Alexandria. These officers reached the points of their respective destination without material obstruction, or delay: Massena entering the town of Alexandria, in time to seize certain magazines, which the Austrians, retreating too precipitately to remove them, had sold to the civil authorities of the place. Bonaparte himself, passing through Acqui and Bosca, established his head quarters at Tortona, on the 4th of May; when the stipulated occupation of that for tress as well as of Ceva and Coni, having been completed, he announced in general orders the commencement of the armistice, and directed the strict fulfilment of its conditions. At the same time, the Sardinian general having expressed a personal solicitude respecting some of his officers who were prisoners, Bonaparte, with that courtesy which befits a conqueror, anticipated the regular exchange, and had them at once conducted to him (5).

Before his departure from Cherasco, he wrote to the directory two letters, which, besides communicating the principal conditions of the truce he had concluded, show how early the vast designs, which under their auspices he afterwards accomplished, were springing up in his active and capacious mind. In the first, dated the 28th of April he says, "I shall march tomorrow against

Beaulieu, force him across the Po, and pass it immediately after him; make myself master of the whole of Lombardy; and in less than a month, I hope to be on the Tyrolian mountains, and in concert with the army of the Rhine, to carry the war into Bayaria. This plan is worthy of you, of the army, and the destiny of France." In the second, written the next day, he tells the directors. "You have it in your power to dictate terms to the king of Sardinia. I intreat you not to forget the small island of St. Pierre," (on the southern coast of Sardinia) "which in the course of events may be of more value to us than Corsica and Sardinia both together." The victorious march to the Simmering, and the conquest of the Tyrolian provinces, which for want of the reenforcements solicited in these letters, and by reason of the long and unexpected inaction of Jourdan and Moreau, he was not able to accomplish until the succeeding spring, are clearly indicated in the first extract (6); as appears to be in the second, an expedition to the east, by his anxiety to increase the insular possessions of France in the Mediterranean, and to provide a place of refuge or refreshment for his armament, too inconsiderable to awaken the suspicions of the enemy, and yet so commodious for his purpose, as to be worth more to France than two of the largest islands in This letter, in all probability, furnishes the earliest allusion to the Egyptian expedition, to be found in the history of the time; although it would seem from the expressions, "I intreat you not to forget the small island of St. Pierre," that Bonaparte had before suggested its military value to the directors (7). Be this as it may, no notice was taken of the suggestion, in the treaty.

In order that his views and wishes might be more fully explained to the government, he prevailed on his brother Joseph, who had been with him at the seige of Toulon, and had accompanied him as a volunteer in this campaign also, to return from Cherasco to Paris, for the purpose of communicating personally with the directors (8). But however carefully elucidated and zealously impressed they may have been, his plans, which eventually, he completely realised, were so far above the conception of the leading minds of the time, that they were scarcely entertained with decent notice by the directors, who substituted projects of their own, which on his side, Bonaparte looked down upon with just contempt.

While transactions of negotiation and acts of courtesy were

passing between the French and Sardinian commanders, the Austrian general was roused from the torpor into which severe and repeated defeats had depressed him, by the unwelcome intelligence of their result. His first care was to approach the Po. and to secure the faculty of placing his army on the left bank of that river. His next, which indicated both judgment and vigour, was to endeavour, by an unexpected attack, to get possession of the Sardinian forts of Tortona, Alexandria, and Valenza, points of a triangle resting on the Po, and embracing the mouths of the Tanaro, the Bormida, and, in a military sense, of the Scrivia. His detachments suddenly appeared before the citadels of Alexandria and Tortona, but the garrisons were alert, and the attempts un-The garrison of Valenza was less vigilant or less successful. fortunate; the fort was reseized by a party of Neapolitan troops; and at this point on the morning of the 2nd of May the Austrian army, hastily withdrawing from Piedmont, crossed the Po on a double bridge of boats. Had these well-conceived projects been successful, the obstacles to the progress of the French army would have been seriously complicated and strengthened; for while it would have been impossible to leave Beaulieu established in these fortresses, it would have been extremely difficult to dislodge him. But, (such is the unrelenting course of adversity), the Austrian veteran's partial success, instead of operating to the disadvantage of his antagonist, only contributed, by fixing his own views strongly on Valenza, to render his discomfiture more certain and calamitous.

It has been already observed that in the conferences and the convention of Cherasco, Bonaparte had carefully stipulated for the possession of Valenza, until his army should effect the passage of the Po; a condition which could hardly fail to come to the knowledge of Beaulieu, and to create in his mind a persuasion that the French would endeavour to cross the river somewhere in the neighbour hood of that place. Having given this direction to his adversary's views, Bonaparte omitted the employment of no means which seemed likely to confine them to it. On the 2nd of May he addressed to the governor of Alexandria, a formal remontrance against the occupation of Valenza by Beaulieu's Neapolitan troops; reminded him of the clause of the armistice relating to that place, required that it should be instantly repossessed by the Sardinians, and offered a division of his own army to assist, if necessary, in the

operation. At the same time, he ordered Massena, who had pushed a party of observation from Alexandria to Valenza, to seize all the boats within his reach on the Po and the Tanaro; and despatched to the head quarters of that general an officer of engineers, with directions to construct flying bridges for the army. These and other measures of similar character and tendency, show that Bonaparte, who was already beginning, even in the most arduous enterprises, to rely on the strength of his own judgment alone, concealed his real designs from his officers, the better to mask them from his adversary; who having succeeded in seizing Valenza and passing the Po under its walls, and knowing that the French had no bridge equipage, was the more easily led into the train of confident but erroneous inferences, thus adroitly marked out for him.

While preparing to surmount the obstacles in his front, the French commander was not inattentive to the importance of security in his rear, and of maintaining his communications with France uninterrupted. Here too, the want of adequate force he had to supply by stratagem. The civility of his deportment and the moderation of his proceedings at Cherasco, may be supposed to have softened the regret, and soothed the animosity of the cabinet of Turin. But he rightly judged, on this occasion, that the surest appeal to the good faith of a legitimate king was through his fears. To produce a salutary impression of this sort on Victor Amadeus, a few hours before his departure from Tortona, he addressed the following notification to the Sardinian general:—

"In consequence of the suspension of arms, which the king of Sardinia has concluded with the armies of the Alps and of Italy, and of the probability of peace, of which I have received fresh assurances, I have ordered a detachment of seventeen thousand men from the army of the Alps, to join the army of Italy. Nine thousand will pass by the Col d'Argentiere to Coni, where, after crossing the Stura, they will take the route to my head quarters. Eight thousand will march by the way of the Great Saint Bernard and the valley of Aoste, and pass the Tanaro at Alexandria."

This large accession of force from the army of the Alps, as Bonaparte himself owns, was neither received nor expected; for although he had solicited reenforcements of the Directory, his application was limited to fifteen thousand men, and it was not until after the lapse of a fortnight, when the Po had been passed,

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the Austrians beaten, and Milan surrendered, that general Kellermann, whose attention was engaged by certain royalist movements at Lyons, and the definition of territorial limits on the Alps with the Sardinian commissioners, detached, by order of the government, the meagre division of Vaubois to Coni. After the signature of peace with Sardinia, this reenforcement was raised to eight thousand five hundred men; but as out of this number garrisons were to be furnished for the numerous forts ceded to the French, Bonaparte's active force, exposed to continual diminution in the field, was but slightly augmented. It was strictly true however that, in the despatch of the 25th of April, which reached head quarters on the 5th of May, the Directory gave him fresh reasons to believe that they would conclude a peace with the king of Sardinia.

Beaulieu, meanwhile, whose vigilance was concentrated upon Valenza, and whose circumspection ranged between the mouths of the Sessia and the Ticin, had drawn his reserve of eight battalions from Milan, and established his principal force in a fortified camp behind the Agogna at Valeggio. This position on the read from Valenza to Pavia, was within one march of any point on the Po, from the confluence of the Sessia to that of the Ticin. At the mouth of the first of these rivers he stationed his advance under the brave Illyrian general Wukassowich, and with his rear guard commanded by general Liptay, held the bridge at Pavis over the second; and having secured all the boats or rafts, which might be useful to the French, he stood upon the defensive, resolved not to risk the advantage of his ground, nor to provoke the enterprise of his antagonist, by a forward movement or a hazardous separation of his forces, as he had ventured to do by his march across the Appennines to Voltri.

Bonaparte, aware of the strong position, and persuaded of the fixed design of the Austrian general, suddenly executed a movement which rendered them completely unavailing. As at the outset of his operations, he had seen his advance obstructed by the highest mountains of Europe, so now he found his pregress opposed by the broadest river of Italy; which, had not its passage been disputed by the Austrian army, might be supposed to have presented of itself a formidable barrier to the invasion of a commander, who, like Bonaparte, had neither a train of postons, nor boats, nor bridge equipage of any sort. But these

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difficulties instead of allaying his enterprise, appear only to have inflamed it; for, without a momentary fluctuation of thought or indecision of purpose, he triumphed over all the obstacles which nature and accident and art had thrown in his way, and led his vanguard into the heart of Lombardy, with as great expedition and as little loss, as if his march had lain along a turnpike road and through a friendly country.

His plan was, instead of risking the bloody and desperate attempt of forcing a passage in Beaulieu's front, and fighting for France a second battle of Pavia, to surprise a passage without opposition in his rear; to cross the Po, fifty miles lower down, at Placentia; by that operation, to place himself as near Milan as his adversary was; and to turn the Austrian fortified position, as well as the important rivers, the Sessia and the Ticin, by which it was covered.

At Placentia, a large town in the Duchy of Parma, the Po, having received these and other tributaries, exceeds five hundred yards in breadth, and for the force and volume of its current, is a river of the first magnitude. The place selected for the passage was about equidistant from Tortona and Valleggio; so that, should Beaulieu discover or divine his intentions, Bonaparte, upon reaching the ferry at Placentia, might find the enemy on the opposite shore prepared to receive him. Moreover, as the march of the French would expose their left flank for the greater part of the distance to an attack from across the river, and as Beaulieu was furnished with means of immediate transportation, he might, by a well timed movement, sever the French column, and overpower their rear and front in succession. It was not only necessary to prevent both these incidents, but so far to outstrip the movements and even the apprehensions of the Austrian geperal as to be able to collect the materials of transportation, and lo effect the passage of a great river before opposition could be offered, where even slight opposition might well prove effectual. To accomplish these objects, sagacity, secresy, celerity, and boldness, the great springs by which the wonders of war are achieved, Were requisite and were employed (9).

Upon arriving at Tortona, and while appearing to enemies and friends to be preparing to force his way across the Po at Valenza, Bonaparte had drawn around him, from the several divisions of his army, ten battalions of grenadiers, consisting altogether of

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three thousand five hundred men. This c , to whose intrepi dity and discipline was thus imparted the ard ___ of emulation, h strengthened with fifteen hundred horse and twenty-four pieces of light artillery, and placed at the head of it general Laharpe who, impatient of a fortnight's restraint on the Belbo, was ease to resume his station in the van. A party of five hundred great diers, and a squadron of horse under Lannes, formed the ad vance of this select body; which, in order to guide and accelerate the critical movement, Bonaparte himself accompanied. On the afternoon of the 6th of May, pursuing the Pavia road as far a Vogherra, he there turned swiftly to the right, and pushed for ward with such rapidity that he reached the shore of Placentia b nine o'clock on the morning of the 7th. Repairing instantly to the ferry, he superintended personally the embarkation of the troom It was found that the ferry boat would carry five hundred or fifty horses, at a load, and would make the passage in half a In this, and on such rafts as could be hastily constructed Lannes, with his party was instantly launched for the left bank of the river, where two squadrons of Austrian hussars, who was patroling in that quarter, drew up to oppose him. But this flori officer, who was the first man to set foot in Lombardy, defic their opposition, and landing in the face of it, attacked and dis persed them.

On the march from Tortona, the French general, whose attention neither great objects oppressed nor small ones eluded; him detached to his left colonel Andreossy and adjutant general Frontin, with a troop of light dragoons, and with directions a pass close along the bank, and to seize any boats they might fine on the shore or in the stream. They were so fortunate as to can ture ten bateaux, freighted with hospital stores, and five hundred wounded, whom, after his passage of the river at Valence Wurmser had embarked for Cremona. These boats, conveyed readily with the current to Placentia, increased so seasonably the means of transportation which that town afforded, that, or the evening of the 7th, the entire corps of Laharpe, following the movement of Lannes, was established in Lombardy; the hear quarters of that general being advanced as far as Emetri, half a league from the river, and half way to Fombio, the first place of note in the direction of Milan.

The point chosen for surprising the passage of the Po being

once unmasked, the other divisions of the army were urged forward by forced marches to gain it; and, during the night of the 9th, the materials found at Placentia having been industriously used in constructing a floating bridge, and establishing a ferry higher up at Verato, the whole army, without sustaining the loss of a single man, completed the passage of this great river. operation, which was deemed at the time a wonderful effort of enterprise and skill, must always be regarded, when the means of success and opposition are compared, as the accomplishment of one of the boldest undertakings which has yet been recorded in military history, or is likely to occur in the exigencies of war. For although, both in ancient and modern times, generals have often succeeded by force, celerity, or stratagem, in passing broad and defended rivers, no instance of such perfect success as attended Bonaparte's passage of the Po can be pointed out, where on one . side the invader was opposed by such great difficulties as he overcame, and, on the other, the defender had as numerous and imposing advantages as Beaulieu possessed. When Bonaparte marched from Tortona he had not a single ponton, boat, plank, or beam; was exposed to the observation of a thickly peopled country, and confronted by an experienced commander at the head of an army stronger than his own. On the other hand, Beaulieu had a superior force of cavalry for the quick collection of intelligence, and the rapid application of resistance; possessed the means of crossing the Po at will; of attacking the flank or rear of the French; and was operating in the midst of a dense population all the authorities of which were in his service (10).

The success of the movement was not more remarkable than the judgment displayed in singling out Placentia for the point of invasion. Its position on the right bank of the river subjected its materials for rafts and bridges, absolutely to the capability of the French army, by forced marches, to seize them. Its distance from Beaulieu's camp was great enough to allow of the passage being commenced before he was aware of its being intended; while it was the only place which, to these advantages, united that of placing the invaders, so soon as they entered Lombardy, as near its capital as the Austrians were; an advantage that, but for the deficiency of boats under which the French laboured, would have made them masters of Milan before Beaulieu could have interposed in its defence. Had the march been

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extended fifteen miles further to Cremona, which place, it has been contended, was the true stratagetical point for passing the Po, the following are some of the inconveniences which would have ensued:—The French columns would have been longer exposed to a flank attack from Beaulieu; Cremona being on the Lombardy side of the Po, the passage of the French might have been, if not successfully opposed, dangerously retarded by the garrison and citizens; while, should the French effect a passage, they would have found themselves much more distant than the Austrians from Milan, with the Adda, an important river, constituting, by the fortifications of Pizzighitone, Lodi, and Cremone, a strong line of defence in their way. As for cutting off Beaulieu's army from Mantua, that operation could hardly have been attempted with safety as long as the force of that general was entire, and while Milan and Pavia, with the extensive fertile and populous country lying between the Sessia and the Adda, remained unaffected by active political sympathy with the invaders, and in quiet subjection to Austrian domination (11).

Beaulieu, who was not apprized of his adversary's extensive movement down the right bank of the Po, until the afternoon of the 7th, no sooner learned it than he felt the necessity of abandoning his laboured works and fortified positions between the Sessia and the Ticin, as a man who perceives the foundations of his house give way, rushes out of doors for fear of being buried in its ruins. He felt also the duty of endeavouring, at the cost of new struggles, perhaps of fresh disasters, to cover Milan, and keep open his communications with Mantua. Though dispirited by recent reverses, this veteran commander exhibited no want of energy or resolution; and, if he resumed active operations behind the Po with less of hope than he had commenced them with beyond the Appennines, he resumed them also with less of presump-When executing his movement upon Voltri in April, he assured the king of Sardinia that it was his purpose not to take off his boots before he entered Lyons (12). His orders now, to garrison the Castle of Milan, alarmed the Austrian Viceroy, by confessing a poignant fear that the capital of Lombardy was not safe from the French. Under the sudden change in the enemy's position and in his own plans, the rear division of his army at Pavia was become his front; and Liptay who commanded it, was directed to march with all possible rapidity on the road to Piszighitone, in order to protect that fortress, hold free the lower route to Mantua, occupy that from Placentia to Milan, and defend the passage of the Po, or crush such of the invader's force as might have succeeded in effecting it.

In the execution of these orders, general Liptay reached Fombio early on the morning of the 8th, and proceeded to throw up intrenchments in his front, to garrison the steeples and houses with infantry, and to occupy, with cavalry and artillery, the roads which, issuing from the village in various directions, traverse the low and level rice fields around it. Bonaparte, on his side, was not less active in moving towards him; for sensible of the disadvantage of receiving the enemy with a broad river at his back, he advanced his parties as rapidly as they landed, so that, by opening his distance from the shore, he might, in case of battle, have room for proper evolutions. In prosecuting this purpose, he came in sight of Fombio, with the principal part of Laharpe's division, in the afternoon of the 8th, and, to complete it, he determined on dislodging Liptay before Beaulieu could come to his assistance. The dispositions required by the form of the village, and the nature of the ground were simple, and were speedily adopted. The attack which was commenced at 3 o'clock, was conducted in three columns, General Dallemagne on the right, Lanusse in the centre, and Lannes on the left. Advancing under a severe cannonade, the assailants forced their way into the streets, against an obstinate resistance from the troops in the bouses, and carried the village at the point of the bayonet. Austrians lost two hundred and fifty killed and wounded, as many prisoners, three hundred horses, twenty pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of military stores. They fled for shelter to Pizrighitone, where, having crossed the Adda, they raised the drawbridges, and prepared to defend themselves by mounting field pieces on the ramparts; for so remote was this fortress from the theatre of Beaulieu's fancied conquests that it had been left almost entirely unarmed.

While attempting to cover the retreat, a regiment of Neapolitan horse in charging the grenadiers of Lannes, was repulsed with severe loss. The courage of that officer was conspicuous in the action, and his activity in the pursuit, which was continued until night-fall and as far as Malleo, a village in half cannon shot of Pizzighitone. Here, Bonaparte, having ascertained, from the

prisoners, that Beaulieu was on his march with the corps of Sebottendorf and Rozelmini, to support Liptay, and that the divisions of Wukasowich and Colli were pressing on to Milan for the purpose of covering that capital, and keeping free the route by Cassano to Mantua, although the labours of the day seemed over, instantly took measures for profiting by the heedless advance of his adversary, and for intercepting his lieutenants from Holding the brigade of Dallemagne and the grenadiers of Lannes stationary at Malleo, he caused Laharpe, with the main body of his force, to fall back for the night to Codogno, a village at which the roads from Pavia, Lodi, and Pizzighitone to Fombio, He conjectured that the Austrian commander, unapprized of Liptay's defeat, might propose to encamp, or to quarter some of his troops, at Codogno; and he instructed Laharpe to observe the utmost vigilance, and be prepared to take advantage of Beaulieu's security. He himself then hastened to the bank of the Adda, and sent parties up and down the shore, with orders to take possession of all the boats they could find; being resolved, if even eight or ten could be collected, to establish, during the night, a part of Dallemagne's brigade on the left bank of the Adda, and thereby acquire the command of a passage for a force sufficient to act against Wukassowich and Colli. In this attempt he was not successful, for the garrison of Pizzighitone, prompted by the defenceless condition of that fortress, had secured all the boats in the neighbourhood on their own side of the river. Upon this, he determined to return to Placentia where the grand operation of passing the Po was yet unfinished, and where, arriving before midnight, he ordered Massena to advance with a strong reserve, and take up a position in supporting distance of Laharpe.

Thus into the last sixty hours had been crowded, by the unremitting vigour of the French general, besides several minor operations, the march from Tortona, the preparation of boats, the construction of a bridge, the passage of more than twenty thousand men over a great river, the invasion of Lombardy, and the defeat and pursuit of Liptay; an assemblage of performances, that constitute probably the earliest example his history affords, of that indefatigable personal activity, and that diffusive and inexhaustible mental energy, of which, as his previous life had been the earnest, the progress of his career will be found to be the incessant and enlarged exhibition (13).

The events which his foresight had provided against as probable at Codogno, actually came to pass there; but with one consequence which was as unfortunate as it was unexpected. Beaulieu, in perfect ignorance of Liptay's defeat, and in perfect confidence, from the breadth of the Po and the want of means for passing it, which he was aware prevailed in the French army, that this great river still protected Lombardy from invasion, was approaching in haste to support his advanced division, and, late at night, took up his quarters at Casal Pusterlengo, a league in the rear of Fombio, and less distant still from Codogno. A regiment of horse which covered his right flank, directing its march for the same object to Codogno, fell unawares upon the chain of French pickets. Salated with a sharp and sudden volley, some of the troopers retired in alarm, some advanced in trepidation, all in the darkness soon disappeared; and although the corps of Laharpe, having been forewarned, was instantly under arms, the firing speedily subsided. Laharpe himself mounted his horse, and led forward a regiment of infantry to the point of alarm, but discovering no enemy he proceeded in company with several officers to the pearest farm-houses, for the purpose of procuring information respecting the strength and object of the party, which had so suddealy disturbed and evaded his outguards. After performing a considerable circuit, and learning what has been related respecting this part of Beaulieu's force, about one o'clock in the morning, he turned his course towards his camp, but unhappily by a road different from the one along which he was observed to leave it. His previous orders and the recent alarm, had excited the vigilance of his men to a state of the keenest alertness. first appearance, the centinels supposed that the enemy, repelled from one quarter of the camp, was approaching another. fred on the party, and with fatal precision; for their gallant general fell dead.

This brave officer was beloved and lamented by his troops, and esteemed and regretted by his commander. In reporting his death to the directory, Bonaparte evinced his feeling, not by empty expressions, but by recommending with an earnestness which the hurry of war and the pressure of affairs could not suspend nor abate, the immediate promotion of the deceased general's son; and, in recording the campaigns of Italy, after describing Labarpe's services, he thus eternized his name—"General Labarpe

was an officer of distinguished merit. A grenadier in form and valour, he possessed talents for command; and, although of an impatient temper, was greatly beloved by his troops. It was remarked that, during the action of Fombio and the whole evening previous to his death, he was preoccupied, dejected, silent, and absent, his faculties in some degree suspended, as if his mind was oppressed with a presentiment of his approaching fate" (14).

Intelligence of this sad event was conveyed to Bonaparte about

four o'clock in the morning, and being of necessity detained at Placentia himself, he instantly despatched Berthier to take charge of the advance. This officer found the troops, though restored to order by the care of General Mesnard, and reenforced by the prompt arrival of Lannes with two battalions of grenadiers from Malleo, disconsolate for their loss. In this temper, he led them against the enemy; and having first dispersed the light parties, which were hovering in front of his own camp, assailed their main position at Casal Pusterlengo. The attack, in which the gallantry of General Mesnard with the 70th infantry excited particular praise, was impetuous and successful; and Beautieu. driven from his position and yielding up his baggage, retreated upon Lodi, there passed the Adda, and took up a line on the cast bank of that river; his left consisting of the remnant of Liptay's corps at Pizzighitone, and his right of the divisions which, conducted by Wukassowich and Colli, were under orders to cross the river above him at Cassano. This line, defended by the Adda and the several fortifications on its banks, he hoped to make good, and, after all his reverses, not only to cover Mantua but to protect Milan; which capital, with an Austrian garrison in the castle, and an Austrian army within a short march of it, would be exposed, he trusted, neither to a hostile attack, nor to a popular insurrection.

In the mean time, Bonaparte having despatched the affairs which, on the evening of the action of Fombio, called him back to Placentia; having adjusted the amount of contribution to be imposed on that town, provided for the immediate passage of his rear division across the Po, and signed an armistice with the commissioners of the Duke of Parma, hastened to rejoin his advance, and to resume the personal direction of its movements. He arrived at Casal Pusterlengo, at three o'clock on the morning of the 19th and marched without delay on the traces of Beaulieu. Early in the forenoon, and at some distance in front of Lodi, with the gre-

nadiers under Lannes, he overtook the Austrian rear guard composed of the grenadiers of Nadasti and two squadrons of hussars. with two field pieces; which Beaulieu, that he might gain time to withdraw his main body encumbered with a heavy train of artillery, across the Adda, had directed to defend to the utmost the approach to Lodi. The ground occupied by this detachment was found to be so strong that it was necessary to execute several manœuvres, before it could be turned and advantageously attacked. The onset of the French was made with that alacrity of courage, which the presence of their general and the confidence of victory, inspired. The defence, which was as obstinate as the post was important, was persisted in, until the Austrians, the French battalions pouring along in succession, were nearly surrounded. They at last gave way, leaving their slain and wounded with one field piece on the ground; and were pursued so closely into Lodi that they could neither shut the gates, nor cross the river, before the French vanguard was in possession of the

Beaulieu's main body, upon which his routed rear guard retreated, consisting of twelve thousand infantry and four thousand horse with thirty pieces of artillery, was drawn up behind fieldworks on the left bank of the Adda, and immediately opposite to Lodi; the artillery in front looking on the bridge, and the cavalry a ittle withdrawn on the flanks. From this position, in which he let at last safe and unassailable, the Austrian general directed a violent cannonade upon Lodi, as soon as he perceived it was occapied by the French; and expecting rather to dislodge his adversary than to be himself disturbed, he declined destroying the bridge over the Adda, and thus interrupting his most direct comnunication with Milan. To avoid and to mitigate the effect of this fire, Bonaparte sheltered his infantry and horse as fast as they came up, behind the rampart of the town, which ran along the bank of the river, and, planting advantageously his own artillery, opened a fire, which, though supported by fewer guns, was more effectual than that of the enemy, inasmuch as he Austrians were but imperfectly covered by their works.

Notwithstanding the strength of Beaulieu's ground, Bonaparte aw at once that, with men like his, it was not impregnable; and persevering in his design of intercepting Wukassowich and Colli in their retreat to Mantua, he resolved, even under the Austrian

guns, to force the passage of the Adda. The attempt was hazardous, but the soul of the enterprise consisted in its danger, and the only chance of success in its apparent impossibility; which so long as the bridge remained entire, was no more than apparent. To prevent its destruction, he proceeded in person and in full exposure to the Austrian artillery, to place two guns in such positions that their cross fire, which, assisted by Berthier, he himself tried, covered the further end of the bridge. freedom with which he exposed himself while making his skill as an artillery officer, instrumental to his success as their general, delighted the troops extremely, and was the occasion of their conferring on him that rank, which, in the annals of the bivousc, rendered him famous, as "The little corporal." Then, comparatively at leisure, he made his preparations for forcing the passage. and striking a final terror into his adversary; ordering the artillery officers to maintain their fire with unabated spirit, and directing Massena to allow the troops, who were drawn up behind the rampart, and had been in constant exertion from 3 o'clock in the morning, a hasty breakfast and a short repose.

The force which he had in hand at Lodi, was more formidable in character than in numbers; consisting of three brigades of Massena's division, the grenadier corps lately commanded by Laharpe, and a reserve of light cavalry under general Beaumost. General Kilmaine, with the principal part of the horse, and general Mesnard with a brigade of infantry, had been detached in the morning from Casal; the first to the left, for the double purpose of keeping free that wing of the advance, and of hanging on the flank of the Austrian divisions, in their retreat from Milan to Cassano; the second to the right, for security on that side, and with instructions to observe and act against Liptay at Pizzighitone. Serrurier's division having been the last to cross the Po, and having been directed to occupy Pavia, was at some distance in the rear; while Augereau's, which had passed the night at Borghetto, was following by the route of Casal, the progress of the advance. To this general therefore, as additional force might be required at Lodi, orders were sent to expedite his march, and to close up with the front as soon as possible.

Although the chief reliance for success, in his meditated undertaking, was on the desperate courage of the troops to be engaged in it, two circumstances enabled Bonaparte to bring its issue, in

some degree, within the range of calculation. One of these was the information of the inhabitants that, at the present stage of the water, the Adda was fordable for cavalry at a place half a league above the bridge; and another, his own observation, that the Austrian commander, in order to shelter his troops from the French artillery, as the French troops were sheltered from his own, had withdrawn his mass of infantry and his corps of horse, behind a swell in the surface of the ground, to a position so much in the rear, that it placed them further from the Austrian guns than the French grenadiers would be, when prepared to rush across the bridge. In the first, he perceived an opportunity of annoying the right flank of the enemy, and distracting his attention at a critical moment; in the second, the practicability, by a sudden and impetuous charge, of reaching his guns before his infantry could interpose; and in both, the likelihood that his own column of attack, would be exposed but for an instant to the enemy's artillery. Upon the edge of these sharp inferences, which few minds would have had the acuteness to shape, or the firmness to rely on, the fate of this important day was to turn.

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when the men were somewhat refreshed, and the immediate junction of Augereau might be counted upon, Bonaparte gave orders to general Beaumont, with the cavalry and four pieces of light artillery, to pass the river at the ford above, and having gained a footing on the opposite bank, to cannonade the right flank of the Austrians and, if practicable, to charge them. A column of attack four thousand strong, composed of grenadiers, with the second battalion of carabiniers in front (15), was formed under the direction of Massena behind the rampart of the town, with the leading sections so close to the gate, that by only facing to the left they could spring upon the bridge. The time required for the detour of the cavalry, Bonaparte employed in passing through the ranks of the grenadiers, by a few energetic expressions, encouraging their zeal and rousing their Shouts of "Long live the republic," reechoed by a intrepidity. thousand voices, welcomed his appearance, and proclaimed that troops who had turned the Alps and traversed the Po were not to be stopped by the Adda (16).

The cannonade was continued with fury on both sides; when the guns of Beaumont being heard on the left, and the Austrian fire seeming to slacken at the sound, Bonaparte himself gave the word to advance. The drums beat the charge, and the assailants, issuing from behind the wall like a band of giants sprung from the earth, suddenly changed the face of the conflict, and quickly brought it to a closer decision. Facing to the left, the forement sections rushed upon the bridge against a storm of fire, which at the first onset was so fatal that the head of the column recled under its destruction. Bonaparte, aware that his attempt must prove instantly successful or dreadfully abortive, perceived the disorder in a moment, and in a moment repaired it. He darted to the front, and seconded by Berthier, Massena, Dallemagne, Carvoni, Lannes, Dupas, and the commissary Salicetti, gave a fresh impulse to the charge; and the grenadiers closing their ranks and quickly redressing their disordered front, swept onward with more determined valour and more ardent steps. The bridge, two hundred yards long, was instantly cleared. Dupas was the first officer across; Bonaparte followed next after Lannes. The grenadiers crowding on their leaders, were seen, some sliding down the timbers of the bridge, others leaping off into the water. speeding up the bank to close with the enemy. Displaying as rapidly as they passed, they delivered one close and deadly fire, and falling upon the Austrian artillery before it could be supported. bayonetted the gunners, and seized the pieces. Then with fury they rushed upon the infantry, which neither in time for rescue. nor in spirit for revenge, under the conduct of Sebottendorf, was advancing. A struggle too fierce to be lasting ensued. The Ametrians, discouraged by frequent defeats and constant misfortunes, were unnerved by this unexpected blast of death, and their line was already pierced and mangled, when Augereau coming up with his light brigade under general Rusca, led it keenly into action, and completed this double victory which, at one blow, severed a strong line of defence and routed a powerful army. Part of Beaulieu's force fled with their general into the Venetian territory. to Crema, part sought refuge with Liptay at Pizzighitone, some continued their flight even to Cremona. Beaulieu's husears ende vouring to cover his retreat, made several charges which, owing to the firmness of the French infantry, were not successful.

But the marching and fighting of the day had so much exhausted the victorious troops, that, though eager for glory they were panting for breath; and the pursuit consequently was not carried far beyond the field of battle. The Austrians left on the ground welve hundred killed and wounded, and in possession of the french, one thousand prisoners, six hundred horses, twenty guns, and several stands of colours. Bonaparte's loss but little exceeded two hundred in killed and wounded; such was the rapidity and effect of a movement which, with the nicest calculation of judgment, seemed to combine the ecstatic boldness of inspiration (17).

The French cavalry, with the exception of a small party headed by Berthier and Marmont, and composed chiefly of Bonaparte's escort, took no part in the action, and received none of the general's praise. It was alleged that the ford was found less pracicable, and the circuit more extensive than they had been represented to be. But the conduct, or rather the nullity, of this corps at Lodi, could hardly lessen the dissatisfaction which Bonaparte had expressed the day before in a letter to Carnot. "I will confess to you that, since the death of Stengel, I have not a single fighting man among the superior officers of cavalry. I wish you would send me two or three adjutants general who have risen in the cavalry, possess a spark of military fire, and are firmly resolved never to make skilful retreats." It was not until the French had reached the borders of the Mincio, and, by capture or contribution, had furnished their troopers with heavy horses; nor until Murat, being returned with promotion from Paris, had an opportunity of displaying that unbounded courage which gave a romantic splendour to the technical force of his charges, that the cavalry of the army of Italy began to prove worthy of their general's skill in war, and to rival the infantry in prowess (18).

The conduct of the grenadiers, of the 2d battalion of carabiniers particularly, was above description or praise. When Bonaparte called for the names of the men who formed the foremost section of the column, for the purpose of mentioning them homourably in his report, the names of the whole battalion were handed him. Léon, a sergeant of the 32d, whose courage had been noticed at Monteligino and Montenotte; and Laforge, a grenadier of the 21st, remarkable for strength and activity, appear however to have been most conspicuous. The sergeant, after passing the bridge in the front section, led the assault on the Austrian artillery; the grenadier throwing himself into the enemy's intrenchments, slew five men with his own hand. Among the generals, in like manner, Berthier was judged to be preeminent

in gallantry. To these circumstances, Bonaparte made allusion in his report. "Were I to mention all who distinguished themselves, I should be obliged to name all the carabiniers and great-diers of the light division, and almost all the officers of the staff. But I must not forget the intrepid Berthier, who himself acted as grenadier, trooper, and gunner, on this memorable day." Yet, however excellent the spirit of the troops, and admirable the conduct of the officers, few victories were ever in so great a degree the result of the commanding general's sagacity and valour as that of Lodi. The modesty of Bonaparte's report, in which no reference to his personal exertions appears, was as heroic as his conduct in the battle (19).

Although the possession of Milan and the submission of Lonbardy were consequences of the victory of Lodi, Bonaparte was disappointed in one of the principal objects which he hoped to gain by it. Wukassowich and Colli, feebly annoyed on their march by Kilmaine, had crossed the Adda without opposition at Cassano, on the morning of the day he passed it by force at Lodi; and being so far on the upper route by Brescia to Mantua, were beyond the reach of interception. Relinquishing therefore further efforts against these generals, he determined to attack Pizzighitone before it could be put in a state of defence, and with that view marched on the morning of the 11th down the left bank of the Adda. The flight of a few shells, seconded by the cannonade of Meenerd from the right bank of the river, compelled the garrison of three hundred men, which Liptay in retreating upon the defeat of Beanlieu had left behind him, to surrender. Cremona, a more impertant place, opened its gates to General Beaumont, who after charging successfully a body of the fugitives from Lodi, appeared before it with a party of cavalry.

From this point, which was the present limit of his career, Bonaparte determined to lead back his forces in order to secure the
country which they had overrun; and turning his views toward
Milan, resolved to impress without delay, on that capital and other
cities of Lombardy, the stamp of French authority, in the room
of that which his victories had expelled. This operation which
first called into exercise his abilities for government, appears to
have awakened the germs of that high ambition, which matured
by the possession of great moral and civil qualities, placed him
far above all the other generals of his age, and conducted him to

a sphere of elevated greatness, which a mind, supported by military talents alone, and ambitious only of success in war, can never reach. In recurring to the events of his early life he afterwards said. "Neither my successon the 13th of Vendemiaire, nor in the campaign of Montenotte, made me believe myself a superior man. It was not until after the battle of Lodi, that I began to think, I might become a decisive actor on our political theatre. Then it was, that the first spark of high ambition was kindled in my soul" (20).

Suspending for the moment his advance toward the Adige, he thus disposed of his troops. The light division lately commanded by Laharpe was distributed along the Adda from Como to Cassano; and that of Serrurier which had been under orders to occupy Pavia, was recalled and posted at Lodi, Pizzighitone, and Cremona; so as to complete the possession of the line of the Adda. From this last place, Serrurier was to observe the discomfited Austrians, who were reassembling behind the Oglio, and the Mincio. Augereau was directed to march upon Pavia, and to display in that celebrated city, which was next to Milan itself in importance, one of the finest divisions of the invading army; while to Massena was assigned the still more honorable duty, of receiving the keys of the noble capital of Lombardy. At the head of his division, this distinguished general moved from Lodi on the 13th of May.

The hostile forces being now separated, the imperialists collecting their shattered battalions within the Venetian frontier, and the republicans spreading their victorious divisions over the plains of Lombardy, the reader will be inclined to turn his attention from the constant success of the one, and the uniform defeat of the other party, to the conduct of their respective commanders. He will observe that while a lamp of foresight guided the French general, the Austrian was bewildered in a cloud of uncertainty. Though active, courageous, and experienced, Beaulieu was as distracted in his efforts as a sightless pugilist, who knows neither where to aim nor to expect a blow; and although operating in the open field, and in a populous quarter of his own country, was invariably subjected to the effect of surprise. The passage of the Po, the success of Fombio, the victory of Lodi, operations which constituted the leading acts of this brilliant section of the campaign, were, each of them, the result of an attempt, which had

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it been foreseen might have been frustrated. But while Beaulieu was guarding the Po at Valenza, Bonaparte had passed it at Placentia; while he was preparing to support Liptav at Fombio, that general was already defeated; and while he felt himself unassailable and was meditating offensive operations at Lodi, he was overthrown by a blow of such quick and incalculable energy, that it was impossible to fear, withstand, or recover from it.

The confusion and dismay which these circumstances spread through the Imperial army, are aptly exemplified by the anecdote which Bonaparte records of an old Hungarian captain, with whom, among other captives, he fell in, while making the rounds of his camp, the night after the surrender of Pizzighitone. The prisoner, who did not know to whom he spoke, being asked by the general what he thought of the state of the war, replied that "Nothing could be worse, and that it was altogether incomprehensible. We have to do" he added "with a young general who is at one moment in our front, at another in our rear, and the next on This manner of our flanks; one knows not how to take him. making war against all rules, is insupportable" (21).

Bonaparte, on the other hand, seizing the initiative by his boldness and maintaining it by his activity, divined the intentions of his adversary on all occasions, and confounded them as with the overruling force of destiny. Accordingly, though operating with little more than his vanguard, he predominated irresistibly in the contest, defeating the corps which came in his way, terrifying those which kept out of it, and in defiance of obstacles that seemed to others insurmountable, by an electric shock of genius and audacity, hurling to the ground the military strength and political power of his once gigantic antagonist.

CHAPTER VIII.

From the 14th to the 21st of May 1796.

in dake of Parma solicits a suspension of arms—Forbearence of Boneparts (Canditions of the truce—The St. Jerome of Corregio—The dake's liber to research it is rejected—Bonaparte's letter to the directory—State of the public saind in Milan—Flight of the archduke—His pusillanimity—A deputation sent to Bonaparte—Massena enters Milan—Invests the castle—Public entry of Bonaparte—The French received as friends—The provisional government—Contribution—Justice but inconvenience of that measure—Purity and self-denial of Bonaparte—His reply to Salicetti—The letter to the astronomer Oriani—His communication to the professors of the university of Pavia—Penury and nakedness of the army relieved—Armitice with the duke of Modena—Paintings and manuscripts taken from the gallery and library of Milan—Bonaparte's address to his army—Circumstances under which it was issued.

On his rapid march from Tortona, along the right bank of the Po, Bonaparte was met at his entrance into the territory of Parma by commissioners from the Duke, bearing a letter of intercession from the Spanish minister, and a solicitation from their master for peace and protection. This prince, an infant of Spain, had been expected to conform to the policy of the court of Madrid, in withdrawing from the coalition and signing the treaty of Basle, the previous July. He had, however, preferred signalizing his bestility to France, and his attachment to her enemies, by refusing to accept the mediation of the Spanish government, or to concur with the head of his house in acknowledging by a convention the French republic. He was therefore looked upon by the directory, and, as it would appear, admitted by himself to be, as far as he was capable of public hostility, an offensive party to the war;

the storm of which, after thundering in the Alps and Appennines, and sweeping through the plains of Piedmont, was now threatening to concentrate its fury on his little state. At the appearance of danger, his pride, like that of greater princes, shrunk within the dimensions of his strength; and, claiming the mediation of Spain, he implored the mercy of the French general. His application was answered by Bonaparte in a letter to the Spanish minister at Parma, the Count Valdeparaiso, consenting to a suspension of arms, and requiring that agents of the duke, authorised to adjust its conditions, should meet him without delay at Placentia.

This forbearance towards a potentate, exposed to summary punishment both by his insolence and feebleness, was not only in conformity with the wishes of the directors, who were naturally anxious to cultivate the good will of Spain, but was recommended by reasons of military policy. In the actual crisis of the campaign, and the existing relations of France with the other states of Europe, the inconsiderable possessions, the parvula rema of the duke of Parma, were worth neither the time requisite to overrun, nor the trouble necessary to govern them. A suspension of arms, on terms acceptable to the duke, and approved by the representative of his kinsman and protector the king of Spain. besides leading to a peace, and detaching from the coalition another member of the Bourbon family, would acquire, for the French army, advantages of the greatest moment, without incurring the sacrifice of time, or the pain of extortion. Under these considerations, the armistice of Placentia, guaranteed by the concurrence of the Spanish envoy, was signed by Bonaparte on the 9th of May, just before his departure to put himself a second time at the head of his advance. The duke of Parma engaged to send commissioners to Paris, to treat for peace, and in the mean. time to pay a military contribution of two millions of francs; to furnish, for the French army, seventeen hundred horses, twelve hundred for draught, four hundred for cavalry, and one hundred for the saddle, all suitably harnessed and equipped. He further contracted to supply, in the course of fifteen days, two thousand quintals of wheat, five thousand of oats, and two thousand bullocks. But a more interesting sacrifice, to which he now consented for the purpose of purchasing those immunities of neutrality that hitherto he had disdained to accept, was embraced

in the fourth article of the armistice, which stipulated for the delivery, at the choice of the French general, of twenty of the finest paintings existing in the dutchy (1).

This was the first time, at least in the history of modern war, that the productions of the fine arts, were introduced into the conventions of hostile states, as equivalents for the concession of peace, or substitutes for the spoils of conquest. The measure, though sanctioned by the directory, originated with Bonaparte, and less a grace and refinement to his warfare, which reflecting instre on the French arms, harmonized the rudeness of military fame, with the softer glories of taste and imagination. The homage of other conquerors for the masterpieces of art, had been shown by seizing with avidity, or leaving with indifference, such specimens as the chance of war placed within their reach. arm of victory had transferred from Corinth to Constantinople, it thence to Venice, the famous horses of bronze. In later ines, Frederick the great, though twice in military possession of Dreaden, left untouched and almost unnoticed the objects collested in the royal gallery. The livelier sympathy of Bonaparte for the efforts of genius, rendered it impossible for him, to desecrate or neglect its creations. What had hitherto been subjects of military rapine, princely exchange, selfish display, or private acquisition, he elevated into considerations of national compact and means of public relief and refinement, receiving, as compensation for territory which he might have occupied, and treasure which he could have exacted, a small selection of Italian paintings. This proceeding, which evinced equal respect for talent and humanity, and opened a higher sphere of glory for the arts, made the magic of Correggio's pencil, turn aside from his country the ravages of war (2).

In order to make the choice with proper care and judgment, Bonaparte had requested the French minister at Genoa, as early as the 1st of May, to furnish him with a list of the most admired paintings and statues to be found in Milan, Parma, Placentia, Modena, and Bologna; and, after notifying the directory of his intention to require from the Duke of Parma a heavy contribution, in punishment of his obstinate adhesion to the coalition against France, had requested them to send to his headquarters three or four connoisseurs, who might designate such objects as were best worth the expense of conveyance to Paris, and the honour

of a place in the museum of the Louvre. But the rapidity of his conquests, outstripping the expedition of his correspondence and the measures of the directory, in executing the convention with the Duke of Parma, he had recourse to the services of general Cervoni, who appears, from his letters, to have executed the object of his mission with modesty and intelligence. By the zeal of this officer, the St. Jerome of Correggio, the chef-d'œuvre of that artist, was sent off to Tortona on the route to Paris, as early as the 18th of May. The bigotry of the duke, who, although he was an élère of Condillac, lived surrounded by monks, and buried in superstitious observances in the castle of Colorno. rendered him more sensible of the value of the saint than of the painting, and he offered to redeem his image at the price of two millions of francs. As this sum would be likely to pass through the hands of the army agents, they were pleased at the liberality of the offer, and urged the general to accept it. reply, which shews that patriotism and glory, the incentives of his vigour in war, were the motives of his moderation in peace. was in these unprophetic words "The two millions, if accepted. would soon be gone, while the great work of Correggio will be the ornament of Paris for ages, and the parent of masterpieces like itself."

The language of his letter communicating a copy of the armistice which he had granted to the Duke of Parma, is remarkable as an illustration of the temper of the public mind in Paris, at the time a consciousness of his vast capacity first actuated him, and the influence of its force was just beginning to be felt in France. That indifference for the Christian religion, which, in consequence of the writings of philosophers, the corruption of the clergy, and the fury of the revolution, prevailed among the French people. was supposed to be faithfully represented by a majority of the directors; while, in the person of one of them, was a chief of the Theophilanthropists, a deistical sect who, renouncing the doctrine of revelation altogether, substituted, for the worship of Jesus and the invocation of saints, hymns to the supreme being, and somes of praise to the virtues. Glancing at this complexion of the government, Bonaparte, when informing the directors that he was about to send them the St. Jerome of Correggio, observed with a mixture of pleasantry and reproach, "I confess the saint chooses an unlucky time for visiting Paris; but I hope you will grant him the honours of the Museum." A respect for religion, and a preference for that in which he was born, early implanted in his mind, never altogether deserted him; and, though faintly intimated on this occasion, soon began to impress itself on his public conduct, and eventually determined some of his most important measures (3).

In Milan, where the population and authorities were different in origin, and opposed in interest, the repeated success and rapid advance of the French army had excited conflicting sentiments. Hope animated the citizens, who sympathizing in the popular principles of the French revolution and submitting painfully to Austrian domination, foresaw, in the triumph of the republican arms, the downfalt of that sway which had so long oppressed them. Fear actuated the court, who, conscious that their power and privileges had been carved out of the national feeling and civil rights of their subjects, felt that the shock which should weaken their grasp for a moment, might restore their prey to liberty for ever. In this extremity the Archduke Ferdinand, who, as viceroy of his nephew the Emperor, governed the Milanese, instead of joining Beaulieu, or meeting Bonaparte in the field, repaired to the churches, and fatigued heaven with processions, penitence, and prayer. From the awful ceremonies of mass and the sacrament, he descended, as the front of danger approached, to the humbler forms of supplication and charity, offering, in his trepidation, relief to others, as the means of obtaining help for himself. Alms were bestowed by the court, and collected in the churches, for the widows and orphans of soldiers slain in battle; and, a more doubtful appeal to the Almighty, the reliques of saints and martyrs were carried in procession, with lights and incense burning through the streets. But the arm of Beaulieu was not strengtheaed, nor the progress of his conqueror impeded, by virtue of these pious importunities, and the Archduke, having received intelligence of the action at Fombio, had recourse to a less devout and precarious method of safety. About noon on the 9th, accompenied by the Archduchess and the officers of his court, he left Milan for Venice, shedding womanish tears at parting from princely possessions, which, as force had given them, force was now matching away. The people who assembled to witness his departure, testified neither joy nor sorrow as the royal fugitives made their way through the streets. From a sense of decency, they declined displaying the first sentiment; and from a sense of independence, affecting the last (4).

Shortly after this practical abdication took place, manifestations of popular feeling indicated a general disposition in Milan to receive the French as friends and deliverers. A tree of liberty was planted in the public square; tricolored cockades, which were at first assumed timidly and rarely, soon appeared in such numbers, that a spectator observed "they must have sprung up from the earth or rained down from the heavens." A national guard, in which, for the first time, the nobles and high functionaries eagerly enrolled themselves with mechanics and labourers, was formed under the direction of the municipal authorities. The Austrian eagle, that double headed emblem of ceaseless rapacity and lethargic strength, was removed from the doors of the public buildings; and, on the portals of the Archducal palace was written "House to let: apply for the keys to the French commissary Salicetti." In a council composed of the corporate officers, and other prominent persons, it was determined to propitiate the favour of the victorious general by approaching him in terms of courtesy and friendship. and to submit to his clemency themselves and their capital.

Accordingly a deputation of citizens, headed by Count Melzi, a nobleman greatly respected for his patriotism and talents, proceeded to Lodi, and presenting to Bonaparte the keys of Milan, demanded his protection. They were favourably received, and the assurance was repeated to them that the war which was waged against Austria, was not designed to injure or offend the people of Italy. As the roads were already infested by banditti, composed of deserters and stragglers from Beaulieu's army, the deputies, upon taking their leave, were furnished with an escort of French cavalry. On the 14th, Massena took military possession of Milan, and, after quartering his troops within and around the walls, proceeded to blockade the citadel. The next day, Benaparte himself made his public entry.

As this was a prelude to the series of similar and greater triumphs which awaited him, its details may deserve to be recorded in the language which was employed to describe it at the time. "The entry of General Bonaparte into this city has been a brilliant spectacle. Upon arriving at the Roman gate, he was saluted by the national guards, who presented arms before him. The officers of the corporation, and a number of the nobility rode out in court

equipages to meet; him and, in the midst of an immense and applanding multitude, paid him reiterated compliments. A strong detachment of infantry marched before him; he was surrounded by a guard of hussars; and followed by a long train of coaches; a body of the national guard of Milan closing the procession. In this order, the general proceeded to the archducal palace, where his quarters were established. The bands of music of the French army, and of the national guard of Milan, by turns, performed annexes and symphonics. A dinner of two hundred covers was served in the palace, in the square before which, a tree of liberty was planted; while crowds of citizens expressed their entimeters in shouts of "Liberty for ever, Long live the Republic" (5)."

Impatient to finish the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, or stimust to establish his army on the line of the Adige, Bonaparte different suffer even the pleasures of a maiden triumph to allure limite the slightest remission of activity, but set about organizating a provisional government for Lombardy, with the same difference and vigour which he had exhibited in conducting its conquest. A spirit of internal order and national independence, it was, on this, as on all similar occasions, the leading object of his policy to instil; and the principal difficulty with which he had to contend consisted in reconciling its promotion with the exaction of heavy contributions, and with the firm establishment of French influence.

Under the imperial sway, the seven provinces into which Lomhardy was divided, were allowed to send deputies to a general council in Milan; where, superintended by the viceroy and a resident minister from Vienna, they exercised, in a limited degree, the powers of government. This institution, with authority less contracted and dependent, was suffered to subsist, and under the presidency of Count Melzi, to conduct the general administration of affairs. A national guard, officered by persons imbued with mai for the emancipation of their country, and disposed to acquince in the protection of France, was organized in all the chief towns. That of Milan was commanded by the Duke of Serbelloni, a achievan of great wealth and popular manners, who, with the principal officers, both civil and military, in the capital, took the eath of allegiance to the French General. The magistrates of corporations and of rural districts were, for the greater part, continued in office, their commissions being renewed by the provisional government. Green, white, and red were adopted as the national colours; and a general impulse toward the foundation of free institutions was manifested by the inhabitants and encouraged by their deliverers.

But the instructions of the government, as well as the wants of the army and the promises of the general, required the adoption of measures tending directly to counteract the propagation of Italian patriotism, and the establishment of French ascendancy. To his soldiers, starving with hunger and cold in the Alps, Bounparte had promised the wealth and abundance of fertile provinces and populous towns. These were now in his power; and could he have hesitated to reward the courage and exertions which enabled him to subdue them, out of tenderness for the feelings and opinions of the inhabitants, the instructions of the directory would have overborne all his scruples. In their despatch of the 7th of May, they said "It is the Milanese particularly which year are not to spare. Raise contributions there in money instantly, during the existence of the terror which the first approach of car armies will inspire."

Under the necessity imposed by this state of things, Bonsparte caused seals to be placed on the doors of the public treasury, and issued a decree requiring that the funds of every description belonging to the viceroy, instead of being returned to the community from which they had been extorted, should be paid into the French military chest. On the 19th of May a proclamation appeared with his name and that of Salicetti affixed to it, calling on the inhabitants of Lombardy, by arguments studiously addressed to their feelings of patriotism and sense of justice, to prove that they deserved independence, by doing something to secure it; to make common cause with the French general in driving the Austrians out of Italy, and, in the advancement of that object, to furnish a contribution of twenty millions of francs, for the pay and support of the army; which, far from the frontiers of France, it was represented, was fighting for the deliverance of Lombardy from oppression. The burthen thus imposed was described to be incomsiderable when compared with the population and wealth of the country; while, to alleviate its inconvenience, the church plate. the funds in the city treasury, and those in the Mont de Piété, ! were directed to be received as parts of it. It was moreover divided into several instalments, its collection was entrusted to the agency of native citizens, and its distribution among the several provinces was regulated by the scale of apportionment, according to which, the tribute to Austria had heretofore been annually raised (6).

This measure, though fully justified by the laws of war, if the Italians were regarded as enemies (7); and by the principles of equity, if acknowledged as friends, was of a nature but too well culculated to generate popular disaffection. But the evil being as unavoidable as it was palpable and great, all that Bonaparte sould do was to endeavour by care, conciliation, justice, and essnowly, to lighten its pressure, and obviate its recurrence. Assordingly articles in kind were made receivable from the conwhaters, at a fair valuation; the army agents were subjected to the strictest accountability for the due application of funds placed their hands; and the rules of discipline were enforced upon Will ranks, with redoubled energy and more vigilant exactness. general himself set an example, which, while it supported the spirit of his orders, commanded the respect if not the emulation of his officers. Neither the allurements of beauty, nor the temptations of gold, were sufficient to surprise his discretion er prevail over his integrity. The lovely Grassini, who aspired subdue the victor of Lodi, complained of a continence, which the neglect of her various and yet virgin charms, proved to be more **Indexible** than that of Scipio; and Salicetti, who in order to atone for former persecution, offered the instrumentality of his friendat the expense of the fairness of his character, found Bonaparte as invincible against weapons of silver as weapons of steel. **Extering** the general's cabinet, this representative of the directory, who was invested with the power of official absolution, said. * the brother of the duke of Modena is here, with four millions of francs in cash. He is come, on the part of the duke, to beg your acceptance of this sum, and I, who know the affairs of your family, come to advise it. Neither the directory nor the councils will ever reward your services. This money is yours—take it without scruple and without noise. The contribution of the duke will be lessened in proportion, and he will be too happy in having acquired a protector." "I thank you," coldly replied Bonaparte, "but I am not going, for the sake of money, to put myself in the power of the Duke of Modena. I prefer remaining free" (8).

He appears to have been altogether insensible to the influence of property or wealth, and spurned the proposal of Salicetti, probably, without an effort. In regard to the approaches of beauty, his more than classical fortitude was no doubt assisted by his conjugal love; for, in a letter to Carnot, written about this time, he said, "I owe you particular thanks for the attention you have been good enough to pay to my wife. I recommend her to you; she is a sincere patriot, and I love her to distraction" (9).

Soon after his entrance into Milan, Bonaparte whose love for true glory made him admire every species of merit, adressed a letter of compliment and kindness to the celebrated astronomer "The sciences," he wrote, "which ennoble the human mind, the arts that embellish life and trasmit great actions to posterity, deserve to be honoured in an especial manner by free governments." Thus encouraged, the modest astronomer waited on the general at his headquarters in the viceregal palace, where an interview took place, which, in one of his despatches. Benaparte thus described "I saw at Milan the famous astronomer The first time he came to see me, he was so much confused that he could not answer my questions. At length, recevering himself, he said. 'Pardon me; but this is the first time I ever entered these apartments, and my eyes are unaccustomed to such magnificence.' He appeared altogether unconscious that in these few words, he conveyed a severe reflection on the government of the archduke. I instantly had his appointments paid up to him, and hastened to encourage him by all proper attentions."

It is not inconsistent with the infirmity of man, that eyes accustomed to survey the splendors of the firmament, should be dazzled by the decorations of a princely saloon. But, in this instance probably, the fame and presence of the young conqueror shed upon the material ornaments around him, a moral lustre, to which the faculties of the philosopher were not habituated, and before which they for a moment shrunk.

In the same spirit was the letter that Bonaparte wrote to the municipal authorities of Milan and Pavia, inviting them to assure the professors and students of the university of Pavia, who had fled at the approach of Augereau's division, of his favour and protection; and of his desire that they should return to Pavia, and renew their labours of instruction and study: "It is my desire, gentlemen, that the university of Pavia, justly celebrated on

many accounts, should resume the course of its studies. Make known then to the learned professors and numerous students of that institution, that I invite them to repair immediately to Pavia, and to propose to me such measures as they may deem likely to give greater activity and a more brilliant existence to their famous university" (10).

With views not less liberal and enlightened, Carnot, in an official despatch of the 16th of May, had recommended the bestowal of favour and distinction on the learned men of Italy. "The French people," said this republican statesman, "attach greater value to the acquisition, as a fellow citizen, of a profound mathematician, a celebrated painter, or a distinguished man of whatever profession, than to the conquest of a rich and populous city." But, before this despatch reached Bonaparte, he had spontaneously accomplished its object.

As, in the heart of this fertile country, the troops were supplied with good and abundant rations, fine bread, fresh meat, and sound wine, they soon became healthy and cheerful, although on their first entering Milan, they were sadly in want of clothing and pay. Even the small pittance of two sous a man to the privates, and eight francs each to the officers of the army, which had been directed by the government to be paid in coin, had not been received by the troops in Italy (11); and their old threadbare uniforms, faded and tattered in the storms of more than one campaign, exposed them, in spite of their renovated discipline and unequalled provess, to the alternate ridicule of laughter and compassion. This state of things, equally repugnant to the interest of the war and the feelings of the general, was not permitted to remain unredressed. With respect to clothing, Bonaparte had determined, from the moment of signing the armistice of Placentia, to purchase materials for that object, and, as soon as active operations were suspended, he carried that resolution into effect (12); so that, in the course of a few days after his entry into Milan, he had the gratification of seeing his men turn out on parade newly clad. Their arrears of pay were at the same time paid up to them; and their comfort being thus assured by the political prudence and military skill of their general, a solid foundation for discipline was laid, the men being no longer inclined to disobedience, or tempted to disorder.

To meet these and other expences of the army, such as the pro-

vision of hospitals, the establishment of magazines on his line of communication, at Tortona, Coni, Ceva, and Mondovi, and the equipment of the artillery and cavalry, all of which necessary outlays, instead of being received from France, were created in Italy; Bonaparte found an ultimate and an ample resource, after exhausting the payments of the Duke of Parma, in the contribution levied on the provinces of Austrian Lombardy. But an immediate and more seasonable one, he supplied by an armistice with the Duke of Modena, which was signed at Milan on the 20th of May.

This petty sovereign, whose daughter and sole heiress was married to the Viceroy of Milan, was as obnoxious to the severity of the French Government by that connexion, as his neighbour of Parma, by the consanguinity of Spain, was susceptible of their indulgence. He was tyrannical, and the more so as he was avaricious; and having extorted large sums from his subjects. was not less fearful of their resentment than of the hostilities of the French army. Safety from both, for his person and his treesure, he sought by an early flight to Venice (3), leaving the vernment of his small dominions to the care of a regency, and to his illegitimate brother, Frederick of Este, a commission to treat with the French general. The conditions agreed upon bound the Dube to send commissioners to Paris to conclude a peace, in the meantime to pay to the order of Bonaparte ten millions of france, and to deliver, at his selection, twenty paintings of the great masters. On these terms, the Dutchies of Modena, Reggio, and Mirandola, which might have been seized upon and devastated without delay or resistance, by a division of the French army, were to enjoy the immunities of neutral states.

In compliance with the instructions of the directory in this regard, which had now reached headquarters, several paintings and rare manuscripts were taken from the public gallery and from the Ambrosian library at Milan, and, with the objects ceded by the Dukes of Parma and Modena, were forwarded to Paris. In this case, Bonaparte, acting as an executive officer, enforced to a cortain extent the rights of conquest. In the former instances, exercising the discretion of an uninstructed agent, he exchanged his military advantages for equivalents specified in a peaceful convention (14).

While he thus established sources of supply within the country

overspread by the force or terror of his arms, he improved on the habits of Roman generals as much as on their maxims of conquest. For not only did he make the war in Italy support itself, but he furnished from the fruits of his victories the sinews of war to distant armies and rival commanders, treasures for the general service of the state, and monuments of taste for the embellishment of the capital. Accepting for himself neither a grain of gold nor an object of art, he sent to Paris more than seventy paintings, remitted to General Kellermann two hundred thousand francs, to Moreau one million, and more than ten millions to the directory, after having supplied the numerous wants of his own army (15).

It was then, when his troops were renovated by rest, invigorated by plenty, and gratified by triumph, that he summoned them to a fresh career of exertion and glory, by an address, every word of which must have stimulated with energy and fire the enthusiasm of their inmost souls.

"Soldiers,—You rushed down from the Appennines like a torrent; you overthrew and scattered all that stood in your way. Piedmont, rescued from Austrian tyranny, yields to her natural sentiments of peace, and of friendship for France. Milan is yours; the flag of the republic floats triumphant over Lombardy; and their political existence, the Dukes of Parma and Modena, owe to your generosity.

"The army which, in its pride, dared to menace you, could find no barrier to withstand your courage. The Po, the Ticin, the Adda, stopped your march not a single day. You passed these boasted bulwarks of Italy as rapidly as you did the Appennines. These great successes fill the bosom of your country with joy; and, to commemorate them, your representatives have decreed a festival, to be celebrated in every commune of the republic. There, your fathers, mothers, wives, sisters, and mistresses, will rejoice in your triumph, and exult in being dear to you.

"That you have done much, soldiers, is true; but does there remain nothing more for you to do? Shall it be said that we knew how to gain victories, but not to improve them; or shall posterity reproach us with having found a Capua in Lombardy? No; already I see you fly to arms. Inglorious rest fatigues you; and days lost to fame you account as days lost to happiness. Then

let us hasten onward; we have still forced marches to make, armies to vanquish, laurels to gather, and injuries to avenge. Let the incendiaries who whetted the dagger of civil war in France, who basely assassinated our ministers, and who burnt our fleets in the harbour of Toulon, tremble—the hour of vengeance is come!

"But let the people every where be tranquil. We are the friends of every people, more especially so of the descendants of Brutus, of Scipio, and the great men we have taken for models.

"To rebuild the capitol, and place in triumph within its walls, the statues of those heroes who rendered it famous; to awaken, from the torpor of a slavery of ages, the Roman people; such are the fruits of victories which will constitute an epoch in the eyes of posterity, and will confer on you the glory of improving the condition of the finest part of Europe.

"The French people, free and respected by all nations, will bestow on Europe a glorious peace, which will requite the numerous sacrifices they have made in the last six years. To your firesides you will then return, and your fellow-citizens, singling you out, will say, "He belonged to the army of Italy."

The vigour of conception, truth of colouring, and rapture of style, in which, in a few sentences, the varied events of the campaign are portrayed; the address, in alluding to the armistice of Cherasco, as the offspring of sentiments natural to the cabinet of Turin; and the felicity with which the troops are reminded that the promises made at Albenga were already fulfilled in the capture of Milan, and the conquest of Lombardy, are evidences of judgment and eloquence, which no reader can be blind to, and no orator surpass. But neither the force nor the propriety of this address can be justly estimated, without considering it in connection with a despatch from the directory, which Bonaparte received at Lodi, the day before his entrance into Milan (16).

CHAPTER IX.

From the 21st to the 28th of May 1796.

Plan of the directors for dividing the army of Italy—Their probable and pretended motives—Remonstrance of Bonaparte—The plan of dividing the army abandoned—Good effects of Bonaparte's remonstrance—His authority enlarged—He renews military operations—Leaves Milan—Revolt of Pavia—He returns to Milan—Burns Binasco, and storms Pavia—The revolt suppressed—Moderation of Bonaparte—Sends hostages into France—The army reaches the Oglio—Uneasiness of Berthier—Bonaparte rejoins the army—Enters Brescia—His proclamation—Reception by the Venetian authorities—Instructions of the directory respecting Venice.

In his letters from Cherasco, as was before observed, Bonaparte had asked for reenforcements, and proposed, after expelling the Austrians from Italy, to force his way across the Tyrolian Alps: and, concerting operations with Moreau and Jourdan, to dictate peace under the walls of Vienna. A project so vast, and at that time unexampled, appears to have alarmed the directory; who, distrusting the prudence, or dreading the ambition of a general, whose plans were cast in a mould of such colossal enterprise, proposed, before his ascendancy should become uncontrollable, to turn his spirit into safer channels. Objects of an ostensible character readily presented themselves, as sufficient motives for the policy inspired by this timid design. Their desire to avenge upon the papal government the murder of Basseville, was naturally enough unextinguished; the King of Naples, whose officers had participated in the plunder and destruction of Toulon. had a contingent of cavalry in the army of Beaulieu; and they complained that the neutrality of Tuscany, either through the inability or the indisposition of the Grand Duke to prevent it, was abused by the English fleet in the harbour of Leghorn. Influ-VOL. I.

enced by these various causes, the directors, in their answer of the 7th of May to Bonaparte's letter, proposing the invasion of Germany, after declining his project as too extensive and hazardous, announced their intention of directing his course, as soon as the conquest of the Milanese should be effected, toward-the states in the south of Italy, and to the collateral task of rescuing Corsica, and freeing Leghorn from the English (1).

With this view they resolved to divide their force in Italy into two armies. One, under General Kellermann, was to hold the ground already gained, reduce Mantua, and, by occupying the passes of the Tyrol, maintain the exclusion of the Austrians from the valley of the Po. The other, conducted by Bonaparte, after driving the English from Leghorn, and detaching an expedition against Corsica, was to march upon Rome and Naples. They determined further, for the alleged purpose of preserving correspondency of action and harmony of feeling between the two generals, to continue in force their decree of the 28th of Anni. which conferred on the executive commissaries, after the example of their predecessors, the deputies of the Convention, authority to require and control the movement of the troops. As the object assigned for insisting on this regulation was not of a nature to conceal the illiberality of its real motive, or to mitigate the mischief of its probable effect, it was not calculated to render the regulation itself acceptable to the judgment or the sensibility of Bonaparta.

This unwelcome despatch reached its destination just three days after Bonaparte, having crowned his astonishing career of activity and success by the victory of Lodi, had repeated to Carnot his magnificent design of penetrating into Germany, and signing a peace in the heart of "astounded Austria." It was easy for a person of his penetration to perceive, that the military absurdity of the directorial plan involved not only dengers to the army, but injustice to himself; and that his well-carned conquests and brilliant hopes were about to be sacrificed, if not to the accomplishment of sinister schemes, at any rate without the slightest prospect of public advantage. This conviction must naturally have excited both his surprise and indignation; yet in his answer, which was prompt and firm, the feelings of the man disappear entirely in the anxiety of the general; and instead of a fiery expostulation in resentment of personal injustice, he addressed to the Directory a respectful remonstrance against the mischief of their injudicious plan. After telling them that he has just that moment received their despatch, and that the conquest of Lombardy,-the condition upon which they founded their project of dividing the army,-was already achieved, he says: "I think it very impolitic to divide the army of Italy into two corps; and equally contrary to the interest of the republic, to place in command of it, two different generals." He then adds. "the expedition against Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, is but a small affair. It should be made by divisions en echelon, so that on the least occasion we might return upon the Austrians, and envelop them at the first movement they made. For the conduct of such an operation, not only is it necessary that there should be a single general, but also that there should be nothing to restrain him in his march or his actions. I have made this campaign without consulting any one, and should have done nothing effectually, had I been obliged to reconcile my conduct with the views of another person. In complete destitution of supplies, I have gained advatanges over a superior force, because, persuaded that your confidence was fully reposed in me, my movements were as rapid as my thoughts. If you fetter me with all sorts of obstructions; if I must refer for the direction of all my steps to the commissaries of government; if they have a right to control my movements, to diminish or augment my force at pleasure, you may count on nothing good being done. If you weaken my means by dividing your force; if you break the unity of military thought in the direction of the army, I tell you, with pain, you will throw away the finest opportunity of giving law to Italy.

"In the present state of things in this country, it is indispensable that you should have a general in the full possession of your confidence. If he be not myself, I shall not murmur, but exert myself with redoubled zeal, to merit your esteem in whatever other post you may confide to me. Every commander has his own manner of making war; general Kellermann has more experience than I have, and will command better; but both of us together will only do mischief.

"Without being invested with your perfect confidence, I can render no essential service. I am sensible it is somewhat imprudent to write you such a letter as this, since it would be so easy to accuse me of ambition and pride. But I owe it to you, who hitherto have manifested for me an esteem which I ought never to forget, to give you a frank expression of my sentiments. "The several divisions of the army are in the act of occupying Lombardy. When you receive this letter we shall be already in motion, and your answer will probably find us near Leghorn (2). Your decision on this occasion will have more influence on the operations of the campaign, than a division of fifteen thousand men, which the Emperor might send to Beaulieu."

In order to obviate the danger of exposing his language to undue construction, or the pride of the executive, to an untoward impression from it, he inclosed his public letter in a private one to Carnot, desiring him to guard the former against an unfair interpretation, and to "make such use of it, as friendship and prudence shall suggest to be proper."

In a style more unreserved he then continues, "Kellermann will command the army as well as myself, for no man can be better convinced than I am, that our victories are owing to the intrepid courage of the troops; but I am satisfied that to unite Kellermann and myself as generals in Italy, would ruin every thing. I cannot willingly serve with a man who thinks himself the first general in Europe; and I am confident you had better have one had general than two good ones. War is like government; it is an affair of tact.

"Unless I enjoy the same esteem which you testified for me at Paris, I can be of no use. It is a matter of indifference to me whether I make war here or elsewhere. To serve my country, to merit in the eyes of posterity a page in our history, and to give to the government proofs of my devotion and attachment, constitute the aim of my ambition. But I confess I have it deeply at heart, not to lose in eight days, the fruits of two months' toil, solicitude and danger; and to keep myself untrammeled by fetters."

This was the situation, and these were the feelings, under the pressure of which, when the disposition of the government and his own destination were utterly precarious; when in the next few days he might be constrained to separate from the army he had rendered victorious, to retire from the foe he was eager to encounter, and withdraw from a country which he hoped to regenerate, that he infused into this address to his troops, such unmitigated energy of thought, strength of purpose, and vivacity of expression.

That the ungracious communication of the government was

present to his mind when he wrote the address, is evident from the new direction in his military plans which it discloses. In his letter to Carnot, the day after the battle of Lodi, in which he described Milan as already taken and Lombardy subdued, the pursuit of Beaulieu and the invasion of Germany, appear as his immediate objects.

"The battle of Lodi, my dear director, gives to the republic the whole of Lombardy. In your calculations you may reckon me already at Milan. I shall not go there tomorrow, only because I wish to pursue Beaulieu, and take advantage of his consternation, to beat him once more. It is possible that I shall attack Mantua in a very short time, and if I carry that place, I shall not hesitate to penetrate into Bavaria. In three weeks I may be in the heart of Germany. If it enters into your intentions that the armies of the Rhine are to advance, I will pass the Tyrolian mounmains before the Emperor can seriously apprehend it." In the address, although the plan of driving Beaulieu beyond the Adige and of attacking Mantua, is not abandoned, it is not mentioned: while, in conformity with the new intentions of the directory, the ardour and indignation of the troops are pointed against the English, against Rome, and Naples. "Let those who whetted the dagger of civil war in France, who basely assassinated our ministers, and who burnt our fleets in the harbour of Toulon, tremble,—the hour of vengeance is come."

If the fear of losing the services on this frontier, of so successful a general, by accepting his conditional offer to resign, had not been sufficient to deter the directors from insisting on the prosecution of their ill judged project, the commanding sense and disinterested feeling of Bonaparte's remonstrance, would, in all probability, have produced that effect. There could be no room for jealousy towards a commander, who, upon learning that he was likely to be defrauded of the fruits of a career which he had so gloriously opened, far from manifesting resentment, declared his readiness to resign to a rival general, his illustrious post, and to serve with redoubled zeal in a new one. Pertinacity with regard to the superintending authority of the commissaries, would have been unreasonable, after Bonaparte's avowal, that in a cam paign, every act of which both Salicetti and the directors themselves extolled, he had consulted no one, had preserved the unity of military thought, and had therefore been successful. The demonstrative force with which he contended that the operations against the states on the right bank of the Po, were merely secondary to those against the Austrians, and should of course he trusted to the direction of the same commander, placed the subject in a point of view which admitted of no question as to military expediency. The consequence of all this was, that although the

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directors had, in a second despatch, very formally repeated their determination to divide the army of Italy as soon as Lombardy was subdued, they did not hesitate, upon receiving Bonaparte's letter of remonstrance, to renounce it altogether; adding, by their deference to the just sensibility and cogent objections of their general, another, and a most useful one, to the list of his victories; since it not only saved the army from probable destruction, and France from invasion; but commenced the abolition of the absurd practice of subjecting generals in the field to the control of executive agents, themselves too often governed by ignorance, interest, or caprice.

In the despatch of the 21st of May the directors, besides authorizing Bonaparte to take his own time for operating against Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, and expressly renouncing their plan of dividing his army, not only invest him with complete and independent military authority for the future, but sanction the previ exercise which he confessed having made of it. "You appear d sirous, Citizen general, of continuing to conduct the whole train of military operations during the present campaign in Italy. The directors have reflected maturely on this proposition, and their confidence in your talents and republican zeal has decided it in the affirmative." From this time, the commissaries, instead of pretending to share the councils or control the operations of the general, ceased to reside at his headquarters, and became more or less reluctantly, merely his agents; while, his energy and enterprise augmenting with the enlargement of his authority, the Birectory found sufficient occupation in approving his plans and praising his achievements. So that henceforward, his war in Italy was as little under the actual suidance of the government of France, as that of Cæsar in Gaul, had been under the direction of the Senate of Rome. The sage habits and martial sagacity of the conscript fathers, deterred them from interfering with the

cretion of a successful general in conducting operations on a theatre so remote; a lesson of wisdom, which reached the minds of

the directors by the gradual process of experience. In this despatch they half admit the folly of their interference in the following words. "The rest of the military operations in the direction of Germany and in the Mantuan, must depend entirely on your success against Beaulieu. The directory, sensible of the difficulty of directing them from Paris, allows you, in regard to them, the greatest latitude, recommending at the same time the utmost caution."

But this confidence, if it had not been dictated by prudence, would have been enforced by necessity. For while it required at least fifteen days for the directory to receive accounts from Bonaparte, and convey to him their instructions in return, he commenced and decided the succeeding struggles of the campaign, in about half the time. So that while it was impracticable for them to lay him under military orders, applicable to the current events of the campaign, it was impossible for him, had he been so disposed, to disobey them.

It may be doubted, however, whether by all his victories in Italy, he rendered as great service to his country as he did by refusing, to subscribe to their plan of dividing his army, and sending him with one division to the lower end of the Peninsula. It was his own opinion that not a man of his party would have escaped; and it can hardly be doubted, that even had Kellermann possessed decided military talents, the other division must have been overwhelmed by Wurmser; when the immediate consequences would have been the recapture of Milan, the recovery of Lombardy, the return of Modena, Parma and Piedmont into the coalition, and the invasion of the south of France. These calamities, the firmess and sagacity of Bonaparte prevented, before he renewed that course of operations which is now to be related (3).

No time was lost after the address to the troops was issued, in turning their faces again towards the foe. On the same day, Augereau was directed, after leaving a garrison of three hundred men in the citadel of Pavia, and depots of convalescents in the neighbouring towns, to commence his march by the way of Lodi and Crema, to Brescia. On the 22nd Massena broke up from Milan, and moved in the same direction; Berthier having been sent forward to Crema, with instructions to regulate, for the purpose of their prompt cooperation, the movements of these and the other divisions. General Despinois was appointed military governor of

Milan, and with a brigade placed under his orders, was charged with the duty of reducing the castle. The superintendence of civil affairs, was of course confided to Salicetti. Having completed these arrangements, and given instructions for preparing a secret expedition of Corsican refugees, for the purpose of freeing Corsica from the yoke of England (4), Bonaparte himself on the morning of the 24th left Milan for Lodi, the populace attending his departure, with acclamations like those with which they had greeted his arrival. But on this latter occasion they proved to be as perfidious, as on the former they were probably sincere; for he had hardly left the gates of the capital, before resistance to his authority began to appear, and had but just alighted from his horse at Lodi, when an express from General Despinois brought him intelligence, that a formidable insurrection had broke out at Pavia, and a threatening commotion shewn itself at Milan.

As soon as the first stupor of submission passed off, the great body of the priesthood in Lombardy, some of the nobles, and many officers of the revenue, taking advantage of that portion of discontent which the demand and collection of the contribution, could not fail to occasion, and practising on the natural inconstancy of popular feeling, had been active in spreading false rumours and irritating notions, among the peasants of the country and the populace of the towns. To these various artifices of mischief, was added the appearance of a number of Austrian agents. who gliding across the Swiss frontier, and confident of escape by the same avenues, mixed boldly in machinations of turbulence and murder. Through the western districts of Louis bardy, the tocsin was sounded. The deluded people were assured, that the English had landed at the mouth of the Var and taken Nice, that the army of Condé had entered Lombardy, and that Beaulieu, reenforced by sixty thousand men, was marchine direct upon Milan. Priests and monks, bearing in one hand a crucifix, and flourishing with the other a dagger, passed through the villages preaching assassination; and the nobles pretending that their principles of equality were shocked by a retinue of domestics, discharged their servants, and by that means augmented the mass of blind discontent, and swelled the torrent of tumultuary violence (5).

The moment Bonaparte was informed of this disturbance, he determined to meet and suppress it in person. With the faculties of

immediate decision and precise detail, for which he was always remarkable, he wrote with a pencil an order to Berthier, to direct by a forced march upon Milan,, two battalions of the 21st, two regiments of horse, one battalion of grenadiers, and four peices of light artillery. Then rapidly retracing his steps, he reached Milan the same evening (6).

The quiet of the capital was already restored. General Despinois had dispersed the only armed body of the people who ventured to show themselves, and had repulsed a sortic from the castle, which was made to favor them. But crowds were yet in arms outside the town, and measures of punishment and prevention were still necessary. Bonaparte had a number of individuals arrested and detained as hostages; and a few of the insurgents who were taken with arms in their hands, he caused to be shot. Then notifying the nobles and the clergy, that he should hold them responsible for the peace of the capital, he addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of the provinces, urging them by the promise of pardon in case of compliance, and the threat of punishment in the event of refusal, to lay down their arms and return to their customary occupations.

In the afternoon of the 25th, leaving part of his force to support Despinois, he set out for Pavia, accompanied by the archbishop of Milan and the commissary Salicetti, and attended by general Dommartin and colonel Lannes, with a light column of fifteen hundred men and a few pieces of artillery. The insurgents had made a countermovement, pushing forward, on the road to Milan, eight hundred of their party, for the purpose of cooperating with the garrison of the castle and malcontents of the town. ceiving the approach of the French, they threw themselves into the village of Binasco. Lannes who was in front, no sooner reached than he attacked them. The grenadiers carried the village by assault, and the insurgents, with the loss of a hundred of their party in killed and wounded, fled across the plains. Bonaparte, adding terror to defeat, had Binasco set on fire, that the sames beheld from the walls of Pavia, might unsettle the purpose of the insurgents. He also sent forward the archbishop, in hopes, that as religious zealots had fomented the commotion, this venerable prelate might be able to allay it; and during the night, had copies of his proclamation thrown over the walls, and posted up on the gates. But neither the words of the proclamation, nor the counsels of the archbishop, nor the flames of M-nasco, prevailed over the turbulent passions of the insurgents; and at day break, on the 26th, Bonaparte with his small force, marched against Pavia, drove in the outposts, and directing a few cannon shot at the gates, summoned the town.

The inhabitants, who, by this time, had armed among themselves, and collected from the neighbouring peasantry, a force of ten thousand men, treated the summons with contempt. They had seized the person of a French general (Hacquin), who, as a traveller, was passing through their town on his way from Paris to the French headquarters, and by threatening his life, had compelled him to sign an order, which induced the commander of the citadel to deliver up his arms and his post. This advantage, the protection of the walls, their own numbers, and the smallness of the French force, conspired to embolden them.

In this posture of affairs it was evident, that the least check er even hesitation, might produce a dangerous and extensive remetion, and require the recall of the whole army, which, by this time, had reached the line of the Oglio. Prudence therefore distated precipitation, and Bonaparte resolved, with fifteen hundred men, to assault a walled town, containing a population of thirty thousand souls and an armed force ten thousand strong.

After repeated rounds, it was discovered that the guns were too light to force the gates. Loaden with grapeshot however they quickly dislodged the rustic marksmen from the walls, and cleared the way for the grenadiers to advance, axe in hand, and hew down the gates. This having done, they charged into the adjoining public square, dispersed the armed multitude it contained, and took possession of the heads of the streets leading from it through the midst of the town. A party of dragoons followed, swept down the main street to the bridge over the Ticin, cut through a crowd of insurgents who defended it, and secured that important pass. Those of the revolters who had been drawn in from the adjacent country, seeing the two principal outlets in possession of the French, were seized with fright at the prospect of being surrounded, and made their escape from the town. The cavalry pursued and cut them down in numbers.

Within the walls, the insurgents still held out, and from cellars, windows, and the tops of houses, maintained a resistance so of stinate, that the necessity of extending to Pavia the fate of Bi-

nasco, more than once suggested itself to Bonaparte's mind. "Three times," he observed, in his report to the directory "did the order to burn the town expire on my lips; when at last I saw the garrison of the citadel, who had taken advantage of the tumult to break their chains, approach, and with cries of joy embrace their deliverers. I had the roll called instantly, and found them all present. Had the blood of a single man been shed, I would have erected on the ruins of the town a column, with this inscription, Here stood the city of Pavia."

Although the order for reducing to ashes this famous city, was thus happily forborn, it was necessary for the safety of the army, and the peace of the country, that the insurgents should not go wholly unpunished. To the offence of revolt against the existing authorities, they had added treachery and violence to the garrison of the citadel, and to a French general, passing through their town in the confidence of hospitality. They had exposed their city to be taken by storm, and to the rigour which that extremity entails. The place was therefore delivered up to military execution. But before this infliction had extended beyond a few of the goldsmiths' shops, a deputation composed of members of the clergy and some of the most respectable inhabitants, conducted by the archbishop of Milan into Bonaparte's presence, implored and obtained his mercy. During the short continuance of the pillage, the French officers had formed themselves into a body of volunteer guards for the protection of the benes of Spallanzani and Volta, a tribute of respect from valour to philosophy, more honorable to the army than the gain of a battle. This noble conduct was in the spirit of Bonaparte's liberality to Oriani, and attentive encouragement to the university of Pavia.

His first intention was to decimate the three hundred men who had been left in garrison in the citadel, and had surrendered their post and themselves. "Cowards!" he exclaimed, "I entracted you with a station essential to the safety of the army, and you delivered it up without resistance, to a set of wretched persants." But he found that the surrender had taken place by command of the captain, who attempted to excuse himself by showing the order which the insurgents had extorted from general Hacquin. This was no justification, in as much as general Hacquin was not in command, and had he been, would have lost

his authority the moment his person was in a state of duresse. The vengeance of violated discipline and of the dishonoured pride of the army, fell therefore on the unfortunate captain. He was delivered over to a court martial, and, in conformity with its sentence, suffered death.

As in the emergency created by a revolt, which without proposing any real benefit to the country in the bosom of which it was concocted, at one and the same moment suspended the progress of Bonaparte's arms, and checked his conquest of opinion in Italy, a blind clemency would have been a culpable weakness, it was natural that its principal instigators should feel themselves. if not guilty of crime, liable to punishment. Some avoided it by flight; eight were apprehended before they could escape, and after being tried by a military commission, where shot. The inhabitants of Pavia, and of all the revolting villages, were disarmed; and as a measure of public security, two hundred individuals were selected from the most respectable families of the country as hostages, and sent under an escort into France. It was Bonaparte's hope that besides the immediate effect of their detention, these Italians, taken from the various cities of Lombardy, would imbibe, during a residence in France, sentiments favourable to a political connection with the Republic, and of consequence, to the success of his efforts to rescue their country from the Austrian yoke. His hope was not disappointed by the event; and this salutary measure closed the proceedings demanded by a revolt, which, as its sudden explosion had endengered his authority, by the energetic manner in which it was suppressed, confirmed his ascendancy throughout Lombardy.

The army, meanwhile, under the conduct of Berthier, following the retreating steps of Beaulieu had penetrated the Venetian territory, and reached the banks of the Oglio. Kilmaine with the cavalry and light infantry was in front, at Brescia; Augereau formed the left at Fontanella; Massena was in the centre at Soncino; and Serrurier coming up from Cremona, took a position behind the Mello in communication with Massena's right. On the 26th of May these four divisions, officers of all ranks included, mustered present under arms, twenty-seven thousand, seven hundred men (7). The escort of Bonaparte with the light column which had been employed in suppressing the insurrection of Pavia, raised the active force with which the contest in the

field against Beaulieu was about to be renewed, to near thirty thousand.

As soon as Berthier felt the patroles of the enemy, he felt also the want of his general's presence. On the 25th of May this officer, who was more than forty years of age, had served under Rochambeau in America, Hoche in la Vendée, and Kellermann in the Alps, and who had the support and assistance of Massena and Augereau, pretenders two months before to the chief command, thus wrote to Bonaparte, who was not yet twenty-seven. "In my private opinion, it is very important that you return to the army; for we are approaching the enemy," On the 26th, when he had advanced from Crema to Soncino, twenty miles nearer to the main body of the Austrians; "Since the arrival of your aide de camp Lemarrais, I have received no accounts whatever from you, and it is now twenty-four hours since he left you. We are all extremely uneasy at this silence, the more so because it appears to me, that your presence here is indispensable, under every point of view, military as well as administrative.- I must repeat general that your presence here is extremely important." From these letters it may be inferred that at the time they were written, Bonaparte had acquired the military confidence, and mental subjection, not only of his troops, but of the proudest and most experienced of his generals.

As his own wishes coincided with theirs, he delayed at Pavia, not a moment after quelling the revolt, but placing general Hacquin, by way of retribution and with a stronger garrison, in command of the place, hastened to rejoin the army. On the 27th, be overtook Berthier at Soncino, and the next day, at the head of his troops, entered Brescia, the capital of a province, and one of the chief towns of the Venetian terra firma. Here, with a view of preventing any interruption of the pacific relations, which, notwithstanding the suppressed hostility of the senate, still subsisted between the two republics, he issued a proclamation, referring to the friendship which had long united the two states; assuring the inhabitants, that their rights of person and property should be respected; that his troops should preserve exact discipline; that provisions should be paid for in silver; and inviting the clergy and magistrates to make known to the people, that in pursuing a bostile force through their territory, the French army, which aspired to the glory of rescuing Italy from Austria, was actuated

by friendly intentions toward themselves. As the conduct of the Venetian government in a matter deeply affecting the pride, and even the independence of the French nation, had recently given umbrage to the directory, Bonaparte, by the terms of this proclamation, evidently endeavoured to conciliate the amity of Venice, by professing to confide in it (8). Monceaigo, the proveditore or intendant of Brescia, received him with sumptuous hospitality, and professed, on the part of his government, sincere friendship for the French republic. Balls were given, and the principal nobles of the place, vied in their attentions to the French generals. But in their instructions of the 7th of May the directory had said to Bonaparte "Venice will be treated as a neutral state, but not as a friendly one. She has done nothing to merit our regard;" making allusion to the reception the senate had given the pretender Louis the 18th, and his court, at Verona (9).

CHAPTER X.

From the 28th to the 31st of May 1796.

Spirit and perseverance of Beaulieu—Prepares to defend the passage of the Mincio—Bonaparte resolves to force it—Battle of Borghetto—Gallantry of Murat—Of Gardanne, and the grenadiers—Danger of Bonaparte—The corps of guides—Augereau enters Peschiera, and Massena Verona—The Austrians, with the exception of the garrisons of Mantua and Milan, driven out of Lombardy—The French reach the Adige—Satisfaction of Bonaparte—His account of the grenadiers—Chagrin of Beaulieu—His letter to the Aulic conncil—His recall—Fieldmarshal Wurmser appointed to succeed him.

Beaulieu, after being driven with slaughter from the line of the Adda, and abandoning in alarm the Oglio and the Chiese, had fallen back behind the Mincio; where flanked on his right by the lake of Guarda, and on his left by the fortress of Mantua, he resolved once more to face his active and unconquerable adversary. In the short space of six weeks, he had been forced from the shore of the Mediterranean over the Alps and Appennines, had been a helpless spectator of the prostration of Piedmont; had retired precipitately from the banks of the Po and the Ticin; and been compelled to leave Parma and Modena, with the capital and insurgents of Lombardy, to their fate; and now, a veteran in misfortune as well as in arms, he stood on the last foothold of Austria in the valley of the Po. A reenforcement of thirteen thousand men from the Tyrolian provinces, which exceeded the losses he had sustained since the armistice of Cherasco, enabled him to bring into action, exclusive of the garrison of Mantua,

which he had strengthened, numbers more than equal to the French. But after all his reverses and defeats, that even on these terms, he should enter the lists again with Bonaparte, shows that he was far from being deficient in spirit and perseverance.

Sacrificing his respect for the neutral character and territorial rights of Venice, to the maintenance of his position, and the safety of his army, by a stratagem not very honourable, he took possession of Peschiera; a Venetian fort, situated at the foot of the lake of Guarda, where it gives birth to the classical Mincio. Here he rested his right under Liptay; his centre, directed by himself, was posted on the heights of Valeggio; and his left, composed of the divisions of Sebottendorf and Colli, occupied the ground between his centre and the lake of Mantua, their principal masses being at Pozzuolo and Goito. The front of his line, besides the protection of the river, was covered by intrenchments and strengthened by batteries. A powerful reserve under General Melas, was stationed at Villa Franca, a short distance in the rear of his centre (1); and in his front, across the river at Borghetto. General Pittoni commanded a strong advanced guard. cio, though for the most part of its course a deep stream, was fordable at several points, and a bridge communicated between Valeggio and Borghetto.

It was easy to perceive that a jealousy for Mantua, the works and magazines of which were receiving supplies and reparation. had induced Beaulieu, to accumulate the mass of his force on his left and in his centre. Bonaparte, whose object was, in gaining the wished for line of the Adige, to break through the enemies' centre with a view either of destroying both wings in succession, or of driving one into the Alps, and the other into Mantua, determined, by exciting an opposite apprehension in Beaulieu's mind, to produce, if possible, a change in his dispositions. With this design, on the 28th, he pushed forward Kilmaine at the head of eight battalions of grenadiers and fifteen hundred horse, from Brescia to Dezenzano, with orders to skirmish vigorously with the light troops of Liptay, and to make strong demonstrations against Peschiera. At the same time, he detached from Augereau's division, a regiment of light infantry under General Rusca, to Salo, half way up the right bank of the lake of Guarda. movements, indicating a design of passing round the head of the lake at Riva, of intercepting Beaulieu's line of communication with the Tyrol, and of forcing the passage of the Mincio at its source, had the desired effect of inducing Beaulieu, to move the principal part of his reserve, from the rear of his centre to the support of his right.

As it was the intention of the French general, to employ his cavalry and grenadiers in the attack on the enemies' centre, he withdrew Kilmaine on the 29th from Dezenzano to Castiglione, and succeeded him at the former place by the main body of Augereau's division. Already Massena was established at Montechiaro, and Serrurier had taken post at Montza; so that on the evening of the 29th, the French line stretching from the left bank of the Chiese to the foot of the lake of Guarda, seemed to threaten Peschiera and Riva, and to avoid Mantua altogether; when, suddenly, at two o'clock in the morning of the 30th, Bonaparte gave orders for all the divisions to move rapidly upon Borghetto (2).

The cavalry, led by Murat and flanked by the grenadiers of Gardanne and Lannes, descended foremost into the plain of the Mincio, and first brought the enemy to action. Borghetto was defended by General Pittoni, with a body of four thousand infantry, part intrenched in the village itself, and the rest stationed on adjacent heights, and by eighteen hundred cavalry posted in the plain. These were attacked by Murat, with that fierceness and chivalry, of which he constantly gave such brilliant examples. His first charge was successful, his second decisive. The Austrians were forced out of the plain and from the heights, with the loss of two thousand prisoners, among them the Prince of Cuto who commanded the Neapolitan horse, nine pieces of artillery, and two standards. The grenadiers, who followed in the charge at a running pace, and contributed greatly to its success, fell upon the infantry in the village, and in spite of their intrenchments and the fire across the river from the batteries of Valeggio, drove them over the bridge, one arch of which, however, they destroyed in their retreat. Bonaparte ordered it to be instantly repaired, and had his artillery brought up to cover the operation by silencing the batteries of Valeggio. But the men, notwithstanding, were so much exposed, that the work went on slowly. At length, Gardanne, followed by fifty grenadiers, plunged into The stream was deep, the current swift; but the men the river. bearing their chins above water, holding their firelocks over their heads, and steadying each other's steps, pushed boldly for the

opposite shore. This movement the whole body of grenadiers quickly followed; when the Austrians, remembering the dreadful column of Lodi, yielded their ground to terror, not to force, and the victorious grenadiers entered Valeggio just as Beaulieu made his escape (3).

The reparation of the bridge being, thenceforward, unresisted. was completed by midday. The rest of Kilmaine's division passed the Mincio, followed by those of Augereau and Serrurier, the former marching up the left bank upon Peschiera; while the latter, with the cavalry and grenadiers in front, the whole directed by Bonaparte in person, pursued the Austrians in their retreat upon Villa Franca, where Beaulieu rallied his centre upon his reserve, and made preparations again to receive battle. His troops he ranged in front of Villa Franca, and planted batteries in advance of his line, still unwilling to resign his last position in the plains of Italy. This resolution which was honorable to Beaulieu. was pleasing to Bonaparte, who hoped by encouraging it, to hold his adversary stationary at Villa Franca, until Augereau could cavelop Liptay at Peschiera, and seizing the heights between the lake of Guarda and the Adige, intercept Beaulieu's line of retreat to the Tyrol. As it was also desirable for the success of this object, to conceal from the Austrian general, the movement of Augereau up the Mincio, Bonaparte instead of marching to the attack. merely occupied the enemy's attention by a severe cannonade upon his whole line. This apparent hesitation was not more inconsistent with his own habitual decision, than with the ardent temper of his grenadiers, of whom, in reporting the affair to the directory, he observed: "I found it very difficult to restrain the impatience, or more properly speaking, the fury of the grenadiers." But the Austrian general, for this time at least, was not outwitted. He discovered the movement of Augereau, withdrew Liptay in time from Peschiera, and commenced his own retreat towards the Tyrol; covering his rear with a heavy body of cavalry, a strong reenforcement of which had joined him during the action. Murat did not hesitate to charge this powerful rear guard; nor was his attack unsuccessful. Seconded by Leclerc with the 10th light dragoons, he gained repeated advantages, and by his personal prowess rescued parties of light infantry, who, in the heat of pursuit and emulation, had been carried into the power of the Amtrian squadrons. Beaulieu, nevertheless, made good his retreat, sending one column of his troops, though Verona, and retiring with the other into the high grounds between the lake and the Adige; where on the road leading to Rivoli and the ferry at Dolce, he was joined by Liptay in the course of the evening. When Augereau reached Peschiera, he found it evacuated.

As soon as Bonaparte determined to amuse Beaulieu at Villa Franca, instead of instantly attacking him, he returned to Valeggio, in order to bring up Massena's division, and to be in a condition, after cutting off the enemy's retreat by Augereau's movement. to strike a decisive blow. Upon arriving there, he found the troops were yet on the Borghetto side of the river, and after the march and action of the morning, the men getting their breakfast. Dismounting, he entered the house which had been selected for his headquarters, and as he suffered from a violent headach, ordered a bath for his feet. It thus happened, that while Massena's division was beyond the Mincio at Borghetto, and those of Kilmaine and Serrurier in front of Villa Franca, the commander in chief was between them at Valeggio, attended only by a small escort; he himself engaged in assuaging his pain, Massena's troops in appeasing their hunger, and Kilmaine and Serrurier in cannonading the enemy.

In the meantime Sebottendorf, who, in his post at Pozzuolo, had heard the firing at Borghetto, was marching up the left bank of the Mincio in all haste to Valeggio, with the hope of taking part in His hussars falling in with no troops in their apthe action. proach, entered the town without meeting opposition or creating alarm, and before they were observed, reached Bonaparte's quar-The sentinel had only time to slam to the door of the court in front, and cry to arms, and the general to pull one boot on, and with the other in his hand, escape through the gardens in the rear, mount his horse, and hasten across the river. The soldiers of Massena, upon hearing the alarm at headquarters, kicked over their kettles, and seizing their arms, rushed across the The Austrian hussars, surprised in their turn, took bridge (4). whight; but the French troops, intent upon revenging the danger of their general, and probably the loss of their breakfast, pursted Sebottendorf the whole evening, cutting off his stragglers. attacking his rear, and inflicting on him severe loss; forcing part of his corps to make their way into the Tyrol, and part to seek refuge in Mantua (5).

Bonaparte's critical exposure and narrow escape on this occasion, and the anxious impression which the circumstance made upon the army, induced him to compose the corps of "guides" for the protection of his person against similar casualties. It consisted of a hundred picked men, of ten years' service, and was organized and commanded by Bessieres, a colonel of cavalry, who was as remarkable for vigour and coolness in action, as Murat was for boiling courage and adventurous gallantry. Small as this corps was at first, yet being led by an officer of firmness and devotion, always under the eye of the general, and launched from his hand at decisive moments, it was frequently of weight in the scales of battle; and in the progress of time and succession of victories. was magnified into the famous imperial guard. From this time forward, Bessieres was charged with the defence of his head quarters by Bonaparte; and by the sentiment of the army, was held responsible for the safety of the general's person, a duty, which his constant activity and frequent exposure, rendered by no means light. The uniform of the guides was the same which, since, was worn by the chasseurs of the guard, and was that also in which Bonaparte himself, to the end of his life, was most frequently habited.

From Peschiera Augereau had pushed on to Castelnovo, but Beaulieu was there before him, and burning his magazines, continued his retreat. On the morning of the 31st, the French continued their pursuit as far as Rivoli, where it was found the Austrians had succeeded in crossing the Adige at Dolce and taking up the bridges, a few pontons only of which, with five field pieces, fell into Bonaparte's hands. During these operations on the left bank of the Mincio, Colli, who had been posted on the other side at Goito, being entirely separated from his commander, entered Mantua, and added strength to the garrison of that important place.

With the exception of this single post and the beleaguered castle of Milan, the Austrians were now driven entirely out of Lombardy; and Bonaparte, after a rapid course of enterprise and victory, had reached the commanding line of the Adige; which, connecting, by a short and bold current, the mountains of the Tyrol with the dyked and flooded low grounds on the Adriatic, defended to the north, by a natural barrier, the vast plain watered by the Po.

Upon gaining this grand point in the bold projection of his

military plans, Bonaparte could not but feel satisfied with himself, as well as grateful to his troops, whose extraordinary courage and activity, had given full play to his spirit and his genius. In his report of the battle of Borghetto and the flight of Beaulieu beyond the Adige, the former sentiment is faintly perceptible; while the latter is expressed in a style so singularly familiar and dramatic, for the texture of an official despatch, as to show that he abandoned himself with real delight, to the duty of attesting the virtues of his army.

"Behold then," he writes, "the Austrians completely driven out of Italy, and our advanced posts planted on the mountains of Germany.

I shall not recount to you the men who have distinguished themselves by acts of valour. It would be necessary for me to name all the carabiniers and grenadiers of the vanguard. These fellows sport with danger and smile at death. They are now perfectly accustomed to contending against cavalry, whose charges they ridicule. Nothing can equal their intrepidity, but the cheerfulness with which they perform the severest forced marches, singing by turns, songs of patriotism and of love.

When, at, last they reach their bivouacs, you suppose no doubt they go to sleep. Far from it—every man has his story to tell, or to propose his plan of operations for the morrow. By the way, their views are often remarkably just. The other day, as a regiment was filing off before me, a private of the light infantry came close to me, and said. 'General, you must now do so.'—' Wretch!' replied I, 'will you be silent?' He instantly disappeared in the ranks, and it was in vain that I had him sought for. But what he recommended, was the very thing I had ordered to be done."

Far different were the feelings of Beaulieu, whose disasters, not yet relieved by the more glaring miscarriages of his successors, exposed him to a weight of censure, which he was unconscious of deserving, but unable to avert. In a state of mind between dignity and desperation, he thus recriminated in answer to a reproachful despatch from the Aulic council. "I asked you for a general, and you sent me Argenteau. He is a grandee I know, and I also know, that to atone for my arresting him, he is to be made a fieldmarshal. I now inform you that I have but twenty thousand men, and that the French have sixty thousand; that I shall retreat to morrow, next day, every day, even to Siberia,

provided they pursue me so far. My age gives me a right to speak out. In a word, make peace as soon as you can, and on any terms you can."

Shortly after writing this uncourtly letter, the unfortunate veteran was recalled in disgrace by orders from Vienna; and Marshal Wurmser, who commanded on the upper Rhine, being appointed to succeed him and to conduct a new army into Italy, his broken forces were placed temporarily under the direction of General Melas; officers, who as they rose in distinction on Beaulieu's ruins, were destined, under the blows of the same antagonist, to sink into deeper misfortunes than even those by which he was overwhelmed (6).



CHAPTER XI.

From the 31st of May to the 5th of June 1796.

Desaparte occupies Peschiera, and Verona—Posts his army of observation on the Adige—Seatures and strength of this line—The army of the siege commanded by Serrurier—Augereau cooperates with it—Neutrality of Venice—Transactions with that state—Threats of Foscarelli—Reply of Bonaparte—Proposes an armed neutrality to the Venetian commissioners—His proposition rejected—Prophetic remark of the commissioners—Agreement for the supply of the army—Penury and inaction of the armies on the Rhine—Project of the directors for obtaining a loan from Venice—Bonaparte promotes it—The senate recall Foscarelli, and appoint Battaglia—Louis XVIII.—Sentiments of Bonaparte on entering Verona—Importance of reducing Mantua—Its situation—Island of the Seraglio—Four suburbs taken possession of by the French—Prisoner in a convent—Bonaparte sets off for Milan.

The great objects of Bonaparte now were, with one part of his force to invest Mantua; and with the other part to cover the sege, by occupying strongly the line of the Adige.

Following the footsteps of the Austrian general, who had not besitated to postpone to his military convenience the neutal rights of Venice, he took possession of Peschiera; and proceeding further on the trace of that example, he ordered Massena to enter Venona; an order which that active officer, who had moved up from Villa Franca to Castelnovo, carried into unresisted execution on the 1st of June (1).

With his own division and the principal part of the cavalry and light troops under Kilmaine, Massena, forming the army of observation, occupied the line of the Adige, from the upper

extremity of the lake of Guarda to the marshy plains bordering on the Adriatic, posting his centre at Verona, his left on Montebaldo, and his right at Porto Legnano. The mountains, which, shooting off from the Tyrolian Alps, block up the pass between the lake and the river, the walls and forts of Verona and Legnano, with the broad channel, deep dykes, and numerous branches of the lower Adige, give to this line, variety of aspect but uniformity of strength.

The division of Serrurier, reenforced by the grenadiers of Dallemagne and Lannes, composed the army of the siege, with which, for the purpose of establishing the investment, Augereau was directed to cooperate. On the 1st of June Serrurier took up his quarters at Roverbello, a village near to Mantua, and on the road to Verona. The next day Augereau moved lower down the Mincio, crossed the road from Mantua to Porto Legnano, and posted himself opposite to the suburb of Cerese.

For the first time, since the opening of the campaign, Bonaparte now found himself in contact with the authorities of a neutral state. In such a position, the duties of a commander under the most favourable circumstances, are sufficiently delicate, from the essential repugnance between belligerent necessity, and neutral independence. But where, as in this case, the neutral state is under the direction of an unfriendly government, the difficulty of the commander is greatly increased.

The Venetian senate, as soon as they learned that the French had forced the passage of the Mincio, had deputed Foscarelli a member of their body, to meet Bonaparte, in order to deprecate, and if possible to prevent, his taking possession of Peschiera. But finding that the Austrians had just been compelled to evacuate that place, Foscarelli could not persist in objecting to its mare occupation by the French. When, however, the engineer demanded the keys of the arsenal, with a view of mounting cannon on the ramparts, and of arming the galleys, which were intended to give to the masters of the fortress the command of the lake, he protested against the proceeding as a violation of the neutral rights of his state.

In a conference which took place at Peschiera, on the 1st of June, and in which he endeavoured to dissuade the French general from occupying Verona, he elevated his tone from remonstrance to menace, and declared that if it was attempted, he would cause the gates of the town to be closed, and the fire of the forts to be opened on the French. "Your resolution is too late," said Bonaparte, "my troops are by this time in Verona. I am obliged to establish my line of defence on the Adige, during the siege of Mantua. It is not with a force of fifteen hundred Sclavonians, that you could oppose the passage of the Austrian army. Neutrality consists in dealing out the same weight and measure to both parties. If you are not my enemy, you are bound to grant or allow to me, whatever you have conceded or permitted to my adversary." He complained of the Austrians having been suffered to enter Peschiera, which he alleged had, by increasing the difficulty of passing the Mincio, cost his army many lives, and after threatening to carry his complaints to Venice at the head of his troops, he set off on the morning of the 3rd to join Massena's division at Verona; a movement, which, although his real object was only to put that place, which commanded three bridges over the Adige, and was the key of his position on that line, under a proper state of government and defence, had much the appearance of carrying his threat into execution.

At Verona, two sages of the council who arrived on a special mission from Venice, attended his conferences with Foscarelli. To them Bonaparte renewed his complaints on the occupation of Peschiera by the Austrians, and on the more than hospitable reception which had been given to the count de Lille at Verona. He spoke in strong and even exaggerated terms, of the probable recentment of the directory, and under the impression created by this tone of menace, proposed to withdraw his army from the Adige altogether, provided the senate, assuming an attitude of wared neutrality, would engage to prevent the passage of the Austrians through that district, and confine their right of way for communicating between the Tyrol and Lombardy, to the road on the west bank of the lake of Guarda,—the sole route, which under the treaty between Austria and Venice, they were entitled to use. This proposition, which was calculated to place the two belligrents on a footing of perfect equality, and to avoid misunderstanding or dissension with either, was not suited to the enervate character or political prejudices of the senate, and was rejected by their commissioners (2). It was on this occasion that the Vemetian deputies conceived those strong impressions of Bonaparte's act and ability, which are expressed in the concluding passage of their report to the senate. "The ingenuity of General Bonaparte's observations, the extent of his views, the manner in which he develops them, his knowledge of the interests of his own and of other countries, all authorize the belief, that not only is he endowed with great talent for political affairs, but that he is destined one day or other to exercise immense influence in France" (3). The vast and varied power of his genius had scarce become sensible to his own reflexion, before it was forcing itself on the observation of others.

His proposal for an armed neutrality having been rejected, Bonaparte persisted in holding military possession of Verona and the line of the Adige; and confined his negotiations for the present, to the conclusion of an agreement with the sages of the council, for supplying his army with provisions, and adjusting the mode and rate, according to which they were to be collected and paid for.

In their letter of instruction of the 18th of May, the directors referring to their original promise and the urgent solicitude of Bonaparte, that the armies of the Rhine should forthwith open the campaign, had said, "hostilities have not yet commenced on the Rhine. The army of the Sambre and Meuse forms its magazines with difficulty. It has not, like the brave army of Italy, a fertile plain before it, and it is obliged to provide beforehand the means for its subsistence in the barren country of Berg and northern The army of the Rhine and Moselle is in a state of extreme destitution; for want of horses, its cavalry is reduced absolutely to nothing; it is without money for the current services; and it is moreover beset and preyed upon by abuses and dilapidations of all sorts. The foot carabiniers of the army of Italy have, by their valour, acquired the means of mounting the horse carabiniers of the army of the Rhine and Moselle. If it is in your power to send horses for them, as well as for the rest of the cavalry of that army, hesitate not to do so; and concert measures with the general in chief, Moreau, for ensuring their reception. Act in the same manner for supplying them with the means of transportation, and for relieving the penury, in regard to cash, under which they labour."

After this picture of impotence and misery on their principal frontier, the directors add the following suggestion: "The republic of Venice could perhaps furnish us with money. You

might even raise a loan at Verona, where the pretended Louis XVIII. has resided. The directory commits this matter to your consideration, and entrusts its execution to the commissary Salicetti and yourself." It was in consequence of this appeal and commission, that Bonaparte, in giving an account of his conferences with the Venetian deputies, observed in his letter of the 7th of June; "In case it is your intention to draw from Venice five or six millions of francs, I have contrived expressly for you this quasi rupture. You may demand it by way of indemnification for the battle of Borghetto, which I was obliged to fight in order to take Peschiera. If you meditate stronger measures, I think it will be necessary to keep up this sort of quarrel, advise me of your wishes, and wait for a favourable moment, which I will seize according to circumstances: for it will not do for us to have to deal with every body at once."

The even hand of history readily feels, that this was beneath him. The plain meaning of his language is, that he had picked a quarrel with Venice, in order to afford his government an excuse for robbing that state; and was himself willing, at a favourable moment, to perpetrate the spoliation, or even to inflict a further outrage. This spirit of subservient fraud, in which he condescended to excite, and proposed to gratify, the rapacious wishes of the directory, was equally unworthy of his resentment as an enemy, or his honour as a friend; in one or the other of which relations, after his recent proclamation at Brescia, he necessarily stood toward the government of Venice; and it must provoke reprobation as soon as it attracts notice. But there are circumstances belonging to the affair which, although they do not justify this abrupt deviation from the uniform dignity of his conduct, will be found greatly to lessen its violence, and to attest that, however grave the impropriety into which he fell, his motives were far from being corrupt, or even illiberal.

The force of the application for the sinews of war, contained in the passage just extracted from the letter of the directory, and coming, in opposition to the ordinary course of things, from a government to a general, was doubtless enhanced by the tenor of the despatch which followed it immediately, and apprized Bonaparte, that in compliance with his remonstrance, the determination of dividing his army with Kellermann, and fettering his authority by the control of the commissaries, was renounced. This proof

of a confiding disposition on the part of the directors, which appeared in such agreeable contrast with the jealousy and ingratitude they had just before been thought to discover, must naturally have affected the fervent and susceptible mind of Bonaparts with grateful emotions, and inclined him to serve them with a seal proportioned to the firmness with which he had expostulated against their folly, and the candour with which they had besought his aid. With this sentiment, a professional and patriotic anxiety to see the armies of the Rhine in motion, no doubt, concurred, in bending his high spirit to the instrumentality which his letter proffers, and in blinding his powerful discernment, to its demorit.

It is thus that strong and noble characters, are beguiled into weakness or betrayed into crime. Against the undisguised approaches of vice they are amply fortified; but when it comes in the shape of some generous emotion or benevolent sentiment, it finds the passage to their hearts unguarded, and before they have time to sift their thoughts, or reflect upon the probable consequences of their actions, involves them in error or precipitates them into guilt. As men often do good from bad motives, so from good ones they sometimes do evil.

But so repugnant was this odious proceeding to Bonaparts's general disposition, that he had not finished his letter, before he endeavoured to allay that very appetite for plunder, to which he had just been ministering mercenary stimulants. "The truth is," he wrote, "that in the affair of Peschiera, Beaulieu basely decived the Venetians; he asked them for a passage for fifty men, and then took possession of the place." In the end, accordingly, though the subject was again referred to in the correspondence, the money was not exacted either by way of loan or indemnification.

The intelligence of the unavailing debates which had been held with the French General, and of his army being in possession of Verona, caused great sensation and alarm at Venice. Instead of the victorious invaders being behind the broad Po, or on the distant Alps, the tricolored flag floated on the Adige; and a war of democratical opinions and republican cannon, was approaching the proud but powerless palace of the Doges. The Austrian party in the senate, or that which, under the guise of neutrality, had favoured the success of the imperial arms, and had hitherte predominated in the state, lost their ascendancy; and the party

which, in place of an insincere and dangerous neutrality, recommended an offensive and defensive alliance with France, obtained for the moment though not a control, a degree of influence in the senate. In this state of things, although the proposition for an alliance was rejected, a resolution was taken to recall Foscarelli, who besides belonging to the Austrian party, was of a proud and unaccomodating temper; and to send Battaglia who was the leader of the popular party, but a man of admitted patriotism and moderation, with enlarged powers, to succeed him. This senator was accordingly appointed superintendant of all the Venetian provinces west of the Adige, including the city of Verona, a suburb of which is situated on the east bank of that river. From his reputation for integrity and address, and from his well known liberal sentiments, it was hoped, that while he forbore to sacrifice the neutral relations of Venice, he would establish a good understanding with the French general, and be able to alleviate sensibly those inconveniences, which are generally inseparable from the presence of belligerent forces in the bosom of a peaceful state.

As beasts of prey and obscene birds, secrete themselves in dens or plunge into thickets, at the approach of day, so the viceroy of Milan, as the dawn of liberal opinions, began, with the advance of the French army, to appear in the Venetian councils, fled with his treasures into the Carinthian mountains. His father in law, the Duke of Modena, less active, or perhaps less alarmed, was content to sink into deeper seclusion at Venice. A third representative of broken royalty, in the person of Louis XVIII., had some weeks before, felt the influence of the French invasion, and been compelled to take his departure from Verona. At the opening of the campaign, the directory apprehending from a variety of information, and particularly from the circumstance of general Colli's sending, at a crisis of peculiar disorder in one of the regiments at Nice, a French emigrant with a flag of truce, to the outposts of the army of Italy, that the residence of the pretender, were he suffered to remain at Verona, would become the focus of intrigues and machinations against the fidelity and success of their troops, demanded of the senate of Venice his removal from their dominions; a demand with which, after being apprized of the victories of Montenotte and Millesimo, they complied. the 21st of April, Louis XVIII., under the title of the Count de Lille, left Verona, for the head quarters of his cousin the Prince of

Condé on the upper Rhine. The royal exile, expressed a warm feeling of indignation, at this act of politic, though reluctant, inhospitality. The feeling was natural, even if it was not just; although he soon had reason to rejoice at the proceeding by which it was provoked. For had he been allowed to remain a few weeks longer at Verona, instead of retiring with a semblance of offended dignity at the unkindness of foreigners, he would have fled in sincere alarm at the approach of his own countrymen (4).

Upon entering Verona for the first time, Bonaparte appears to have been affected by sentiments, suitable to a later stage of his career, rather than to his actual position. They are thus expressed in a letter to the directory, written on the 3rd of June.

"I have arrived in this city with the intention of leaving it to-morrow morning. It is very large and very beautiful. I shall place a strong garrison in it, for the purpose of securing the three bridges over the Adige.

"I have let the inhabitants know, that had the pretended king of France, not quitted here before I crossed the Po, I would have burnt their city to the ground, as a punishment for presuming to make it the capital of the French Empire.

"I have just visited the amphitheatre. This relic of antiquity is worthy of the greatness of the Roman people. It made me ashamed of the meanness of our Champs de Mars. A hundred thousand persons may be seated in it, and hear every word of an orator addressing them" (5).

It would seem, that the future greatness of his power and fortune, was already breaking in visions on his mind; that he felt the pretensions of Louis XVIII, as infringements on his own prospective claims; and looked on monuments of ancient magnificence, with a rising hope of equalling their grandeur.

Besides giving instructions to Massena respecting the garrisoning of Verona, and the positions on the river to be taken above and below it, he gave orders for completing the fortification and arming of Peschiera, upon a scale which would enable it to stand a siege; measures of energy and foresight, which were justified by the example of the Austrians, the necessities of his position, the wishes of his government, and the temporizing policy of that of Venice (6).

It may deserve to be remarked, that his prompt and vigorous proceedings in regard to this republic, corresponded precisely with

the line of policy, he had laid down, in deliberating with his generals at Cherasco; and were attended by the very effect which he then prospectively assigned to them; namely, keeping down the hostility of that degenerate state, by shewing a readiness to face and repel it.

Although the army of Italy was now triumphantly established on the Adige, Piedmont humbled, Parma and Modena neutralized, Lombardy overrun, and the Austrian forces overwhelmed by defeat and scattered in the German mountains; yet the citadel of northern Italy refused submission to the victor's laws, and rendered all his conquests insecure. The reduction of Mantua was therefore an object of the highest importance to Bonaparte; and as an army was assembling on the Rhine for its relief, and the heats of summer, fruitful of disease in the low and irrigated plains of the Mincio, were soon to prevail, he saw that celerity in the operation, was the surest, if not the only means of success. He therefore determined to commence it without delay, and in person; and, accordingly, on the 4th of June left Verona for the head quarters of Serrurier, before the earliest dawn of morning.

Mantua is situated on an island in the midst of three confluent lakes, formed by the waters of the Mincio, in its course from the lake of Guarda to the Po. It communicates with the mainland by five causeways. The first called the causeway of the Favorita, from a neighbouring palace of the Dukes of Mantua, separates the upper from the middle lake, and forms the commencement of the road leading up the Mincio to Roverbello, Peschiera, and Verona. It was built of stone, and its junction with the mainland, was fortified by a regular pentagonal work called the Citadel which was well garrisoned, and was covered on several of its faces by inundations. The second causeway, or that of St. George, leading to the right or eastward of the first, joined the mainland at the suburb of St. George, and formed the beginning of the road to Porto A gate of masonry in the suburb closed the entrance to this causeway, which is one hundred and twenty yards in length; and several drawbridges interrupted it in the centre. The causeway, which takes its name from the adjacent suburb of Pietoli, is the third. It divides the middle from the lower lake, at a point where the water is very narrow, but where, to compensate for this contraction, a broad space of open ground, bordered by moats, and forming an intrenched camp for the garrison, lies between the shore of the lake and the walls of the town. So that should an assailant succeed in passing through this avenue, he would have to force a fortified camp, before he could attack Mantua itself. The fourth causeway, pointing in a direction perpendicular to the course of the Po, terminates at the suburb of Cerése. Its principal defence was a gate of masonry, surmounted by a small tower or cavalier: but at this point the water is again wide. The last causeway, called the Pradella, issues on the road to Cremona, in a direction precisely opposite to the causeway of St. George. Its defence consisted of a hornwork, constructed on a natural bank in the lake.

From this description it appears, that of the five causeways issuing from Mantua, like radii from a centre, one only, that of the Favorita, could be said to be fortified. The consequence was, that an inferior force, by seizing the heads of the four unfortified causeways, and reducing or investing the citadel or regular work which defended the first, might, though inadequate to make an impression on the place itself, block up the garrison within it; a circumstance which would enable a commander situated as Housparte was, to give to his covering army, an extraordinary degree of activity and an unusual proportion of strength.

Below the town lies the plain of the Seraglio, an insular triangle, having the foot of the lake of Mantua for its apex, a section of the Po for its base, and for its sides, the canal of Fossa & Macetra on the right, and the lower Mincio on the left; the first falling into the Po at Borgoforte, and the second near Governolo (7).

A garrison of thirteen thousand warlike Germans held the birthplace of Virgil, and from behind ramparts garnished with more than three hundred cannon, disputed its possession, against an army of adventurous Gauls; while the degenerate countrymen of the Epic bard, waited the issue of the contest, without participating in its danger or its glory (8).

General Canto D'Irles, an officer of experience and reputation, commanded, assisted by the courage and counsel of Wukassowich and Roccavini, whose veteran brigades having been withdrawn from the field, formed part of his garrison (9).

The importance of keeping possession of the heads of the causeways, or in other words of the suburbs in which they severally terminated, was felt so impressively by the garrison, that they laboured night and day in strengthening these posts. Bonaparts was equally sensible of their value, and the moment he arrived at Roverbello, took measures for assailing them. As the citadel, or the fort which covered the Favorita, was not to be carried by a coup de main, the other four avenues were the first objects of his attention; and his plan of operations was as well conceived as it proved to be successful. After the Favorita, the stronger of these exterior posts, were that of St. George, which was the second in the series, and that of Cerèse, which was the fourth. By taking these, the two weaker intermediate suburbs, or the third and fifth, would be insulated, and in all probability, evacuated.

Sending directions to Augereau, to cross the lower Mincio, and assail the suburb of Cerèse, he himself with the grenadiers of general Dallemagne, having Lannes, with a vanguard of six hundred, and Serrurier, with a regiment of infantry in reserve, on the morning of the 4th assaulted the suburb of Saint George. Colonel Sturioni, at the head of two thousand four hundred men, defended this village, the approach to which was commanded by the batteries of the town. The French grenadiers rushing forward with their usual impetuosity, soon dislodged Sturioni, killing a hundred of his men, and pursuing him so closely over the causeway, that he had not time to raise the drawbridges. was in vain that, from the batteries of Mantua, vollies of grape shot were showered upon the assailants. They halted, but it was only to form under Lannes a column of attack, with a resolution of mounting to the assault of the town. But Bonaparte judging the attempt desperate, ordered a retreat. The grenadiers, allured rather than deterred by difficulty, retired reluctantly though not without loss; and when Bonaparte told them to look at the immense batteries on the enemies ramparts, murmuring said, "they had much stronger batteries at Lodi" (10).

The besiegers proceeded to fortify themselves in the suburb they had taken, and to erect such works as would shelter them from the cannon of Mantua. With this object in view, an officer conducting a party of grenadiers, entered a convent, which from its exposed situation the nuns had deserted. Hearing cries of distress, which appeared to proceed from a cell in the rear of the establishment, the soldiers burst open the door, when a spectacle presented itself which filled them with horror and compassion, and proved that, however burthensome the maintenance of the French army might be, their victories more than recompensed the people

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of Lombardy, by letting in the light upon their grievances, and breaking up the barbarism of conventual tyranny. Seated in this dismal cell, on a wretched chair, was a young female with her hands confined by manacles. Terrified at the sight of armed men, she begged them to spare her life. The brave grenadiers eagerly broke her handcuffs, and treated her with deferential kindness. She appeared to be about twenty-two years old, the four last of which she had spent in solitude and chains. Love, as natural to her country as her age, was her crime, and under its influence she had endeavoured to escape from the convent. If she interested her deliverers by the liveliness of her gratitude, she distressed them by the vivacity of her fear; for whenever any one approached the cell, the unhappy creature shuddered with the apprehension of being again laid hold of by the sisterhood. When the soldiers, in answer to her prayers to be allowed to breathe once more the fresh air, told her that balls were flying about, that her cell was the safest place, and that it would be dengerous to go out, she exclaimed: "Alas! it is death to stay here." A state of things, in which atrocities like this were permitted, the Austrians were struggling to maintain, and it is no wonder that the opinions and wishes of the just and enlightened, were in favor of the French (11).

Augereau, on his side, was also successful. As he approached the suburb of Cerèse, the advanced posts of the enemy numbering about three hundred men, quitted their ground on the plain of the Seraglio, abandoned the village, and retired before him to their main body, who were intrenched behind the bridges in the causeway, and the stone gateway, in front of which was a battery. The loopholed tower on the top of this gateway, was filled with sharp shooters. As soon as his infantry came within fire, Augereau, who felt that, though he might occupy the evacuated suburb, he could not be said, in the spirit of his orders, to possess it, as long as the head of the adjoining causeway was held by the Austrians, determined on dislodging them without delay. Posting his artillery in a situation to favour his attack, he led forward his infantry in two columns, the foremost battalions of which, upon getting in half musket shot, deployed into line and opened a fire so warm and defective that the Austrians were soon driven out of their position and forced across the causeway. The grenadiers advanced quickly in pursuit, but were stopped by the broken bridges, which they

endeavoured to repair, and the gateway, which the musketry from the tower above it, keenly defended. Andreossi was ordered to bring up the artillery, and burst open the gate. Before this could be done, a drummer, a boy only twelve years old, climbed over the gate in the midst of the fire, but unperceived by the enemy perched above him, and descending inside, opened it to the French, who rushed through, crossed the canal on a bridge, which had been left unbroken for the retreat of the garrison of the tower, and pursued the enemy until they took refuge within the ramparts of the town. The party in the tower, thus cut off from Mantua, surrendered at discretion (12).

Thus the two stronger of the exterior posts, being in possession of the besiegers, the two weaker or intermediate suburbs, were evacuated by the garrison. All were immediately occupied by the French. Six hundred men they stationed at St. George, Pietoli and Cerèse respectively, and at the remoter suburb of Pradella, a thousand. Consequently the Favorita was the only avenue by which the garrison could reach the mainland. This, Bonaparte ordered Serrurier to observe closely, with an adequate force; and charging that officer with the direction of the siege, leaving a variety of orders with Berthier, and requiring Augereau to prepare his division for a movement to the south of the Po, he himself set off in the evening for Milan. Personal observation had satisfied him that Mantua was proof against a coup de main; and if to be taken at all, before the Austrian army, reenforced by troops from the Rhine, should come upon the besiegers with the sweep of a returning tide, it must be by a vigorous siege, with open trenches and heavy cannon. But on this side the Adda, he had no other artillery than field pieces. The battering train, originally destined for his army, want of transport had compelled him to leave for the most part, where he found it, in the arsenals of Nice and Antibes; and that which he had formed of the cannon taken in Ceva, Coni, and Tortona, was detained at Milan in besieging the castle. To accelerate the fall of Mantua, it therefore became necessary to finish at once the siege of the castle of Milan. and he determined to give a personal impulse to the operation. Other objects required his reappearance in the capital of Lombardy, and on the right bank of the Po; for already he was the pivot on which not only the fate of Italy, but the war in Germany turned (13). Attended by Bessieres with the company of guides,

accompanied by Murat with a detachment of hussars, and followed by Lannes with a corps of twelve hundred grenadiers, he reached Brescia at midnight of the day, in the morning of which he had left Verona.

He felt great confidence in his generals, and unbounded reliance on the troops. The spirit and activity of Massena, with his experience in mountain warfare, fitted him admirably for maintaining the line of the Adige, and the ground he had taken in the passes into the Tyrol. The prudence and firmness of Serrurier were well adapted to the conduct of a rigorous blockade. On leaving him, Bonaparte entertained the flattering hope, of soon reducing the Castle of Milan and the fortress of Mantua, and before the Austrian columns could pour down from the Tyrol, of having his whole force disembarrassed and active, united on the Adige. But to use his own expressive language, "before Mantua was to fall, how many battles were to be fought, what difficulties to be surmounted, and what perils overcome!"

CHAPTER XII.

From the 5th of June to the 3d of July 1796.

Causes of Bonaparte's return to Milan, and to the right bank of the Po-The quarrel with Rome-Armistice with Naples-Alarm of the Pope-The executive commissaries-The extent of their powers-The Directors adopt the policy of Bonaparte—His occupations at Milan—Converts the blockade of the castle into a siege-His correspondence-His attention to the family of general Laharpe-Insurrection of the Imperial Fiefs-Atrocities of the Barbets-Suppressed and punished-Bonaparte writes to the Senate ct Genoa-The Senate promises to comply with his demands-His proclama. tion to the inhabitants of the Tyrol-He dismantles the fort of Fuentes-The expeditions to Bologna, and Leghorn—He goes to Modena—Reduces the fort of Urbino-Enters Bologna-Releases the cardinal legate on his parole—An example of ecclesiastical honour—Disposition of the Bolognese -Their reception of Bonaparte-The Spanish Jesuits-Overtures of the Pope-Armistice of Bologna-Faux pas of the commissaries-Bonaparte joins the column of general Vaubois—The armistice of Brescia ratified— Bonaparte writes to the Grand Duke of Tuscany-Marches upon Leghorn-Arrests the Tuscan governor—The English cruisers, and merchant vessels escape from the harbour—The English merchandize seized—Vaubois appointed governor of Leghorn-Bonaparte visits his relative the Abbé-Repairs to Florence-Dines with the Grand Duke-Visits the galleries of the Fine Arts, and of Anatomy-The castle of Milan surrenders-Bonaparte returns to Bologna-Thence to Roverbello-Revolt of Lugo-Suppressed by Augereau.

The affairs which engaged Bonaparte's attention during this second occasion of absenting himself from the front of his army, are deserving of attention, as much on account of their multiplicity, as of their importance. The time proposed for his absence

was of necessity short; for the fragments of Beaulieu's force gathering strength from the accession of recruits and detach in the Tyrol; and Wurmser who was about marching his co from the Rhine, might be expected to be felt on the Adi early as the middle of July. This interval of four or five during which the main action of the campaign was to be sued, it was the purpose of the French general to employ it desing the series of secondary matters, which had been brouthe instructions of his government and the progress of his within the sphere of his duty; and which weighty, vario complicated as they were, he appears to have transacted, but the difficulty as their narration will require.

Among the most urgent of these intervening objects, v necessity of securing the rear of his army from annoyance part of Rome and Naples, before his front should be again e with the Austrians. From the moment of Basseville's un murder, an open rupture had existed between the French r and the Papal government; although, the want of means side and of opportunity on the other, had hitherto preven tual hostilities. Nevertheless the Pope had not failed to the arms peculiar to his office, the weapons of superstition conding the more palpable strength of the coalition, deat with sanctimonious horror, the progress and objects of the revolution, and calling on the faithful, time after time, to from one common demolition, the thrones of Princes and tars of God. The thunders of the Vatican, having almost ex their force in the dark ages and the incipient stages of the re tion, no longer struck statesmen with perplexity and with awe. Still, the exhortations of the head of the church, were not without influence on the kings and p Europe, emboldening their hostility, or discouraging their towards the new republic. This influence, which was n strongest in Italy, was most authoritative in the southern 1 that peninsula, which were darkly shaded by the wing of stition, and remotely secluded from the general intellig Europe.

The temporal power of the Pope was so much more scribed even than his declining spiritual sway, that, shan alarm and following the examples of the Dukes of Par Modena, he would probably have made overtures for pear naparte, upon learning that he had entered Milan, but for the encouragement and support of the Neapolitan cabinet; which was in a great measure directed by the passions of the queen, a sister of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette.

The kingdom of the Two Sicilies, though not large, was fertile and populous; so that besides the contingent of cavalry furnished to the Austrian army, the king was able to bring into the field, fifty thousand infantry at least. His geographical position at the foot of Italy, while it very much shielded him from an enemy on the Po, gave him certain facilities of annoying that enemy by expeditions directed through the Roman states. But events of a political and military character were now in progress, which were calculated to effect a thorough change in the policy of Naples, and to strike from the rash but trembling hand of the Pontiff, this staff of support.

The Neapolitan cavalry had participated in the numerous defeats suffered by the Austrian army, and being generally thrown into the rear to break the pursuit of the French grenadiers, had been subjected to a full proportion of the loss and discouragement, which fell to the lot of the vanquished. These mortifying disasters, so different from the promised pleasures of a successful broad into France, while they rebuked severely the pride of the troops, abated sensibly the confidence of their monarch. Spanish government at the same time, continued its exertions to detach Naples from the coalition, being naturally anxious to fortify the side which it had almost espoused in the great European quarrel, and to bring the policy of a kindred throne into accordance with its own. While these causes were strongly operating b dispose the cabinet of Naples to peace, the battle of Borghetto, in which half the Neapolitan cavalry was captured or destroyed, took place, and gave them a decisive effect. The feeble king, finding at last that the counsels of hope and of resentment were equally desperate, despatched the prince Belmont Pignatelli, to the headquarters of Bonaparte, with instructions to propose as a preliminary to the conclusion of peace, an immediate suspension of The prince in coming from Milan, to which capital he had first repaired, met Bonaparte on his way thither at Brescia; and after a conference, which was neither tedious nor unfruitful, igned an armistice on the 5th of June. The conditions, besides the tssential one of an immediate cessation of arms, provided that the 10 B

king should send envoys to Paris, to treat for peace, and should withdraw his cavalry, now reduced to two thousand four hundred, from the Austrian army, and place it in quarters around Brescia. This condition seemed to offer a good assurance for the faith of Naples, in as much as should the King refuse to ratify the treaty which might be concluded at Paris, his cavalry would be at the mercy of the French army.

But besides securing these advantages, and detaching from the enemies of France, the only remaining branch of the family of her exiled kings, this convention, by insulating the holy see and exposing it unassisted to the whole force of the French army, accomplished, at the very outset of Bonaparte's excursion, one of the chief objects for which it was undertaken.

The change of policy on the part of Naples, though suddenly adopted, was, it would appear, not concealed from Pius the 6th; who as suddenly altered the tone of his patriarchal exhortations: and, instead of preaching up a crusade with a view of forcibly reinstating his clergy in France, with that flexibility of principle of which the most orthodox princes are not the least capable, set about fulminating bulls against all catholic priests, who should endeavour to excite or prolong civil war in the Republic (1). solved also to try the efficacy of Spanish intercession, he prevailed on the Chevalier Azara, resident minister of Spain at Rome, to sound the disposition of the French commander. From these circumstances it was evident that, in consequence of the convention with Naples, there would be little difficulty in dealing with But as no contribution had been exacted from the former state, Bonaparte was not without apprehensions, that a proceeding. so much at variance with the wants, wishes, and habits of the directory, would incur their disapprobation. His letter, announcing the armistice of Brescia reveals these apprehensions, by the carry est distinctness with which he explains the solid advantages d that convention.

- "You will find enclosed a copy of the armistice concluded between the armies of France and Naples.
- "1st. We deprive the Austrian army of two thousand four hand dred cavalry, and place that force at our mercy.
- "2nd. We take, from the English, five ships of the line and a number of frigates.
 - "3rd. We continue to break up the coalition against France.

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"If you make peace with Naples, the armistice will be useful, as it will before hand have reduced the strength of the Austrian army. If, on the contrary, you do not make peace, the armistice will still be useful, by putting in my power two thousand four hundred of the Neapolitan cavalry, and inducing the king of Naples to take a step displeasing to the coalition. This leads me to consider the military question-can we, and should we go to

" For the siege of the castle of Milan, the occupation of the Milanese territory, and garrisoning the fortresses we have con-

quered in Italy, fifteen thousand men are necessary.

"The defence of the line of the Adige, and the maintenance of our positions on the Tyrolian Alps, require twenty thousand (2). There remain, including the reenforcements on their march from

the army of the Alps, not more than six thousand.

"But had we twenty thousand, it would not be advisable for us to undertake a march of twenty-five days, in the months of July and August, in search of sickness and mortality (3). In this interval, Beaulieu would repose and recruit his army in the Tyrol; arengthen it by reenforcements which come in daily; and take from us, in autumn, all that we took from him in spring. Whereas, by means of the armistice, we can impose what terms we please For already the papal government is preparing to issue a bull against those who, under pretence of zeal for religion, are preaching up civil war in France.

"From a communication I have had this morning with M. Azara, Spanish minister, who has been sent to me by the Pope, I gather he has been instructed to offer a contribution. I expect soon be at Bologna; would you like my accepting as an equivalent for an armistice, twenty five millions in money, five millions in povisions, three hundred paintings, statues and manuscripts in poportion, and that I cause to be liberated all the patriots who we been arrested for revolutionary acts? I shall have full time breceive your orders on the subject, as I shall hardly get to Bopa before ten or fifteen days. Then, should the six thousand of general Chateauneuf Randon come, there will be no difbilly in pushing on as far as Rome. At all events, I beg you to and assured that, when you have once informed me of your de-Med intentions, they must be very difficult of execution indeed, "I do not accomplish them" (4).

The demonstration which this letter contains of the advantages to be gained, and the evils to be avoided by a peace, or even an armistice, with Naples, is clear and irresistible; and it produced accordingly a decided effect on the policy of the directors; who instead of prosecuting their hostile intentions against Naples, sanctioned the armistice, and entered into negotiations which led to peace.

It is observable that, in this letter, Bonaparte omits all allusion to the executive commissaries, and requests specific instructions for himself alone, designing no doubt indirectly to recommend their exclusion from his measures, for the civil as well as the military conquest of Italy. From their reply, it appears the directors, although they sanctioned his armistice, rejected his recommendation, and in terms conveying an intimation, that thenceforward they would not confirm any armistice concluded without the concurrence of the commissaries. In their despatch of the 15th of June they say, "Although it was to be desired that the king of Naples should pay some millions in contribution, upon signing the armistice, the directors approve it, referring at the same time to their previous instructions in regard to the necessity of having, in transactions of this kind, the intervention of the executive commissaries near the army of Italy."

Up to this period of the campaign it is therefore evident, that Salicetti and Garrau, although shorn of all pretensions to military authority, were in full possession of the civil and diplomatic faculties with which they had been originally endowed.

But with the exception of this point, all the suggestions in Bonaparte's letter were approved; and the policy of the directors which four weeks before, was perfectly opposite to his views, was, now made to coincide with them completely. "It should be our object," they continue, in the same despatch, "to terminate the war in the south of Italy as soon as possible, and to occupy ourselves with the means of procuring peace, by our situation in the north of that Peninsula." This was repeating in other words what Bonaparte had told them in the letter of remoustrance of the 14th of May. "As to the expedition against Leghorn, Rome and Naples, it is but a small affair. It should be made by divisions as échelon, so that on the least occasion we might return upon the Austrians and envelop them at the first movement they made."

The moment Bonaparte arrived at Milan, he repaired to the

works before the Castle, and discontinuing the blockade, had trenches opened immediately, and the operations of an active siege commenced.

From the series of his published letters, it appears that he reached Milan on the evening of the 6th of June, and left there for Tortona on the morning of the 12th so that his stay was between five and six days. Exclusive of his personal attention to the siege, and to matters connected with the finance and government of Lombardy, his time was employed in conferences with the agent of the king of Sardinia, respecting the due execution of the late treaty of peace, and in corresponding with the directory and with their agents civil and military, in the various states, to which his growing influence and overspreading energy extended; such as the ambassador at Basle, the ministers at Genoa, Venice and in the Grisons, generals Moreau, Kellermann and Clarke. To the two former of these officers he announced the transmission of funds for the service of their respective armies; to the last, he communicated the arrival at headquarters of his young relative Elliot, whom Bonaparte had consented to receive as one of his aides de camp. This letter was a private one, and the ostensible subject of it altogether personal; but as Clarke was military secretary to the directors, Bonaparte did not fail to make him the instrument of conveying to the government, his reiterated objections to an expedition to the south of Italy, and consequently, his anxiety to have the armistice with Naples confirmed. civil expressions in regard to Clarke and his nephew, he adds. "Things are going on very well here, but the dog-days are coming at full gallop, and there is no remedy against their fatal Wretched mortals that we are; all that we can do is influence. As to subjecting her to our will, we are to observe nature. impotent. The campaign commenced two months too late; so that we are obliged to keep the field in the most sickly country in Europe. I can see but one way to avoid being beat in autumn, and that is, to manage so as not to be obliged to march to the south of Italy."

It will be remembered that, in the previous January, he had handed to Clarke for the consideration of the directors, a plan of campaign, in which the advantage of acting in the winter season was insisted on. Repeating this remark to the secretary of the directors, who, to his general interest in the success of his coun-

trymen, added a natural concern in the fortune of a favorite kinsman, was a sure way of enlisting his zeal against the deprecated project, and in favour of a ratification of the armistice of Brescia.

He wrote also a private letter to Carnot, discouraging a march to the south, even as far as Rome, and urging, as preferable, a negotiation with the Pope. "By my letter to the government you will be informed of our position. If the battalions announced as on the way to reenforce us, come up in time, it will be easy for us to push on as far as Rome. Nevertheless, as operations may take place in Germany of a nature to change our relative position every moment, I think it would be advisable to leave me the option, of concluding an armistice with the Pope, or of marching upon Rome. In the first case, prescribe the conditions of the truce; in the second, tell me what I am to do; for our troops cannot maintain themselves in Rome long. The distance is immense, the fanaticism of the inhabitants excessive, and a great superiority in numbers naturally gives confidence to men. We shall soon be in July, when every march will cost us two hundred sick."

These letters were all received at Paris before the answer of the directory, approving the armistice with Naples, was written. and had of course their influence in determining its purport (5). But they are important chiefly as they show that the ordinary relation between governments and their commanding generals was in Bonaparte's case, and without arrogance or even design on his part, completely reversed; and that, instead of bei indebted to his superiors for directions for conducting the war, or funds for carrying it on, he was, at this early period of his career, constantly transmitting to Paris treasures for the general service of the state, and counsels by which the instructions to The meagre despatches from himself were to be regulated. Jourdan and Moreau, during the same campaign, by the force of contrast, set this bounteous aspect of Bonaparte's capacity and conduct in a very striking light.

His letter to Moreau deserves to be transcribed because it is a model of elegant brevity, and of unaffected good feeling, on an eccasion where some degree of egoistical display and ostentations rivalry might have been expected; and because it was the commencement of that intercourse between these two generals, which terminated so lamentably for the latter. It is in these words; "General, I transmit to you a million of francs, which you may

draw for on citizen Barthelemy our minister at Basle. The army of Italy has asked permission of the directory to convey to you this portion of their military contributions, in the hope of promoting the comfort of their brother soldiers, of the army of the Rhine." The assertion of fact contained in this letter, though veiled in the forms of complimentary expression, was founded in truth; for, in a despatch of the 22nd of May, Bonaparte had observed to the directory: "If you desire it, I will transmit a million of francs to Basle for the army of the Rhine." In referring the present to the fraternal generosity of his troops, he no doubt intended to make it more acceptable to Moreau; though it does not appear that his letter was answered.

During this short stay, in Milan, he embraced the following occasion of paying respect to the memory of General Laharpe, by endeavouring to promote the interest of his son and his family. An agent of the Swiss cantons, having applied to him for permission to export a quantity of rice from Lombardy to Switzerland. he consented to grant it, on condition that the canton of Berne would restore to young Laharpe the confiscated property of his deceased father, and, toen force this proposition, he wrote immediately both to the directory and to the French ambassador in Switzerland. To the former on the 11th of June, he said: "General Laharpe was a native of the canton of Berne. The authorities of this canton confiscated his property at the breaking out of the revolution. I entreat you to have it restored to his children. The Swiss have requested of me authority for transporting into their country several thousand measures of rice; a request which I have granted, on condition that the canton of Berne make restitution, to the son of Laharpe, of that General's property. I hope you will approve of this measure." To Barthelemy, he wrote on the same day. "The canton of Berne confiscated the fortune of the late General Laharpe at the beginning of the revolution. I hope you will exert yourself to have it restored to his son." This powerful influence, thus earnestly and seasonably directed to the accomplishment of a benevolent object, the reader will be pleased to learn, did not fail of success.

In passing through Pavia, in order to palliate the ravages, of the approaching season, he gave direction for establishing a hospital of two thousand beds in the Castle, and commanded that a requisition should be made on the city for the necessary matresses, and furniture. Pursuing his route, he reached Tortona in the course of the night of the 12th of June, having, since he left that place on the 6th of May, conquered Lombardy, dispersed the army of Beaulieu, gained the line of the Adige, and invested Mantua.

The object of his visit to this quarter was to repress the revolt and warfare, which the Austrian minister at Genoa had contrived to instigate in the imperial fiefs, and among the lawless inhabitants of the Genoese and Piedmontese frontier. These fiefs were small districts, lying in the Genoese territory on the slopes of the Appennines, the lordship or superior title to which, was in the Emperor of Germany, while the actual possession, was held by certain noble families of Genoa. A natural sympathy inclined the aristocracy of that circumscribed state, to favour the coalition of monarchs, against the republic of France, and consequently the proprietors of these fiefs were disposed, as members of that body. as well as by reason of their feudal dependance on the Emperor, to interrupt the successes of the French general. Encouraged by the Austrian minister Girola, these noblemen excited the ignorant inhabitants of the districts in question, to set at defiance the legal regulations and neutral character of Genoa, so far as to form themselves into military companies; and under the imperial standard, to wage open war against detachments of the French army. Their original force was soon and seriously augmented by the neighbouring population, upon whom the ambiguous allegiance of a frontier position, and the fluctuating ravages of incessant war, had impressed a taste for plunder, and habits of cruelty and outrage. Descriers from the army of the King of Sardinia also joined them, as well as fugitives from the "gross bands" of Austrian prisoners, who, escorted by small detachments of the army of Italy, easily and frequently escaped, in traversing the deep and devious passes of the Alps.

The first victims of their violence were stragglers from the neighbouring garrison of Tortona; the next, parties of volunteers and convalescents, who were on their way from the depots in France, to join their regiments in Italy. At last, gaining strength and boldness from success and impunity, these deluded outlaws, to whom the example of Pavia might have been a warning, intercepted the French couriers on their route, surrounded and batchered in the castle of Arquata, a detachment of one hundred and

fifty men, and assailed a battalion of six hundred on their march into Italy, with such vigour, as to cut off a number of soldiers, and detain the corps, skirmishing in the mountains three entire days.

These outrages, by which the communications of the army with Genoa, Savona, and Nice, were in a great measure intercepted. occasioned much inconvenience, and demanded at the hand of the French general immediate redress. They seemed to justify the assertions of his officers, who at Cherasco had warned him against the machinations of the Genoese nobility. However, he soon convinced both enemies and friends of the superior accuracy of his own opinion in the conference referred to, when he declared: "The oligarchs of Genoa are not to be dreaded." His intentions, in relation to this irritating subject, were thus sternly expressed, before he left Milan, in a letter to the French minister at Genoa. "I have come to Milan, to carry into execution the treaty of peace with the King of Sardinia. I am informed, that the minister of the Emperor at Genoa, excites the peasants to revolt, and furnishes them with powder and money. If this is true, it is my intention to have him arrested in Genoa itself."

His arrival near the scene of these atrocities, checked them immediately. But the task of crushing the revolt and clearing the mountains of brigands, or, as they were called, barbets, effectually, he confided to Lannes, who at the head of his twelve hundred grenadiers, with a small detachment from the garrison of Tortona, marched into the imperial fiefs, took Arquata by storm, and put to the sword the murderous brigands who defended it. He razed to the ground the castle of Augustin Spinola, who was the proprietor of this fief, and who, of all the Genoese senators, had been most forward in promoting the designs of Girola, and fomenting hostilities against the French.

In the more immediate neighbourhood of Tortona, numbers of the barbets were arrested by detachments from the garrison, and several of their leaders, after being identified by trial before military commissions, were sentenced and shot.

These measures of severity and intimidation, which, however much to be lamented, were absolutely necessary to the safety of his army, posted on the Mincio and the distant Adige, and having no other communication with France than by the routes which the barbets infested, he followed up by representations to the

Sardinian authorities and the Genoese government, calculated to put an end to the annoyances of which he complained. governor of Alexandria was informed, that parties from the garrison of Serravalla, a post under his authority, had aided and abetted the insurgents of the fiefs, and the brigands of the mountains; and was required to have the abuse and its authors cor-Murat, who still held the rank of first aide de camp of the commander in chief, was despatched to Genoa with a letter to the senate; and with orders, after having been presented to that body by the French minister, to deliver it in person; Bonaparte foreseeing that, if it reached its destination by a less direct channel, a fortnight might elapse before it would receive attention. In this communication, he demanded that the governor of Novi. who had contenanced the insurrection, should be dismissed; that the minister of Austria, who had forfeited his privileges, should be arrested or sent away; and that the senate should undertake. to clear the routes and escort the French convoys, with their own troops. His letter was delivered by Murat in person, and being backed by the terrible severity of his military inflictions, awed the senate into a promise of full and immediate compliance with his demands (6).

Thus the insurrection in the fiefs, and the outrages of the barbets, were suppressed, and the communications of the army recetablished as early as the 17th of June, a celerity which, as usual, surpassed the foresight of the directory, who were of opinion that these affairs could not be attended to, until after Bonaparte should have returned from the expedition to Leghorn and Bologna.

To provide against future disturbances in this quarter, he issued an order, tracing the routes which the soldiers were to pursue, and directing that no party less than twenty-five in number nor without being under the command of a commissioned officer, should be allowed to pass. And dividing all the country between the French frontier and the province of Mantua, into four districts under as many generals of division, the chief places of which were Nice, Coni, Tortona, and Milan, he charged these officers, with the execution of his regulations within their respective limits (7).

During this halt at Tortona, his active mind was directed to objects of service in other quarters, which, though imperceptible as yet to less lofty intellects, the progress of the campaign

was soon to elevate into magnitude. A detachment of the army of observation having approached the city of Trent, soon after Massena took possession of Verona, the prince bishop, who held civil and ecclesiastical authority in the province, accompanied by a number of the principal inhabitants, fled with signs of irreclaimable terror. Equal alarm seized the population of Bautzen and Brixen, important towns situated higher up the Adige and deeper in the Alps. Even at Trieste, at the head of the Adriatic, an absurd report that the French projected a descent on that coast, suspended so effectually the commerce of the place, that many of the merchants packed up their most valuable furniture, and prepared to remove to Vienna (8).

It was his desire to calm this consternation, which would leave the province into which he still hoped to penetrate, desolate or hostile, and which, although in some instances it might produce temporary submission, was liable to result in general and desperate resistance. The remoteness of Massena's position increased his anxiety, since, should the Austrians be able to raise a levy en masse in the Tyrol, that officer might be overwhelmed by numbers before Bonaparte could be at hand to succour or withdraw him. Influenced by these motives, he addressed on the 14th of June, from his head quarters at Tortona, the following proclamation to the people of the Tyrol.

"I am about to march through your country, brave Tyrolians, in order to force the Emperor into a peace, necessary to Europe and to his own subjects. It is your cause I am going to defend. For a long season, you have been vexed and fatigued by the horrors of a war undertaken, not to promote the interest of the tierman people, but to gratify the passions of a single family. The French army respects and befriends all people, particularly simple and virtuous mountaineers. Your religion and customs shall be held sacred; our troops shall observe the strictest discipline, and shall take no article of property, without paying for it in cash. Receive us with hospitality and we will treat you as brethren. But should any of you lose sight of your real interest, so far as to take up arms, you will find our anger terrible as lightning. We will burn the houses and lay waste the fields, of whatever villages may take part in this war, which is foreign to them.

"Do not allow yourselves to be persuaded into a false step by

the agents of Austria. Save your country, which has already suffered a four years' war, from the miseries which would afflict it. The court of Vienna, when compelled to make peace, will restore to the people the privileges it has usurped, and to Europe the tranquillity it has disturbed."

On the 1st of June, the armistice on the Rhine having been duly denounced by the Austrians, the immense armies under Jourdan and Moreau were necessarily roused from their long and unseasonable torpor, and general Kleber, with the left wing of the former. attacked the Duke of Wurtemburg at Alten Kirchen, and drove him with loss beyond the Lahn. Upon receiving intelligence of this welcome event, Bonaparte lost no time in seconding operations, which, had they been sooner commenced, would materially have advanced his own. For this purpose, he sent a detachment of troops against the small Austrian garrison in the fort of Fuentes, situated at the head of the lake of Como, where the Adda descending from the Enghadine Alps, falls into that lake or rather The fort was taken and dismantled, and the effect which was desired, of making the left wing of the Austrians on the upper Rhine, apprehensive of annoyance from the army of Italy, in the direction of Swabia, was produced (9).

Having accomplished these various objects on a semicircular line of mountainous country, extending from the Tyrol to Gence, and near its centre at Milan and Brescia, Bonaparte left Tortona on the 17th of June, to take charge of the collateral expeditions which he had prepared against the cruisers and commerce of the English at Leghorn, and the forces that the Pope was collecting in the legations of Bologna and Ferrara. The Holy Father, notwithstanding his alarm at the secession of Naples from the coalition, and the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, was encouraged by communications from Vienna, to expect the speedy appearance of Wurmser on the Adige, and the landing at Leghorn of an English force from Corsica, destined to traverse Tuscany, and to cooperate with his own troops and the Austrian army, in the valley of the Po. Apprized of these projects and combinations, Bonaparte proceeded to disconcert and defeat them.

The division of Augereau having been prepared for the movement, orders were sent from Tortona to that officer, to march into the Roman territory. On the 16th of June, he passed the Po at Borgoforte (10), took possession of Ferrara, and on the 19th entered Bologna, making prisoners of the two cardinal Legates, with four hundred of the papal troops. At the same time general Vaubois at the head of five thousand men, consisting chiefly of the reenforcements from the army of the Alps, entered Modena; where Bonaparte himself, after passing through Placentia, Parma. and Reggio, arrived at an early hour on the 19th. The people of Reggio and Modena received him with acclamations, and appealed to him for deliverance from the tyranny and avarice of the duke. But as the regency had so far performed the conditions of the armistice, Bonaparte would not violate them. He therefore employed his influence to allay this effervescence of popular spirit, and to engage for the regency a degree of public respect. With this view, he was present at a banquet to which they invited him, and treated the members with such marks of attention. as raised them into consideration in the eyes of the people, while it inspired them with respect for himself.

The road from Modena to Bologna, passed directly under the papal fort of Urbino; a work which was surrounded by a bastioned rampart with wet ditches, and having a covered way which was newly repaired. It contained a garrison of three hundred men, well armed, amply supplied, and commanded by a knight of Malta. On reaching Modena, Bonaparte detached a part of his escort under colonel Vignolles, with an order to the garrison of Urbino, to open their gates and surrender as prisoners of war; and such was the terror inspired by his name and arms, that the order was instantly obeyed. Of the fifty pieces of artillery on the walls, thirty of the largest calibre were immediately dismounted and conveyed to Borgoforte, where Serrurier had established his park for the siege of Mantua. The knight and his garrison, swelled the number of the prisoners of war (11).

Upon arriving at Bologna at midnight, on the 19th, Bonaparte found the cardinal Legate like his colleague of Ferrara, a prisoner in the hands of Augereau. His eminence solicited and obtained permission, to go to Rome on parole. Instead of requiting this indulgence by efforts to conciliate, he laboured, it was found, to irritate the Pope and the people against France. His leave of absence was in consequence revoked, and he was required, by an order from Berthier, to return immediately to the head quarters of the army. His reply to this order, which created no

little amusement and not less surprise, set forth, that the Pope, by a brief, had disengaged him from the obligation of his word of honour.

Bologna, the most populous and considerable city in the Pope's dominions, after Rome itself; the residence of many enlightened professors, and the resort of students from all parts of Italy, had not been uninfluenced by the liberal sentiments and popular feeling, which produced and sustained the French revolution. An oasis in the desert of ignorance and superstition which overspread the greater part of the Roman states, it was animated by a strong repugnance for the government of ecclesiastics, and an ardent desire to see the liberty of Italy asserted and maintained. Augereau therefore, as a French general, was received with confidence and cordiality; and Bonaparte, whose Italian name and origin were respected, with enthusiasm and affection. He peared frequently in the streets, always without a guard; and when he went to the Opera, would permit the attendance of no other escort than the volunteers of Bologna. In that language of force and originality, which was already commanding attention, he conversed much with the senators on the condition, resources, and destiny of their city; and led their minds to hope for the glory and independence of Italy. It was on this, his first visit to Bologna, that a deputation from the senate composed of Caprara, Marescalchi, and Aldini, waited on him with the golden book of the town, and exhibited to him, with proud satisfaction. the names and arms of several of his ancestors, who were carolled in the list of their nobility and magistrates.

In a very few days, the aspect of the city was changed; the people generally, and even some of the ecclesiastics, assuming arms and military dresses. The French soldiers were treated like brothers by the people, and the officers entertained as friends by individuals of rank and fortune. There were three er four hundred Spanish Jesuits at Bologna, and among them some men of learning and merit, who, alarmed at the excitement of the citizens, and apprehensive of violence from the troops, began to fly to Rome. Bonaparte, averse to civil dissensions and political persecution, quieted their fears by assure of protection, and insured their safety by special orders.

From Bologna, he obtained, with the ready consent of the authorities, a selection of fifty paintings, including, besides the fa-

mous St. Cecilia of Raphael, masterpieces of Guido, Domenichino, and the three Carracci.

When the capture of the two provincial capitals, Bologna and Ferrara, became known at Rome, the political obstinacy and theological hate of Pius VI. gave way entirely, and he had recourse again to the good offices of the Spanish minister Azara. This envoy, who had previously conferred with Bonaparte at Miina, and was now furnished with full powers by the Pope, repaired to Bologna, and on the 23rd of June signed an armistice, by which the Pope engaged to open negotiations for peace at Paris; to settle an annuity on the family of Basseville; to discharge all political prisoners; to cede to France the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and the citadel of Ancona with all its artillery and maguines; to deliver to the French commissioners one hundred suckness of the fine arts, and four hundred manuscripts; and to pay, in short instalments, twenty one millions of france, exclusively of the contributions already imposed on the legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Faenza, into the last of which, Augereau's column had by this time penetrated.

As it was the determined intention of the government that the executive commissaries, though divested of military authority, should take part in all diplomatic transactions, both Salicetti and Garran assisted in the negotiations at Bologna, but in a manner and with effects, which were agreeable neither to the general nor to the directors. In their reply of the 6th of July to Bonaparte's letter, announcing the armistice with the Pope, and of which but a short extract is preserved, they say; "We are satisfied with the armistice concluded with the Pope. The other advantages which you regret not being able to draw from this negotiation, we agree with you in hoping may be realised in the definitive treaty; which we shall be in no hurry to conclude, being persuaded that the army of Italy, by maintaining its glorious conquests, will give us all the latitude necessary to impose on Italy such conditions as will be most favourable to the republic. To avoid the difficulties you encountered in discussing the terms of this armistice, it would have been desirable, that our commissaries had not conferred with M. Azara, except in your presence."

Since he had proposed in his letter of the 7th of June, to demand thirty millions of francs and three hundred paintings, as an equivalent for an armistice, and had actually obtained only twenty-one

millions of francs and one hundred objects of the fine arts, it is probable that he attributed this difference to the indiscretion of the commissaries.

Notwithstanding the decided advantages of this convention, which rendered an expedition to Rome unnecessary, and completely protected the rear of the army of Italy, its conclusion was regretted by many leading men in the government at Paris; who, solicitous for liberty of thought as well as political freedom, hoped to see on this occasion, the Pope's temporal power and spiritual influence, abolished together. Nor was it acceptable to the senate of Bologna, who feared being again subjected to both. In quieting the apprehensions of the Bolognese, Bonaparte found little difficulty, by assuring them that the French government was in a position to dictate terms of peace, and would not conclude one without guaranteeing their entire independence of Rome. Satisfied with this assurance, the people of the two conquered legations, acting in conformity with their new situation, organised and armed a body of national guards.

With reference to the Papal government, it did not enter into Bonaparte's views to promote its overthrow either as a political or a religious establishment. He was still inclined, in regard to the people and the states of Italy, to be governed by the principle he had laid down in conferring with his officers at Cherasco, to take no part in intestine divisions, but to encourage all classes to exert themselves for the union and independence of their country. religious office of the Pope, early recollections and habits of thought, disposed him to revere. He was aware that, if to some it appeared to be a fabric of superstition, it was to many a temple of refuge and a shrine of consolation. His mind could not entertain the absurd desire of compelling disbelief any more than belief in matters of conscience. So that, while the directory were denying the Pope his title, calling him the prince of Rome, and while some of his generals applied still less respectful terms to the Romish hierarchy (12), Bonaparte's language and deportment toward the head of the Catholic church, were uniformly decorous and respectful. This superiority to the force of prejudice, marking him out among the characters of his country and his age, cahanced the dignity of his reputation and the influence of his opinions.

During the conferences with Azara, it occurred to the vigilant

mind of Bonsparte, that while he was employed on the south side of the Po, and his generals were engaged in blockading Mantua and occupying the line of the Adige, the Austrians on the upper Rhine, might send a force through Swabia and the country of the Grisons to penetrate into Lombardy, and steal a march upon Milan. In consequence, he ordered adjutant general Leclerc to repair to Coire, the capital of the Grisons. Thence, after consulting with the French minister Comeyras, he was to proceed as far as the frontier of Swabia, to assure himself of the probable intentions of the enemy, of the positions they would be likely to take should they traverse the mountains in that region, and the disposition with which they would be regarded by the inhabitants The report of Leclerc on all these points was highly natisfactory; and this simple measure of precaution enabled Bonaparte through est, the campaign, to dispense with the employment of any other rce in that direction, than a small post of observation on the lake A Leco (13).

The object of his invasion of the Roman states being accomplished, he took leave of the Bolognese, and hastening across the Appennines, rejoined the column of Vaubois on the 26th at Pistoia. With a view of evincing his respect for the clergy, without discouraging the popular impulse towards political freedom, which was making itself sensible in this part of Italy, he took up his quarters at the house of the bishop, who was remarkable among his brethren for entertaining liberal opinions. Here he was waited on by the Neapolitan minister Belmont Pignatelli, with the agreeable intelligence that the King of Naples had ratified the armistice, and that orders had been given to separate the corps of cavalry from the Austrian army and to quarter it around Brescia.

Upon the first appearance of a French division on his frontier, the grand duke of Tuscany had sent his prime minister Manfredini, to Bologna, to represent to Bonaparte that he had refused a passage through his dutchy to the troops of the King of Naples, and that it would be the height of injustice, were the French to violate a neutrality, which, when asserted for their benefit, the allies had respected. In answer to this communication, which overlooked the difference between the two cases, Bonaparte despatched his aide de camp Marmont with a letter to the grandinke, in which he promised that no part of his troops should pass through Florence; but left uncorrected the impression of the prince,

that the column of Vaubois was on its march for Rome. On the 27th, Marmont having rejoined headquarters with a notification, that provided the troops did not take Florence in their route, no objection would be made to their passage through Tuscany, Murat was put in motion with the vanguard, which being closely followed by Vaubois with two battalions of the 75th, crossed the Arno at Fusecchio, as if pursuing the Sienna route to Rome. The next morning, however, turning suddenly to the right, the column, after a rapid march of eight hours, entered Leghorn without opposition.

Before leaving Pistoia, Bonaparte sent Marmont to Florence with a second letter to the Grand Duke, in which, as it was now too late to obstruct his movement, he stated explicitly its direction and purpose; complaining, on the part of his government, that the flag of France and the rights of French citizens had been repeatedly violated and insulted by the commanders of British cruisers in the port of Leghorn; and alleging that the Tuscan minister at Paris, having confessed the inability of his master to prevent these outrages, or in other words to maintain his neutrality, he had received orders from the directory to supply the deficiency of force felt by the grand duke. In conclusion, he gave notice, that the column of general Vaubois would enter Leghorn in the course of the next day, and assured the grand duke that his fachis garrison, his subjects, and their property, should be respected. Having then directed the second brigade of the division, to wait for further orders at Pistoia, he followed the march of the first, and overtook Vaubois at the gates of Leghorn.

Notwithstanding the suddenness and celerity of the movement, a number of British merchantmen and a frigate, had time to make sail and escape from the harbour, the frigate carrying off two French prizes of great value, which she had just taken under the guns of the Tuscan forts. As the governor, Spannocchi was held responsible for this forfeiture of neutrality, and was accused by the French consul and residents of other hostile acts, Bonaparte had him arrested immediately, and conducted to Florence under a military escort, representing his malpractices in a letter to the grand duke, and expressing a hope that he would be duly punished.

Although the English ships escaped, the English merchants sufferred heavy losses. Their flourishing factory was destroyed, and their property to such an amount confiscated that, after the numerous, and in some instances probably, fraudulent reclamations made by merchants of Genoa and Marseilles, were satisfied, and various other losses incident to transactions of the kind were incarred, it yielded twelve millions of francs. Property belonging to the subjects of other powers at war with France, was subjected to the same process; an understanding being entered into with the Neapolitan Consul, that the sequestration laid on the merchandise of his countrymen should be taken off, provided the armistice of Brescia was followed by peace. General Vaubois was appointed military governor of the town, and was put in possession of the forts which sarrounded the harbour. Bonaparte gave him written instructions, in which he was directed to favour the commerce of minutals, particularly that under the Spanish flag; to conciliate to the utmost of his ability, the officers and subjects of the grand hite; to collect and report all the intelligence that could be obtained from Corsica; between which island and the Tuscan coast, heammunication was kept up by the Corsican refugees, whom Benaparte, a month before, had caused to be furnished with arms and money.

Besides excluding the British flag from Leghorn, and preparing the way for a successful invasion of Corsica, a great advantage which resulted to the French from this expedition was that it completely frustrated the descent which it was understood the viceroy of Corsica proposed making at that port, with a view of marching into the valley of the Po, and cooperating with the forces of Austria and the Pope. Its justice, as far as Bonaparte was concerned, was not doubtful, inasmuch as the conduct he pursued, was commanded by the instructions of the directory, and sanctioned by their approval. It is not so certain, however, that on their part this extreme measure of redress was justifiable. That some abuses of the neutrality of Tuscany at the expense of the rights of France had been committed at Leghorn by commanders of English cruisers was probably true, and there was reason to believe they were connived at by the governor. But the general conduct of the grand duke, under his treaty with France, had been marked, it was admitted, by good faith; and good faith required that, before the French government took into , wown hands the redress of the grievances complained of, an opportunity should be given to the grand duke, by a formal notification of their intention, of removing, if in his power, the occasion for so painful a trespass on his independence. But this mode of proceeding, though just, might not have been politic; and consequently the directors, who assured Bonaparte "that the English established at Leghorn should be treated like inhabitants of London," instructed him expressly to conceal the object of his march into Tuscany, until it would be too late for the grand duke to oppose its execution or prevent its success. Whatever may have been the feeling of this prince, in the unpleasant crisis to which the affairs of his government were brought, he appears to have been so far restrained by his own prudence, or satisfied by the deportment of Bonaparte and the exact discipline of the French troops, that he made no further complaint or remonstrance.

Bonaparte's celerity in the despatch of affairs, answering to the necessary expedition of his movements, the evening after his entrance into Leghorn, he was able, in compliance with an invitation from the grand duke, to set off for Florence, the capital of a brother of that proud monarch, over whose armies he had already gained so many triumphs, and with which he was impatient again to contend. For the sake of visiting the Abbé Bonaparte, a relative of his father, he stopped for the night at San Miniato. only favour which the old ecclesiastic asked of his powerful kinsman, whom he entertained with affectionate hospitality, was to procure a saintship for a member of the family who had died in the odour of sanctity many years before, but for want of the necessary fee, had not yet been canonized. "The Pope," said he, "will not refuse if you ask it; though even, if it must be paid for, the price will be but a trifle for you." Bonaparte could only smile at the simplicity of the good old man, "who appeared," he said, " not to be aware that saints were no longer in vogne." On the 30th of June, the victorious general entered the city

On the 30th of June, the victorious general entered the city from which his ancestors had been banished, and in order to manifest his confidence in the honour of the grand duke, arrived without his escort, and accompanied by Berthier alone. Upon alighting at the hotel of the French minister, Miot, he was received with military honours by a battalion of the grand duke's guards, which had orders to attend him as a guard of honour. He dined with the grand duke, and was conducted by that prince through the famous gallery of Florence. His admiration was rivetted on the Grecian Venus; and, from the account he has left of the incident, it is to be inferred that when he was before at

Florence, his father either did not visit the gallery, or did not take his son along with him; an omission sufficiently remarkable under either aspect.

Not less attentive to the useful than the elegant, and led probably by a taste for anatomical studies, which, at a later period of his life, he seriously undertook, the French general, accompanied by the celebrated Fontana, passed into the anatomical gallery in order to view the admirable collection it contained of preparations in wax. Models of these he ordered for the purpose of sending them to Paris.

In conversing with the grand duke he mentioned the interview at San Miniato with his relative, for whom he obtained, in lieu of the favour which he desired from the Pope, the cordon of the ecclesiastical order of St. Stephen, of which at the time the abbé was but a knight.

It was at the table of the grand duke that Bonaparte received the despatch of general Despinois reporting the surrender of the tastle of Milan, which had capitulated at three o'clock the previous morning. The intelligence of his brother's loss could hardly have been agreeable to the Tuscan prince; but the event was not unexpected, and as it appeared to confirm the ascendancy of the French in Italy, it reflected additional advantage on his own peaceful relations with the republic, and his good understanding with her formidable commander (14).

The conduct of Despinois, his officers and men, was praised by Bonaparte, and the terms of the capitulation approved, more particularly, since besides adding two thousand five hundred to the number of Austrian prisoners, and five or six thousend to his force on the Adige, they placed at his disposal a hundred and fifty pieces of heavy artillery, and five thousand muskets; the former of which were greatly wanted before Mantua, and the latter to supply the wear and tear of the campaign, as well as to assist in arming the expedition which was about being fitted out against Corsica. ensure a sufficient stock of small arms for his men, Bonaparte, on his way to Leghorn, demanded of the republic of Lucca, which previously to the conquest of Lombardy, had furnished a subsidy to Austria, a supply of six thousand muskets. The demand was complied with, and the muskets were in the act of being conveyed to Mantua; but it being found that they were not of a suitable calibre, he had them sent back. Before leaving Florence, he instructed general Despinois, after placing a small garrison and a few guns in the castle of Milan, to convey the whole of his heavy artillery to the camp of Serrurier, and with the troops under his command to join the army of Massena; a destination which he gave also to the brigade, which, under general Valette, had remained stationary at Pistoia.

On the 1st of July, Bonaparte returned to Bologna, where he was anxious, before crossing the Po, to establish his authority firmly, and to secure, under the new order of things created by the armistice with the pope, the preservation of public tranquillity. His vigilance was not misplaced, nor his presence unnecessary; for he found the inclination of a majority of the people for complete emancipation from political bondage to ecclesiastics so decided and impatient that a speedy reaction, attended with discreditable commotions, was to be apprehended. He exerted himself to subdue this intemperance, and employed much of his time in inculcating upon the leading citizens the prudence of restraining, rather than precipitating, the movement of the public mind toward sudden innovations and extreme changes. His character. his fame, his origin, gave force to the intrinsic value of his counsels, and encouraged the friends of order to hope that the French troops might be safely withdrawn from the legations. He therefore ordered Augereau to conduct his division, with exception of the small garrisons of Ancona and Ferrara, to the position assigned him on the lower Adige; and on the 3d of July, a month after his departure from Roverbello, he himself alighted at the beadquarters of Serrurier.

During this period, besides travelling at least four hundred miles, and negotiating two most important conventions, he had, without losing ground on the Adige, or the Mincio, reduced the castle of Milan, suppressed the insurrection of the imperial fiefs, reopened his communications with France, overawed Genoa, forced Urbino to surrender, taken possession of Bologna, Ferrara, Ancona, and Leghorn; detached two legations from Rome; separated the Neapolitan cavalry from the Austrian army; excluded the fleets of England from the ports of the Tuscan, Ionian, and Adriatic seas; conciliated, by personal attention, the grand duke of Tuscany, and provided a park of artillery for the siege of Mantua. In the same time, the cabinet of Vienna had not been able to transfer a corps of troops from the upper Rhine to the Adige.

But his departure from Bologna was speedily followed by disturbances in the legation of Ferrara. A monk arriving there from Trent, by way of committing a pious fraud, reported that the Austrians had passed the Adige in great force, raised the blockade of Mantua, and were pushing on rapidly to Bologna. To second the impression of this news, inflammatory handbills were circulated by the priests; and when Augereau was calling in his detachments in order to begin his march, a rabble amounting to fifteen thousand persons, actuated by fanatical rage, and miscalled by their chiefs the army of the Pope, drew together at Lugo, a considerable town on the river Senio. The bishop of Imola, in whose diocese Lugo was comprehended, endeavoured by persuasion to disperse this crowd, exhorting them "to render unto Cæsar the things that were Cæsar's," and to submit dutifully to the existing authorities. His precept, though enforced by the presence of his grand vicar at Lugo, was disregarded. Upon this, Augereau sent an officer with a detachment of horse and foot, requiring the leaders of the insurgents to dismiss their men and retire to their homes. The missionary of the bishop they had received without respect, but at the same time without injury; but the French officer they first invited to approach, and then fired upon, killing three of his men, and wounding five. thus intractable to counsel, Augereau found it necessary to make them feel his strength. Directing general Beyrand, whose brigade had been quartered at Forli, to move up towards Lugo, he joined that officer with a battalion of infantry, a squadron of horse, and two field pieces, and marched against the insurgents in front, while a detachment from Ferrara came upon them in the rear. Relying on their numbers, they rejected a second sumnons, which Augereau sent by Capelletti, the Spanish chargé d'affaires at Bologna. They were then attacked in front and rear, broken at the first shock, put to flight and pursued, with the loss of three hundred of their number. With this affair, the insurrection terminated; and Augereau renewed his march to the Adige (15).

CHAPTER XIII.

From the 3d to the 21st of July 1796.

Mantua blockaded—Massena's attack on the Austrian works—His success, and the satisfaction of Bonaparte—Sickness of the troops, and want of reenforcements — Bonaparte visits Verona, and Milan — Warlike preparations of Venice—Bonaparte occupies all the strong places on the Adiga —His confidence—He meets Josephine—Expedition to Corsica preparad—The count de Marsan—Bonaparte returns to Mantua—Failure of his attempt to surprise it—Opens trenches—His correspondence with Josephine —Goes to Castiglione—His correspondence with the directory—Affairs at Leghorn—Bonaparte's dissatisfaction—His letters to Vaubois and Garran—The Grisons—Bonaparte sends a minister to Rome—His suggestion to the directory—His order respecting the extortions of the army around Mantas—Figment of the aulic council.

From the time that four of the causeways issuing out of Martua were taken possession of by the besiegers, Serrurier, ince pable from the want of artillery of making a serious impression on the place, had contented himself with pressing it by a cloblockade. The month of June passed over without his being to do more than strengthen his posts by fieldworks, at eliquid points, and keep the Favorita and the citadel, under the subservation of an adequate force. At length the heavy artifrom Urbino and Milan began to arrive in successive consothat upon Bonaparte's return to Roverbello, he found the tof Serrurier almost prepared to commence the siege in His presence, it may be supposed, did not relax their spir slacken their exertions.

But as the army of observation was liable to be attacked by the fresh Austrian forces, it was important that he should inspect its positions; and, returned from a distant excursion, show himself again to the troops. Accordingly, after passing a night in the camp of Serrurier, he set out in the forenoon of the 4th of July for Roveredo; a town on the Adige, a short distance above the lake of Guarda, where Massena, after a successful assault on the enemy's lines, had posted his light brigade under general Jou-

The Austrians, with a view of closing the passes into the Tyrol against their enterprising enemies, and of defending Trent from a second insult, had constructed with great labour, and fortified with equal care, a line of intrenchments across the strip of mountainous land between the head of the lake of Guarda and the Adige. The fosse was deep, the rampart high, the commanding points crowned with artillery, and huge rocks suspended at other places. were ready to be precipitated on the assailants. Two Austrian regiments and four hundred Tyrolian riflemen defended this strong work, which, as the lake and the river flanked its extremities, they hoped to render impregnable. But Massena, desirous probably of proving that fortune had not changed sides, either because Bonaparte was absent or Wurmser had arrived, resolved upon the daring attempt of breaking through this barrier (1).

At ten o'clock in the morning of the 28th, general Joubert, at the head of four hundred carabiniers, supported by six hundred of the 4th light infantry, moved against the right of the Austrian line, and without firing a gun, passed the ditch, scaled the rampart, and drove the enemy from their work at the point of the bayonet, killing more than three hundred of them. So successful was the attack that, besides two hundred prisoners, Joubert took four hundred tents, with all the baggage, mules, and ammunition, of Lattermann's regiment. At the same time, lieutenant colonel Recco, with four companies of grenadiers, supported by the 11th light infantry, though he was ordered only to make a diversion, dislodged the Austrians from the left of their intrenchment, slew a hundred of their men, and took seventy. The loss of the French was very slight. Bonaparte was delighted with the result of this affair, and so much so with the spirit of the officers and men, that he reported the particular instances of their good conduct to the directory, with this observation, "Such is the result of the first action between the troops of the adverse armies, since the new general has taken command of the Austrians" (2).

Pleased with the situation of affairs in this quarter, he returned on the 6th to the army of the siege, where he found that a sortie of the garrison against the suburb of Pradella had been repulsed in the course of the morning. The same evening, he made a close reconnaissance of the town, and, during the night, having visited all the posts of the besiegers, he gave orders to the commanders of the several corps, to prepare for opening the trenches without a moment's delay. It appeared that the insalubrity of the season began to be felt by the troops, and that, out of Serrurier's seven thousand men, fifty fell sick daily of fever. In this state of things, the necessity of drawing assistance from the army of observation, became imperative, and he accordingly caused Massena to retire from the position he had so-gallantly carried, and to take up a line considerably in its rear, extending from Torre on the lake, to Rivalta on the river.

These facts he communicated to the directory, and urged upon them the expediency of sending forward at once the long promised reenforcements of ten battalions from the army of the ocean; assuring them that while his force, exclusive of the garrisons, which he was obliged to maintain in Piedmont, Lombardy, and at Leghorn, did not exceed forty thousand men, that of the Austrians already amounted to fifty seven thousand (3). So strong was his sense of deficiency on this point that, before leaving Bologna, he had obtained from the executive commissaries a requisition on General Kellermann for an immediate reenforcement of two regiments from the army of the Alps, suggesting that their place might be supplied by an equal number of the local militia, for the pay of which he offered a remittance of one hundred and fifty thousand francs; but the requisition was not complied with (4).

Under these circumstances, his anxiety to disembarrass himself of Mantua, where, while the enemy's relieving force, was constantly accumulating by reenforcements, his own besieging force was daily diminishing by sickness, became so strong that he adopted a plan for surprising the place; and, in order to prepare for its execution, directed Austrian uniforms to be got ready for the grenadiers, flat boats to be provided for their conveyance across the lake, and gun boats, with furnaces for heating shot, to

be equipped, by the 16th, the time he fixed on for the attempt. In the interval he determined to visit Verona and Milan; the first, for the purpose of examining its fortifications and the line of posts on the lower Adige, as well as to observe the approaches of the enemy, and to ascertain the value of intelligence, which imported that Venice was making active preparations for war; the second, with a view of promoting the change of political organization which the people of Lombardy were assuming, and of confirming the influence of his name and arms, to the end that, in the vicissitudes of the approaching contest, the rear of his army and his communications with France, might be free from disturbance. At Milan too he had a hope of meeting Josephine, from whom he had been separated since a very few days after their marriage.

Upon arriving at Verona, he soon found there was ample cause for apprehending hostile movements on the part of Venice. In the neighbouring villages, his soldiers had been assassinated by the peasants, and the Sclavonians in garrison in the citadel, had of late engaged in frequent brawls and conflicts with the French troops in the town. These indications of animosity, connected with the sudden activity which the senate had given to the recruiting service, in their Istrian and Dalmatian provinces, promised any thing but a continuance of peace between the two republics.

He remonstrated warmly with the Proveditore on the murder of his soldiers; and demanding the punishment of the assassins and the immediate removal of the Sclavonian garrison, announced his intention of comprehending the forts of Verona in his line of defence. He sent at the same time a courier to Venice, with a letter to the French minister, requiring him to demand of the senate the immediate discontinuance of their warlike preparations (5). Of these, intelligence had been conveyed to him through an indirect channel, at Bologna, which had occasioned his urging Lallement to be more active in obtaining information both as to the movement of the Austrians, and the intentions of Venice. The senate immediately repeated in writing, assurances of good faith, protesting that their levy of troops was solely a precaution for preserving tranquillity in the capital and the adjacent territory, the population of which was likely to be more or less agitated by the military conflict about to commence within their borders. To give colour to their professions, they transferred the Sclavonian gar-

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rison to Padua. This measure, with these explanations, satisfied the French minister; but Bonaparte, as the event showed with more reason, retained his impression that it was their design to take advantage of any reverse which he might sustain. He persisted therefore in his plan of occupying all the strong places on the Adige, and after visiting his posts below Verona, and reconnoietring the country in front, he reported to the directory the result of his observations, and the dispositions of his troops, in the following letter of the 12th of July. "General Sauret, with three thousand men, defends the country from Salo, on the lake of Guarda to the lake of Iseo. General Massena, with twelve thousand, defends a line from Torre on the lake of Guarda, to Rivalta on the Adige, and he defends the passage of the Adige from this last place to San Giovanni, three miles below Verona. The city of Verona is fortified with the artillery which was found in it. General Despinois, with five thousand men, holds the ground from San Giovanni to Ronco. General Augereau prolongs the line of defence from Ronco to Castanira, where there are sluices by means of which all the country below can be inundated. thousand cavalry and twelve pieces of light artillery, General Kilmaine is at Valeze, ready to fly to any point at which the enemy may attempt a passage. Porto Legnano, where there is a bridge over the Adige, is fortified with the Venetian artillery it contained. Independently of the bridges which we have at Porto Legnano and Verona, I am causing one of boats to be constructed opposite the Chiusa, and strong batteries erected to cover it. By means of these three passages, the army will be able to cross the Adige rapidly, and assume the defensive or offensive at the first movement of the enemy. His advanced posts are at Alla and Malsesena, and he is now pushing columns of considerable force down behind the Brenta. At Bassano there are nearly eight thousand men. In these relative positions we have been observing each other for several days. Woe be to him, who shall calculate falsely !"

Errors of calculation it is evident he was not apprehensive of falling into, for he observes in the same letter—" In the course of a fortnight, our situation in Italy will be so decided that I shall be able to execute without difficulty, from point to point, whatever directions you may give me respecting Genoa and Venice. This latter republic," he adds, "is arming strenuously, but I am master of all her strong places on the Adige." Thus confident was he of

success against the overwhelming odds and dangerous combinations of open and secret foes, at the very time that Wurmser, meditating his destruction, was sending emissaries into Mantua, with assurances to the governor of speedy relief (6).

From Verona he hastened to Milan, where he had the gratification of meeting Josephine, who had arrived there from Paris, escorted by his aide de camp Junot. Armed with all the powers of pleasing, which enchanting manners and a benevolent heart confer on a beautiful woman, there can be no doubt that her presence in the capital of Lombardy, contributed to refine and corroborate the impression, which the fame and genius of her husband had stamped on the minds of the inhabitants.

He ordered generals Gentili, Casalta, and Cervoni, all natives of Corsica, to repair to Leghorn, and to conduct to that port all Corsican refugees within the districts of Lombardy which they commanded; and he directed the proper officers at Leghorn to prepare every thing requisite for the expedition, and to spare neither pains nor expense in facilitating its success. The enthusiastic solicitude with which he expressed himself in reference to this enterprise, had its source, no doubt, in his attachment to the land of his fathers and the place of his birth. In answering the letter of Bonelli, a Corsican officer, who had succeeded in landing in the island with a few men, he said-"I have received your letter of the 22nd of June, from Bocognano. I congratulate you on your arrival in Corsica. I have given orders to all the refugees to get ready to go over, and put themselves at the head of the brave patriots of Corsica, shake off the English yoke, and recover their liberty, the perpetual object of solicitude to our compatriots.

"What glory it will be to them, if they can alone drive the proud English from their country!" Then reverting to his invariable and liberal rule of political action, he tells Bonelli—"I advise you not to yield to any spirit of party whatever. Let all the past be forgotten, with exception of the conduct of a few of the principal traitors, who led that brave people astray" (7).

By the treaty of Paris in which he had ceded some, and agreed to demolish others of his strong places in Piedmont, the King of Sardinia had placed himself completely at the mercy of France. It was in consequence a great object with this prince, to preserve a good understanding with the French general; which induced

him, besides keeping a regular chargé d'affaires at Milan, to send frequently to headquarters, the Count de Saint Marsan, who on this occasion met Bonaparte at Milan. He was about his own age, of enlightened mind, independent in his sentiments, and strongly averse to the reestablishment of Austria, in Italy. He appears to have made himself extremely acceptable to Bonaparte, while he served with faithful zeal the interests of his master, who not unfrequently required the support of his conqueror against his own subjects (8).

Faipoult, the French minister at Genoa, in a long despatch of the 24th of June, had endeavoured to convince Bonaparte that, in order to secure the flag and the commerce of France, in the Genoese ports, from aggression and insult, instances of which had recently occurred in the gulf of Spezzia, he ought to march on the city at the head of fifteen or eighteen thousand men, exact a contribution of six or eight millions of francs, by way of indemnification; insist on the exclusion of British vessels from the ports of the republic, and enforce the banishment of fifty citizens whose enmity to France predominated in the senate. From his answer to these suggestions, which is dated the 13th of July, a conception may be formed of the importance he attached to the reduction of Mantue, of the complication of affairs which in the heat of war, he had to manage, of the close reciprocal dependence which subsisted between his military and diplomatic duties, and of the tact with which he conducted the latter. "The time for Genoa has not yet come, for two reasons; -1st. Because the Austrians are getting reenforcements and we shall soon have a battle. If I gain it I shall have Mantua, and then a simple express to Genoa, will be worth as much as the presence of an army. 2nd. The notions of the executive directory respecting Genoa do not appear to be as yet fixed.

"They have, it is true, ordered me to exact the contribution, but they have not authorized me to adopt any political measure. I have sent them your letter by an extraordinary courier, and have applied for orders, which I shall receive in a fortnight. Until then forget all subjects of complaint against Genoa."

On the 16th, Bonaparte returned to Mantua, where at 3 o'clock in the morning the besiegers had repelled a powerful sally of the garrison. While a party of fifteen hundred men attacked the suburb of Cerese, Wukassowich, with a column of three thousand, moved silently against the Pradella. The French outposts falling back before so strong a force, he got within pistol shot of the batteries which he proposed to destroy. But Dupas, one of the heroes of Lodi, received him with the fifth battalion of grenadiers, and held him at bay until Generals Fiorella and Dallemagne brought up the covering parties. The Austrians were then attacked on both points, and after a contest of two hours, driven back into Mantua with a loss exceeding five hundred men. That of the French was estimated at two hundred.

The time fixed on for attempting the surprise having now come round, eight hundred grenadiers, dressed in the fashion of the Austrian uniform, were embarked during the night of the 16th in time to land at 2 o'clock in the morning, under the battery of the bastion of the palace; where they were to seize the postern gate, and let down the drawbridge in the causeway of St. George, so as to afford an entrance into the town for a column of the besiegers. To improve the chance of success, colonel Lahoz, a native of Mantua, was placed at the head of this column, and was accompanied by several Italians, who joined in the effort to expel the Austrians from their country. But fortune sports with the designs of men; and as Bonaparte had written to the directory, in announcing his intention of attempting a surprise—"The best formed projects of this sort, are at the mercy of a dog or a goose."

On this occasion, it happened that the Po fell that day about three feet, which caused the waters of the Mincio to subside, so that the boats grounding in the midst of the lake, were obliged on the approach of light, to be run with their warlike freight into the reeds, in order to conceal them from the garrison. Here they remained the whole day, hopes being entertained that, on the succeeding night they might have a rise of water and better fortune. But the Po continued to fall, and the Mincio consequently to subside, so that the attempt was abandoned, and as soon as it was dark, the boats were withdrawn (9).

As the only resource now left to the beseigers, was to try the effect of hard fighting and heavy metal, preparations for an attack were immediately made with a view of opening trenches on the island of Mantua, and as close as possible to the walls of the town. On the 18th, Berthier, by order of Bonaparte, sent a summons to the governor; who returned for answer that he would defend the place to the last extremity. At eleven o'clock the same night, two

columns, each two thousand strong, embarked from the suburb of Pietoli, under the conduct, one of Murat, the other of Dallemagne; the former destined to assail the right, and the latter the left, of the intrenched camp which the garrison held on the island. To favour this bold operation, Andreossi, with a squadron of gunboats, was to cannonade the opposite side of the place, in order to divert the attention of the besieged. Batteries for firing red hot shot and shells, which had been erected at the Pradella and the suburb of St. George, were to bombard the town, while one in front of the Favorita, was to play upon the citadel, and prevent any communication between that post and Mantua.

The lake being narrow at Pietoli, and the troops keen for the conflict, Murat and Dallemagne were not long in effecting the passage, nor slow in executing the duty assigned to them. They forced the enemy's intrenchments, took their camp, and drove Roccavina, with his five battalions, at the point of the bayonst, into the body of the place. Thus the physical obstacles to a regular siege being surmounted, colonel Chasseloup, the chief engineer, traced out a line of trenches under discharges of grape shot, and before day ground was broken. The bombardness continued, and proved to be ruinous; the custom house, the palace Coloredo, and a number of the principal edifices, being consumed by the time it was day; and the consternation of the garrison and the inhabitants was so great that, but for Wurmeer's promise of relief, Mantua would probably have been thus early surrendered.

As soon as day light enabled the governor to see the exposed situation of the assailants, he ordered a powerful sortie to be made, and to favour it, redoubled the fire from his ramparts. The sallying party came out and approached the French rapidly; but the grenadiers throwing themselves into ditches and ravines, behind hedges and hillocks waited for them steadily, without firing a shot or uttering a shout. This stern silence, more awful than a sharp fire, intimidated the Austrians, forced them to retire, and gave the besiegers possession of the ground. The next night, the trench was finished, and on the succeeding one, armed with heavy cannon, which opened point blank against the walls.

From the works before Mantua, Bonaparte despatched frequent letters to his wife, which besides confirming in a singular manner the fidelity of his public reports, and the accuracy of his posthumous statements, are remarkable for shewing how completely his heart was divided between love and glory; subjects of tenderness and war, passing in alternate succession, down the rapid current of his thoughts. The morning after the failure of his attempted surprise, his letter to Josephine was as follows;—

"I have passed the whole night under arms. I should have taken Mantua by a bold and fortunate stroke, had not the waters of the lake fallen suddenly, so that my column, which was embarked, could not reach the destined point. I shall make an attempt this evening in a different manner, but it does not promise so satisfactory a result.

"I have just received a letter from Eugene, which I send you. I beg you to write in my name to these dear children, and to send them some jewels for me. Tell them I love them as if they were my own. Whatever is yours or mine, is so confounded in my heart, that there is no distinction. I am extremely anxious to know how you are, and what you are doing. I was in the village of Virgil, on the bank of the lake, and in the moon's silver light; but not an instant without thinking of Josephine.

"The enemy made a general sally on the 16th. He killed and wounded two hundred men for us, but was forced to retreat precipitately with the loss of five hundred.

"I am well, devoted to Josephine, and incapable of pleasure or happiness but in her society.

"Three Neapolitan regiments have arrived at Brescia. They have separated from the Austrian army, in consequence of the convention I concluded with M. Pignatelli.

"I have lost my snuffbox. I beg you to choose another for me, a little flat, and to put a pretty inscription on it, with a lock of your hair."

The day after the bombardment he wrote to her again.

"Two days are past without my getting letters from you. Thirty times to day have I made this observation. You know how sad a circumstance it is; for you cannot doubt of the tender and engrossing solicitude, with which you inspire me.

"We attacked Mantua yesterday. We bombarded it from two batteries with red hot shot and shells. All night the unfortunate town was in flames; the spectacle was dreadful and imposing. We have taken several of the outworks, and to night we are to open the trenches. To morrow I go with the headquarters to Castiglione; where I shall pass the night.

"I have received a courier from Paris; there were two letters for you; I have read them. Notwithstanding that this seems quite natural, and that you gave me permission to do so the other day, I am fearful it may displease you; and that afflicts me very much. I would have wished to reseal them—fie! that would be abominable. If I am guilty, I beg pardon. I swear to you it was not from jealousy; no indeed; I have too high an opinion of my adorable friend for that. I wish you would give me full permission to read all your letters; then there would be no more remorse nor apprehension.

"Achille has come post from Milan. Not a letter from my adorable friend—adieu my only joy. When can you come and join me? I will come to Milan for you myself. A thousand kisses as ardent as my soul, as pure as thou.

"I have had the courier called. He says he saw you and you told him you had no commands. For shame! wicked, ugly, cruel, tyrannical, pretty little monster that you are! You laugh at my threats and my folly. Ah! if I could shut you up in my heart, you know I would there imprison you. Let me hear that you are gay, that you are well, and that you love me."

In a letter of three days' later date from Castiglione, after mentioning his distress at being unable to repeat his visit to her at Milan, he urges her to meet him at Brescia, and proceeds to regulate the journey of his wife by the march of his troops, the two objects most dear to him. "Travel by short stages, and during the cool of the day, so as not to fatigue yourself. The troops take only three days to come to Brescia."

Altogether, it may be observed that his letters to Josephine at this period, express a rapture of feeling in perfect harmony with the fire of his military spirit, and the generous sensibility of his character. Relieved by occasional touches of gaiety, they often breathe the deep passion and burning tenderness of Rousseau (10).

It would appear notwithstanding that the ardour and devotion of the youthful victor did not melt Josephine into a forgetfulness of her recent conquest; nor induce her to remit, in the least, its pride. In answering his letter of the 19th, she reprimanded him for opening letters addressed to herself; and with

her slight and graceful hand, forbad the chief, who was scattering armies and overawing states, from venturing thenceforward a glance at his wife's correspondence. He was as submissive as she was imperious. "As to your letters, which you are vexed at my opening, the enclosed shall be the last. Your letter was not received when I unsealed it."

On the other hand, the disposition to jealousy, and the amiable facility of character, which Josephine through life discovered, were already beginning to disclose themselves; the latter quality in a manner that was agreeable probably, neither to the sensitive violence of her husband's love, nor to the inaccessible dignity of his disinterestedness. In this same letter of the 22nd of July, after quieting her alarms in relation to a certain Madame Te—, he tells her: "Be sure to return to adjutant general Miollis the box of medals which he writes me, he has sent you. Men are so apt to slander, and are so mischievous, that it is necessary to be guarded on all points."

The siege of Mantua being now converted into an ordinary affair of military art, Bonaparte confided its immediate direction to the prudence of Serrurier, and the skill of the engineer and artillery officers under his command, and on the 20th transferred his headquarters to the neighbouring village of Castiglione, where, in case the Austrians should burst forth from the Tyrol, he would be at hand to receive them, before they could disturb the siege. His field of battle was probably to be, either between Verona and the Mincio, or the Mincio and Brescia, accordingly as the enemy should come down the east or the west side of the lake of Guarda. The intelligence from the outposts of Massena was so threatening that he soon found himself obliged to relinquish the intention he had indulged of paying Josephine a second visit at Milan. On the 21st he wrote to her, "I shall set off to night for Peschiera, the mountains of --- (and) Verona, whence I shall go to Mantua and perhaps to Milan, to receive one kiss from you, since you assure me they are not frozen." But the next day he was still at Castiglione; and, in a letter to his wife, said: "The exigencies of the service require my presence in this neighbourhood. It is impossible for me to go to such a distance as Milan. It would require five or six days, during which, movements might take place in this quarter demanding my personal attention. You tell me your health is good; I beg

you therefore to come to Brescia. I am sending Murat there this moment, to provide such lodgings as will please you. I think you would do well to set off very late on the 24th from Milan, sleep at Cassano, and arrive at Brescia on the 25th, where the tenderest of lovers will await you." In compliance with this invitation, Josephine joined him, and was present when the operations against Wurmser commenced.

During the week he remained at Castiglione, pressing to a conclusion on one side the seige of Mantua, and preparing on the other to meet the irruption of Wurmser, his correspondence with the directory was continued with a circumstantial minuteness and an earnest attention, which exemplify the enviable faculty he possessed, of concentrating at will the force of his intellect on any given object. His letters refer to almost every state in Italy, and to most of the subjects which had been confided to his superintendence; and the clearness and tranquillity of mind that they exhibit, when contrasted with the absorbing fury of the struggle on the brink of which he stood, resemble the stillness and splendour of those summer noons, which, in the happy climates of the south, are followed by evenings of tempest, of thunder, and of floods.

Upon the conclusion of the armistice of Bologna, the two commissaries, whose inconvenient cooperation has been mentioned, returned to Milan; whence Garrau soon after betook himself to Leghorn, as to a theatre upon which he might exhibit the full extent of his authority. Arrived there, his interference gave rise to proceedings vexatious to the inhabitants and extremely disagreeable to Bonaparte. They are thus referred to in a letter to the directory of the 20th of July: "You will receive herein extracts of two letters from general Vaubois. Our agents conduct themselves harshly towards the merchants of Leghorn, and treat them with a rigour which it was not your intention should be observed even toward English merchants. This alarms the commercial people of Italy, makes us pass in their eyes for Vandals, and has completely alienated from us the merchants of Genoa; that the mass of the population of that city, which has hitherte always been favorable to us, is now decisively against us.

"If our mode of administration at Leghorn is detestable, our political proceedings toward Tuscany are not better. I was perticularly careful to refrain from making any kind of proclamation there; and I expressly ordered that no function of government

hould be openly exercised. You will see by the enclosed prolamation, the consideration which has been shewn for my views of policy, and the little respect that has been paid to my orders. The act of driving the emigrants from Leghorn and a district of wenty leagues around it, is as useless as impolitic. There are very few emigrants at Leghorn, and of these the Grand Duke himself has ordered the departure. It would have been much he more simple course, to cause three or four to be arrested by the authorities of the country, for disobedience to his order; then he few remaining would have escaped of their own accord. This proclamation, by which juridiction over twenty leagues of country is arrogated, has a very bad effect, unless (which is in direct opposition to your instructions) you wish to assume the tone, and adopt the politics, of ancient Rome."

In addition to this letter of complaint to the government, he wrote on the same day one of reprimand to general Vaubois for having consented to issue this offensive proclamation; and another of reproof to the commissary Garrau, for having required it. His letter to the general, remarkable for conclusive good-sense and manliness of sentiment, contains the following observations: "I am far from being satisfied, general, with your proclamation. The executive commissary had no right to require it of you; and in the important post confided to you, an officer is as culpable if he obeys persons having no right to command him, as if he disobeys those who have. From the spirit of my instructions, as well as from all I said to you at Leghorn, you ought to have known that I should not approve of your proclamation.

"It is the intention of the government to refrain from doing the slightest harm to the Leghorn merchants, or to any other subjects of the Grand Duke. While we support the interests of our own country, we ought to be generous and just. The vexations with which the commerce of Leghorn has been visited, have occasioned me as much distress as surprise."

Yet the author of this letter has been called cruel and rapacious, during his command in Italy (11).

To the meddlesome commissary he wrote in terms of reproach, instruction, irony, and defiance.

"The requisition you have made citizen, commissary, on general Vaubois, is contrary to the instructions given to me by the govern-

ment. I beg you to confine yourself henceforth within the limits of the authority assigned you by the executive directory; otherwise I shall be obliged to forbid, by an order to the army, all obedience to your requisitions. We all exist only by the law; he who wishes to exercise or usurp functions which the law does not grant him, is no republican.

"When you were a representative of the people, you possessed unlimited powers, and every body made it a point of duty to obey you. At present you are an executive commissary; vested with an important character no doubt, but your authority is restrained by positive regulations: to them confine yourself. I know very well you will declare that I am acting like Dumouriez. It is indeed evident that a general who has the presumption to command the army intrusted to him, and to give orders without a decree of the commissaries, must of course be a conspirator."

Cooled by this rebuke, the prurient arrogance of the commissary, ceased henceforward to show itself in the affairs of Italy. The distinction so broadly drawn in this letter, Bonaparte was peculiarly qualified to make, inasmuch as he had been two years before at the mercy of the deputies of the convention, while now he felt authorised to defy, and even to threaten, the commissaries of the executive.

With Piedmont, Parma, Modena, Tuscany, Rome, and Naples, all controversy seemed now to be settled, and accordingly on the 6th of July Bonaparte had written to the directory, "All our diplomatic affairs in Italy except those in Genoa and Venice are terminated. For Venice," he adds, "the moment is not favorable; we must first take Mantua, and beat Wurmser well." On the 20th of July he recapitulates his grievances, and his plans in relation to this republic, still postponing until the capture of Mantua, the adoption of coercive measures. This letter discloses a new subject of complaint against the commissaries.

"The gentlemen of the senate of Venice, wished to treat as as they did Charles VIII. They concluded that, like him, we would plunge down into the lower end of Italy; and that they might probably wait upon us as we returned.

"I immediately made myself master of the citadel of Verona, which I armed with their cannon; and, at the same time, I sent a courier to our minister at Venice, instructing him to enjoin upon the senate a cessation of their warlike preparations. You have seen

he notes on this subject, which I forwarded by my last courier. They have even now discontinued their arming. The republic of Venice has already furnished provisions for our army to the amount of three millions of francs. It is not the republic itself that furnished them, but a contractor who is paid secretly by the Venetian government. I agreed for this with the Proveditore general; stipulating however that, at a future day, the French government would reimburse the expense.

"This contractor called on me frequently for money; I put him off with promises, giving him positive orders to continue his supplies. He has since applied to the commissaries, who gave him a bill of exchange for three hundred thousand francs, to be paid out of the contributions of the Pope. Of all possible measures, this was the worst. In consequence of it, there is no inclination to furnish. By this bill of exchange for three hundred thousand francs, payable at the moment it is known we are to receive twenty-one millions, all hope of payment is destroyed, and at the same time an impression is created that, by importunity and a cessation of supplies, money can be drawn from us. So that I am now obliged to be vexed with the Providetore, to exaggerate the murders which have been committed on our troops, and to complain bitterly of their arming, which they did not do, at the time the Austrians were the strongest. In this way, I shall compel them to furnish me, in order to appease my resentment. This is the way these people must be dealt with. They will continue to furnish me, partly from inclination, partly from compulsion, until Mantua is taken; when I will declare openly that they must furnish me the contribution stated in your instructions, which will be easily enforced. I think it might be useful for you to express to the Venetian ambassador your surprise at their armed preparations, which, beyond all doubt, were intended against us. There is no government more treacherous and base than that of Venice."

As to Genoa, his plans had undergone a sudden change, in consequence of the prospect of a speedy reduction of Mantua. On the 6th of July, he informed the directory it was time to act decisively against that state, in conformity with the plan proposed by the minister Faipoult; and he applied for the requisite authority. But on the 13th, as he to Faipoult, he had come to the conclusion of waiting until Mantua was taken, "when

a simple express would be worth a whole army." With this state, however, he appears to have felt extremely unwilling to deal harshly, and accordingly we find he took an early occasion of recommending the negotiation of a treaty of alliance with her, as preferable to the exertion of force.

The government of the Grisons, a small confederacy in the north-eastern corner of Switzerland, had requested that Bonaparte would furnish them with the same quantity of wheat which they had been in the habit of obtaining every year from Lombardy. The French agent in the Grisons, Comeyras, came all the way to headquarters to support this demand, alleging that the directory had ordered it to be complied with. Bonaparte soon convinced him that the order referred to, was a mere anthority to satisfy or reject the application at his discretion; and showing the minister he was better acquainted with the subject than he himself was, declared that, if the government of the Grisons would demand the wheat, in virtue of the contract between them and the Austrian viceroy, he would furnish it, because in that case he would be entitled to the equivalent condition, which was the right to march troops through their territory. Comeyras had sense enough to abandon the ground he had taken; and acting under the directions of the general, secured the right of passage for the French army, and the supply of wheat for the Grisons.

While at Castiglione, and by authority from the directory, he despatched Monsieur Cacault to Rome, as minister of France near the Holy See, and furnished him with credentials, with a letter of recommendation to the Spanish envoy, and with instructions in detail relative to the execution of the armistice of Bolegna. His letter of the 21st of July accrediting this envoy, addressed "To his reverence the Cardinal Secretary of State," opened the relations of peace between the French republic and the head of the Catholic church, in these terms:—

"I have the honour, my lord, to depute to his holiness, cities Cacault, agent of the French Republic in Italy, in order that he may attend to the execution of the armistice concluded between the republic and his Holiness, under the mediation of the court of Spain. I beg you to have the goodness to receive him in this capacity."

The English viceroy Corsica, upon finding the French in possession of Leghorn, made a descent upon the island of Ella,

and placed a garrison in Porto Ferrajo. Foreseeing this operation, Miot the French minister at Florence, had urged the grand duke to provide against it, by augmenting his force in that island, a measure which the grand duke declined. Bonaparte, although he expressed great regret at the event, instructed Miot to refrain from menaces or even complaints, as they would merely excite the grand duke's resentment, and as he hoped, after recovering Corsica, to be able to drive the English from Elba. In a letter announcing this affair to the directory, he makes the following suggestions.

"In the actual situation of Italy we must avoid making new enemies, and must wait until the decision of the campaign, in order to take a resolution conformable to the true interests of the republic. You will then be sensible, no doubt, that it will never suit us to leave Tuscany in possession of a brother of the

It is probable that discontent at the English being permitted to occupy Porto Ferrajo, entered into the motives which dictated this advice in regard to the ultimate destination of Tuscany; although, as the grand duke was heir presumptive to the emperor, and the expulsion of Austria from Italy was the main object of the campaign, the measure Bonaparte recommended was one of obvious and almost necessary policy. So much was this the case that, before the directors received his despatch, being informed that the emperor was dangerously ill, they ordered Bonaparte to intercept the grand duke on his way to Vienna, in the event of his brother's demise, and to take military possession of Tuscany (12).

Thus this short pause in his active military duties, Bonaparte employed in communicating intelligence and advice to the directory, counteracting the blunders of their commissaries and ministers, and adjusting their relations with the different powers of Italy, some subdued into reluctant peace, others retained in restless neutrality. His promptness and versatility in conducting together these various affairs, and making them all concur to the success of his arms, may be compared to the skill and agility of an equestrian performer, riding several horses at once, vaulting from one to another, applying to this the curb, to that the lash, regulating the pace of each, and to the same goal, urging the swift course of all.

Since his return from Leghorn and Bologna, one subject connected with the army had given him great dissatisfaction; and this was that, during his absence, many acts of plunder and extortion had been committed in the country around Mantua. his efforts, from the commencement of the campaign, to repress by example, precept, and punishment, disorders of this kind, the reader is already acquainted. His proclamation at Cherasco. his rejection of Salicetti's overture at Milan, his declaration to the directory that their contribution counteracted the effects of his victories, his orders, and those of his generals on several occasions, place this virtue of his military character beyond question or controversy. The views of his government in relation to this subject, generally coincided with his own. In their original instructions of the 6th of March, the directors said, "The general will exert himself to maintain a severe discipline, and to save the inhabitants from the vexations and disasters which so often attend upon the scourge of war, and which good order and a vigilant administration can alone prevent."

In a despatch of the 28th of April they observe—"But in praising the courage and intrepidity of the army under your command, the directory is filled with bitter regret at seeing the laurels they have gathered stained by the disorders and pillage in which the troops have indulged. This disastrous situation of affairs, the excesses which sully the glory of the defenders of the republic, will probably have been repressed by the severe order which you issued, and which the imperious necessity under which you were placed, cannot fail to justify. And the directory hopes that henceforward the good conduct of the army will enable you, not only to report it to the government, but to revoke speedily the extraordinary powers which you have been obliged to confer on your generals of division."

When general Beaumont received the surrender of Cremons, he published an order, of which the following is an extract:—
"The government of France enjoins that the rights of person and property be respected. Any soldier who violates either shall suffer death." About the same time, general Dallemague issued an order authorizing the inhabitants to arrest and conduct to his headquarters for punishment all French soldiers who might be found committing any trespass whatever. In concurrence with these measures a notification was made to the people of the Cre-

mona district, by the municipal council of the town and the French general commanding there in concert, by which the inhabitants were directed to sell nothing to the French troops but for cash, and to refuse in their dealings assignats or other paper money. As a French officer and historian justly observes, "It was impossible to shew more respect for the rights and property of the inhabitants, or to be more careful in removing all occasions for complaint and discontent on their part" (13).

Upon Bonaparte's return to the camp of Serrurier, the people of the Mantuan district lost no time in appealing to his well known sense of justice and solicitude for good order, against the vexations and extortions to which, during his absence, they had been subjected. Their confidence in his integrity was not deceived, for he forthwith issued the following order, dated the 6th of July.

"The general in chief having been informed that various abuses have been committed, and that the good people of the dutchy of Mantua have been oppressed by infamous exactions, commands as follows:

"1st. There shall be held three assemblies, composed of one deputy from each commune in the dutchy; which assemblies chall meet on the 12th of this month. The first shall meet at Roverbello, and shall consist of deputies from the country between the Mincio, the Po, and the states of Venice; the second shall meet at Gouraque, and shall be composed of deputies from the other side of the Po; the third shall meet at Castiglione, and consist of deputies from the country between the Mincio, the Po, the district of Brescia, and Lombardy.

"2nd. Each deputy shall bring with him, 1st. The certificate of his appointment; 2nd. A list of the complaints which the inhabitants have to make against any individual of the army; 3d. A statement of the contributions in money which his commune has furnished, with the names of the persons to whom they have been paid; 4th. A statement of the contributions in provisions, and the names of the persons receiving them; 5th. A statement of the amount found in their public treasury; 6th. A statement of the impositions, direct and indirect, which have been laid on his commune, and of the balance thereof which remains due.

"3d. Each assembly shall have for president its oldest member, and shall meet in a place to be fixed upon by the municipal

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authorities of the town in which it is directed to convene.

"4th. Each assembly shall commission three of its members to repair to the general in chief, with the lists and statements above mentioned; immediately upon which the assemblies are to be Their existence is not to last more than twelve dissolved. hours.

"The general in chief forbids, under the severest penalties, the agents of the army, military commissaries, and the officers generally, from making any requisitions whatever, unless the same be signed by the intendant general."

The practical efficacy of this order, in bringing to light every abuse, and exposing to censure or punishment its author, no matter what might be his rank, is very remarkable, when it is considered that in most cases measures of this kind have the effect of concealing the abuses, and sheltering the culprits complained of. The prompt dissolution which he decreed to assemblies created by himself, is worthy of particular attention, as evincing the extreme apprehension under which this wonderful man always laboured at seeing power exercised by popular bodies.

By means of this just and energetic measure, he not only guarded the resources of the country, and maintained the discipline of the army, but must have laid a deep foundation of respect and influence in the hearts of the Italian people.

About this time, the Aulic council not having gained any real victories in Italy, circulated through the German journals, the account of a pretended one. The sorry fiction was thus alluded to by Bonaparte, in a letter to Carnot of the 6th of July:-"General Berthier is furious at the imaginary victory which the German gazetteers have made Beaulieu gain over us. For my part, I think these gentlemen have a right to comfort themselves in the only manner they can. Dreams have always been the consolation of the unfortunate."

CHAPTER XIV.

From the 21st of July to the 21st of August 1796.

The French armies on the Rhine—Influence of Bonaparte on their operations—Efforts of Austria, to form a new army in Italy—Strength of Wurmser's army—Comparative weakness of that of Bonaparte—Wurmser opens the campaign—His plan—Forces Joubert—Falls upon Massena—Progress of Quasdonowich—Plan of Bonaparte—He raises the siege of Mantua—Withdraws Massena and Augereau from the Adige—Moves against Quasdonowich—Combat of Lonato—Brescia retaken—Salo retaken—Battle of Lonato—Of Castiglione—Defeat and retreat of Wurmser—Activity and exposure of Bonaparte—Combat of Peschiera—Verona retaken—The Austrians driven back into the Tyrol—Reflections.

As early as the month of July the vigour and skill of Bonaparte, not only held in quiet or subjection the whole of Italy (the single fortress of Mantua excepted), but extended their influence to the distant theatre of the Rhine; where the interests of France, confided to older generals and numerous armies, were upheld and promoted by his exploits alone.

Upon leaving Paris to take command of his army, he was given to understand by the directory, that Jourdan and Moreau, at the head of one hundred and fifty thousand men, would open the campaign in the course of the month of April; and that consequently the enemy against whom he was to contend in Italy, if not weakened by draughts to repair the ravages of war on the Rhine, would at least receive no reenforcements from that quarter. But so different was the actual progress from the preconcerted course of the campaign, that Jourdan and Moreau

remained inactive in cantonments until the first of June; and commenced operations then, not with a view of seconding the movements of Bonaparte, or relieving him from the pressure of superior force, but because the Austrian cabinet, upon learning the submission of the court of Turin, had denounced the armistice on the Rhine, in the hope of effecting by a timely diversion, the rescue of Beaulieu from destruction, and Lombardy from conquest, and of compensating, by successes on that frontier, their unexpected and uninterrupted reverses in Italy. As for the promise of the directory, the unceremonious language in which they confess its violation, deserves to be cited as a rare example of official candour. In their despatch of the 18th of May, before they even apprehended that the Austrians would be the first to denounce the armistice on the Rhine, they declared to Bonaparte: "The moment in which the enemy shall detach a force from their armies on the Rhine, to oppose to our army in Italy, is the one we should choose for breaking the armistice."

But this was far from being the full extent to which Bonsparte's operations in Italy had affected the state of the war in Germany. The armistice was denounced on the 21st of May, and as by is terms a previous notice of ten days was required, hostilities were not to commence before the last day of May. At that precise epoch, notwithstanding the strength of the armies under Jourdan and Moreau, the Archduke Charles and Wurmser were opposed to them with a superiority in numbers of twenty-two thousand men, including an advantage in cavalry of more than two to cas; and the Austrian generals consequently meditated offensive operations. But in a very few days after the rupture of the armistice had been directed by the cabinet of Vienna, intelligence of the battle of Lodi, and of the capture of Milan, produced a complete revolution in their plans. It was no longer possible to save Lonbardy by movements however active or bold on the Rhine; and therefore an order was instantly despatched to marshal Wurmer. directing him to march with a corps of thirty thousand select troops to the relief of Mantua. At the same time, the archdul was instructed to confine himself to the defensive, and to allow the armistice to continue. But for this last object, the instructions were too late in reaching their destination.

As Jourdan was in possession of the bridges over the Rhine at Dusseldorff, Cologne, and Neuwied, while Moreau had no such

advantage, the first movement of the French was to be made by the former general, in order to divert the attention of the enemy from his colleague. Accordingly on the 1st of June general Kleber, with the left division of the army of the Sambre and Meuse. broke up from Dusseldorff, and passing the small rivers, the Wipper, the Agger, and the Sieg, attacked and defeated on the 4th at Altenkirchen the right wing of the archduke under the duke of Wirtemburg; and following up his success drove it across the Lahn. In order to support this operation, Jourdan with his centre crossed the Rhine at Cologne and Neuwied, and advanced upon Kleber's right to the Lahn; while general Marceau, with the remaining division, leaving his camp at Bingenfield, took post in front of Mayence to observe and keep in respect the corps of Austrians under general Mercantin. These operations had the effect which was desired; for the archduke, in order to strengthen his means of counteracting them, drew an entire division from the army on the upper Rhine. But, on the 15th of June, he defeated at Westlar, the extreme left of the French under general Lefebvre; and Jourdan, discouraged by this check and dissatisfied with his position, having his troops on a line perpendicular to a broad river and the enemy in superior force on his exposed flank, declined risking a general action, and commenced his retreat. greater part of his army, he effected this on the 18th at Cologne and Neuwied, his rear protected by a brigade under general Soult, and a series of brilliant charges executed by adjudant general Nev. With the left division, Kleber, upon whom Lefebvre had rallied, also retraced his steps, and after sustaining himself gallantly against a violent attack at Kirpen, on the 18th, returned to Dusseldorff without serious loss or disorder.

While these abortive operations of Jourdan were in progress, Moreau, who, in consequence of teh immense detachments to the right and left that had been drawn from the army opposed to him, had acquired a decided superiority of force, with the divisions of Desaix and St. Cyr gained an advantage over a corps of twenty thousand men, which had been posted by Wurmser at Franckenthal, on the left bank of the Rhine. On the 5th of June, this corps was dislodged and forced to take refuge in their intrenched camp, at the head of the bridge of Manheim. This inconsiderable success was not sufficient to counterbalance the failure or redeem the discredit of the republican arms on the lower Rhine,

and therefore the directory, determining to reverse their plan of operations on this frontier, ordered Moreau to assume the offensive by effecting the passage of the Rhine at Strasbourg. The execution of this order he commenced on the 24th of June, and, after a variety of skilful movements, established his entire force on the right bank of the river in the first week of July.

As soon as Moreau got in motion, the archduke Charles hastening to oppose him with the greater part of the force before which Jourdan had retreated, gave the signal for this officer to resume offensive movements in his turn. On the 29th of June, his divisions again passed the Rhine at Dusseldorff, Cologne, and Nieuwid; so that in the beginning of July, both the French armies on the German frontier, having gained in succession a superiority of force in consequence of Bonaparte's battles on the Po, had succeeded in passing the Rhine, and opening the campaign effectively. But it was now too late to reflect, by this operation, any advantage upon the army of Italy, for the Austrian force for the relief of Mantua, was already assembling in the Tyrol, and could not be recalled or weakened by a distant diversion at Strasburg or Cologne (1).

From the moment that Beaulieu was driven into the Alps, with the remains of his army, amounting to twenty-five thousand men, strenuous exertions had been made by the Imperial government, to collect an overwhelming force on the Italian frontier, not only by the detachment of thirty thousand regular troops from the upper Rhine, which has been mentioned, but by volunteers and The martial population of the Tyrolian provinces, recruits. attached by hereditary allegiance and the enjoyment of peculiar privileges, to the house of Austria, being appealed to by the archduchess Elisabeth, who held a court at Inspruck, furnished the first species of force in considerable numbers (2). To supply the last, the immense monarchy laboured through all its regions, and the men as fast as they were raised, were forwarded rapidly from every quarter to Trent. In consequence of these exertions, Wurmser, by the middle of July, found himself at the head of an army eighty thousand strong, furnished with all the means of war, and invigorated by the health of a mountain climate; so that, confident in his strength, he felt prepared to retrieve the emperor's possessions in Italy as rapidly as his predecessor had lost them. His headquarters were established at Trent as early as the 15th of

July, where his great strength, imposing attitude, and formidable preparations, exerted a powerful influence against the cause of France, upon the public mind in Lombardy and Venice. The disaffected repeated the old and sinister proverb, "Italy is the grave of the French;" and the well disposed expressed astonishment at the improvidence and ingratitude of the directory, in leaving an army so brave and meritorious, without reenforcements, and exposed to a contest against such fearful odds. Observations like these, circulating among the troops, were not likely to give encouragement to them or confidence to Bonaparte (3).

His army of observation still occupied a line from the lake of Iseo, to the sluices on the lower Adige. The division of Sauret, in position at Salo, was destined to guard the valley of the Chiese. and to cover Brescia. Massena had his headquarters at Bussolengo, his main body on the plateau of Rivoli, and his light brigade under Joubert, on Montebaldo and the Corona. Despinois, with the brigade of Dallemagne, occupied Verona and held its three bridges; and, with his other brigade, defended the Adige as far as Porto Legnano; where Augereau took up the line of defence, and continued it down the river to the sluices at Castinira. fort of Peschiera was garrisoned by four hundred men, commanded by general Guillaume, who with six armed galleys under post captain Lallemand, was prepared to assert the command of the lake. The cavalry was commanded by general Kilmaine, and the artillery by general Dommartin. These various corps gave a total of somewhat less than thirty two thousand men, to which the army of the siege being added his whole force which he could oppose to Wurmser was about forty thousand; while the garrison of Mantua raised the aggregate strength of the Austrians to at least ninety thousand. Confident and daring he was; but as he was neither rash nor desperate, he could not, at this moment, contemplate his position without serious apprehensions (4).

When he opened the campaign in April, the mountain passes, the rapid rivers of the maritime Alps, the neighbouring frontier of the Var, would, in case of a reverse, have afforded him refuge. Now however, with a more formidable superiority of numbers against him, he was in the midst of vast plains, at least a fort-night's march from the French frontier, and surrounded by a population of several millions, whose inconstant favour or secret aversion, a spark of disaster might kindle into a wide blaze of

hostility. Reenforcements he had solicited, until solicitation was hopeless, for except detachments from the army of the Alps to garrison the fortresses in Piedmont and Lombardy, and the forts of Leghorn, the reenforcements which reached him, had but little more than repaired his losses by sickness and the sword. His applications for succour in men, the directory had answered by promises which were not fulfilled, and by demands for aid in money which were complied with (5). Disease, that had weakened the army of the siege, began to affect the divisions, posted near the lake of Guarda, and the course of the Adige. Under these circumstances, justly as the French general confided in the gallantry of his officers and the courage of his troops, he could draw hopes of success only from a conscious reliance on his own genius.

On the 28th of July, Wurmser, after leaving a reserve of ten thousand men for the protection of the Tyrol, and dividing the mass of his force into three columns, put them in motion. centre, led by the marshal in person, and composed of thirty thousand men, was to move directly forward between the Adigs and the lake, and, dislodging in its progress the posts of the French on Montebaldo, the Corona, and the plateau of Rivoli, was to force its way to the gates of Mantua. On the marshal's left, general Davidowich with a column twenty thousand strong, was to descend the east bank of the Adige, pushing rapidly forward in light division as far as Verona; and with the other two, after passing the Adige at Dolce, was to cooperate with Wurmser the attack on Rivoli, where the greatest opposition was expected On his right, general Quasdonowich was in charge of another column of twenty thousand men. He was to pass down the valley of the Chiese, and throwing his force into three divisions, with one was to drive the French from Salo, with another to occupy Gavardo on the Chiese, with the third to take possession of Brescia; and then reuniting his corps, was to cut off Bonaparte's retreat to Milan, and come into connection with Wurmser in the neighbourhood of Mantua. This distribution of his force, which its immense superiority doubtless prompted and alone could anthorize, shewed that the object of the Austrian commander was not only to defeat, but to destroy his adversary.

The first blast of the storm struck upon Joubert, who, though enfeebled by sickness, had lost none of his resolution. At 3 o'clock in the morning of the 29th, he was assailed by the vanguard of Wurmser. He maintained his ground for several hours; but in the course of the afternoon, after a succession of combats, against numbers incessantly increasing, he was forced back upon Massena at Rivoli. Here a fresh, and more important, conflict arose. The Austrians, confident in their strength, and animated by the presence of their commander in chief, fought with uncommon spirit and pertinacity; but they were constantly repulsed, until night suspended their efforts. The French, having the advantage of ground, and the Austrians in numbers, the loss of the latter was severe; and Massena was so well satisfied with the issue of the struggle, that soon after it ceased, he offered, if Bonaparte would send him seven or eight thousand fresh troops, to retake the positions of Joubert the next day (6).

On the 28th, having received intelligence, that Wurmser was in motion, Bonaparte had hastened to Castelnovo, a small town midway between Peschiera and Verona. At this point, where he was in reach of the principal posts of his army of observation, and directly in front of that of the siege, he established his headquarters, watching the movements of his adversary, that he might determine in what manner to meet them. On the 29th, he passed on to Verona, where he found the light troops of Davidowich and the outposts of Despinois already engaged. No enemy, having appeared in front of Augereau, he sent orders to him to break up from the lower Adige and to conduct his division by a forced march to Roverbello, so as to be at hand to assist in covering the Returning to Castelnovo, he received during the night a succession of couriers, with intelligence that a division of the enemy had joined their light troops on the heights above Verona; that Joubert had been forced back upon Massena at Rivoli; that the fires of the enemy's bivouacs, extended completely across the land from the Adige to the lake of Guarda; and that, on the opposite side of the lake, three divisions had shewn themselves, one marching in the direction of Brescia, a second down the Chiese to Gayardo, and that the third, as early as three o'clock in the afternoon, had attacked general Sauret by surprise at Salo. day light, on the 30th, further intelligence came in, that Brescia was in possession of the enemy, who had taken the guards of the hospitals, all the sick, and the magazines. The upper route to Milan was thus intercepted, and the lower one by Cremona alone remained open. Information speedily followed, importing that general Sauret fearing he might be separated from the main army had retreated to Dezenzano, leaving general Guyeux with a battalion of the 15th light infantry, surrounded by the enemy, in an old chateau at Salo. It was soon added that the vanguard of the division which occupied Gavardo, a village intermediate between Salo and Brescia, had attempted to seize the bridge over the Chiese at San Marco, but had been repulsed by a party of light troops, charged with its defence.

These facts, while they unmasked the plan of Wurmser, revolved in the vigorous mind of Bonaparte, enabled him to unfold his own. The former, relying on his immense superiority of force, aimed to encompass his adversary, and pressing his outnumbered troops to a point near Mantua, there to overwhelm him: the latter, eyeing the danger as it approached, instead of inventing stratagems to avoid it, collected all his energy to repel it. Perceiving that, like Beaulieu at Montenotte, Wurmser had separated his columns, and that his right was disjoined from his centre, by the broad lake of Guarda, his calculation was that. although he had more than two to one against him, if he could attack each column separately, he might enter the lists on equal terms, and defeat them all in succession. Adopting this plan, upon Quasdonowich who, besides being farthest removed from support, menaced his rear, he resolved with all his disposable force to deal the first blow. But this project, even to be attempted, would require that the siege of Mantua should be raised at the farthest within twenty-four hours, since in this time, were the army of observation withdrawn, Wurmser might fall upon that of the siege; and that the various outposts and numerous cannon, which his troops had gained by gallantry and conquest, should be abandoned to the enemy. This sacrifice, when the citadel of Italy was on the point of surrendering (for the engineer reported, that it could not hold out longer than six hours) of more than a hundred and fifty guns, the trophies of war, was of a nature to be peculiarly painful to an artillery officer. But the energy of his mind and his confidence in the efficacy of the vast plan which he had formed, empowered Bonaparte to make the sacrifice without impeding his decision by a moment's hesitation. He despatched an order to Serrurier, commanding him to raise the siege instantly, and after spiking his cannon, burning his carriages, demolishing his platforms, burying his balls, and casting his powder into the

lake, to retire on the Cremona road behind the Oglio to Marcaria, and guarding vigilantly that route to Milan, to hold himself ready to act with the army in the field. Then, withdrawing the division of Despinois from Verona and the posts below it on the river, he directed it across the Mincio upon Lonato; and repairing in person to Dezenzano, ordered general Sauret, after a moment's reflection upon the importance of the object and the risk of separating his corps, to return immediately to Salo, and disengage general Guyeux (7). This brave officer, when he was relieved, had resisted with his small garrison, and without food or even water, a whole Austrian division, forty eight hours, repulsing five furious assaults. Just as the Austrians were making a sixth attack, Sauret came upon the ground, and falling on their flank, defeated them entirely, rescued Guyeux and his garrison, liberated general Rusca, who was wounded and a prisoner, and besides taking two colours and several guns, made two hundred prisoners (8).

When Bonaparte transferred his headquarters to Castelnovo, he was not aware that any part of Wurmser's force was coming down the west side of the lake of Guarda, or was likely soon to get into his rear; so that there appeared to be no objection to Josephine's accompanying him. She went with him to Verona, and witnessed from the ramparts the skirmishing on the heights above the town. On their return to Castelnovo, she saw the wounded from Massena's division brought in, and taking alarm, departed for Brescia and Milan. But already the road was intercepted by the Austrians, who had attacked Ponte San Marco, and were approaching Lonato. She hastened back to Castelnovo, when it was thought safest that she should cross the Po below Mantua. Overcome by terror and grief, she wept bitterly at parting with her husband; who tenderly embracing her, confident in the plan he had resolved on, and prophetically inspired by love and valour, exclaimed: "Wurmser shall pay dear for these tears, which he makes you shed." Her road led along the lake of Mantua, and so near to the town, that they fired on her party from the walls, and some of her escort were even wounded. vent first to Bologna, and passing the Appennines, retired to Lecca, pursued by rumours of Bonaparte's destruction, but sustained by a secret confidence in his genius and his fortune (9).

In the mean time, and before Dallemagne with the leading brigade of Despinois could reach his destination, the centre division of Quasdonowich had come down from the heights of Gavardo and taken possession of Lonato, with a view, after establishing a post there, of advancing to the Mincio, and forming a junction with This Bonaparte being determined to prevent, he or-Wurmser. dered Dallemagne on the 31st to take Lonato, instantly and at whatever price; and to give vigour to the attack, led the brigade of which the 32nd formed a part, in person. In his official report, the combat that followed is thus described: "General Dallemagne had not time to make the attack, for he was himself assailed. An obstinate conflict ensued, which was a long time undecided; but the 32nd was engaged, and I was satisfied. In the end, the enemy was completely defeated. He left six hundred on the field, and as many prisoners." The Austrians, thus discomfited, fell back to Gavardo, and were joined by their comrades, driven the same day from Salo by general Sauret; who, under some uncertainty respecting his orders, and again apprehensive of being cut of from the main army, abandoned Salo a second time, and retired with his whole division to Dezenzano.

While by these sudden marches and combats, Bonaparte, with the slender corps of Sauret and Dallemagne, interdicted from the valley of the Mincio, the column of Quasdonowich, Massena pertinaciously held his ground against the weight of Wurmser's masses at Rivoli. During the whole of the 30th, this post was made good against the increasing numbers and unabated violence, with which the Austrians assailed it. At night, Massena in conformity with orders, drew off his troops undisturbed from all his positions on the Adige, and falling back to Peschiera, passed the Mincio in the morning, and directed his march according to the general plan, upon the road to Brescia. At the same time, and under similar instructions, Augereau, who had promptly conducted his division to Roverbello, and had there been joined by the reserve under general Kilmaine, passed the Mincio at Borghetto and pursued also Thus with the exception of the garthe route toward Brescia. rison in Peschiera, the whole French army, in the forencon of the 31st, having abandoned the line of the Adige, was to the right of the Mincio; while Wurmser, with his centre and the column of Davidowich connected by the bridges of Dolce and Verona, held all the country on the left of that river, and was proceeding to give his hand to the governor of Mantua.

In his measured march to that important fortress, the Austrian

marshal posted the division of Bayalitch on the heights around Peschiera, in order to mask that place, and directed two others under Liptay upon Borghetto, with orders to seize the bridge, and open a communication with the column of Quasdonowich. These dispositions Bonaparte had anticipated, by causing Massena and Augereau, upon crossing the Mincio, to leave rear guards to dispute its passage. General Pigeon commanded that of Massena opposite Peschiera, and that of Augereau was at Borghetto under General Valette. Upon being forced, the former had orders to retire to Lonato, and the latter who had eighteen hundred men, to Castiglione, by a vigorous defence of which village, he was expected to hold back the apprehended advance of Wurmser from Mantua to Brescia.

With the residue of his force, the Austrian marshal moved on, secure in his strength, to the achievement of his grand object, the deliverance of Mantua; and his surprise was equal to his exultation, when upon arriving before the town on the 1st of August, he found no enemy. The empty trenches and deserted works, served to persuade him that his approach had sufficed to put the besiegers to flight; while the ruined batteries, burnt carriages, and spiked cannon, were naturally interpreted into signs of utter despair, instead of proofs of deliberate resolution. He made his entry into Mantua, to the sound of bells, the discharge of artillery, and with other circumstances of parade and triumph. He had performed his promise to the governor; in the course of three days, besides rescuing the citadel of Lombardy from imminent danger, he had taken an immense park of artillery. The rashest of his foes had yielded to his force, while the most prudent had not waited to feel it. It was therefore not surprising that the aged commander, observing the chief part of his task accomplished, should pause to enjoy his signal success, and the gratitude of his comrades whom it appeared to have delivered. Ordering a detachment to pursue Serrurier, who retired on the Cremona road as he approached on that from Verona, he halted in Mantua, and formally suspended his operations.

Bonaparte meanwhile had determined, after driving the Austrians from Lonato and Salo, to dislodge them from Brescia, so as to complete the dispersion of their right column, and reopen his direct communication with Milan. Accordingly he ordered Massena, after reaching Lonato, to push on along the

main road by Ponte San Marco, and marching all night, to arrive at Brescia early on the morning of the 1st of August. He then joined Augereau at Castiglione, and leading his division, with exception of the rear guard under Valette, by a less frequented route, in the same direction, at ten o'clock in the morning entered Brescia. But Quasdonowich, being informed that the French were approaching from various points, had already abandoned Brescia, and with such precipitation, that he left the magazines untouched, and his prisoners unparoled. Detachments were forthwith sent in pursuit of him, one under general Despinois up the valley of the Chiese to Gavardo, the other under adjutant general Herbin, along the ridge leading to the heights of St. Ozetto.

By these operations the storm was suspended, but not dispelled. Quasdonowich was disconcerted and driven back, but he had in a great measure evaded the blow aimed at him; was not yet materially weakened, and being supported by the weight and proximity of Wurmser, who was powerful and triumphant, might be expected soon to reorganise his column and resume offensive movements. But this interval, short as it was, might be employed against Wherefore Bonaparte, although he might now have Wurmser. withdrawn his army in safety behind the Adda, or even beyond the Po, gave instant orders for the countermarch of Massena and Augereau, the first to Ponte San Marco, and the second to Montechiaro, where they would be in positions to support their respective rearguards at Lonato and Castiglione, which, by this countermovement, were to become their vanguards. While his active lieutenants executed this order, he himself, extending his thoughts to the dangerous contingencies by which he was surrounded, halted for a moment at Brescia, to write the following letter to the commissary Salicetti, who was then at Milan. The careful zeal and prodigal devotion, with which, in this crisis of distraction and peril, he gave all his faculties to the cause of his country, will strike the attention of every reader.

"Fortune has appeared for a moment to be against us. So many events have passed in the last few days, and I have still so many occupations, that it is impossible for me to give you an exact account of them. But in a word, thanks to the victory of Lonato and to the vigorous measures I have adopted, things are beginning to take a more favourable turn. I have raised the siege of Mantua, and am here with my whole army. I shall embrace the first op-

portunity of bringing the enemy to action. It will decide the fate of Italy. Vanquished, I shall retire to the Adda; victorious, I shall not halt in the marshes around Mantua. Louis will give you verbally the details of our victories of Lonato and Salo. He will also inform you of my actual force, and of that of the enemy. Write to general Kellermann to detach to me by double marches, all his disposable troops. Make sure that the citadels of Milan, Tortona, Alexandria, and Pavia, are supplied with provisions. We are greatly fatigued here. Five of my horses have sunk under me. I cannot write to the directory. I charge you to acquaint them in a few words, with what I have said, and what Louis will say to you" (10).

This communication when received at Milan, revived in a great degree the confidence of the French and their friends; and as it proved that Bonaparte was still between Milan and the Austrians, kept in awe the partisans of the latter. Its substance being transmitted to the directory, served to inspire them with hope respecting an army which, after all its services, they seemed to have abandoned to fortune.

No resolution more gallant or more glorious was ever taken, than that with which the French general, disdaining the safety of an easy retreat, the support of various garrisons, the prospect of approaching succour, and reliance on eventual chances, now determined to throw himself across the path of Wurmser, and to bring the contest to an immediate decision. The divisions of Massena and Augereau, with the cavalry and light troops of Kilmaine, did not amount to twenty-four thousand men, while the enemy, strengthened by draughts from Mantua, could meet him with more than double that number. But he trusted that his march upon Brescia, accompanied by Serrurier's retreat from Mantua, would be mistaken for flight; and that Wurmser's divisions would pursue like the wounded Curiatii with unequal steps, and give him an opportunity of engaging them separately. In this sagacious conjecture he was not mistaken, and though several of his collateral efforts directed by his lieutenants failed; his principal operations, conducted by himself, were all successful.

After seeing Massena and Augereau posted on their destined ground on the evening of the 1st, he returned to Brescia in the course of the night, in order to push forward to their support in the approaching battle, every man who could leave the hospitals or be spared from the necessary guards. The following short letter, which he despatched to the directory, shews how little the energy of his purpose was affected either by the greatness of the Austrian force on one hand, or the neglect of his government on the other; and how willing he was to communicate to the directors, the confidence which he himself derived from the spirit "We have experienced some reverses, but victory of his troops. begins already to return to our standards. If the enemy surprised us at Salo, and was so fortunate as to take from us the Corona, we have since beaten him at Lonato, and retaken Salo. With this letter I send one of my aides de camp, who can report to you To-morrow I will forward a report of all verbally the details. that has happened in the last six days. You may rely on the courage and devotion of the army of Italy, and on our firm resolution to vanguish. It is in the difficulties of this crisis, that I have found occasion to admire the intrepidity, and the entire devotion to tional glory, with which the brave army of Italy is inspired " (11).

Returning to the positions of Massena and Augereau, he had the mortification to find that Salo had been injudiciously abandoned by general Sauret, and that Castiglione had been shamefully yielded by general Valette. The former post, which as it covered in some degree the left flank of Massena and annoyed that of Quasdonewich, he ordered the brave general Guyeux instantly to retake; and atoned for the loss of the latter, and for the shock which it co-casioned to the pride and courage of the army, by degrading Valette from command in the presence of his troops; not suffering for a moment either the error of one general or the baseness of the other, to relax his own activity or resolution.

During these various and rapid movements of the French general, the Austrian commander exulting in Mantua, was in momentary expectation of being joined by his right column, and of hearing that such of the flying French corps as had not been able to avoid an action, had been routed and dispersed. In the evening of the 1st of August however, a report reached him that Quasdonowich, after sustaining two defeats, had been driven back into the mountains, and that the French were still in possession of all the plain from the Mincio to Milan. He was forest to conclude therefore that, before Lombardy was recovered, would be necessary for him again to take the field. Accordingly, he sent orders to his divisions at Borghetto and Peschiera, to

pass the Mincio, and leaving a detachment to reduce the latter place, to march upon Lonato and Castiglione. A detachment from the garrison of Mantua he sent again in pursuit of Serrurier, and prepared to advance himself to Castiglione, with the intention of uniting his forces at that point; where, he trusted, by his presence and the weight of numbers, to overcome all opposition, as well to his junction with Quasdonowich, as to his march upon Milan. But as his confidence, which had been overweening, was now shaken, his decisions were not prompt, nor his movements expeditious.

General Pigeon, upon being forced to retire from the Mincio. fell back, according to his orders, to Lonato, where he was prepared to maintain himself as the vanguard of Massena, who was now in his rear at Ponte San Marco. In the same manner general Valette had retired to Castiglione, about an equal distance in front of Augereau. Here, upon being attacked in the aftersoon of the 2nd by an advanced party of Austrians, instead of resisting obstinately, as he was expected to do, this unfortunate officer fled in a panic upon the first impression of the enemy, with half his detachment, reporting, on his arrival at Augereau's beadquarters, that the rest of his men were taken. But these brave fellows, though deserted by their general, were true to their country and their own honour, and under the conduct of an inferior officer, effected a safe and orderly retreat to the position of Massena. By this pusillanimity of Valette, which as he was thought to have been a little shy, on the 29th of July, in defence of the Corona, it was impossible to pardon, or even to excuse, the Austrians got possession of this village, situated on the main road from Mantua to Brescia, and on an eminence, which commanded an extensive plain (12).

At daylight on the 3rd the two armies were in presence, three divisions of Austrians under Liptay and Bayalitch, being opposed to the two divisions of Massena and Augereau, and the cavalry under Kilmaine; for, as long as the Austrians had a large force at Mantua, Serrurier was of necessity kept at Marcaria, to prevent Milan being reached by the lower route. The French did not exceed twenty-four thousand, while the Austrians amounted to twenty-eight thousand, including a great superiority in cavalry, which, in that open country, was of moment. They had this additional advantage, that they were susceptible of immediate vol. 1.

support from Wurmser. To prevent the possible intrusion of Quasdonowich, Bonaparte, after detaching general Guyeux to Salo, had stationed general Sauret on the heights between that place and Dezenzano, with the remaining brigade of his small division, and with his front towards the valley of the Chiese.

Between the right and left of both armies, a considerable interval existed. Massena's main body was in front of Ponte Sau Marco, his advanced guard, under general Pigeon, being still in possession of Lonato. Without a similar advantage, Augereau was on the right at Montechiaro, where he was supported by a reserve of cavalry under Kilmaine, and strengthened by a battery of light artillery, under the aide de camp Marmont. It was Bonaparte's intention, while the disordered corps of Quasdonowich was occupied on the left by Despinois and Guyeux, and before Wurmser should come up from Mantua, on the right, that Massena should fall on the enemy at Lonato, and Augereau attack him at Castighone. Beating either wing of the Austrians, he hoped to destroy the other or both.

At Lonato his design was forestalled; for, by daylight on the morning of the 3d, that place was assailed by Bayalitch in great force, and carried in spite of a sharp resistance on the part of general Pigeon, who, after losing a number of his men and three pieces of light artillery, was surrounded and taken. Sensible of the danger at such a crisis of even a momentary reverse, Bonaparte put himself immediately at the head of the troops, formed the 18th and 32nd into a column of attack, and ordering the 15th dragoons to follow in support, a second time led a charge upon the village of Lonato. As he advanced against the enemy's contre, they extended their line in order to outflank him, and from a tendency in their right to gain a connection with Ouasdonowich. This imposing evolution might have disconcerted an ordinary assailant, but as it really weakened the point aimed at by Bonaparte, it assured his skilful glance of victory (13). Commanding 'F Massena to obviate it by throwing out light troops laterally, he directed his charge with increased confidence and impetuosity, full upon the Austrian centre, and at the first shock broke it irre-The 15th dragoons, bursting in at the moment, and ' mented the slaughter and completed the confusion; and Mass bringing his line into action, retook Lonato by a ult; and the routed Austrians were forced headlong from the ield.

turned their flight first toward the Mincio, the direction from which they had advanced. But with the double purpose of keeping them separated from Wurmser, and ensuring their capture by the corps of Despinois, Guyeux, and Sauret, Bonaparta ordered his aide de camp Junot, with the company of guides, to get ahead of them at Dezenzano, and force them up the lake toward Salo. Junct soon came up with the fugitives, but disdaining their rear. talked to his right, as he was directed, gained their front, and while his small troop attacked them sword in hand. Singling out he commanding officer, he wounded and seized him; but his rty being outnumbered, he was himself soon surrounded, and ra conflict, in which he cut down several assailants, was tumbled we his saddle into a ditch, under six sword cuts, three of which No on the head. The 15th dragoons and the 4th light infantry, in Bonaparte had detached to his support, coming up under ena, the Austrians were routed afresh, driven down on the thre of the lake, and pursued with slaughter towards Gavardo Salo, where, vainly attempting to escape into the Tyrol, some ere slain and many captured. The brave aide de camp, bloody, *halpless, senseless, but still breathing, was taken up by the guides, carried carefully to headquarters, and passed for cure and **Miles** (14).

The action at Lonato being decided, Bonaparte lost no time description in the freshest are was despatched under the orders of general St. Hilaire to support of Guyeux who, far to the left, was engaged in the support ask of retaking Salo, and dealing with the division task of retaking Salo, and dealing with the division task had been routed at Lonato. The officer commanding the light infantry was ordered to march instantly to the assistance and agreeau, to whom the tidings of victory were themselves a transfer comment.

This general having received his instructions the previous moved forward at an early hour against Liptay at Castrone. The enemy's line extending on either side of that vilgreted its left upon an eminence, its centre upon a fortified in Castiglione, and communicated by its right, somewhat with the Austrian force which was engaged at Lonato. With the Austrian force which was engaged at Lonato. The attack on the eminence, and with carrying a redoubt by the fortified. Adjutant general Verdier, with the grana-

diers and the 4th regiment of the line, was to storm the castle in the centre; while general Pelletier at the head of the 69th, was to engage and employ the Austrian right. To facilitate the operation confided to Beyrand, general Robert was directed before dawn to place the 51st in rear of Liptay's left, and to fall upon it furiously as soon as it should be warmly engaged in front. A brigade of infantry formed into column followed in support of the line, and was itself followed by the reserve of cavalry under general Kilmaine. In this order, Augereau at sunrise commenced the action.

Though in command of one of the finest divisions of the army, full of courage, and panting for distinction, Augereau had been less frequently and seriously engaged than other commanders of divisions. In the actions of Montenotte, Dego, and Mondovi, he had not participated. He was not present at Fombio; and when he reached Lodi, the bridge was passed, the artillery taken, and the battle At Borghetto, the cavalry and grenadiers had forced the passage of the Mincio before he came up; and in spite of his expeditious march, the enemy just escaped him at Brescia. It is true that at Millesimo he had repulsed Colli and compelled Provera to surrender, but a harder action on the same day was gained by the divisions on his right. Of the affair at Ceva he shared in the honour and success. Since, while Serrurier had repulsed several sallies from Mantua, had carried the intrenched camp on the island, and pushed his trenches to the very walls of the place; he had driven the Austrians from a single suburb, and suppressed a fanatical insurrection at Lugo. But with exception of these secondary triumphs, which stimulated rather than satisfied his appetite for glory and the thirst of his troops for battle, he and his brave division had heard the sounds of war and listened to the praise of their comrades, but had remained innocent of blood. It was, therefore, with eagerness and joy that he and they found themselves confronted by hostile ranks, whose denseness and numbers, if they rendered victory arduous, would without, as they trusted, making it doubtful, swell its carnage and enhance its fame.

His first onset was so vehement that the Austrians were driven at all points. Castiglione was taken, the castle stormed, the fortified eminence on their left carried, and their right wing forced to recoil. But general Liptay, observing the smallness of the force by which he was pursued, and beginning to feel, as he fell back, the van of Wurmser, reformed his line, and renewed the combat. By a second charge, as vigorous as the first, he was again repelled, and Beyrand following up his success, drove the Austrian left wing upon general Robert, who, assailing it in flank and rear, by the surprise as well as by the force of his impression, cut it up severely and threw it into complete confusion.

By this time, the head of Wurmser's column, advancing by the way of Guirdizolo, came in force upon the field, and enabled Liptay to sustain the fight with fresh troops and increasing numbers. At the same moment, Augereau was reenforced by the 4th light infantry from Lonato, and Kilmaine brought the reserve into action. The rival generals, displayed equal activity. The Austrian relying on his numbers and a sense of continual support, endeavoured by extending his left to turn the French right wing. this, Augereau brought general Robert with the 51st into line, and strengthened that wing with the 4th and 17th light infantry; and ordering general Pelletier with the 69th and the brigade that moved in column, to hold the ground which had been gained, he advanced a third time upon the enemy. The action then raged with a struggle, which was too long and bloody not to be the last. Augereau in person attacked and carried a bridge over the stream flowing by Castiglione, and completed the expulsion of the enemy from the skirts of the village. Beyrand contending with superior numbers, gave and received repeated assaults, in the last of which and in the moment of victory, he met an illustrious death. Pouraillier, Bougon, and Marmet, fell, where they fought, at the head of their regiments; Kilmaine, though greatly overmatched in horse, led fierce and frequent charges. Pelletier with the reserve was brought into action. Infantry, cavalry, artillery, were all perseveringly engaged, and each party alternately gained and gave ground. At length Bonaparte arrived on the field; the French, animated by his presence, were unconquerable; and though outnumbered, exhausted, and slaughtered, at the close of the day were victo-They had not the power to pursue (15).

The loss of the Austrians in this battle, which took its name from Lonato, where the commander in chief had been principally engaged, was two thousand five hundred in killed and wounded, four thousand prisoners, and twenty pieces of artillery. The loss of the French was severe, and in officers immense; Augereau's

division being so completely dismounted, that he had to apply for a general and a colonel for Beyrand's brigade; and in a postcript to his report said: "Not having officers for my men, I have detained the aide decamp of general St. Hilaire."

In reporting the action to the government, Bonaparte, after doing justice to the conduct of Augereau, did honour to the memory of Beyrand. "During the whole day," he wrote, "Augereau delivered and sustained the most obstinate combats, against numbers doubling his own;" and of Beyrand he added: "His loss, which is deeply felt by the army, is particularly regretted by me; for I had the greatest esteem for the moral as well as the military qualities, of that brave man." General Dommartin who commanded the artillery, adjutant general Verdier and the aide de camp Marmont, who assisted in managing Augereau's batteries, were particularly distinguished. Among the regiments, the 4th of the line, commanded by Pouraillier, which, with the grenadiers stormed the fortified castle, received the highest praise.

At Salo, general Guyeux had been still more successful against a division of Quasdonowich, having not only recovered that post, but taken more prisoners than, (until he was joined by general St. Hilaire) he had men. But general Despinois, whose movement from Brescia was expected to connect itself with the attack upon Salo on his right, and the operation of adjutant general Herbin on his left, so as to present a line of exclusion completely across the valley of the Chiese, against Quasdonowich, had failed to perform the duty assigned to him. Upon approaching Gavarde on the 2nd, general Dallemagne, who led his advance consisting of a battalion of the 11th, attacked the enemy with such vigour and impetuosity, that he dislodged them from their first position in front of the village; from their second in the village itself; took one colour and made a hundred and fifty prisoners. But not being supported by his commander who, after a faint demonstration retired, he was immediately surrounded, and left to cat his way with the bayonet. His order to this effect was gallantly obeyed, and he even made fifty prisoners in its execution. He lost his horse, and after a march of thirty miles on foot over rocks, fields, and cross roads, he reached Rezato, where he learned that Despinois had previously and safely returned to Brescia.

This exposure of a part of his corps, was not the worst part of Despinois' misconduct. On the 3rd, while the fate of Italy was in

Reacia, complaining in despatches to the commander in chief of the plunder of his private baggage, decrying the conduct of his men, and declining all mention of general Dallemagne (16). His imbecility received an appropriate reward though not an adequate punishment; for while he was slightly and equivocally mentioned in Bossparte's report, Dallemagne was expressly and earnestly recommended for promotion. It is probable, his good conduct a Milan, was allowed to weigh against his failure at Gavardo, where through the interval occasioned by his unworthy retreat, a number of the fugitive Austrians escaped into the mountains, and the rear of Bonaparte, while he was engaged at Lonato, was the same extent exposed.

Arom Castiglione, where the French general had witnessed the claricus success of Augereau, and was employed in examining the state of his division and giving instructions for a battle, that was yet to be fought, he wrote in the evening of the 3rd to general collection he expected from his followers, and thought necessary for their triumph. In the relative situation of the hostile forces, it was of importance that this officer should detain around Peschiera, the corps by which it was invested.

You must have been a spectator of the battles, we have fought with the enemy, this, and the last few days. We have taken twenty thousand men and killed a great number. His army is completely routed, and to-morrow or the day after, we shall enter your walls. Until then, whatever may happen, surrender not but at the last extremity. If a breach is made, show the greate⁸⁴ transcs. Salutation, esteem, and glory."

On the morning of the 4th, it was calculated, that the column of Quasdonowich by slaughter, capture, or dispersion, was for all effensive purposes annihilated; and that the three Austrian divisions, which had been pushed forward from the Mincio, had let more than half their strength, in the battle just decided. The result seemed to be, that Wurmser could not bring into the field, at the utmost more than a moiety of his original force; and to be prepared to meet him Bonaparte, as indefatigable as he was dring, now exerted himself. Despinois, he commanded to hasten up from Brescia, and Massena from Lonato. As the advance of Wurmber from Mantua, rendered the occupation of the lower route to

Milan no longer necessary, Serrurier, after leaving his baggage and sick under a guard beyond the Oglio, was required to march upon Castiglione, and be prepared on the morning of the 5th to act against the Austrian rear and left flank. He further directed the exhausted stock of ammunition to be replenished, the gun carriages to be carefully refitted, and every material of the service to be prepared for action. He reconnoitred closely the Austrian position and found it a good one, presenting a formidable front, and an appearance already of thirty thousand men, a number which was hourly augmented from Mantua. He caused intrenchments to be thrown up around Castiglione, and judging the position of Augereau to be unskilfully taken, corrected it himself. He then set off for Lonato in order to superintend in person the movement of the troops, and to satisfy himself that neither moments nor men were missed, in collecting the utmost possible force at Castiglione.

He had scarcely reached Lonato where Massena had left a detachment of twelve hundred men, when an Austrian officer bearing a flag of truce was conducted blind fold into his presence, and summoned him to surrender, affirming that the place was surrounded and resistance hopeless. His predicament was as full of embarassment as of surprise, for he learned at the same time, from his own officers, that the Austrians, informed by the neighbouring peasants that there were but twelve hundred men at Lonato, had taken possession of the bridge of San Marco, and were actually at the gates of Lonato. But his presence of mind extricated him. and gave his enemics, bound like victims, into his hands. Perfectly acquainted in consequence of his personal activity, with the ground and with the various positions held by his troops, he inferred at once that this must be the remnant of that corps, which he had defeated the day before at that very spot, and forced to retreat upon Salo; whence, its escape being intercepted by Guyeux and St. Hilaire, it was again endeavouring to find its way to the Min-Confident in this conclusion, instead of concealing he avowed his presence, and replied to the Austrian: "Return to your general, who seems disposed to insult the French army, and tell him I am here, and that he and his men are my prisoners. I know he is one of the columns that my troops have cut off from Gavardo and Salo. If he does not surrender in eight minutes, if he fires a single musket, I will give no quarter." Then having caused his numerous and brilliant staff to mount on horseback, he added: "Take the bandage from the gentleman's eyes and let him look around him;" and continued, "you see here general Bonaparte surrounded by the staff of the brave republican army. Tell your commander, he is likely to make a good prize-depart." While the astonished herald made his report, Bonaparte ordered his twelve hundred men, with his company of guides to be prepared for supporting his bold menace by a charge; for as to surrendering, it was out of the question. But for this desperate experiment there was no occasion; for the Austrian commander, confounded at learning that he had stumbled upon general Bonaparte with his whole army, and secretly cursing the peasants who he supposed had deceived him, hastened in person with an offer to capitulate. "No," said Bonaparte, who dreaded lest each moment might undeceive his adversary, "you are prisoners of war and must surrender instantly and at discretion;" and upon the unhappy Austrian asking for time to consult his officers, he turned abruptly away, and gave orders to Berthier for the grenadiers and artillery to attack. Hearing this, the Austrian general could hold out no longer, and exclaimed: "We surrender at discretion;" when a division of four thousand infantry and a troop of dragoons, having several general officers at their head, laid down their arms, and delivered up four cannon and three colours. This unexpected and bloodless conquest, besides rescuing from captivity the soul and leader of the army, and preventing a strong reenforcement from joining Wurmser in the next day's action, served to confirm the confidence of the French (17).

As the troops under Sauret, Guyeux, Dallemagne, and St. Hilire, were left to guard the valley of the Chiese, and to continue the pursuit and complete the destruction of Quasdonowich, they could take no part in the approaching battle. So that, with all his exertions, Bonaparte could collect at Castiglione, before the arrival of Serrurier's division, not more than twenty thousand men. The increasing insalubrity of the season which had weakened all the divisions, had reduced the fighting force of Serrurier to five thousand men; and the recent marches and battles had thinned the ranks of Massena and Augereau. Of those officers, whom the sword had spared, several of the best were disabled by sickness. Since the first day's combat at Rivoli, Joubert had been a prey to fever, and on the morning of the 5th of August, Serrurier and Kil-

maine retired sick into the rear (18). General Fiorella conducted the division of the former, and general Beaumont succeeded the latter in command of the cavalry. With a zeal, that did him honour, Salicetti, leaving his colleague Garrau in the management of affairs at Milan, and forgetting his former pretensions to authority, joined the army as a volunteer aide de camp to the commander in chief (19). But as long as the troops saw "the little corporal" at their head, they regarded neither loss of officers nor want of men.

By day break on the 5th, the rival armies were drawn out for the conflict which was to decide the fate of Italy; the Austrian comparatively fresh but greatly discouraged, the French exhausted by incessant fighting, but animated by constant victory. Besides his aggregate superiority, Wurmser had an immense advantage in cavalry; and although many of his regiments and most of his generals had been defeated, he himself was yet unconquered, and retained all the reputation he had won by years of service and his last campaign. His army was formed in two lines; his left inclining toward the Chiese, rested on the heights of Medolano, and his right extended to the village and tower of Solferino. In front of 🕍 left he had constructed a strong redoubt, which, as it commanded the plain through which the French were to advance, rendered in position formidable. Attended by all his cavalry, he placed himself with his right wing.

The French in one line occupied the heights of Castiglione, Asgereau on the right, and Massena on the left. Beaumont with the cavalry supported Augereau, and Massena was sustained by a small reserve of infantry in column. As Bonaparte purposed decisive operations against the enemy's left, he took post with his right wing. Counting much on the impression of Serrurier's division, the advance of which was expedited by successive orders, his intention was to wait its appearance; and as Wurmser did not can his ground, both armies remained motionless for two hours. When these had elapsed, and it was certain that Serrurier's division was on the point of arriving, Bonaparte determined to second its inpression, first by drawing Wurmser's attention to his front, next by inducing his first line to advance. He therefore drove in the Austrian pickets along their whole front, and as soon as they were supported caused his line to fall back. Wurmser, misled by feint, pressed forward with his first line; when at the moment

of his dulag so, the camon of Fiorella who conducted Serrunier's division, opened on the rear of his left wing. This was Bosuperto's signal for battle, and he resolved to begin it by crushing the Austrian left.

Accordingly, adjutant general Verdier, with the greenalist with ordered to dislodge the enemy from the height of Medolano, to carry the redoubt by which it was crowned. Marmons. with a battery of twenty pieces, was directed to support the onenation; and to cover his artillery, the cavalry under Beammont advanced into the plain to a position on the extreme right. newerful combination being quickly executed succeeded. ment's fire shook and shattered the Austrian left, Verdier's indiers stormed the redoubt, carried the height, and forced af the enemy's first line back upon the second, which surand engaged by Fiorella, was now faced to the rear. Under complicated pressure the whole of the Austrian left wing By gave way, and was driven in upon the centre, while Bong-10.400k possession of the ground they abandoned, and vitasly followed up his success. Fiorella continuing his moveforereached the rear of the enemy so completely that his Like cavalry penetrated to Wurmser's headquarters, and was near ing his person. At the same moment, Bonaparte commanding mattack by his whole line, Augereau fell upon the Austrian matre, and Massena bore down upon their right; while adjutant pmeral Leclerc, at the head of two regiments in column, stormed be tower of Solferino. The Austrians who were already thrown mo disorder, made but a feeble resistance against this general harge, and were soon pushed off the field. The French being too meth overworked to pursue vigorously, Wurmser retreated with the damage than confusion. He lost in the action two thousand billed wounded and prisoners, fifteen guns, and one hundred ad twenty ammunition waggons. Had the French been as fresh nthe Austrians, his army pressed in between the Mincio and the the, must have been destroyed or taken. General Despinois, Phase corps had been least engaged, was sent in pursuit, and in becourse of the night added many to the number of the prisoners. the defeated general retired in haste behind the Mincio, where his was, with his left resting on the garrison of Mantua, and his that strengthened by the corps investing Peschiera, which gave is a field force of thirty thousand men, to maintain himself, until

succours drawn from the Tyrol, and support: lorded by Quanowich, of whose utter ruin he was ignormed, should enable to resume offensive operations, and to add, to the relief of Manthe recovery of Lombardy. But he little knew as yet the chara of the adversary he had to deal with.

The loss of the French in the battle of Castiglione was sign and the only distinguished officer who fell, was adjutant gen Frontin (20).

This victory, more important for its consequences than its nage, being achieved, Bonaparte felt the intense weight of duty alleviated; and after charging his secretary to despet report of it to Milan, and issuing orders for an early pursui the morning, threw himself in his clothes and boots upon a co and enjoyed the first sleep he had indulged in for seven days (His attendants, who had sustained less privation, care, and fatig took time to reflect on the prodigies of his genius and valour, the vicissitude of their common perils and triumphs. Salit writing from the field of battle, said to the directory; "If I am capable of giving you an exact and circumstantial relation of military exploits, which confer immortal glory on the army of and their general, I can at least assure you that, in order to them, you must go back to the battles of Hannibal." diers, cheered by rest and food, proud of themselves, and glor in their leader, paid him a less classical compliment. For destruction of Beaulieu at Lodi, they had made him a corpu and they determined to complete his promotion for the victory Wurmser at Castiglione. They accordingly conferred on him rank of sergeant, which though the highest preferment in t gift, failed to supersede his title of "corporal" (22).

Not losing by negligence or repose what he had won by skill activity, Bonaparte put his troops in motion betimes on the ming of the 6th. Augereau marched back to Borghetto, and sena also retracing his former route, sought a passage of Mincio at Peschiera. General Guillaume, in order to justiff confidence of his commander, who was ready to fulfil the precontained in his letter, had walled up his gates, so that some I were lost in opening a passage for Massena's division through chiera. On the afternoon of the 6th, the vanguard under get Victor and colonel Suchet, issued from the walls and attacked intrenched camp of the investing Austrians, who being per

resh, made an obstinate resistance. At length, however, they rere driven out of their works, in which the victors took several madred prisoners and eighteen guns. Passing the night in the samy's camp, Massena the next morning followed in pursuit up he right bank of the Adige, and regained his former position at incli. Bonaparte, with the division of Serrurier, brought up the y, and passing through Peschiera after Massena had quitted e, reached Verona in the night of the 7th. In the mean time rmeer upon finding that his right was assailed at Peschiera, had drawn in haste from his other positions on the Mincio and reed across the Adige at Verona, where with his rear guard he prosted, when Bonaparte arrived. By the marshal's order the swere closed in hopes of gaining time to effect his retreat, and by his baggage to a distance before day. Upon Bonaparte's Throning the Venetian proveditore to open the gates, a delay Debours was insisted on; which being evidently intended to r the Austrians, he ordered general Dommartin to bring up tillery and force an entrance. The order was promptly sed, and although Wurmser himself escaped, a number of **Men,** with all his baggage, were taken.

Angereau meanwhile, after exchanging a cannonade for some time the Austrian centre, had found such serious difficulty in effect-passage of the Mincio at Borghetto, that he determined to march to Peschiera, and cross under cover of that fortress. He timenced his movement just before Wurmser retired, and mached Verona after Bonaparte had regained possession of that thee.

Marshal Wurmser, compelled to share the fate of his predeener in battle, was also doomed to experience his panic, and fallow his footsteps, in retreat. Retiring with all speed from Vema up the Adige, he crossed to the right bank above Rivoli, and puted strong rearguards in Massena's front on Montebaldo and the Corona, the elevated positions from which on his first burst than the Tyrol, he had dislodged Joubert. Davidowich hastentic his retreat in the same direction, placed a strong detachment of Alla to retard the pursuit of the French up the left bank of the there. Quasdonowich with the fragments of his dismembered thann, still held, on the extreme verge of the valley of the Chiese, the posts of Lodrone and Rocco d'Anfo. On the 12th geBonaparte, and collected into two corps the several detachments left on that side of the Mincio, marched upon Rocco d'Anfo, which being turned by St. Hilaire and assailed in front by Sauret, was carried at the first assault. The Austrians, keenly pursued, fell back upon their post at Lodrone, where the two united remnants were beaten with a loss, besides their slain, of eleven hundred prisoners and six guns. The French continuing their advance as far as Storo, Quasdonowich abandoned his last remaining post at Riva, setting fire to his flotilla which was collected there. time Massena, who had dislodged the detachments of Wurmserfron Montebaldo and the Corona, enjoyed the satisfaction of establishing his division in all its original positions on the Adige. affair in which the 18th light infantry was greatly distinguished. he took four hundred prisoners and several guns. Augereau at the same time passing the Adige at Verona, ascended the left bank, drove the rear guard of Davidowich from Alla, and occurred that post.

In consequence of these rapid and energetic movements. Wurmser became fearful that his adversary might push column on his right and left and cut him off from the Tyrol. He therefore abandoned entirely all the country bordering on the upper extremity of the lake of Guarda, and retired to Roveredo and Trest, where the fragments of his shattered columns, being united with his reserve, formed a force near forty thousand strong in mabers, but so enfeebled in spirit, that a single French battalion (chi itself a match for an Austrian brigade. An instance of this extreme trepidation on one side and confidence on the other, ofcurred on the occasion of Massena's vanguard reaching Rivoli. A party of Austrians fired on them with four field pieces from the opposite side of the river. The French light troops immediately took a position and opened a discharge of small arms that compelled the Austrian party to retreat; upon which twenty Fresch soldiers, stripped off their clothes and plunged into the river, order to swim across and make prize of the cannon. But on rising up the bank, they found that twelve full armed Austriss had stayed by their pieces. Though naked and unarmed, they advanced, and took, besides the guns, the armed men, who not the spirit either to fight or run away (23).

Thus, in a single fortnight, the imperial army, after penetrated in three divisions as far into the plain as Verona, Mantua, and

Brescia, had been driven back to its mountain fastnesses, with the oss of twenty-five thousand men killed and wounded, fifteen thousand prisoners, seventy pieces of artillery, and nine colours. The loss of the French army was estimated at seven thousand, of which two thousand five hundred and six were prisoners, and were speedily recovered by exchange (24). It was again divided into the armies of observation and the siege, Serrurier's division constituting the latter, and those of Massena and Augereau with the cavalry, composing the former, which resumed its posts of defence along the Adige. It had need of repose, for on the 25th of August when the long promised reenforcements were just beginning to come up, the hot unwholesome weather and the severity of the pervice, had sent fifteen thousand men into the hospitals (25). The division of Serrurier recommenced the blockade of Mantua. with less than three thousand men fit for duty. General Fiorella who had succeeded him in command, had succeeded him also in falling sick, and was obliged to resign his charge to general Salarguet, who at that time commanded in Milan. This officer was directed to take post at Marmirolo, a village on the road to Castiglione, which though less remote than Roverbello from the Mantuan lakes, was thought to be less exposed to their pestilential vapours (26).

Wurmser, though an Austrian marshal, was by birth a French wobleman. He commenced his career in the cavalry, was distinruished in the seven years war, and in the war between Austria In 1793 he forced the lines of Wiessembourg, and the Turks. und in 1795, after defeating Pichegru at Heidelberg, invaded the Palatinate. He was an officer of resolution and energy, and a general of ability and experience. In the secret correspondence between the agents of the Bourbon Princes and Pichegru, the wom de guerre conferred on Wurmser, was Cæsar. Against any wher commander of the age than Bonaparte, against Jourdan, Pithegru, or Moreau for example, with such advantages as he brought into this campaign, he would have added to his fame no doubt, the glory of reconquering Lombardy, and probably of forcing the French to lay down their arms. This he attempted against Bonaparte, and his army and his fame disappeared like the illusions of a dream.

His own enemies and those of his conqueror, concur in accusing him of imprudence; first, in allowing his right column to be separated from his centre by the whole breadth of the k Guarda, and next, to be divided into three corps and dir upon three different points. But in regard to the first char may be doubted whether, in the same circumstances, any commander would have been more prudent, or would have fined his plan of invasion to the single object of relieving tua. Had he done so, and with a superiority of force exce two to one, suffered Bonaparte undisturbed in his rear, to him at the passage of the Mincio, or to retire at leisure b the Oglio or the Adda, falling back upon his garrisons as reenforcements, the defeat of the Austrian general would been probable, and his censure certain and severe. of his right column into three corps, the foundation of the s charge, seems altogether inexcusable. But his capital error sisted in halting at Mantua. Upon finding the siege raise ought to have marched instantly to form a junction with Qu nowich, sending at the same time a detachment from the gai to pursue Serrurier with orders to detain him on the Oglio this mode of operating, he might have met Bonaparte in the of Castiglione as early as the 2nd of August, with fifty tho men against twenty four thousand; which, while Serrurier v Marcaria, and the detachments of Despinois, Sauret, Guyen: Herbin, were employed against Quasdonowich, was the hi amount of force that the French general could bring against Instead of this, after allowing Bonaparte to drive Quasdon from Brescia on the 1st, he suffered him to defeat half his reing force on the 3rd, and on the 5th to engage the residue; w as the column of Serrurier was permitted to fall by sa upon their rear, "came like sacrifices in their trim," and but a nerveless resistance.


But the radical cause of Wurmser's failure, was the same produced the disconfiture of his predecessor; his personal riority to Bonaparte. He possessed courage, capacity, an perience, but not a sublime genius for war; and of course unable to contend against theoriginal combinations and unexpected designs, which the mind of the French general readily even Mistaking the crouching of the lion for a sign of fear, he was with emotions of triumph at Bonaparte's sudden abandomm the trenches and guns before Mantua. Consequently, even advantage which he sustained afterwards, had the effect of

se, surprise engendered dismay, and dismay produced imbety; so that his spirit was subdued before he exerted his strength Castiglione; and collapsing under the pressure of disappointnt and consternation, he returned a pigmy to those mountains, m, which a fortnight before, he had stalked forth a giant (27). The mind of Bonaparte being superior by its native force to ficulty and danger in all forms and dimensions, was roused to exertion of greater fortitude and resources, by the increasing gencies of the contest. The decision by which with one hand raised the seige of Mantua, while with the other he shivered to ces the corps of Quasdonowich, must ever be regarded as the ost adroit and at the same time most athletic effort of intellectual your, of which the annals of war can boast. When its force as, in some measure, eluded by the flight of Quasdonowich from escia, his rapid countermarch and instantaneous resumption of e offensive against Wurmser, like the survivor of the Horatii rning back upon his foes, furnishes an example of generous enprise and skilful audacity, for which no terms of praise convey equate approbation. His presence of mind when surprised and rrounded by a division of Austrians, in not only escaping but pturing them, though an incontestable fact, bears the appearance a marvellous fiction. His constant activity, his unwearied vilance, his energy of purpose, unrelaxed by the errors of Sauret, e imbecility of Despinois, or the cowardice of Valette; the comptitude and manliness with which he headed and handled his oops, were all equally honourable to his conduct and his valour, responded with the vastness and excellence of his combinaons, contributed to render their success infallible, and being terted against successive masses and overwhelming numbers, led the short space of a week, with a greater variety of action d a series of more important results, than are usually found reorded in long campaigns, of celebrated generals and powerful

For seven days of incessant activity he was exposed to the heat fan August sun or the damp of unwholesome dews, his only susmance a crust of bread from his pocket, and wine and water rom his canteen; his only slumber occasional nods on horseback. In this time, besides continual marching and the care of ordering all the movements of his various corps, he commanded personally in three actions, gained as many victories, and deprived the enemy

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of a multitude of warlike and well disciplined troops, equal in number to his own entire army. Yet throughout this toilsome and sanguinary period, his manner, though animated, was never vehement, and his mind, though intensely employed, seemed neither absorbed by affairs, nor oppressed by solicitude, nor agitated with hope, nor tumultuous with elation (28).



From the 25th of August to the 1st of September 1796.

Firmness of the French party in Milan—Letter of Bonaparte—Revolt of Casal Maggior—Bonaparte's order—Public sentiment south of the Po—The jesuits of Bologna—Proceedings of the Pope—Cardinal Mattei—Leghorn—Good conduct of general Vaubois—Naples—Lucca—The Barbets—Murder of general Dujard—Pusillanimity of the paymasters—Letter of Bonaparte—The expedition to Corsica—Bonaparte's correspondence while at Brescia—His opinon of his generals—His soothing letter to general Sauret—Colours presented to the directory—The addresses and answers on that occasion—Progress of Jourdan and Moreau—Efforts of Austria to raise a new army—Bonaparte prepares for fresh operations—Arrives at Verona.

The garrison of Mantua, as soon as the siege was raised, had applied themselves to completing the demolition of Serrurier's half-destroyed works and batteries, and to conveying within the walls the immense train of artillery which he left behind. Wurmser had revictualled the place on his first arrival, and during the halt which he made on the left bank of the Mincio in retreating, had introduced in lieu of the diseased and enfeebled corps of Wukas-sowich and Roccavina, two fresh divisions from the Rhine, raising the garrison to fifteen thousand men (1). But his precipitate flight to the mountains was soon followed by the unwelcome return of the besiegers to the suburbs, and the painful beginning of a new in-

vestment. For although in the short interval of its absence, the division of Serrurier had lost at least a third of its strength, it had gained a full equivalent in reputation, and therefore struck the dispirited Austrians with dismay (2).

If the want of artillery had not rendered an immediate reneval of the siege impracticable, the increasing malignity of the climate around Mantua would have induced Bonaparte to decline it. Wherefore instead of exposing the troops to service in the trenches, he ordered general Sahuguet, to limit his operations to the maintenance of a strict blockade.

This officer lost no time in executing the directions of the commander in chief. As soon as he was joined by general Dalemagne, whose brigade was ordered to reenforce him, he disloged the Austrians from Governolo and Borgoforte, the two angles of the Seraglio which rest upon the Po; and having succeeded by the 24th of August, in regaining possession of that island and all the exterior posts, he laboured diligently in fortifying his line of contervallation, and in keeping the garrison restricted to their works. Thus situated, the contest subsided from the bloody assaults and combats of a siege, into a trial of patience under the inflictions of the season, which, as the besiegers were the exposed party, fell with more fatal influence on the French (3).

The entrance of Wurmser's columns into Verona and Brescia. and the sudden disappearance of the French from the line of the Adige and the trenches before Mantua, brought into view the latent dispositions of the people of Lombardy. A market division of parties was perceptible; but the preference of a precarious freedom under the protection of France, to a bopeless subjection to the despotism of Austria, clearly prevailed. In Pavia, Cremona, and Casal Maggior, an important town near the mouth of the Oglio, the imperial party had the ascendancy; but in the country generally, and in the capital particularly, a great majority of the inhabitants manifested a decided attachment to the cause of the French, and professed to regard it as their own. This sentiment was strongly and honourably displayed by the people of Milan, among whom Bonaparte had been oftenest seen, to whom he was best known. When it was ascertained that the Austrians had taken Brescia, and when it was rumoured that, after defeating the French, they had entered Cassano and were approaching the gates of Milan, a large concourse of citizent, aded by the municipal officers, waited on the French commisries, and eagerly demanding arms, announced their firm resoluon of sharing the fortune of the French army. And although, tring an interval of several days, no intelligence was received om Bonaparte's headquarters, the quiet of the city was not diurbed, nor the authority of the French officers checked by the ightest disobedience. Indeed the hostility of the people to Auria appeared to increase as the fortune of France seemed to ecline; so much so that, upon a report being spread that Bonatrie's army had been routed, and that Wurmser was advancing pon Milan, the citizens assembled in crowds, and made the streets, quares, and theatres resound, with stanzas translated from the larseilles' hymn (4).

These demonstrations of zeal and attachment, Bonaparte was to sagacious and too just to disregard, and on the 9th of August, and addressed to the municipality of Milan, the following letter from is headquarters at Verona—"When the army retreated, and he partizans of Austria, and the enemies of liberty, believed its estruction inevitable; when it was impossible for you yourselves a suspect that this retreat was only a stratagem; you displayed an attachment for France, and a love of liberty; you exhibited a real and firmness, which deserve the esteem of the army, and will ensure you the protection of the French republic.

"Every day your fellow citizens render themselves more worthy ffreedom; they acquire every day new energy, and will appear no loubt, at no distant period, with glory on the theatre of the world. Receive this testimony of my satisfaction, and of the sincere vishes of the French people to see you free and happy" (5).

This letter, though evidently guarded in its terms against the soveyance of promises which the author might not be authorized e make or able to fulfil, contributed nevertheless to strengthen be dependency of the people of Lombardy upon the support of france; and coinciding with their consciousness of having incurred heresentment of their former rulers, promoted the public anxiety for the establishment of an avowed and definitive independence of france.

The punishing the revolt of Casal Maggior, where the populace, not satisfied with overpowering the slender French garrison, had murdered several soldiers and pillaged the baggage of the army, was a graver and more necessary operation. Having issued a pro-

clamation, requiring of the municipality the arrest of all persons concerned in these outrages, and imposing on the town a fine of a million of francs, Bonaparte ordered general Murat to take command of a light column, and enforce the execution of these measures. His order prescribing the movement of Murat, enters into details which afford another proof of his intimate acquaintance with the constitution of his army, and his persons attention to its minutest operations. The order is addressed to Berthier.

- "You will instruct the general of brigade Murat to depart for Casal Maggior, and take command of the moveable column destined to enforce the execution of the requisition, relative to the town.
- "You will appoint a military commission to accompany his, whose duty it shall be to bring to trial the assassins of the French soldiers, and the authors and instigators of the revolt. A commissary of the army, and a military agent will attend him, for the purpose of collecting the contribution of a million. He is to effect an entire disarming of the citizens, and he will take care to came the different articles of the proclamation to be executed in the space of three or four days. His column will be composed of the hundred men of the 21st chasseurs, two pieces of light artillers, and the 51st regiment."

In the towns and states south of the Po, the evidences of popular feeling were not less favourable to the French army, than the At Bologna, Ferrara, Modena and Reggio #2 were at Milan. deep regret was expressed for their reverses, the tide of sentiment rose to enthusiasm at the news of their victories. The government to which these two last towns were subjected, exhibited sentiments of the opposite character, joy for their disasters, and chagrin at their successes. For while the duke of Parts guided doubtless by the influence of the Spanish court, maintained faithfully the neutral position he had lately taken (6); the regular of Modena, the members of which had been recently protected by Bonaparte's countenance, manifested openly their hostile intertions. The Jesuits of Bologna were equally infatuated and equally ungrateful. Forgetting that, on his first entrance into Bologna, had screened them from the effects of popular odium, they seized the occasion of his retreat, to agitate the public mind, and " stir up their flocks to insurrection. The good fi ad authority he senate, obviated their attempts; and the triumph of the French trms deprived them speedily of all popular influence. So that Boaparte with his accustomed moderation, chastised them only by letter reminding them of their duty, and threatening punishment for the next offence (7).

Upon the news of Wurmser's successful irruption reaching Rome, he Holy See licensed afresh the insults of the rabble to French ciizens, and suspended instantly the execution of the armistice of Bologna. Cardinal Mattei, the archbishop of Ferrara, was so reoiced at the raising of the siege of Mantua, and so confident of the immediate expulsion of the French from Italy, that he publicly invited the people to revolt from the actual government, took possession of the citadel, and with a few adherents raised the flag of the church. The pope himself acting as if the French were already heyond the Alps, despatched a new legate to Ferrara with authority preorganize the papal administration. The victories of Longton and Castiglione, and the disastrous retreat of Wurmser, while hey renewed the operation of the armistice, exposed the pope to scorn, and the cardinal to punishment. The scorn fell upon the person of the legate Della Grecca, whom the people of Ferrara would not permit to enter the town he was commissioned to govern; but the cardinal escaped in a great measure the punishment which his imprudence provoked, by an humble exclamation of catholic repentance. When conducted by an order from headquarters into the presence of Bonaparte, and asked if he had any justification of his conduct at Ferrara to offer, his only reply was peccavi, peccavi; a confession which disarmed the general's indignation, and reduced the cardinal's penalty to a short residence in an ecclesiastical seminary at Brescia. The explanation, given by the papal government on the subject of the legate's mission, was less beconic and much less sincere. The Spanish ambassador Azara was authorized to inform Bonaparte that it was simply a measure of precaution against the Austrian government, which had, of old, pretensions to the sovereignty of the legation, and whose design it was, taking advantage of the derelict state in which it would be left by the retreat of the French army and the absence of the pope's representative, to occupy and hold it as a province subject to the This excuse, which appears to have obtained credit with Azara, before it reached Bonaparte, had been deprived of plausibility by the confession of cardinal Mattei (8).

Wille Brançaire, was cratenting with Warmer on the China, the constraint of his garrison at Leghorn was engaged in offorts to proceed that port from an English squadron. This object he reconstruct in accomplishing, by stationing under the small fort at the point of the mole, a lugger furnished with a crew of on hundred men, four long brass pieces, and a furnace for housing balls. A frigate and a brig, which stood in ahead, for the purpose of silencing the small fort on the mole, and opening a passage in the harbour for the squadron, were soon compelled to draw of by the red hot shot of the lugger. The great Nelson, who, with the rank of commodore commanded the squadron, finding the dificulty of forcing an entrance greater than any object likely to lo gained by it, did not renew the attempt, but confined his operations to a simple blockade 9.

The conduct of Vaubois, who had thus completed the capulsion of the English cruisers from the great seaport of Tuscaus, was, throughout his command at Leghorn, distinguished by prudence and vigour; and although his mistaken compliance with the requisition of Garrau had excited momentary displements he acquired in an eminent degree, Bonaparte's confidence and esteem.

The good disposition of the small republic of Lucca towards the French, was shown in a very touching manner. When Josephin compelled to leave her husband's headquarters and escape un the guns of Mantua across the Po, sought shelter at Lucies notwithstanding the adverse reports which prevailed, she was received by the senate with all the testimonies of remotiwhich they could have offered to the consort of a powerful prince (10).

On the maritime Alps, where the boundaries of France, Piedu and Genoa, were intermingled, the same cause which had shall the faith and affected the policy of cabinets and cardinals, ret into predatory pride and violence the brigands called barbets. I night they plundered villages in the plains, and by day ways travellers in the mountains. On the 20th of August, a bedy two hundred of them, fell upon general Dujard, the comm in chief of Bonaparte's artillery, who was on his way to v the arsenal of Antibes and to arm the coast of Provi which had been lately insulted. At the first fire of the bright this general, a colonel, and ty

tendants wounded. His escort was dispersed, and his baggage, which was considerable, including a quantity of public money in his charge, was pillaged.

Upon receiving intelligence of this atrocity, Bonaparte organised a column of four thousand men, composed of regular troops from the adjacent garrisons and depots, and placed it under the command of general Casabianca. This officer, who being sent on duty to Corsica was soon succeeded by general Garnier, had orders to concert his operations with general Macquart, the commander at Coni, and to pursue the most effectual measures for arresting the chiefs of the barbets, and dispersing their followers. The orders being promptly executed, suppressed the outrages against which they were directed (11).

Another circumstance which affected the condition of the army and grew out of its temporary retreat, demanded the attention of the commander in chief. The paymasters and commissaries, at this period, were civil agents, who, however expert at accompts, and in receiving and distributing money, were not qualified to face the dangers to which the army of Italy was frequently exposed. Upon Bonaparte's raising the siege of Mantua and marching with all haste to Brescia, these agents were seized with such alarm for their personal safety as well as for that of their treasure, that they deserted the service and fled towards Genoa; not a few of them prosecuting their flight as far as the gulf of Spezzia. The retreat of one of these fugitive functionaries is thus described by Bonaparte in a despatch to the directory, of the 25th of August.

"The commissary Salva has abandoned the army. In a paroxysm of fear, he saw the enemy every where. He passed the Po in his fright, and communicated to every one he met the terror by which he was distracted. In vain he posted for two days and nights, nothing could reassure him. Writing in all directions 'Let every one save himself who can,' he got within two leagues of Genoa, when he died after twenty-four hours of a brain fever, in the transports of which he believed himself surrounded by the terrible Hulans, and hacked to pieces by their swords. Nothing can equal such cowardice but the intrepidity of the soldiers."

After this introduction, he recommends the employment of military officers for the administration of the pay and supplies of the army. "Such is the inconvenience of the law which requires that the paymasters and commissaries should be civil agents, while this service really requires more courage and military confidence than that of officers themselves. The courage necessary for the former is altogether moral, and cannot be produced but by familiarity with danger. I have felt on this occasion, how important it is that none should be permitted to exercise these functions, but such men as have served several campaigns in the line, and given proofs of courage. No man who values his life more than the glory of his country, or the esteem of his comrades, should be employed in the French army. Yet one is shocked every day, by hearing agents in these departments of the service, confess and almost boast of fear."

[CHAP. XV.]

This defection of the agents intrusted with a branch of the service on which the health and strength of the army materially depended, together with the absence of several military officers from their corps on the plea of duty, sickness, or wounds, produced an order of the 18th of August, recalling all absentees within a very short period under pain of arrest and dismission, and prescribing severe regulations to prevent its evasion (12).

Among the many subjects upon which, while the troops were allowed a little repose, his mind was employed, not the least interesting was the expedition he had projected for the rescue of his native island from subjection to England. The command of the party destined for this service was conferred on general Gentili, a native of Corsica; and in the organisation of his corps of refugees, colonels and majors were to take command of companies, which, it was hoped they would be able upon landing in the island, to fill up by volunteers, to battalions and regiments. The expedition was to assemble at Leghorn, and previous to its embarkation was to be subject, as an auxiliary force, to the orders of the general in command at that place (13).

From Bonaparte's official despatches it appears that, after entering Verona on the night of the 7th of August, he remained in the vicinity of that town, superintending the movements and distribution of Massena's and Augereau's divisions, until the 9th; that then after passing by Marmirolo, reconnoitring Mantua, and giving instructions for the renewal of the investment, he established his headquarters at Brescia on the 11th, and continued there until the 19th, engrossed by multifarious and urgent duties; corresponding with the directory, recomposing the strength of his army, making regulations for the restoration of its health, and redressing the interesting the strength of his army, making regulations for the restoration of its health, and redressing the

juries which his authority in Italy had sustained, by the shock of Wurmser's invasion; as a prudent mariner hastens to repair, when the storm has subsided, the rents in his canvass and the strains of his spars.

One of his letters to the directory written at this period from Brescia, is so replete with military portraiture, that it deserves a page in his history.

"I think it may be of use to give you my opinion of the generals employed in this army. You will see that but few of them can be serviceable to me:—

"Berthier; has talents, activity, courage, character; every thing in his favour.

"Augereau; a great deal of character, courage, firmness, and activity; is accustomed to war, is loved by the soldiers, and fortunate in his operations.

"Massena; active, indefatigable, daring; possesses coup d'ail and decision.

"Serrurier; fights like a soldier, assumes no responsibility; firm in his character, has too little esteem for the soldiers; is sick.

"Despinois; feeble, inactive, not bold nor warlike, not loved by the troops, and does not fight at their head. On the other hand, has pride of character, political intelligence, and sound opinions; good to command in the interior.

"Sauret; a good, an excellent soldier; not sufficiently intelligent for a general, and not fortunate.

"Abattucci; not fit to command fifty men.

"Garnier, Meunier, Casabianca; incapable, not fit to command a battalion in a war as active and serious as this.

"Macquart; a brave man without talents, quick tempered.

"Gauthier; good for a bureau, has never made war.

"Vaubois and Sahuguet have been employed in the command of fortresses. I have just caused them to join the army, and shall learn how to estimate them. Hitherto they have acquitted themselves extremely well in the posts assigned to them; but the example of general Despinois, who did very well at Milan and very ill at the head of his division, forbids my judging of men but by their actions."

General Sahuguet, it has already been mentioned, succeeded Fiorella in the command of Serrurier's division, and in the direction, of the blockade of Mantua; and general Vaubois was recalled

from Leghorn and placed at the head of the division of Saures, who was stationed at Brescia, in command of the reserve. This brave officer whose activity in the late operations was lessessed by a painful contusion on the leg received in a charge of cavalry, felt, it appears, some repugnance at resigning a light division to take command of the reserve; and it was in order to allay this metural sensibility that Bonaparte addressed to him the following letter.

"Considerations connected with your health alone, induced me to give you command of the reserve, and to place another officer at the head of the division under your orders. This division is again destined for service too active to be compatible with the infirm state of your health. But you will nevertheless render yourself useful in the post I assign you, which is not less important than the one you leave; although the service which it will require is less severe, and better adapted to your situation. The reserve will see the enemy, but is intended to reach him by less difficult routes. The services which you have already rendered ought to convince you that this change of position is not designed to affect your reputation. Were it to indicate the slightest diminution of my confidence in your courage and patriotism, it would convey a meaning altogether foreign to my real sentiments."

Sauret's surprise and indecision at Salo no doubt convinced Bonaparte that, notwithstanding his zeal and intrepidity, he was incapable of conducting a light division with sufficient vigour and activity. The cautious inference which he drew from the conduct of Despinois to the capacity of Vaubois and Sahuguet, turned on to be but too well founded.

The colours, nine in number, which were taken in the actions with Wurmser's columns, Bonaparte sent to Paris in charge of Berthier's aide de camp, Dutaillis; by whom they were presented to the directory, with the usual ceremonies, on the 27th of August. In his address on the occasion, Dutaillis thus spoke of the commander in chief. "These successes which will be for ever glorious, are due to the bravery of our soldiers, as well as to the skilful dispositions and indefatigable activity of their young present. Night and day at their head, sharing their dangers, their fatigues, and their privations, he conducts their attacks, directs their courage, and opens to them the road to victory." The reply of the directors, though full of general applause for the army is

emarkable for containing not a single allusion to Bonaparte; lthough in their despatch twelve days earlier, they had loaded im with praise.

The armies of Jourdan and Moreau had been more successful a their second invasion of Germany than in their first; and with decided superiority of force, in consequence of the victories of tonaparte in Italy, had advanced rapidly towards Vienna; the ormer penetrating as far as the Rednitz, the latter to the banks of he Lech: tributaries, the first of the Necker and the second of the Danube. Notwithstanding this pressure near the heart of the mpire, the Austrian cabinet, slow but persevering in their counils, and not unobservant of the negligence of the French governnent towards Italy, determined to persist in their efforts for the ecovery of Lombardy, and to give Wurmser an opportunity o vindicate his fame. With the reserve which had been left in the Tyrol, detachments which had been drawn from the lower Danube, draughts from various garrisons, and recruits from the hardy population of the Alps, who, inured to toil and inclined to war, were readily incorporated with the veterans of his army, Wurmser found little difficulty in répairing in a great measure his losses at Lonato and Castiglione, and raising his active force. exclusive of the garrison of Mantua, to fifty five thousand men. So that by the last of August, he was prepared to venture a second descent into the valley of the Po.

As Bonaparte had also received reenforcements sufficient to compensate his losses in action, the two generals were to begin a second contest, as far as numbers were concerned, on terms less unfavorable to the French than the first. Apprized of Wurmser's strength and intentions, Bonaparte resolved, by assuming the offensive, to counteract them, and at the same time to prevent his sending assistance to the army opposed to Moreau.

After a short visit to Milan he returned to Brescia on the 30th of August, as appears from a letter to Josephine, whom he had just parted with; "My first thought on arriving here, my dear Josephine, is to write to you. Your health and your image were not absent from my mind an instant during the whole journey; nor shall I be tranquil until I receive letters from you. You cannot conceive my anxiety; for I left you sad, distressed, and half sick. If the most devoted and the tenderest love can console you, you ought to be happy. I am overwhelmed with affairs. Adieu my

dear Josephine, preserve your health, love me, and think of me often, often."

Determined, as he had written to Salicetti, no longer "to halt in the marshes around Mantua," and in confident preparation for the offensive operations which he meditated, he dictated on the same day a proclamation, addressed to the Tyrolians, and destined for distribution at a suitable moment. The next day, having communicated in a despatch to Moreau his intention of penetrating to Trent, and effecting the conquest of the Italian Tyrol, and invited him to come into combination with this movement by advancing from Bavaria upon Inspruck, he proceeded to Verona; where his arrival in the midst of Augereau's division, was the signal for the army to advance.

CHAPTER XVI.

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From the 1st of September to the 1st of October 1796.

Warmser resolves on a second invasion—His plan of operations—That of Bonaparte-He moves against Davidowich-His precautions-Combat of the Sarca, of Serravalle, of Mori and Marco-Death of general Dubois-Battle of Roveredo-Defeat and loss of the Austrians-The French enter Trent-Bonaparte advances to the Lavis-Forces the passage of that river, and defeats Davidowich-Consternation of the Austrians-Bonaparte returns to Trent—His proclamation to the Tyrolians—Its effect—His prophetic letter to Josephine-Movement and views of Wurmser-Bonaparte leaves Trent, and pursues him down the Brenta-Combat of Primolano, of Covolo, of Solagno-Battle of Bassano-Defeat and flight of Wurmser-Affecting night scene - Mezaros attacks Verona - Repulsed - Critical situation of Wurmser-He reaches the Adige-Gets possession of the bridge of Porto Legnano-Bonaparte endeavours to intercept him-Combat of Cerea—Narrow escape of Bonaparte—Wurmser passes the Molinella— Effects his retreat to Mantua—Augereau retakes Porto Legnano—Combat of Due Castelli-Battle of Saint George-Wurmser defeated and driven into Mantua—The blockade reestablished—Bonaparte goes to Milan— Comparative loss of the contending armies—The trophies of the campaign presented to the directory-Letter of Carnot to Bonaparte.

Marshal Wurmser, unaccustomed to defeat and burning with shame at the disastrous issue of his attempt to retrieve the reprobated misfortunes of his predecessor, lost no time in endeavouring to justify the original preference and continued confidence of his government, by making a second effort for the relief of Mantua.

His plan on this occasion, which there is reason to believe was

prescribed by the cabinet of Vienna, differed from the former one, both in the distribution of his force and the direction of his march. Instead of dividing his army into three columns, and invading Lombardy by as many routes, he was to separate his force into two divisions, and to act offensively with one only; which instead of operating on either side of the lake of Guarda was to direct its course down the valley of the Brenta and across the plains of the lower Adige (1).

While the marshal, taking this route at the head of thirty thousand men, was to pass the Adige at Verona, and push forward to the relief of Mantua, general Davidowich with a corps, consisting of twenty five thousand, was to occupy the passes of the Tyrol. Should the French attempt to penetrate these defiles, either for the purpose of recalling Wurmser from his march down the Brenta, or of forming a connection with the right wing of Morean in Bavaria, Davidowich was to remain on the defensive. But should Bonaparte attempt to withdraw his troops from the upper Adige in order to oppose Wurmser on the Brenta, Davidowich was to assume the offensive, and prevent the project by attacking Massena, or take advantage of it, by moving on directly to Mantus.

As soon as Bonaparte discovered the nature of his adversary's plan, he formed his own, and determined to throw himself first on one division of the Austrians, and then on the other, trusting by the vigour and celerity of his movements, to disable both before either could gain a decisive advantage. Having first routed Davidowich, he was to fall swiftly on Wurmser; the destruction of whose army he hoped in this manner to accomplish, and after effecting his proposed combination with Moreau, to complete what he had left unfinished at Lonato and Castiglione. Leaving at Verona general Kilmaine, who had recovered strength sufficient to return to duty, with three thousand men, composed of cavalry, artillery and infantry, to defend the passage of the lower Adies. and by doing so to cover the blockade of Mantua, he caused the fortifications of Verona on the left bank of the river to be strengthened, so as to be capable of resisting a sudden an The duty thus confided to Kilmaine, who stationed advanced parties in the plain of Verona, and had a garrison at Porto Legnano, was thought to be of such great importance, in comparison with the small force placed at his disposal, that Bonaparte gave him minute written instructions, pointing out the

proper mode of defending his line and frustrating the attempts of the enemy, in whatever direction or numbers they might approach (2).

Having thus thrown in the way of Wurmser's immediate success in this quarter, an obstruction of no little difficulty, Bonaparte prepared to move against Davidowich, whose headquarters were at Roveredo. On the 1st of September, the divisions of Vaubois and Massena constituting the left and centre of the French army, were put in motion. The former broke up from Storo and Salo; Vaubois marching from Storo, around the head of the lake to Riva, and Guyeux lembarking in the flotilla at Salo, and steering his course also for Riva, where after passing the Sarca, the united division was to direct its march to the Adige, and form a junction with the centre. The division of Massena supported by the reserve of cavalry, and superintended by Bonaparte in person, crossed the Adige at the bridge of Polo, and moved up the high road leading from Verona to Trent. The next day Augereau, whose division was yet sore from its toils and wounds at Castiglione, followed from Verona, as the right wing and second line of the army; having its light brigade thrown out upon the ridge of mountains, which command the valley of the Adige, and run parallel to its course.

In this disposition, it is obvious that the left column of Bonaparte under general Vaubois, was on the 1st of September, separated from his centre, by as great an extent of space and obstruction as had, just a month before, divided the right wing of Wurmser from his centre.

It might seem to follow, that the same strictures which are directed by Bonaparte himself, as well as by less liberal and less competent critics, against the plan of Wurmser's first invasion, would be applicable to this march into the Tyrol. A little reflection however will bring to view important distinctions between the two operations. When Wurmser and Quasdonowich commenced their movements from the mountains to the plain, they were united. When Massena and Vaubois began their advance from the plain to the mountains, they were divided. Each march separated the Austrian general further and further, until on the third day, one was at Rivoli, and the other at Brescia, thirty miles apart. Each march brought the French generals nearer and nearer to one another, until, on the third day, they were fighting

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in connection at Serravalle and Mori, and separated only by the Adige, over which there was a bridge. As the Austrian columns proceeded, they penetrated into open plains, where the effect of a superior force would be more decisive against them. As the French columns advanced, they entered into steep mountains and narrow passes, where superiority of numbers would be of less advantage.

But notwithstanding this substantial difference between the two operations, and in favour of that directed by Bonaparte, he did not think the movement of Vaubois unattended with danger. He therefore sent special instructions to this general, and also to general St. Hilaire, who commanded the vanguard of the division and in whom he placed great confidence, urging upon them the necessity of keeping light parties to a distance in their front, and their artillery and baggage far in the rear, so that if approached by a superior force, the column might fall back a day's march, without inconvenience (3).

In addition to the slightness of the danger to which Vauheis' movement was exposed, and to the great prudence with which that danger was provided against, may be taken into consideration the incalculable superiority which both parties felt had been exhibited in the late contest by Bonaparte and his troops. Animated by the confidence which this conviction inspired, the French columns, winding along under the eye of their great commander, dived into the gloomy gorges of the Alps with no other anxiety than a fierce impatience to meet the foe who was to dispute their possession.

At two o'clock on the 3rd, the vanguard of Vaubois, upon reaching the bridge over the Sarca, found it defended by a brigade of the prince de Reuss, who with the rest of his division was stationed in an intrenched camp at Mori, five miles nearer to the Adige, and who trusted that the bridge would be maintained until be could bring his whole force to its defence. But St. Hilaire relying on the bayonet, attacked the Austrian brigade with a charge se furious, that it was dislodged in a moment, and retreated precipitately, leaving the bridge and fifty prisoners in possession of the French. Giving the enemy no time to rally, St. Hilaire pursued close on their heels, and forced them to take refuge in their intrenchments at Mori.

At the same hour, Massena's advance attacked the outpess

of Wukassowich at Alla, sabred a few dragoons, took their horses and drove their comrades up the Adige to Serravalle. Late in the afternoon, general Pigeon, who was in charge of the light brigade, having reported to Bonaparte that the enemy was in force at Serravalle, received instantly and executed without delay directions to dislodge them. With the post, he took three hundred prisoners. Here the commander in chief, with the main body of the troops, bivouacked; Pigeon pursuing the foe he had beaten, as far as Marco, where Wukassowich with his whole division was intrenched.

At day break, the next morning, the two armies, each consisting of two divisions, were confronted on both sides of the Adige, the Austrians occupying the fortified camp at Mori, and intrenchments in a strong and narrow defile at the village of Marco. On the side of Massena, the attack was commenced by general Pigeon, who at the head of a party of light infantry scaled the heights to the left of Marco. With another party thrown into loose order, adjutant general Sornet skirmished with the Austrians on the right, while general Victor at the head of the 18th of the line, in dose column, attacked them by a direct charge up the main street Notwithstanding the violence of the assault, the of the village. Austrians, encouraged by the gallantry of their commander and the strength of their ground, made a firm resistance, and held their position for two hours. At last, under the repeated and headlong efforts of the French, they betrayed marks of unsteadiness in the centre. Bonaparte instantly ordered general Dubois, an officer who had served with distinction on the Rhine, to charge them with the 1st hussars. The charge was bold, brilfant and victorious; but Dubois, after seeing his aide de camp shot at his side, fell mortally wounded. As he lay extended on the field, Bonaparte approached to speak to him, when collecting his last breath, he said: "I die for the republic; oh! let me live long enough to know that the victory is complete" (4).

Wukassowich, though hotly pursued, disputed sternly each turn of the road and point of the mountain, as he fell back upon his main position at Roveredo. Allowing him no time to rest or to rally, Bonaparte ordered general Rampon with the 32nd to get upon his flank, by advancing along the flat between the town and the river; and general Victor with the 18th in column, to charge him a second time in front. These movements

combined and impetuous, were crowned with success; Wukassowich was defeated after a stubborn resistance, with considerable loss, and forced to retire to Calliano, where in a strong and narrow defile, Davidowich had collected the main body of his corps; for during these operations Vaubois, on the opposite side of the Adige, had forced the intrenched camp of Mori, and compelled the prince de Reuss to retreat, in correspondence with Wukasso-

wich and in the same direction. The trophies of the French, besides a thousand prisoners, the ground they had gained, and the slaughter they had inflicted, consisted of three pieces of artillery.

It was now half past one; when Bonaparte directing Massessa to collect his separated regiments and allow them a momentary repose at Roveredo, advanced with an escort of cavalry to reconnoitre the enemy. He soon came up with them, about fre miles beyond Roveredo and ten this side of Trent, and discovered that although they had been defeated several times in the morning, they were now in a position which seemed impregnable. The village of Calliano seated in a gorge of a pass about eighty vards wide, and between mountains so steep and lofty, that their summits appeared almost to touch, was fortified by a castle that commanded the pass, and by a strong wall running from the base of the mountain to the left bank of the Adige, which washed by its rapid stream the foot of the opposite precisits. The castle was garrisoned, the streets and houses occupied, and embrasures, cut in the wall, were armed with cannon. Here Davidowich was resolved to make a stand, not only from a just confidence in the strength of the post, but from the necessity which was felt of giving time to Wurmser, who was still at Treat, te withdraw his headquarters from that town, and join his army on its march down the valley of the Brenta.

By the time Massena brought up the troops, Bonaparte, who knew that the success of his whole plan depended on the rapidity with which each step was executed, and who was of a character to hesitate at no difficulty, had determined on a dispetitor for attack. He ordered general Pigeon with the light infanty to scale the mountain on the right, and after clearing away the Austrian parties which held its accessible points, to fire deep upon the troops in the village.

On the left, he pushed forward alparty of sharpshooters under the bank of the river; and directed General Dommartin **

bring up eight fieldpieces, and take a position from which he could cannonade the village and reach the castle and the wall. The well directed fire of Dommartin, the galling musketry of Pigeon from the heights, and the close and fatal shots of the marksmen from the river bank, soon began to disturb Davidowich. strong and well posted has he was; when Bonaparte who had prepared a heavy column of nine battalions, seized the occasion, and ordered a charge. Rushing forward against a rattling fire of artillery and small arms from the wall, the castle, the houses, and the streets, the French column soon reached, and as soon overthrew the Austrians; and stopping at no obstacle, recoiling from no danger, cleared the village and the pass with greater slaughter. The retreat of Davidowich once begun, soon became precipitate, and the pursuit of Bonaparte was so vigorous that his aide de camp Lemarrais, with fifty hussars, passed entirely through the body of flying Austrians, and wheeling round, charged them in front, with intention of forcing them to lay down their arms. But stronger from fear than from courage, the routed Germans struck down Lemarrais with many blows, and rushing over his body in their flight, nearly crushed him to death. Bessières was equally bold and more fortunate; for, seeing a party of Austrians on the point of escaping with two field pieces, he put spurs to his horse, and followed by half a dozen of the guides, forced them to abandon their guns and save themselves by flight. In the two actions of Roveredo and Calliano, which were called the battle of Roveredo, Davidowich, besides an immense loss in killed and wounded, left in the hands of the French six thousand prisoners. twenty five pieces of artillery, and seven colours. The pursuit was urged inveterately the whole night, and at day break on the 5th, the division of Massena which had been joined by that of Vaubois, after exchanging a few cannon shot with the rear guard of Davidowich, entered the ancient city of Trent, twelve hours after Wurmser had quitted it on his march to the right down the Brenta-

It was now necessary to give rest to the exhausted troops, but it was also indispensable to drive Davidowich still further into the Alps, in order to accomplish the proposed connexion with Moreau; and with a view that the possession of the capital might not be doubtful, nor the movement in pursuit of Wurmser, interrupted. In the afternoon, accordingly, Bonaparte having ascertained that Davidowich had taken post about seven miles above Trent, de-

termined to attack him with the division of Vaubois, while Massena halted at Trent, and Augereau should come up to that towa. Putting himself at the head of the vanguard, and directing Vaubois to follow with the main body of his division, he found Davidowich intrenched in the village of Lavisio, where the Lavis falls through a deep and rocky channel into the Adige.

The Austrians were formed on the further bank, at the head of a bridge, which their batteries swept and commanded. It was the fierce temper of the present expedition to disregard difficulties, whatever their magnitude, and therefore, as soon as the division reached the ground, Bonaparte ordered an attack; directing Murat with the 10th light dragoons, each trooper having a foot soldier behind him, to ford the Lavis above the bridge, and breaking through the enemy's left to sweep round upon the rear of his centre, while General Dallemagne with the 25th of the line in close column, was to carry the bridge, and charge the Austrian line in With some difficulty, Murat forded the river, and his ininfantry alighting and commencing the attack, he succeeded in passing through the enemy's left and coming round upon their rear. Under the steady fire of the Austrian batteries, the first attack of Dallemagne failed. But Bonaparte riding to the frest of the 25th and telling the men to remember Lodi, they renewed the attack, carried the bridge, and entered the village. Austrians, forced in front and assailed in rear, fell into disorder, and fled in the greatest panic. In the pursuit, adjutant-general Leclerc, and Major Desaix, with fifteen grenadiers, managed to get ahead of the fugitives, and formed an ambush in a defile which they were to traverse in their flight. The Austrian cavalry, instead of protecting the rear, led the retreat, and first found themselves arrested. More resolute to fly than to conquer, they charged forward and gave Leclerc several sight wounds. But his grenadiers crossing their bayonets, formed a barrier which the despairing Austrians found impassable. The sun was below the horizon, and in this mountain glen it was already night, so that they could not see and could as little imagine the smallness of Leclerc's party. The consequence was that a hundred hussar's of Wurmser's own regiment, with three hundred infantry, surrendered prisoners of war to seventeen Frenchmen, giving up, with their arms, one standard.

Davidowich being thus repeatedly beaten, retired out of im-

mediate reach of his conqueror toward the sources of the Adige, and established his headquarters at Newmark, having lost, in four days fighting, more than fifty miles of an Alpine pass, the whole of the Italian Tyrol, ten thousand men, thirty pieces of artillery, and nine stands of colours (5).

Establishing Vaubois in the position from which he had driven Davidowich, Bonaparte returned immediately to Trent, and in the course of the night, caused the proclamation which he had dictated at Brescia, to be published. It was in these words:

"Tyrolians! you solicit the protection of the French army; you must show that you deserve it. The greater number of you are well disposed towards us; you must compel the small number of obstinate men to submit to the general will. Their unreasonable conduct draws upon their country the calamities of war.

"The superiority of our arms is now established. The ministers of the Emperor, corrupted by the gold of England, betray him. The unfortunate monarch takes not a step without committing a fault. Do you desire peace? The French are fighting for it; we come into your territory for no other purpose than to oblige the court of Vienna to comply with the wishes of desolated Europe, and to listen to the cries of their own people. We come not here with projects of aggrandizement. Nature has marked out the Alps and the Rhine as our frontiers, at the same time that she made the Tyrol, the limit of the house of Austria.

"Tyrolians! whatever may have been your conduct heretofore, return to your homes. Abandon colours which have been
so often dishonoured by defeat, and which are powerless for your
protection. It is not a few enemies more, that can intimidate the
conquerors of the Alps, and of Italy; but the generosity of my
country commands that I should endeavour to make the victime
of this war less numerous. We have proved ourselves to be
formidable in battle, but the friends of those who receive us with
hospitality. The religion, customs, and property, of such districts
as submit to us, shall be respected."

To this proclamation was annexed the following ordinance:

"The communes into which the companies of Tyrolians shall not have returned on our arrival, shall be laid waste with fire, the inhabitants seized as hostages, and sent to France. When a commune shall submit, the syndics shall be bound to give in, within an hour, a list of such of the inhabitants as are in the pay of the

Emperor; and if they make part of the Tyrolian companies, their houses shall be burnt immediately, and their relations, to the third degree, arrested and sent off as hostages. Every Tyrolian belonging to the free companies, who may be taken with arms in his hands, shall be forthwith shot. The generals of division are charged with the strict execution of this ordinance."

These cogent demonstrations of persuasion and menace, had the effect which was desired. The inhabitants, satisfied that no permanent conquest of their province was to be attempted, submitted, at first in quiet constraint, and finally with good will, to the victorious invaders of their mountains (6).

When the difficulties which Bonaparte overcame in this irraption into the Tyrol are considered, the confidence of success with which he undertook it will appear surprising. This proclamation was prepared, it will be remembered, at Brescia; and on the 3rd of September, upon getting to Alla, before he had gained a single action, he foretold to Josephine the very day on which he would enter Trent. "We are in full campaign my adorable friend; we have dislodged the enemy's outposts, taken eight er ten horses and as many dragoons. The troops are very gay and in the best temper. I hope we shall succeed, and enter Trent en the 5th" (7).

The impetuous advance of Bonaparte into the Tyrol, his capture of Trent, and pursuit of Davidowich even beyond the Lavis, by intercepting the Inspruck line of communication with Vienne, created a necessity for Wurmser to disengage himself quickly from the defiles of the Tyrol, and adopt for his line of operations, the Styrian route between Mantua and Vienna. Fresh motives were thus supplied for his movement down the valley of the Brenta; and additional reasons presented themselves, in recommendation of his design of attempting the relief of Mantua, in that direction. Moreau, advancing through the country lying between the Danube and the Alps, had passed successively the Lech and the Iser; and with the light troops of his right wing. had entered the valley, which opens up from the plains of Bavaria toward Inspruck. The facility which this state of things seemed to afford for a junction between the armies of Bonaparte and Moreau, confirmed Wurmser in the inference, that the vehement and sanguinary pursuit of Davidowich deep into the Tyrolian mountains, was a determined step in the march of his ad-

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versary, from the waters of the Adige to those of the Danube. Under this impression, he commenced his movement down the valley of the Brenta, free from apprehension of annoyance in his rear, or of serious resistance in his front, while forcing the passage of the lower Adige, liberating the garrison of Mantua. recovering possession of Lombardy, and reinstating among the various potentates of Italy, the former relations and paramount influence of the Emperor. Subjected to this false impression, and inflated with these visionary hopes, the fieldmarshal, instead of recalling a part of his corps to Trent in order to sustain Davidowich, decided to leave him to his fate, and to allow Bonaparte, if he could, to force his way into Bavaria. While he was yet at Trent, therefore, he sent orders to Mezaros, who had the conduct of his advanced division, not to halt at Bassano, but to pass the Brenta and push on to Verona, cross the Adige and relieve Mantua. He himself, with the columns of Sebottendorf and Quasdonowich, and a strong reserve of cavalry, was to follow immediately in his support. But Bonaparte was far from retaining, in the cool and lengthened nights of September, the same project for operations in the Alps, which he had proposed in the long days and fervent heat of the summer solstice.

Inadvertence to the variation in the state of the mountain passes, about to be produced by the change of the seasons, which would appear to have vitiated the reasoning of Wurmser, was perceptible in the instructions of the directory, to which Bonaparte replied before day on the 6th of September. After saying that he was now in a position to form the desired connexion with Moreau, should this general advance to Inspruck, he observed: "The plan which we are adopting"—" which was a good one in the month of June, is of no value in the end of September. The snow will soon reestablish the barriers of nature. Already the cold begins to be sharp. The enemy who has felt it, has thrown himself on the Brenta in order to cover Trieste. I march to day along that river to attack him at Bassano, or to cut off his rear if he moves upon Verona" (8).

Just after this letter was written, intelligence was received from general Kilmaine, that Mezaros was on his march from Bassano, and might be expected to arrive in front of Verona on the 7th. Upon this information, Bonaparte formed the instant resolution, in accordance with his original plan, by giving the utmost expedi-

tion to his movement, to fall upon Wurmser while separated from Mezaros; to enclose him in the district between the Brenta and the Adige, should be push toward Mantua; or should be retire behind the Piave at his approach, to envelop and destroy Mezaros, and then return in pursuit of Wurmser toward Trieste. Committing to general Vaubois the defence and the government of the Tyrel, and authorising him, in the event of Moreau's right wing advancing to Inspruck, to move towards him as far as the Bress or main crest of the Alps, he commenced, at day break on the 6th, his rapid march down the rocks and ravines of the Brenta. Angereau, who had not been engaged in the late furious combats, was now thrown in advance; the divisions, wielded by the dexterous vigour of their chief, succeeding each other on the dreadful theatre of war, with the gaiety and precision of troops of dansers shifting in the ballet. The division of Massena constituted the main bedy. and the cavalry followed in the rear.

It was Bonaparte's calculation that as Wurmser had quitted Trent on the evening of the 4th, it would be necessary, in order to reach him before he could overtake or recall Mezaros, to accomplish the march to Bassano in two days at most, that is to go over as much ground in two days, as the Austrian general would in three and a half. The distance was fifty-five miles and the route reced and difficult. But a few words of exhortation kindled the arder of the troops to such a pitch of excitement, that they made comtions which perfectly answered his hopes. After waiting to finish his despatches and to see the last man out of Trent, he set off to evertake the advance; saw, for the first time, the waters of the Brents, and encamped late at night with the vanguard of Augerean, # Borgo Valzugagno having traversed half the distance and the roughest part of the route. At dawn, on the 7th, the swift march was resumed, the road being smoother the pace was accelerated, and in a few hours the van, commanded by general Lanusse, case up with the rearguard of Wurmser in the village of Primoless, where the course of the Brenta approaching the face of a steep rock, formed a pass which appeared impervious. The Austrian were formed in two lines, their right resting against the rock, their left touching the river. Not a moment's pause, not an instant's hesitation, was allowed. The 5th light infantry skirmished as sharpshooters, while the 4th of the line, conducted by Lannes, was formed into a column of attack, and rushing headlong into the jaws of the pass, bore down all resistance, forcing the Austrians to retire with a loss of four hundred prisoners. The small but strong fort of Covolo, cut in the living rock, and situated lower down the pass, served as a rallying point. But that post was turned on the left by the light troops, while a vigorous assault was made in front, and the Austrians were again dislodged. The 10th hussars and 5th light dragoons, commanded by colonel Milhaud, followed in a charge, and gaining the front of the retreating Austrians compelled them to lay down their arms. Four thousand prisoners, ten cannon, fifteen ammunition waggons, and eight stands of colours, were the fruits of this success. The army proceeding down the left bank of the Brenta, crossed its tributary the Vannoi, and delayed in its progress by the two combats, bivouacked at the village of Cismoni; were Bonaparte, who, from impatience to bring Wurmser to action, had kept constantly in front, established his quarters. Separated from his staff officers, his guides, attendants, and baggage, and exhausted with fatigue and hunger, he was glad to divide with a soldier, who lived to remind him of it years afterwards, a ration of bread (9).

Wurmser who had just reached Bassano, about twelve miles in advance, heard with surprise and not without alarm, that his terrible and active foe, instead of being engaged in the distant defiles of the Tyrol, had cleared the gorges of the Brenta, destroyed his rearguard, and was thundering at the gates of his camp. Not wanting in resolution he faced about instantly, detached a corps of five thousand men up the Brenta to Solagno, and formed his line of battle sixteen thousand strong, exclusive of a splendid corps of four thousand horse, on both sides of the river, about a mile in front of Bassano, where the valley was narrow. and defensible. His ground and his numbers induced him to hope that he could arrest the progress of Bonaparte, until Mezaros should enable him to become the assailant, and to change at last, the fortune of the war. He sent accordingly express after express to that officer, requiring him to countermarch upon Bassano, and adding entreaty to command, urged him to put in the movement the greatest possible celerity. But there was not time for Mezaros, who was himself demanding assistance, to come between the lion and his prey. With his utmost exertions, he had returned only as far as Montebello, when Wurmser a second time felt the force of Bonaparte in a pitched battle, and was a second time signally overthrown.

, the French were in At two o'clock on the morning of the motion, the commander in chief at the Land of the Ldvance; and at six they came in sight of the five thousand Austrians posted at Solagno, on both sides of the Brenta, and in the narrow pass, where that river escapes from the mountains into the plain, through which it finds its way to the sea. Massena, whose division was now in front, was ordered to cross to the right bank of the Brenta. and scaling the mountain, to turn the enemy's left, and by a brisk attack to force the pass on that side; while Augereau continued his direct movement against the party on the other, which would be exposed and shaken by Massena's success. The operation in both directions succeeded, and the Austrians fled with the loss of two thousand prisoners and four pieces of artillery: falling back in confusion on Wurmser's main body, and augmenting is numbers without increasing its spirit.

The victors, with unabated rapidity, continued their advance, and soon entered the expanding valley in front of Bassano. The first glance at Wurmser's line of battle dictated Bonaparte's plan of attack. Operating again with his right wing, he directed Massena to occupy a chain of hills which commanded Wurmser's left, and extended to the suburbs of Bassano. The commencement of the evolution indicated to Wurmser the importance of ground. which, though it was nearer to him than his adversary. he had neglected; and he detached a party with orders to seize it. Bonaparte, determining not to be prevented, rode up to Massess's light troops, and commanding them to follow him at a runn pace, reached the disputed eminence as soon as the Austrians. A fight under his personal direction took place on the summit, the two parties exchanging volleys of musketry as they approached. As soon as the distance was sufficiently shortened, Bonaparte ordered his men to cease firing and fall on with the bayonet. The Austrians were quickly dispersed and the French firmly established on the height

This point being gained, and the detachment ordered to act on the enemy's flank, Bonaparte next directed Massena and Angereau to execute a general attack on Wurmser's line; the former of the right, the latter on the left bank of the Brenta. Augereau had the greater numbers, Massena the stronger ground to overcome. Both employed the bayonet, and both were successful, the divisions emulating each other, the regiments charging with astonishing impetuosity, and breaking the thick ranks of the enemy at every onset. Massena, inclining towards his party on the height, and repeating his attacks with promptness and vivacity, crowded the enemy down against the river, and forced his way toward the bridge of Bassano. On the other side, Augereau, who handled his troops with vigour and skill, leaning with his right upon the river, and moving directly upon Bassano, contrived, with a small body of horse under Murat, to curb, even in the open plain, the powerful cavalry of Wurmser. In this order, Massena approached the bridge of Bassano, and Augereau the town itself; when the former general, putting himself at the head of the 4th regiment of the line commanded by Lannes, forced the bridge by a vigorous charge, seized the guns by which it was defended, and turning them on the enemy, entered the place at the same moment with Augereau, and pellmell with the routed Austrians.

Here Wurmser found himself compelled to fight for the defence of his headquarters. The desperate resistance of a battalion of grenadiers who were cut down almost to a man, enabled him to escape with a small escort of dragoons, his military chest, and his personal baggage. His extreme right, commanded by Quasdonowich, being wedged out from Bassano by the direction of Augereau's attack, retreated in safety to the Frioul. But his left, which had been opposed to Massena and jammed in upon the river was in great part destroyed or taken. His numerous artillery, instead of retiring down the direct road to Citadella and Padua, by which means it might have been conveyed across the Brenta and united with the corps of Mezaros, fled from the field into the town, where it increased the confusion of the vanquished and the triumph of the victors. By three o'clock the battle Wurmser's loss besides an immense proportion of was over. slain, consisted of six thousand prisoners, thirty cannon, three hundred ammunition and baggage waggons, fourteen hundred horses, and two bridge equipages, each composed of thirty boats. In short, his army was disorganized and, with the exception of his cavalry and the three thousand men who escaped under Quasdonowich, with as many scattered fugitives who joined Mezaros, destroyed; a catastrophe which confirmed the promise of Bonaparte to the directory two days before, in his report of the battle of Roveredo. "You may expect very soon to hear of a battle, still more bloody and decisive." For his gallantry in

this action in which he himself took two Austrian colours, Lannes was promoted to the rank of brigadier general.

In flying from Bassano down the left bank of the Brenta, the Austrian fieldmarshal, finding himself closely pursued by a party of Bonaparte's guides, turned fiercely upon them, killed two of the men, wounded their lieutenant, and continuing his flight to Fonteniva twelve miles from Bassano, crossed the Brenta, and taking the road to Vicenza, succeeded in uniting at that place his few attendants with the division of Mezaros. The victorious army needed repose, and encamped for the night at Bassano.

It was on this night that an incident occurred which is strongly illustrative of Bonaparte's poetical temperament, or his keen susceptibility of emotion from any object, however simple, which happened to excite his imagination. It cannot be better related than in his own words; "Attended by three or four officers. I crossed a part of the field of battle, from which the dead were not yet removed. The moon shone beautifully bright, and the stillness of the night was profound. Suddenly, a dog rising up from the clothes of a dead body, sprang towards us, and ran back inmediately to his bed. By turns he licked the face of his master. and flew at us, seeking, it appeared, both assistance and revenue. Whether it was owing to the humour of the moment, or to the effect of the place, or the time, or the act itself, or to some indefeable influence, it is certainly true, that I never witnessed any thing. on a field of battle before or since, which so deeply affected me. I stopped involuntarily to contemplate the spectacle. This man, I said to myself, had probably many friends, some no doubt in his camp and in his company; yet here he lies, abandoned by every creature but his dog. What a lesson does nature teach us in this faithful brute. What is man! and how mysterious are his impressions! Without emotion, I had ordered battles which were to decide the fate of armies. With dry eyes, I had witnessed evolutions which were to cost the lives of many of my own men; and here I found myself moved and agitated by the cries and grief of a dog! Of this at least I am convinced that, at that moment, I should have been more relenting than usual to a suppliest enemy; and could better than ever have entered into the feelings of Achilles, when he restored the body of Hector to the tears of Priam " (10).

When we read these touching reflections, it is hard to refrain

from remembering the fate of the man who made them; that Berthier, Augereau, Murat, and Marmont, who probably witnessed, if they did not share, his emotion at the desolate fidelity of the soldier's dog, all deserted or betrayed him; and that Augereau, adding the venom of insult to the sting of treachery, made the memory of his ingratitude as lasting as that of his courage.

The day before the battle of Bassano, Mezaros whose force amounted to nine thousand men, had attacked Verona, in the hope of gaining possession of that important place without difficulty. But the quarter against which he advanced, had been skilfully fortified. A strong demi-lune defended the Vicenza gate, and parties of cavalry and infantry advantageously posted upon the roads approaching it, skirmished successfully with the Austrian light troops. But Mezaros pressed forward through the plain with his main body, supported by a corps of two thousand cavalry, and Kilmaine unable to resist him, retired slowly behind his works, unmasking a battery of thirty pieces, with which the aide de camp Muiron poured showers of grape shot into the hostile column. Mezaros, upon this, brought up his guns, and under cover of their fire, attempted an assault. But his efforts, which were attended with serious loss, promised no success, and he drew back and encamped at St. Michel. In the course of the night, he sent an express to Wurmser, demanding a reenforcement of infantry, and a bridge equipage, with the design of investing Verona, passing the Adige and marching to Mantua. But while waiting for assistance he was required to afford it, and although he yielded prompt obedience, instead of supporting his commander in the battle of Bassano, he was only able as has been related, to receive him in his flight at Vicenza.

By the positions of Vaubois in the Alps, and of Bonaparte on the Brenta, Wurmser was cut off from the Tyrol, and from all communication whatever with Vienna; at the same time that Kilmaine's positions on the Adige, separated him from Mantua. The flower of his army, its courage, confidence and strength, were destroyed; his artillery and magazines in possession of the French; and in place of thirty thousand well appointed troops, with which but two days before he was prepared to penetrate to Mantua, he could muster but fifteen thousand disheartened followers, who, repulsed at Verona, and beaten at Bassano, were

herded together at an intermediate point, watchful not for fame but for safety, and studious not to fight but to fly. Thus situated the unfortunate successor of Beaulieu, was disposed to look for escape in any direction rather than that, in which their common destroyer was approaching. He turned his eyes anxiously towards Mantua.

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Early on the 9th, Bonaparte detached the division of Augerean down the left bank of the Brenta to Padua, and crossing that river on the bridge of Bassano with the division of Massena, supported by the cavalry, marched himself for Vicenza; intending by holding the two great routes from Verona, to intercept Warnser's return to the valley of the Brenta, and to enclose him in the angle formed by the upper and the lower Adige. At this moment, the position of the Austrian general was most critical, he himself despairing of safety and his adversary counting on his capture. But the fortune of war disappointed the hopes of this and the fears of that commander, by means which though perfectly fortuitous, were as well adapted to the end they produced, as if they had been designed with earnest meditation and arranged with the greatest care.

As Bonaparte advanced Wurmser fell back, and at night, on the 9th, was at Montebello; when hearing that the French general had reached Vicenza the same evening, he continued all night his march for the Adige. His numerous cavalry, which having su fered slight loss, was less disheartened than his infantry, inwadeted the plain as he approached the river, and like the fabled styri ghosts crowded the bank in search of a passage. At Alberta. about midway between Verona and Porto Legnano, they got peesession of the ferryboat, in which two squadrons were passed over, with orders to reconnoitre the positions of the French around Mantua, and if it could be done, to communicate with the garrison. It was not possible that Wurmser with the rest of his troops, composed in great part of horse, and having the French army at their heels, could effect a passage in this single hoat; and had he crossed over with only a few followers, thus incurring the disgrace of abandoning his army, his chance of passing through the lines of the besiegers, would have been desperate. But it was at this moment, when the zeal of his followers could afford him no hope of rescue, that the folly of a French officer came to his relief. When Kilmaine first felt the approach of Mezaros, he ordered

up to Verona the garrison of Porto Legnano, and sent directions to general Sahuguet, to supply its place by a detachment from the army of the siege. This order Sahuguet obeyed; but the officer commanding the new garrison, had hardly reached Porte Legnano, when he learned that some of the stragglers of his party, while following in his rear, had been cut to pieces by the Austrian cavalry. They had in fact been fallen in with by the two squadrons which on the morning of the 10th crossed at the ferry of Albaredo. Alarmed at this circumstance, and imposed on by the reports spread by the Austrians, that the French army had been cast off in the defiles of the Brenta, and that Wurmser with his whole force was approaching, he abandoned his post and marched back to the lines around Mantua, with such haste and trepidation that he left the bridge of Porto Legnano entire, although it was of wood. This circumstance being soon discovered by a party of Austrian dragoons, was instantly communicated to Wurmser, and furnished an opportunity for his escape. hastened to Porto Legnano, and took possession of the place and of the bridge.

By this time Bonaparte, rapidly pursuing, had reached Arcola. a village near the mouth of the Alpon and the bank of the Adige, a little above Albaredo. Informed here of Wurmser's unexpected possession of a passage across the Adige, he still hoped to intercept him before he could pass the Molinella, a smaller river twenty miles in front; or at least before he could enter Mantua. In the evening of the 10th accordingly, he proceeded through the marshes of Arcola to the ferry at Ronco, and directed Massena with the ferry boat, and such rafts as could be constructed to put his division across the river. At the same time, he sent orders to Augereau to march immediately from Padua to Porto Legnano, taking case to throw out a strong party on his left flank, lest the Austrian general, keeping down the Adige, should evade him in the direction of Castel Baldo. On the opposite side general Kilmaine was ordered, with all the troops he could spare from his small force at Verona, to fall back to the Molinella; and general Sahuguet with a brigade of the besieging army to advance to Castellaro, where the road from Porto Legnano to Mantua passes that river, the bridges over which he was to destroy. But Kilmaine and Sahuguet even if united, would be so feeble, that it was necessary for Massena's division

to interpose, before the Austrians, in the precipitation of retreat, should reach them. Could this be effected, Wurmser's eacspe would be impracticable. Driven from the Adige by Augereau, and repelled from the Molinella by Massena, Kilmaine, and Sahuguet, he would be forced to lay down his arms between these two rivers, and almost in sight of the fortress which he had hoped to enter with relief, and at one time with conquest.

In consequence of fatigue, or by reason of a disinclination to abandon all chance of regaining the valley of the Brenta and his natural communications with Austria, or of that indifference to the value of time with which the imperialists seemed to be afflicted; or perhaps from an anxiety to get intelligence from his two squadrons of hussars who had passed the Adige at Albaredo: Wurmser halted the whole of the 10th at Porto Legnano, and thereby gave his adversary full time to get between him and Mantua. But, on the morning of the 11th, having been apprized by his patrols that the division of Augereau was approaching from Padua, and had already captured at Montagnana a rear guard of five hundred men, he left a detachment eighteen hundred strong to defend the bridge of Porto Legnano against his persuers, and took the direct route to Mantua. At the same time Bonaparte had completed the passage of the Adige at Ronco. and was pushing forward to intercept him at Sanguinetto, a town half way between Porto Legnago and Castellaro.

From Ronco to Sanguinetto there were two routes: one leading to the left and for some distance along the Adige, fell into the main road from Porto Legnano to Mantua, at the village of Corea: the other passing directly across the country, struck the same main road, at Sanguinetto itself. General Pigeon, who commanded Massena's vanguard, followed this direct route, but Murat with five hundred light dragoons took that to the left, hecause it inclined more towards the enemy. At Cerea he cacountered the head of Wurmser's column, and drove it back by an instant charge; but pursuing it some distance with his characteristic boldness, he was exposed to a fire of artillery which cat off some of his men, and forced him to retreat. General Pieces equally ardent, upon hearing the cannonade, inclined also rapidly to his left; and upon reaching Cerea drew up the 4th light infantry twelve hundred strong, behind a stream which crossed the road in front of the village; hoping with his small party supported

by Murat, to arrest Wurmser's heavy column, until Massena could come to his assistance. By this unforeseen manœuvre he exposed himself to a superiority of force, which, as it moved under the combined impulse of discipline and desperation, no gallantry on ground such as he had taken, could possibly withstand.

Wurmser was at first daunted by the attack of Murat, and for a moment hesitated to continue his movement. But discovering by means of his multitude of cavalry that there was but a handful of men in his front, he resumed his march, and opening his column into line, turned Pigeon on both flanks, charged him in front, and by the weight of numbers overpowered him, taking about half his infantry and forcing him with the rest of his party to fly. This obstacle being overcome, the marshal half emboldened and half alarmed, resumed with celerity his march for Mantua, when another accident still further diversified the aspect of these intricate movements.

Bonaparte, who was in front of Massena's division on the direct road to Sanguinetto, upon hearing the fire at Cerea, conjectured its cause, and ordering the troops to follow him, rode thither at full gallop. But when he arrived, Pigeon was already routed, and the Austrian dragoons driving on in pursuit. He just had time to wheel about, put spurs to his horse, and escape. It happened that Wurmser came to the very spot he had reached, a few moments after he turned back, and was told of the circumstance by a peasant woman. He ordered a pursuit in every direction, commanding, however, that the French general, if overtaken, should be brought to him alive; thus signalising by a soldier's generosity his misfortunes as a general. Rut it was not in the power of the aged marshal to destroy or to spare the antagonist, before whom he had so frequently fled. Bonaparte soon fell in with the 8th battalion of grenadiers under General Victor. This formidable corps, behind which the broken troops of Pigeon and Murat had rallied, presented a barrier which the Austrian party did not attempt to force, but rejoining their main body, they continued their movement on the direct road to Mantua.

It was now impossible to intercept Wurmser with Massena's division; but Bonaparte hoped, if his order for destroying the bridges over the Molinella had been executed, that Sahuguet and Kilmaine might stop him at Castellaro, until he could overtake him

the next day. It was already dark, and as the troops had been allowed no rest since the morning after the battle of Bassano, Massena was ordered to collect his corps and bivouack for the night. At day break the pursuit was renewed, the main body of the division pushing on to Sanguinetto, while general Victor with a brigade was detached to Porto Legnano, in order to cooperate with Augereau, in the capture of the Austrian rearguard which, it was ascertained from the prisoners, had been left there to defend the bridge.

Wurmser continued his retreat all night, and early in the morning came to Nogara, about six miles from the Molinella. There discovering by his scouts that the French were waiting for him at Castellaro, he sent forward a detachment to amuse them. and with his principal force turned off to the left, in hopes of finding a passage three miles lower down at Villa Impenta. This movement proved fortunate, for general Sahuguet had neglected to destroy the bridge at that place. As soon as he discovered Wurmser's change of direction, he sent general Charton at the head of five hundred of the 12th light infantry to Villa Impenta. with directions to retard the enemy until he and general Kilmaine could fall back to a point between Wurmser and Mantua, with their united force. But before Charton reached Villa Impenta, Wurmser had passed the bridge. Charton, instead of throwing his detachment behind the hedges and ditches with which the ground was intersected, led on by his boiling courage and the confidence of his men, met the attack of two regiments of cuirassiers, in the open field. His party was overwhelmed in an instant, two hundred of his men slain, the rest taken, and himself killed on the spot—affording by his gallantry but a poor atonement for his rashness. This obstruction, and a similar one a little further on at Due Castelli, having been surmounted, the Austrians reached Mantua without further difficulty, the besiegers, from the smallness of their force and their sanguine hope of reducing the place, having neglected to throw up lines of circumvallation. On the evening of the 12th of September, and at the head of thirtees thousand men, the aged marshal established his headquarters in the suburb of St. George, and his communication with the gar-But instead of averting their fate, he was destined to share and prolong their calamities.

On the same day, Augereau arrived in front of Porto Legnano, and

summoned the commander, who finding his post invested by the brigade of Victor in the rear, surrendered, yielding invisiteen hundred and seventy three men prisoners of war, with twenty two pieces of artillery, as well as five hundred men of Pigeon's party which had been taken at Cerea the day before.

Upon reaching Castellaro in the afternoon of the 12th, Bonaparte found that Kilmaine and Sahuguet had fallen back from the Molinella, and soon after learned that, notwithstanding his efforts and perseverance, Wurmser had again escaped him. However relaxing neither in activity nor vigour, he commenced immediately www dispositions, tending to shut the marshal up in Mantua, where he would be exposed to the ravages of the climate and want of provisions, the sooner and more severely, by reason of mambers. With this object in view, he sent orders to Aureau to hasten forward from Porto Legnano to Governolo, to e and hold that important issue from the Seraglio, and then move up the left bank of the Mincio, against the Austrian right. In the morning of the 14th, with Massena's division, he himself advanced upon the road to Due Castelli, with intention of acting sminst their front; while Sahuguet finding his blockade raised, had passed above Wurmser's left, and gained the Roverbello road. Limaine fell in with Massena's division and followed in its rear.

At Due Castelli, the light troops of Massena attacked by surprise a superior body of Austrians, and at first gained some advantage; but the 5th regiment which was to support the advance, missed the road, and failed to come up in season. The Austrians rallied and repelled their assailants, who were charged in their retreat by a corps of dragoons just returned from foraging, and driven back with loss. The 32nd however, led by general Rampon came to their rescue, and being supported by Kilmaine with the 20th dragoons, renewed the action, and though repeatedly charged by a superior force of horse and foot, maintained a successful fight until night, and driving the Austrians out of Due Castelli, encamped on the battle ground.

On the right, General Sahuguet invested the citadel so as to cut off its communication with Mantua, and attacked the suburb of La Favorita, at first successfully, taking a number of prisoners, and three field pieces. But the post being sustained by a strong sortie from the town, he was forced to retire with the loss of the guns he had taken.

Augergau who had fallen sick at Porto Legnano, resigned the command of his division to general Bon, who in obedience to the orders of Bonaparte marched upon Governolo; where in dislodging a party of Austrians, Lannes was wounded. These operations which on the whole were not discouraging to the Austrians, terminated their retreat and the pursuit of the French, closed the day of the 14th, and were preliminary to the battle of St. George (11).

On the 15th the Austrian field marshal was prepared to accept battle and to contend for the suburbs of Mantua; having drawn all the assistance he could from the garrison into his line. With his left wing established in the suburb of the Favorita, his centre in that of St. George, and his right posted behind dikes and country houses in the direction of Pietoli, he presented a front, well garnished with artillery, of eighteen thousand infantry and more than five thousand cavalry. The French general, after closely reconnoitring his position in the forenoon, advanced against him from three points with a force about equal in infantry, greatly inferior in cavalry, but so superior in spirit that, notwithstanding the weight of the Austrian artillery, and the advantage of their sheltered position, the victory was not doubtful. The action was commenced at two o'clock in the afternoon by

The action was commenced at two o'clock in the afternoon by general Bon, who coming up from Governolo assailed the Austrian right with vivacity, and compelled it to shrink upon the centre. But Wurmser, under the impression that this was the principal attack of the French, brought his whole reserve to this point, forced Bon to retire, and pressed on him vigorously as be fell back. On the right, general Sahuguet took a position facing the suburb of the Favorita, and opened a fire on the Austrian left wing, which producing an impression on Wurmser's mind that the whole French line was engaged, made him inattentive to his centre at St. George, against which Bonaparte in person advanced at the head of Massena's division.

General Pigeon with the light infantry marched in front, and was directed to deviate to his right, in order to turn an open plain which was to be traversed by the troops, and in which they might be charged by the Austrian cavalry. His position in front of this plain would also enable him to intercept the communication between St. George, and the Favorita, or the enemy's left and centre. The division followed; general Rampon with the 32nd supported

by Kilmaine with two regiments of horse, on the right; general Victor with the 18th of the line and the 8th battalion of grenadiers, in close column on the left; and Massena with the rest of the division in reserve. As soon as the two lines were engaged, Victor led his column to a charge, broke the Austrian centre, and tarried the suburb of St. George. In this assault, the 5th battalion of grent diers was conducted by adjutant general Leclerc and the ide de camp Marmont, and performed prodigies of valour. the 1st battalion of the 18th, pursuing the Austrians out of the tirb, was charged in open ground by a squadron of Hunga-M tairassiers, who having overpowered the vanguard of Pigeon iii Carea and destroyed the party of Charton at Villa Impenta, regained the confidence natural to cavalry against uncovered satry. This brave battalion however received the charge on he points of their bayonets, and as the cuirassists recoiled from sparkling steel, gave them a fire so dreadful, that all who surbd it, surrendered on the spot.

The violent attack on his centre affected Wurmser's progress of his right, and general Bon renewed his assault in that quarter. The Austrians retiring before him, and finding their centre broken, fell into confusion and fled. Part escaped over the causeway of St. George; but the great mass retreated along the shore of the lake to the causeway of the Favorita. Rampon with the Mind, Pigeon with the vanguard, and Sahuguet with the right ving, pressed closely upon them and made many prisoners. But being covered by the fire from the ramparts of Mantua, and the Attifications of the citadel, and his rear protected by cavalry, Warmser with about nineteen thousand men, got safe into Man-His loss in killed, wounded and prisoners did not exceed four thousand, including amongst the last a regiment of six hundred cuithesiers, all mounted; showing that on this occasion his resistance was not desperate. Eleven guns and three colours fell into the hands of the French, whose loss in killed was not considerable. But owing to the intrepidity and exertions of the officers, a great Sumber of them were wounded; generals Victor, St. Hilaire, Berthe, Meyer, and Murat; colonels Leelerc, Talland, and Suchet. Others also were distinguished, and recommended for promotion (12).

The Austrian general, after being driven into Mantua, occupied the Seragile, into which Bonaparte, partly from the existasted con-

dition of his troops, and partly from a hope that the enemy, finding themselves unrestrained, might venture on another battle in the field, had declined to penetrate. But Wurmser availing himself of the opportunity thus afforded him, threw a bridge of boats over the Po, and brought into the place a number of cattle and a large supply of forage. On the 20th a party of fifteen hundred Austrian horse came out as far as Castellucchio, where one of the French grand guards was posted. This retired according to orders, with a view of drawing the Austrians further out: but they hesitated, halted, and then withdrew within their lines. Four days afterwards, however, general Ott, with a strong corps principally of cavalry, passing down the right bank of the Mincio, made an effort to carry the bridge at Governolo, with inteation it was thought of getting into the rear of the French, crossing the Adige, gaining the Brenta, and thus relieving the garrison of useless and expensive troops. But the French maintained themselves against a number of charges and a severe cannonade, until they were reenforced, when the Austrians were repulsed with the loss of a thousand men and six guns. After this severe check, Wurmser showed no disposition to risk a contest in the field, and Bonaparte ordering Massena to reform the army of observation, took the command of the siege from general Sahuguet whose inadequate measures had opened the way for Wurmser's escape, and conferred it on general Kilmaine who, by his firmness and address in defending Verona, had risen greatly in his esteem.

On setting out for Milan, where he was called by public daty and invited by private affection, he ordered Kilmaine to seize the first opportunity of driving in the garrison from all their outposts, and of occupying the Seraglio. This order was completely executed by the 1st of October; Kilmaine by retaining a regiment of Massena's division, having formed an army of nine thousand men, with which he entered the Seraglio, dislodged the detachments from the suburbs of Cerese and Pradella, and drove the garrison into the town. On the other side, the citadel being invested by Sahuguet, the third blockade of Mantua was complete, and Wurmser with twenty eight thousand men, his wounded and sick included, was confined within the narrow circuit of the walls. Hoping for relief, sooner or later, he took measures for holding out as long as possible, and had several thousand of his horses slaughtered and salted, thus avoiding a great consumption of for

rage, and procuring a large stock of food. This added to the supplies which had been collected from the surrounding country, and to several convoys which, during the interruption of the investment, the regency of Modena had introduced into the place, persponed to a day more distant than the besiegers expected, the possibility of reducing the garrison by famine.

Before his departure for Milan, Bonaparte made this disposition of his victorious troops. Massena, in command of the army of observation, occupied the valley and the gorges of the Brenta, with his headquarters at Bassano, and his light troops advanced to the banks of the Piave. General Bon with the division of Augreen was stationed at Verona, and had a garrison in Porto Legrano, which he was directed to fortify (13). Kilmaine, as already autioned, blockaded Mantua, where mindful of the easy entrance Wurmser into that fortress, he threw up a line of circumplation around the suburb of St. George; and Vaubois governed to Italian Tyrol, having an intrenched camp on the Lavis, and his headquarters at Trent.

During the first fortnight of September the Austrians, in the battles of Roveredo, Bassano, and St. George, and in the various preliminary and dependent combats, lost nine thousand men in killed and wounded, eighteen thousand prisoners, seventy five pieces of artillery, twenty two stands of colours, thirty general and eighty staff officers, six thousand horses, a quantity of baggage, several hundred ammunition waggons, and two bridge equipages. With about thirteen thousand men Wurmser took refuge in Mantua, the remnant of his fine army having escaped in straggling parties, or retreated under his beaten lieutenants. The loss of the French in the same period was estimated at seven thousand five hundred men, of whom eighteen hundred were stain, four thousand three hundred wounded, and fourteen hundred taken.

The honour of presenting to the directory the colours and standards won from the enemy in these glorious actions, was conferred by Bonaparte on his aide de camp Marmont, who had distinguished himself on several occasions. The ceremony took place on the 1st of October. The minister of war, in introducing Marmont to the directory, among other things said,—"Posterity will scarcely credit the assertion of history, that in a single campaign the whole of Italy has been conquered, three armies in succession

destroyed, more than fifty colours taken by the victors, and that forty thousand Austrians have laid down their arms; that, in fine, these prodigies have been accomplished by a young warrior only twenty-five years of age, with an army of Frenchmen only thirty thousand strong." In the address of Marmont there was this passage-"The army set forward; it overthrew every thing which opposed its march, and for the first time since the existence of the republic, French troops saw the sources of the Brenta, and entered the ancient walls of Trent. Then, changing suddenly its course, it reached, with the rapidity of lightning, the rear of the enemy, and general Bonaparte forced marshal Wurmser to receive battle even at his headquarters." After presenting the twenty-two Austrian colours, the aide de camp with much prepriety added, "I have the honour also to present to you, two colours taken from the troops of the Pope. To these trophist, which cost us but little exertion, we attach but small value, yet they serve to attest the activity of the army of Italy, and to mark the extent of country which it has overrun."

The president of the directory, who closed the ceremony by presenting a pair of pistols to Marmont, spoke as follow—" We give thanks to the brave army of Italy, and to the superior games which directs it. The executive directory, in the name of the republic, receive with the liveliest satisfaction the trophies of se many astonishing actions; and we charge you to convey to year brave brother soldiers this testimony of the national gratitude.

"And you, youthful warrior! to whose courage and good conduct the general testifies, wear these arms as a mark of colors of the part of the directory; and never forget that it is as glorises to employ them at home, in maintaining our republican constitution, as to use them in the destruction of our foreign enemies."

These presentations and discourses, designed upon classical models, and associating the ornaments of the army with the chiefs of the state, were well calculated to quicken the emulation, elevate the spirit, and confirm the fidelity of the troops. From sobriety of taste, or perhaps from incipient umbrage on the part of the directors, and egoistical intoxication on that of the aide de camp, their language echoed but faintly the sentiments of the minister's address. The emphasis of their applause was a twerged upon the army, while but transient notes of praise were estowed upon the general. But he, intent only on great and immortal

glory, was indifferent to the small distinctions of contemporary fame. Had he not been, the following inofficial letter from Carnot, dated the 19th of September, and written in answer to his despatch of the 6th from Trent, in which he had said, "You may soon expect to hear of a more bloody and decisive action," as well as to his report of the battle of Bassano, would have soothed his self-love, although it held out no hope of reenforcements from the government, nor of cooperation from the armies on the ne (14).

We waited, my dear general, with an impatience which you my readily conceive, the result of the action you announced to by your former courier. We have just received your last resurt, and though accustomed to the most extraordinary things on part, our hopes have been surpassed by the victory of Bas-What glory for you, immortal Bonaparte! what a terrible for haughty Austria! She could never have recovered from I had all our armies been as successful as that of Italy. But the erable falling back (reculade) of Jourdan, disconcerts all our projects. The army of the Rhine and Moselle, which was about reaching out its hand to you, finds itself exposed, almost surrounded, and obliged to retreat precipitately in order to defend heank; and it will require all the ability of Moreau to extricate throm this embarrassment. Nevertheless Beurnonville, who relives Jourdan, brings with him a considerable reenforcement. He will resume the offensive, and I hope the result of all this will be the general discomfiture of the army of prince Charles.

"It is not the less certain, however, that we shall be deprived of the resources of Bavaria, that your left is no longer supported, het we shall have great difficulty in furnishing you with succours, duivalent to the column that was to unite with you by the way Theoruck. It is then in your own energy, that our resources hest be found."

CHAPTER XVII.

From the 1st of October to the 1st of November 1796.

Armies of the Rhine—Repulse of Jourdan and retreat of Moreau—Instrutions of the directory—Nullified by the victories of Bonaparte, and falciloi
by the retreat of Moreau—Their erroneous views of the war—Their abstive and contradictory orders—Bonaparte applies for reenforcements—Increasing sickness of his troops—His absurd project for reducing Master—
His efforts to obtain auxiliaries in Italy—The people of Lombardy and so independence—Popular revolution in Reggio and Modena—Secondal
by Bonaparte, and discountenanced by the directors—Correspondence—
Congress of Modena—Cispadan and Transpadan republics—Bonaparte's proclamation at Bologna—Mission of cardinal Mattei—Conflicting pairs
of the directors—Their military and political plans, equally absurd—Operations of the archduke Charles—Incapacity of Beurnonville.

It has been already mentioned that when the destruction of Beaulieu's army and the first investment of Mantua, compelled the cabinet of Vienna to change its plan of campaign on the Rhine, and to confine itself on that frontier to the defensive, Jourdan and Moreau received orders, a second time, from the directory, to pass that river and to penetrate into Germany. In pursuance of their instructions the two generals, Jourdan opposed by Wartensless, and Moreau by the archduke Charles, advanced from the Rhine, and after several successful but not decisive actions, succeeded in conducting their forces, into the valley of the Danube. But on the 24th of August, the archduke Charles having marched rapidly with a large part of his force from the front of Moreau, across

the Danube, to the assistance of Wartensleben, attacked and worsted Jourdan at Amberg, and following up his blow, overtook and defeated him on the 3rd of September at Wurtsburg, compelling him to retreat with loss and disgrace to the Rhine. This mexpected reverse, exposing Moreau to an encounter with the united armies of the archduke and Wartensleben, caused him to abandon the positions he had gained on the Lech and the Iser, and renouncing all hope of forming a junction with Bonaparte in the Tyrol, to turn his undivided attention to the task of effecting his retreat to the Rhine. This painful operation he conducted with milantry and success, repelling attacks upon his rear, overreming resistance in his front, passing rapid rivers, scaling steep mountains, threading dismal forests, traversing gloomy defiles; constantly pursued, incessantly opposed, halting as often te fight as to rest, sometimes surrounded, never appalled, and always victorious (1).

What this famous retreat of Moreau, though in regard to national falling, it was in some degree a compensation for the miscarriage of Jourdan, was not the less fatal to the hopes of the directory, nor the less likely to disconcert the plans of Bonaparte. Its commencement was thus announced to him by Moreau in a letter of the 9th of September.

"I have received, citizen general, your letter of the 31st of Auand. I was prepared to attack the gorges of the Tyrol; the Lech and the Iser were already passed, which afforded us excellent openings upon Inspruck. But the army of the Sambre and Mease, when upon the point of arriving at Ratisbon, has been repulsed in a succession of affairs as far as Amberg, report says even as far as Wurtsburg. This compels me to change the direction of my movements. The enemy, who was unable to resist in this quarter, keeps the field only with heavy parties of cavalry on our flanks and in our rear, which occasionally annoy us. I cannot venture to impart to you my present intentions, for fear this letter should fall into the hands of the enemy. As soon as they are determined I will inform you. Our advanced posts occapy Newburg and Newstadt; the army is encamped at Guesserfeld. The corps of Ferino, occupies Mosbourg, Frankin and The right is on the sources of the Lech towards Lampten-Frunks, and Schougar. I most sincerely wish that more avorable events would enable me to second your operations."

or of lealy, and the u 5. general, which in the republic has obta en of energy to ex d. The arm chick might be productive of in frustate the scheme of the e has determined us to direct with the greatest part of his f Besinits and the upper Rhine, in o ville, who leads from the army to that of the Sunbre and Me that of the army of the North,

o reach Inspruck speedily, and to threaten an irruption into Baaria. Avoid as much as the nature of the country will permit, isseminating your troops, so as to leave nothing to chance, in he different operations which you will have to execute. You vill feel strongly the critical interest of existing circumstances, nd that it is absolutely necessary to exert all our means, and specially to combine their operation through the whole line on which our enemies act. This concert can alone restore us the ofensive on every point; and we flatter ourselves, that the manpuvre of prince Charles, fortunate for the moment, will draw apon his army a terrible blow by tempting him to try again the fortune of battles. We transmit you a copy of the last report received from general Jourdan; and in this despatch confine our observations to the movement which we direct the brave army of Italy and its able commander, to make in the Tyrol; referring you to our former letters for all matters concerning the other objects of the command confided to you."

When this letter was written, Bonaparte had conquered the Italian Tyrol, left Vaubois in a position to threaten Inspruck and cooperate with Moreau, had shattered to pieces the corps of Davidowich at Roveredo, and destroyed the army of Wurmser, at Bassano; and when it was received, had chased that general into Mantua, after defeating him and the garrison at Saint-George, These successes rendered this letter of instructions so very unseasonable, that no reference whatever is made to it in Bonaparte's correspondence.

Nor was the nullity of this despatch, confined to the instructions it conveyed to Bonaparte. So far was Moreau from profiting by the cooperative movements of the army of Italy, or from executing the promised attack upon the archduke Charles, or from leaving a detachment in Bavaria to cover the Lech and resist the Austrian general Latour, that after detaching Desaix to the left bank of the Danube and thence recalling him, he retreated with his whole army directly to the Rhine.

When Bonaparte, in communicating the armistice of Cherasco, said to the directory; "Before the expiration of a month, I hope to be on the Tyrolian mountains, to find the army of the Rhine, and in concert with it, to carry the war into Bavaria," the directory, in their despatch of the 7th of May, rejected the proposition, as "beset by the greatest obstacles, and difficulties that

might be called insurmountable." When he repeated the same proposition, with the express condition that he should first have taken Mantua, they again declined it and for the same reasons, in their despatch of the 18th of May. Yet in September, when Mantua was not taken, and when Jourdan had been defeated, Moreau compelled to renounce the offensive, and when saow was beginning to fall in the Alps, they recommended the very movement to Bonaparte, which, when proposed by him under more favorable circumstances both moral and physical, they had declined as impracticable and visionary.

The fact is they set out with the plan of making the Rhine their principal frontier, and the maritime Alps their secondary one. for this campaign; and they adhered to that system long after the astonishing successes of Bonaparte had completely inverted the circumstances on which it was founded, and attracted all the great interests of the war to the Italian frontier. For whether the armies on the Rhine advanced or retreated, his operations in Italy were equally arduous, active, bloody, successful, and bold; while the movements of the contending parties in Germany, were as has been shown, decisively regulated by the progress of his arms. This incongruity between the theory of the campaign and its actual development, added to the extreme celerity of Bonsparte's movements, and the swift succession of his victories. resdered the directory as little capable of prescribing his military operations, as of directing the course of the clouds, and made their instructions when they came to hand, inapplicable always, and frequently ridiculous; a circumstance which no doubt had its effect in impressing on the spirit of their correspondence, as appearance of confusion and of conscious absurdity which, in process of time, generated a degree of ill will against their enly successful commander.

To illustrate and confirm this view of the relation between the government at Paris and their general in Italy, it might suffice to refer to the instructions which he next received. On the 38th of September, the report of the battle of Bassano having reached them, the directory acquiesce in the practical nullity of their previous orders, and endeavour to overtake the rapid progress of their general's achievements, by an extension of their plans and by fresh instructions. "The army which you command, general, has completely justified our hopes in this campaign; but it appears

re surpassed them by the new successes which you rebus. The result of the actions of the 7th and 8th are as is as they are unparalleled, and even although Wurmth the inglorious relics of his force, should escape your t, which is by no means probable, we must regard the of his army as complete, and the conquest of Italy as irrele.

mong the dispositions we have adopted in order to reap the of our success, and to render it decisive in favor of the lic, all the interests of which lead to peace, the first is to to the emperor that, if he does not immediately send a plentiary to Paris to enter into negotiations, you are going to y the port of Trieste, and all his establishments on the ic. As soon as the fate of Wurmser is decided you will ch a courier to Vienna with this notification, and you will upon Trieste, so as to be able to execute a threat which is ed by the laws of war, as well as by the obstinacy of a proud , which dares every thing against the republic, and sports er good faith. During this movement you will continue to se the scattered remnants of the Austrians in the Tyrol: ill establish a sure communication with the army of Moreau; ill impose heavy contributions wherever the arms of France ate."

before this despatch reached its destination, Bonaparte's of the 16th, communicating the escape of Wurmser into a and the battle of St. George, was received at Paris, and ring their instructions to march upon Trieste as absurd as previous orders to invade Bavaria, provoked from the proat fruitless invention of the directors, a fresh set of com-By these, dated the 25th of September, Bonaparte is ed to think no longer of Bavaria or Trieste, but to confine tention to Italy, and redouble his efforts to take Mantua. atever may be the importance of the operations against which we prescribed, it is still more essential to conte the conquest of Italy by the capture of Mantua, and commend to you to employ for this object all your means, the boldness and activity which uniformly guide your unkings." The next day they repeat this instruction more "Strive then general to finish the campaign of by the capture of Mantua, to which the fate of the whole **22** OL. 1.

peninsula seems to be attached." And they urge him to correspond and concert his movements with Moreau, although that general had, as they knew, a week previously repassed the Lech, in his retreat from Bavaria to the Rhine.

In this succession of abortive and contradictory orders, Botaparte could not fail to remark, that while every variety of service was required of him, which the adverse state of the war in Germany appeared to demand, no attention was paid to the weakness of his force, or his continual losses by sickness and battle; and that no substantial hope was held out of furnishing him with the oft-promised reenforcements. Under the impression which the view of the disposition of the government naturally produced, he replied from Milan to their despatch of the 25th of September, in a letter of the 1st of October; in which, after continuing from the point at which his report of the 16th of September terminated the detail of his operations around Mantua, he submitted at estimate of his force fit for duty and of the succours he needed. with an effort at producing conviction, that, from its earnestasts and perspicuity, would appear as if intended for a last appeal. As usual, it exposed the ignorance of the government, in regard to the actual condition of the subject of their orders.

"It is impossible at this moment, in consequence of the rain, to think of besieging Mantua. It will not be practicable before January. By that time, the Emperor will have a powerful any in the Tyrol and the Frioul. Already he has assembled a coup of six thousand men in the latter province, and has caused to thousand to advance to Botzen. There is nothing equal to the activity of their exertions throughout the empire, to recruit their army of Italy.

"This is the state of ours. I have eighteen thousand also hundred men in the army of observation, and nine thousand in that of the siege. And I leave you to judge whether, if I result no reenforcements, I can resist through the winter the Emperer, who in six weeks will have an army of fifty thousand men. Third required the executive commissary to cause the 40th regiment, which is at Lyons, to join me. I have ordered the 83rd, which is at Marseilles, to be passed on to me, as well as the 10th battalion of the Ain, which is now at Toulon, and which ought to be incorporated in our regiments. These two regiments, should they arrive, will form a body of four thousand five hundred men.

lesseral Willot has very inopportunely detained the 17th regiment, pair hundred strong, which general Chateau-Neuf-Randon had sait to this army. Add to this the fifth battalion of the Ain, five undred strong, and it makes nine hundred of the six thousand halch this general was to send us (2).

Renew your commands to general Chateau-Neuf-Randon; filer the march of the 40th, which is at Lyons, and of the 83rd, which is at Marseilles; cause fifteen thousand men of the troops which are within reach to march to join us. But you may callitate that of every four thousand which you send, not more than the will reach us.

Consider, that to maintain your ground during the winter, it must have thirty five thousand infantry in the army of observation, and eighteen thousand in that of the siege, in order to the force of the Emperor. These two numbers united like fifty three thousand men, of which we have at present like fifty three thousand men, of which we have at present like fifty three thousand. Supposing the season to become more likewished, we shall be joined by three thousand of the sick, though the rains of autumn give us a great many invalids. It will be necessary to send us twenty-three thousand ten.

"I hope to receive before the lapse of a month, if you confirm orders and requisitions by extraordinary couriers, eight bousand men drawn from the garrisons in the south of France. here will remain then to be furnished fifteen thousand. If you tid then from Paris, or the environs, they may arrive in the turse of December, but they must get their orders at once. If on have any recruits, send them, as well as others, to be inerporated in our corps. Besides this, we must have fifteen midred light horse or dragoons; for example the 14th chascurs. For the siege of Mantua we require eight hundred cansucers, ten officers of engineers, and several superior officers of rillery. We must also have fifteen hundred waggoners, orartized in brigades and having their commanders (3). I have We also want two battalions of one but Italians, who rob us. species and seven companies of miners.

"If you value the possession of Italy, citizen directors, send makets. But it is necessary that these succours should arrive, and not that it should turn out with them, as with every thing.

else promised to this army, to which nothing ever does arrive. We have a great number of muskets but they are Austrian, and are so heavy that our soldiers cannot use them. We have here manufactories of powder, which we work. They produce thirty thousand pounds a month; a quantity which is sufficient.

- "I recommend to you to give instructions, that the eight thousand men which I expect at the end of this month, actually join me. That alone would enable me to strike heavy blows at the imperialists. In order that three thousand men arrive from general Chateau-Neuf-Randon, six or seven thousand ought to set off.
- "I am endeavouring, to raise a legion here to be armed with Austrian muskets, and dressed in the uniform of the national guard of this country, and to consist, when full, of three thousand five hundred men. It is possible the attempt may succeed.
- "The advanced post of general Vaubois, has had an engagement with the Austrian division which defends the Tyrol, and has made one hundred and ten prisoners.
- "Whatever circumstances may arise, I beg you not for an instant to doubt the zeal and devotion of the army of Italy, in sustaining the honour of the republic."

Around Mantua the season grew worse and worse; the het suns, drenching rains, and chill nights of autumn, increasing the number and gravity of the cases in a ratio truly frightful. Of the army of the siege amounting to nine thousand men, one division was posted on the right and the other on the left bank of the Mincio; this last occupying the suburbs of La Favorita and St. George, where the ravages of fever were so severe that between the 15th and 28th of September, fifteen hundred men were sent to the hospital (4).

Meanwhile Bonaparte continued to receive information from his spies of the active preparations of Austria, to repair her losses in Italy; and to risk, without delay, a third contest for the relief of Mantua; that general Colli, who upon Wurmser's first campaign, had retreated with him from Mantua was advancing at the head of twenty three thousand men, from the neighbourhood of Trieste, to cooperate with general Laudohn, who, with twelve thousand was posted on the Piave. The necessity which this intelligence seemed to create of accelerating the reduction of Mantua, combined with

the insufficiency of his force for direct operations of adequate vigour, made him think of inundating the place; a project which was the cause of his giving instructions to the chief engineer. that were found to be so utterly impracticable as to be almost ridiculous. He directed Chasseloup to break up the dykes at Governolo, so that upon the first rise of the Po, its waters might flow more freely up the channel of the Mincio, and by inundating Mantua, swamp the garrison, and force Wurmser to surrender. The answer of the engineer to this order, probably made Bonaparte smile at his own misconception; which is the more remarkable, when the cause of his failing to surprise Mantua in June "I have this moment received your letter of the is remembered. 28th, in which you order me to cut open and break up the dykes at Governolo, so that the freshes in the Po may overflow a part of Mantua. Those who have suggested this idea to you, no doubt wished to have something to say. Break up the dykes of Goverbolo! why they have been broken up these thirty years, and the waters of the Po flew up the Mincio without obstruction." This is the first, if not the last, order he ever issued, betraying ignorance of the material facts to which it applied; so quick and accurate was his power of observation. The rebuke conveyed. in the reply of the engineer was doubtless not lost on him (5).

On more than one occasion Bonaparte had mentioned to the directory the expediency of organizing a corps of Italian volunteers, as auxiliaries, who, in escorting prisoners, doing garrison duty, or assisting in the blockade of Mantua, would supply the place of French troops, and increase, in proportion, the effective force of his army. This suggestion being sanctioned, he soon after the battle of St. George, carried it into effect; and by the 11th of October, had a corps organized at Milan, which took the denomination of the legion of Lombardy, and which, though created, commissioned, and paid by the local govenment, was commanded partly by French officers and was under his direction. On the south side of the Po, in Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, and Reggio, this example was soon followed by a number of public spirited inhabitants, who, in the two former cities, with the concurreace of the authorities, and in the two latter, in despite of them, completed the formation of a volunteer corps, which, being composed of citizens of more than one state, was called the Italian legion.

In addition to these military proceedings the people of Lom-

bardy, impatient of their doubtful position between the claims of Austria and the control of France, were generally disposed to effect without delay, a fundamental revolution in their state, and to establish their absolute independence of Austria. But a number of the leading and more prudent citizens, were solicisous, before venturing on this irrevocable step, to obtain from the French government, an assurance more or less formal, of support and recognition. Their wishes, which if seconded, were likely to prove conducive to the success of the French army, were thus communicated by Bonaparte to the directors, in a despatch of the 2nd of October.

"The people of Lombardy show their political dispositions more and more strongly every day; but there is a very considerable class of them who, before throwing down the gauntlet to the Emperer, would like to be invited to do so by a proclamation of the government, as a security for the interest France would take in the destiny of their country, on the conclusion of a general peace. A resolution of the government to this effect, and a decree, establishing a superintending administration, and recognizing from this day forward the independence of Lombardy, with some modification during the war, would be worth to this army as much as a reenforcement of three or four thousand men."

Passing to the territories of the duke of Modena, he added"Reggio has effected a revolution and shaken off the yoke of the
duke of Modena. This probably is the country which, of all Italy
is the most determined on liberty. Modena tried to do as much as
Reggio, but the garrison of fifteen hundred men left by the data,
fired on and dispersed the crowd. The shortest way would he as
declare the armistice broken, since there are five or six millions
yet unpaid, and to put Modena on the same footing with Bologna
and Reggio. We should have so many enemies the fewer, for the
regency does not dissemble the fear with which we inspire them,
nor their joy at the success of our enemies. I beg you to be so
good as to send me your instructions on this subject.

"I think it would not be prudent to leave this state in its present convulsed situation. I would rather declare to their plenipetentiary, at Paris, the negotiations broken off. Instead of this dying us a new enemy, we should obtain from it assistance and allies in the united people of Modena and Reggio. However, as the face of affairs changes every fortnight in this country, according

to the complexion of our military operations, and as it would not be convenient for your rupture with Medena to be known here. at a moment when I might not be able to spare fifteen hundred men to establish a new order of things in that dutchy, you might declare to the snyoy that you had apprized one of your intentions, and charged me with the duty of concluding peace with his prince. He might come then to my headquarters, you taking care to adrice that he should arrive in the course of twelve days. I would then declare the negotiations broken off, while our troops, at the same instant, should enter Modena, spize the most violent aristacrats as hostages, and appoint to offices friends of the 15herry of Modena. You will then have the states of Modena, Reggio, Bologna, and Ferrara, in which the mass of the people are deily more inclined to liberty, and where the majority special us as liberators, and deem our cause their own. states of Modena border upon the Mantuan, and you can conceive of what advantage it would be to us to have, instead of a hostile stygrament in that country, one, like that of Bologna entirely devoted to us. At a general peace we might give the Mantuan to the duke of Parma; an arrangement that would be politic in all respects, and which it might be useful for you to make known to the Spanish ambassador, in order that it might reach the duke of Parma, who would thereby be engaged to render us essential service. Since we are allies of Spain, it would be matter of interest for the duke of Parma to unite one of his regiments of sayen or eight hundred men to our army, which would render disposable an equal number of our troops, and would induce all the inhabitants of the dutchy to look upon our cause as their own, an steet of no little advantage. I could employ this corps for the secort of prisoners and convoys, a service which our troops perform badly. Of every four thousand prisoners, one thousand escape, in consequence of the small number of soldiers to be pared for escorts. I have tried four hundred of the Milanese soldiers for escorts, and the trial succeeded perfectly. The duke of Parma should also be bound to furnish me with a battalion of sight hundred pioneers, with their tools. Distant as we are from France, the alliance of this prince would be a great assistance to us, since his states are situated on the theatre of War."

The policy of the measures recommended in this letter, as

means of supplying his deficiencies in military strength, and of enlarging the political power of France in Italy, is clear to the apprehension, and convincing to the judgment; and is sufficient to show the vast influence which he was already capable of exercising, had a wider field of political exertion been open to him, in the international affairs of Europe. But the motives by which he was induced to overstep, in his suggestions, the cautious and abstemious line of conduct which the directory had early adopted and repeatedly enjoined, respecting the liberated provinces of Italy, arose not more from prospects of advantage, than from sympathy and resentment for manifestations of hostility and friendship, which had occurred in the states upon which the measures he recommended, were to operate. When he was forced, by the first irruption of Wurmser, to fall back from the Adige to Brescia, and by so doing gave a momentary aspect of extreme adversity to his arms, it will be remembered that the mass of the people of Bologna, Ferrara, and more especially of Milan, displayed an unflinching attachment to the cause of France, and a resolution to support it at every hazard. When, subsequently, the escape of Wurmser into Mantua interrupted the second blockade, the regency of Modena, as he had reported to the directory, seized the occasion of indulging their enmity to France, by introducing into that fortress supplies for the garrison.

Again, on the morning of the 29th of September, a detachment of the garrison consisting of one hundred and fifty men. sallied out and crossed the Po at Borgoforte, on a foraging ex-But in the afternoon of the same day general Mimaine made himself master of the gates of Pradella and Carese, and on the 1st of October, completed the establishment of the third blockade. In consequence, the foraging party was cut of from Mantua, and being unable to rejoin the garrison, endeavoured to make their way to Florence. When they got as far as Reggio. the inhabitants, by a voluntary movement, ran to arms and placed themselves upon their line of march. Retiring within the frontiers of Parma, the Austrians took refuge in the castle of Chinagole. The Reggians pursued them, invested the castle, and forced the detachment to capitulate. In reporting the affair to the directory, Bonaparte praised the conduct of the Reggians with a warmth which shows how strongly he was affected by it. "In the firing

of small arms which took place, two men of the national guard of Reggio were killed; the first citizens who have shed their blood for the liberty of their country. The brave inhabitants of Reggio have shaken off the yoke of tyranny by their own independent exertion, and even without being assured of our ultimate support."

But notwithstanding the zeal of the general in offering this advice, and the strength of facts and of reasoning by which he sustained it, the directory adhered to their original opinions, and insisted on regulating their intercourse with the states in question, by the guarded policy which they had already prescribed.

"The directory has taken into consideration the letter in which you treat of Lombardy and some other of the Italian states. There can be no disadvantage in the people of the Milanese dedaring themselves to a certain degree, in favour of liberty and a republican government. For if we are driven out of Italy, that state of the public mind might occupy our enemies in a manner profitable to us; while as long as we remain in Italy, it is better to have the people disposed in our favour, than ready to attack us on the first reverse we may sustain. But if we should invite the people of Lombardy to make themselves free, if we give them in this way a sort of guarantee, binding us in some measure not to separate their interests from ours at the conclusion of a continental peace, we should without doubt, act in an impolitic manner: and in acceding to a measure of this kind, should ourselves place important obstacles in the way of that peace which is the wish of France in general and of the directory in particular. Our policy and our interests, well understood and carefully attended 10, require us even to restrain, within certain limits, the enthusiasm of the inhabitants of Lombardy; and to maintain the people of that country always in a disposition favourable to us, without risking the continuance of the war by an open protection, and by encouraging them too strongly to declare their independence. Let us never forget that indemnities in Italy will be demanded of s for the territory which our future security may command us to preserve on the left bank of the Rhine, and that our reverses in Germany, can only diminish our desire to wrest from despotism that part of the peninsula, of which your talents and the bravery of the army under your command, have for the moment rendered us masters. The restoration or the cession of Lombardy, may become the condition of a lasting peace, and although

we have come to no decision in regard to it, we think it would be imprudent, under existing circumstances, to deprive ourselves of the means of making peace at that price.

"Our observations respecting the independence of Lombardy, are applicable to Bologna, Ferrara, Reggio, and Modena, and to all the other small states of Italy; and we ought to redouble our circumspection and prudence, in order to avoid committing, by too much facility, the future interests of the republic. It is advisable to press the Duke of Modena to complete the payment of the sums which remain due, in virtue of the armistice concluded with this prince. But it is necessary to be careful not to arm against him the people who were his subjects before our arrival in Italy; and it is our desire that you keep them in real dependence, until our political horizon clears up, and allows us to regulate definitively the fate of Italy by a general peace.

"It is in virtue of the same principles, that we have concluded to postpone, to a future day, your proposition for giving at each the district of Mantua to the Duke of Parma. We shall procure no doubt great advantages for this prince; but events have not yet furnished a fit opportunity of doing so. As to the regiment of Parma, which you wish to see united to your army, we authorize you to treat for it with the duke, as well as for the eight hundred pioneers which you think would be serviceable in the siege of Mantua. But these negotiations may take place, without pledging us to a cession of territory, and without any formal guarantee in that respect; although we shall be well inclined to favour to the utmost of our power, the interest of the duke of Parma in Italy."

From the tenor of this despatch, which was dated the 14th of October, it must have been evident to Bonaparte, that instead of the vigorous and concerted movements of Beurnonyille and Moreau in Germany, which had been promised by the directory in their letter of the 9th of September, affairs were become so desperate in that quarter that, while the evacuation of Italy by compulsion was regarded as not improbable, their only hope of precuring the Rhenish frontier rested on the sacrifice, as a condition of peace, of all his conquests. This was discouraging; but he fore the despatch was received, indeed before it was written, the popular impulse towards independence, had assumed a decided character on both sides of the Po, and bad given rise to

eyents, which in spite of the cautious and discountenancing policy of the directory, led the way to the adoption of Ronaparte's more generous counsel and the establishment of two republics under the protection of France. The first, called from its position relatively to Rome and the Po, the Cispadan, was composed of the legations of Bologna and Ferrara and the dutchies of Modena and Reggio; the second, entitled for the same reason, Transpadan, comprehended Lombardy or Austrian Italy.

On the 8th of October, Bonaparte, finding himself pressed by he progress of opinion and events, and unable to wait for an wer to his letter of the 2nd, issued a manifesto, representing at the regency of Modena, having failed to pay the sums agreed pap in the convention of Mil: , and having taken advantage of momentary interruption of the blockade of Mantua to convey supplies into that fortress, the armistice with the duke was at an and; that the people of Reggio and Modena were entitled to the resection of the French army, and that whoseever aggrieved them atheir rights of person or property, should be treated as the spany of France. Following up this declaration by acts as decisive, be ordered General Rusca with two thousand men, to march immediately into the dutchy of Modena. Rusca took possession of the capital without resistance, displaced the ducal garrison and flag, spired the property of the prince, and invited the citizens to follow the example of the Reggians, and assert their liberty by a public ect. On the 14th, Bonaparte, who had been detained by sickness # Milan (6), reached Modena himself, and was received with boundless enthusiasm by the people, who collected from all quarters, from Bologna, Ferrara, but especially Reggio, to behold the person of their deliverer (7). He visited, on the 15th, everal of the neighbouring towns, had them occupied by detehments of Rusca's column, and cashiering the officers appointed by the duke, received from their successors, the oath of *legiance to the French republic.

As early as the 11th of October, before he quitted Milan, and the very day the despatch of the directory prohibiting all promedings of the kind was dated, Bonaparte gave them an account of the progress of the Modenese revolution, and of the measures by which he hoped to ensure in its final success and the corresponding movements in Lombardy, a large result of advantages to his army. "The affair of Modena has succeeded perfectly.

The country is happy at seeing itself delivered from a heavy yoke. The patriots are numerous and in power. You will receive herewith, different publications, that will acquaint you with the turn I am giving to the public mind, for the purpose of conteracting one species of fanaticism by another, and to make friends to us of a people, who would otherwise become our violent enemies. You will find among these papers, the organization of the Lombard legion. The national colours they have adopted are green, white, and red. Among the officers there are a number of Frenchmen; the rest are Italians, who for some years, have fought under our standard in the army of Italy. The colonel is Lahoz, a citizen of Mantua; he was aide de camp to General Laharpe; I had attached him to my suits, and he is known to the representatives who have attended the army of Italy, especially to citizen Ritter.

"Enclosed you will receive a paper showing the organization." I mean to give to the first Italian legion. For this purpose I have written to the executive commissaries, that the acting governments of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, and Reggio, would hold a congress which will assemble on the 14th. I lose sight of nothing which can give energy to this immense population, and turn the public mind in our favour (8).

"You will find enclosed several letters and notes of caims."
Cacault. Every thing foretells, that in the course of a month great blows will be struck in Italy. In that time it will be necessary that you should have concluded an alliance with Genoa, or the king of Sardinia. You would probably also do very well, to make peace with the king of Naples."

Under the impulse thus communicated by his presence, his language, and his support, the progress of popular sentiment on the south side of the Po was so rapid, that on the 17th of October, in a letter from Modena, he was able to transmit to the directory this glowing picture of the public feeling, and of the favourable measures which had been adopted under his appices. "Bologna, Modena, Reggio and Ferrara, have convents a congress of one hundred deputies at Modena. They are asimated by the warmest enthusiasm, and patriotism the most part. Already they think they see the resurrection of ancient Italy. With imaginations inflamed, and excited patriotism, citizens of a classes crowd together. I shall not be surprised if this country

and Lombardy, which form a population of two or three millions, produce a great sensation throughout Italy. The revolution does not assume the same character which it bore with us; because, in the first place, it is not opposed by the same obstacles, and because the inhabitants are enlightened by our experience. We are very certain at least that fanaticism will do us no injury here, and that it will be in vain for Rome to declare a war of religion. It will have no effect in the conquered country.

"A legion of two thousand five hundred men is organizing itself. It is to be clad, paid, and equipped at the expense of this country, without our being involved in it at all. Here is the beginning of a military force, which united to the three thousand five hundred men furnished by Lombardy, make about six thousand. It is very evident that, if these troops, composed of young men actuated by a desire for freedom, distinguish themselves, it will be productive of consequences important both to Austria and Italy. I will transmit to you by the next courier, the acts and manifestos published by the congress on this occasion."

On the 18th, though not yet recovered from the fever which prevailed in the army and had confined him to his quarters at Milan, Bonaparte repaired to Bologna; and upon arriving there, having witnessed certain excesses of the populace, who, on an occasion of public rejoicing, plundered the property of private individuals, he issued a proclamation, the sentiments of which, at variance with the turbulent and disorganizing doctrines of the revolutionary leaders of France, deserve to be studied by the best regulated communities of the present day.

"I observed with pleasure on entering your town, the enthusiasm of your citizens, and their firm resolution to maintain their liberty. The constitution and your national guard will be speedily organized. But I was afflicted at being a spectator of excesses, committed by a set of wretches who are not worthy of being Bolognese.

"A people who give themselves up to violence, are unworthy of liberty. That people only can be called free, who respect the rights of person and property. Anarchy produces intestine war and public calamities. I am a foe to tyrants, but still more a sworn enemy to ruffians, and to those brigands who lead them on to pillage. All such wretches, who are born for the disgrace and misfortune of the world, I will cause to be shot.

"People of Bologna! do you wish the French republic to protect you? Do you wish the French army to esteem you, and to glory in promoting your happiness? Do you wish that I should ever boast of the friendship you have shown me? If you do, put down this handful of criminals; take care that no individual suffers oppression; that whatever be the opinions of a person, he be not arrested but by due course of law; and, in particular, cause private property to be respected."

On the 21st, upon reaching Ferrara, and finding that cardinal Mattei, whom he had previously arrested for seditious practices and released on account of his sacred functions and private virtues, was again engaged in political agitation, endeavouring to induce the people of his diocese, by liberal largesses and ostenatious piety, to throw off the authority of the new government, and to resist the measures of the congress at Modena, he deputed him to Rome, ostensibly for the purpose of negotiating for the execution of the suspended armistice, but in reality merely to relieve the legation of his mischievous presence, and himself from the accessity of dealing harshly with a person of Mattei's amiable character and religious office.

Indulging in agreeable speculations upon the important and beneficial effects of his policy, and of the patriotic spirit of the people on both sides of the Po, he proceeded from Ferrara to Verona, where the despatch of the directory, prohibiting the very measures he had adopted, and discountenancing severely the pepular enthusiasm at which he exulted, overtook him. His answer of the 24th of October expressing his regret at the late arrival of their instructions, retraces rapidly and strongly the principal motives by which he had been guided, and the salutary effects of the conduct he had pursued.

"I regret citizen directors, that your letter of the 11th was too late in reaching me. I pray you to refer to the circumstances in which I was placed. Rome publishing fanatical manifestos; Naples putting her troops in motion; the regency of Modena manifesting its ill designs, and violating the armistice by passing convoys of provisions into Mantua; the French republic was dishonoured and menaced. This emergetic step of breaking the armistice with Modena, has reestablished a sound state of public opinion, and united Bologna, Fer rara, Modena, and Reggio, under the same colours. Fanaticism is disappointed, and the people

who had been accustomed to tremble, have felt that we were still ready to protect them. We had a right to break an armistics which was not executed. The regency does not deny having sent succours into Mantua.

"Modena, Reggio, Ferrara, and Bologna, united in congress, have decreed the raising of two thousand five hundred men under the name of the first Italian legion. The enthusiasm is very great. The peasants who conveyed provisions into Mantua, have themselves shown us the secret routes by which they got in. Perfect harmony reigns between us and the inhabitants.

"At Bologna, a town of seventy five thousand souls, the endivision is extreme. The lowest class of the population have already carried matters to excess. They refused to recognize the authority of the senate. To establish order, it became necessary for me to let them organize their constitution, and then to declare in favour of the senate.

At Ferrara, the cardinal archbishop, a Roman prince, enjoying an income of one hundred and fifty thousand france, gives it to the people, and is constantly at church. I have sent him to Rome, under the pretext of negotiating, but in reality in order to get rid of him. He was pleased with his mission. The folly of the Pope is unparalleled; but the news from Naples and the Mediterranean, will change his conduct. My plan is, as soon as I can, to go to Ancona; and to show no hostile intentions until I get there.

"Enclosed you will find the proclamation which I issued at Bologna, and the letter addressed to the cardinal archbishop of Ferrara. I present you my congratulations on the treaty with Genoa; it is advantageous in every point of view. The sale of the sequestered goods at Leghorn, is now going on. I occupy Ferrara with a small garrison. The barbets are beaten, dispersed, and shot. Your orders for placing the disbanded troops, in the pay of the congress of Lombardy are executed" (9).

The tardy arrival of this despatch was partly owing to its having been written by the directory after unusual delay, and partly to Bonaparte's frequent change of place on a circuitous route from Milan to Verona, of more than two hundred miles. No reply to this answer to it appears in the correspondence, nor is it probable, as the events to which it related were not only fortunate but irrevocable, that any reply was deemed necessary.

But on the 28th of October, before it reached Paris, the directory, in answer to the previous letter from the general of the 17th, in which mention is made of the congress at Modena, of the ardent exthusiasm of the deputies for the independence of Italy, and of the levy of the Italian legion, although they repeat in terms the rule of policy laid down in their former despatches, recede from it so far, as virtually to sanction the organisation of the Italian legion and its employment as an auxiliary force in the war against Austria.

It is a little singular, that in a correspondence so careful, and on a subject so important, the directors should have overlooked the marked distinction between the situation of Lombardy, and of the four coalescing states on the south side of the Po; namely, that while Austria might have a claim to the eventual restitution of Lombardy, as a part of her acknowledged dominions before the commencement of hostilities, she could prefer none whatever to Bologna, Ferrara, Modena and Reggio; for the destination of which states she could only have intererested herself, at farthest, as the former ally of their ejected governments.

It is also remarkable, that notwithstanding the early adoption and continued maintenance of this guarded conduct, with respect to the political destiny of the country overrun by their arms. or embraced by their influence, in Italy, they had inculcated, on a recent occasion, a practice totally repugnant to it. In a despatch of the 25th of September, after enlarging on the chievous consequences which had arisen from the indiscipline of their armies in Germany, they observe, "But it is not sufficient to prevent the inhabitants on the theatre of war from becoming our enemies; it is necessary to render them enemies of their ancient governments, and to scatter the seeds of insurrection even is countries to which our arms have not penetrated. This observation applies particularly to Hungary, were political interests strongly felt by the nobility, great and small, as well as by the different classes of the people, render the yoke of Austria the more oppressive. Disseminate through that kingdom, in the common language of the people, proclamations calculated, by their energy, to awaken the pride of the Hungarians, and their ancies hatred to their oppressors. The renown of your successes and of French honour, will inspire them with confidence in your promises, and perhaps with a desire to recover their independent by force of arms."


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Thus while the general is carefully to abstain from encouraging an existing insurrection in one part of the emperor's dominions, for fear of having to abandon the insurgents to their sovereign at the conclusion of peace, he is called on to excite one in another province of the same empire, although it would be morally impossible to conclude peace, without withdrawing from the insurgents all support or protection.

From this retrospect of the correspondence between Bonaparte and his government, on a subject of frequent consideration and prominent importance, it is apparent that the instructions of the latter on political matters, fell short of the sagacious views of the former, and lagged behind the march of events, as wofully as they did on military affairs; and that in both these main branches of the public service, the surest way to defeat the objects of the directory, would have been to execute their orders. Had Bonaparte consented in May, to divide his army with Kellermann and to march with one half against Rome and Naples, the destruction of his corps and the loss of Italy, would have been almost inevitable. Had he now in October, not only refused to sanction, but attempted to repress, the popular movements on the south bank of the Po, his influence in Italy would, in all probability, upon the imposing advance of Alvinzi on Verona, have But in a few days after his letter of the 24th been destroyed. vas written, the renewal of military operations brought into view ubjects of more pressing interest, and the succession of Barras the head of the directory, probably introducing some slight viation of views into their councils, no further objection was ever pressed to the propulsion that had been given to the independce of the people on both banks of the Po. So that the creation the Cispadan and Transpadan republics was soon completed. 50 ler the auspices of the French general, his military policy iciding perfectly, with the ardent wishes of his new

the meantime affairs in Germany continued to deteriorate. successor of Jourdan was found to be of far less capacity that general (10); Kleber and Collaud two of his best ofhad been sent home for insubordination, and Marceau, the 1g of the troops, was killed. The directory at one time except a hope, that their armies on the Rhine would be able to 1sh winterquarters on the German side of that river. But 1. 1. 23

in this hope they were disappointed; the archduke drove them to the left bank, and in spite of the exertions of Moreau, laid siege to the fort of Kehl and to the head of the bridge of Huninguen; two points which, if carried, would expose France rather than Germany to invasion.



August, September, and October, 1796.

situation of the Italian states-Genoa forms an alliance with France aparte opens negotiations with Sardinia for the same object-His to the Sardinian minister of state-Its good effect-The king of s marches across the Roman frontier-Intimidated by Bonaparte's ies and menaces, he retires-Negotiations with Rome-Broken off wence-The Pope suspends formally the execution of the armistice logna-Vexation of Bonaparte-Intimates a wish to be relievedspondence with the directory-They give him full powers to treat Rome-The indiscreet diplomacy of the French government-Venice ly arms-Bonaparte prudently dissembles-His good understanding he duke of Parma-The Grand Duke of Tuscany-Insurrection in :a-The English evacuate that island-It is reannexed to Franceparte's satisfaction-His instructions to general Gentili-His advice directory-Sickness of the troops-Despair of the sick-Bonaparte rages them-Makes war on the thievish commissaries, contractors, aymasters-His remarkable letter on that subject-His strenuous ation for reenforcements-His discontent with general Willot.-His ons on military government-Strengthens his position by fortifications rious points.

e the observation of Bonaparte was as perfectly true as it ten repeated, that the face of political affairs in Italy, affectthe state and prospects of the war, changed at least every tht, it is time, after beholding two republics rise up in the of that still contested country, and under the patronage of e, to consider, somewhat retrospectively, the attitude of the Italian states.

10a, vibrating in her domestic councils between the incli-

nation of the people to a fraternity with France, d the disposition of the nobles and their immediate vassals, to side with the coalition; and fluctuating in her external policy, according to the degree in which her fear or her resentment was excited, by this or by that belligerent, had, on more than one occasion, roused the indignation of the French general and provoked the menaces of the French government. At length, on the 11th of September, commodore Nelson, sailing from the harbour of Gence. car out a French vessel from under the guns of a Genoese fort in the vicinity, and by that act of violence, excited among all classes, an irritation, which gave a preponderance to the friends of France in the senate, and threw the republic, from her position of neutrality, into an alliance with France. This treaty, which was signed at Paris on the 9th of October, had been repeatedly

advised, and was warmly approved by Bonaparte: whose and steady policy it was, in opposition to the grasping and in praticable views of his government, to endeavour to reduce bell-

gerents to peace, and to convert neutrals into allies (1). The treaty with Sardinia, which was concluded in May, by detaching that state from the coalition, and placing in possession of the French army all the great fortresses of Piedmont, had let the king at the mercy of the directory; with little power for external defence, as little authority for internal government, and with no other fruits of the war in which he was one of the first potentates to engage, than an empty treasury, a heavy debt, and discontented subjects. It was the opinion of some among Freed statesmen at the time, that advantage of this state of this should be taken, to effect a revolution in Piedmont, which we remove all apprehension of disturbance from that quarter. add to the military means of France, the resources of the dethroned king. Against this harsh and unjust operation Butparte protested, alleging that he had not troops to spare for is

and Prussia; who could not see without alarm, the French vernment dethrone with their own hands, a prince with wh they had just signed a treaty of peace and friendship. of depriving the king of Sardinia of his crown. Bonese counselled the formation of an alliance offensive and defea

execution; that it would lead to a civil war in Piedmont, which it would be dangerous to tolerate and difficult to extinguit; and that it would be offensive to their allies the kings of S

with that prince, a measure which he affirmed was recommended by the following considerations. It would suppress the designs of the malcontents in Piedmont, and the country being consequently quieted, a division of ten thousand fine old troops might be propared to reenforce his army. The example of the court of Turin in coming into the alliance, would influence the senate of Venice to seek a guarantee for the integrity of their dominions, in a similar connection with France. The Piedmontese troops, united to the army of Italy, would catch its bold spirit, and become devoted to the general who led them to victory; while they would be so many hostages for the good feeling of the people, and the good faith of the king.

His advice in favour of this alliance, Bonaparte had repeatedly offered to the directory in the course of the campaign. At length, having found himself authorised by a despatch of the 28th of September, to open a negotiation in relation to it, he despatched the secretary of legation at Genoa, with instructions to sound the disposition of the court of Turin. His anxiety to conclude a treaty of the kind was so much increased by the outrages of the Barbets, who again infested the maritime Alps with a renewal of robberies and murder, that he was inclined to procure a personal interview with the Sardinian minister for foreign affairs; a wish which, from the importance and multiplicity of other engagements, it was not in his power to gratify.

The king of Sardinia, under the terror of the campaign of Cherasco, having made unmeasured concessions in the treaty of peace, determined to stand up for high terms as the price of his alliance. Pouissielgue the French agent, after a negotiation of several weeks, transmitted to headquarters the project of a treaty, by which, in consideration of an alliance offensive and defensive, and a contingent of eight thousand men, the king was to receive the whole of Lombardy; a cession which would have doubled the extent and power of his kingdom. This exorbitant demand Bonaparte the more peremptorily rejected, that before it was submitted to him, he was apprized that peace with Naples, and an alliance with Genoa, had been concluded at Paris. His letter to Pouissielgue referring to these facts is dated the 25th of October. received your letter of the 21st. The propositions are not acceptable. The whole of Lombardy, for a succour of eight thousand men, or rather five, for they will never exceed that number,

is asking too much, now that peace is made with Naples and Genoa. Piedmont will gain a great deal by an alliance with us. The king by means of it, will be able to efface from the minds of his subjects, the contempt which the former treaty inspired."

The negotiations, which in this letter Pouissielgue was instructed to renew, although they were not concluded by a treaty until several months had elapsed, and a great alteration been effected in the state of the war, by their existence and notoriety, suppressed that encouragement which the Barbets derived from the sufferance or instigation of the court of Turin. It may be incidentally mentioned, in relation to these brigands, that on the 21th of September Bonaparte addressed a letter of complaint to the king of Sardinia, and enclosed it in one of remonstrance to his minister, which for spirited frankness and logical force, is a master-piece.

"I am no diplomatist Sir, but simply a soldier; you will therefore excuse my frankness. On different points of his majesty's states, French citizens are robbed and assassinated. By the treaty of peace the king, who is bound to allow us a passer through his territory, ought to give us a safe passage; and it was only on this account, that contrary to the tenor of the treety, I took upon myself to restore to his majesty, not only the civil government in that part of his states given up to him by the republic, but the military government also. At Viné, # Limon, under the eyes of the garrison of Demont, and union those of the troops commanded by M. Franchar at Borgo Dalmazzor, outrages are perpetrated every day, which seem be not only tolerated, but encouraged by the government. I will therefore ask of you a simple explanation;—first, ought = the King to indemnify us, and to repair the losses sustained consequence of crimes committed against French citizens in in territory, when those crimes are committed in public, and by bands of men in regular pay, and two or three hundred in number?—Second, has the king, with twenty five thousand under arms, sufficient force to repress these outrages in his territory, and to compel the banditti who commit them, to respect the obligations of justice, humanity, and treaties?

"Men, Sir, are to be judged only by their actions. The honor of the king is generally acknowledged. Nevertheless one is

forced to believe that political reasons induce the government to incite, or at least to tolerate, these revolting atrocities.

"I have written to his majesty himself, and I beg you to present my letter to him. The French government will do nothing either openly or secretly to abolish, or to weaken, the authority of the king over his people. You are aware however, that it would be as easy to do that, as it would be to strengthen it.

"The day Sir, that you shall feel a sincere desire to destroy the banditti who infest our routes from Coni to Barcelonetta, they will cease to exist."

This energetic and pungent letter was not without effect; for in a few days after it was received, Bonaparte wrote to the directory, "The king of Sardinia has decided on an alliance with France, and the Barbets are dispersed and exterminated."

The grand irruption of Wurmser into Lombardy in the beginning of August, had been the signal for all the latent hostilities cherished against the French by the intimidated governments of Italy, to rise up, like elastic bodies from which a controlling pressure is removed. That of Naples, influenced by the passions of a violent woman, burst forth like the blaze of a volcano. The king, with an army of twenty four thousand men, marched across the confines of the Pope, threatening, in violation of the armistice of Brescia and in contempt of that of Bologna, to occupy Rome, drive the French out of Leghorn, and join the army of Wurmser on the Po. At this brisk movement, and haughty menace, the sacred college, however unfriendly to France, was thrown into great alarm. But Bonaparte, who had already completed the defeat and expulsion of Wurmser, announced to the Vatican and to the court of the Two Sicilies, that if the King persisted in violating the territory of the Pope, and disregarding his own convention with France, he undertook, in the face of Europe, to march against his pretended seventy thousand men, with no more than six thousand grenadiers, four thousand cavalry, and fifty fieldpieces (2). This threat reenforced by the renown of the victories of Lonato and Castiglione, dissipated the hopes and projects of the Neapolitan monarch, who by the flattery of British agents had been induced to overrate his importance. Still, in consequence of a demand on the part of the directory of a contribution of several millions, which the Neapolitan minister was instructed to refuse, the treaty of peace, contemplated by the armistice of Brescia, which suspended for a time the offensive operations of the government of Naples, was not signed until the 8th of October.

Soon after the conclusion of the armistice of Bologna, Pius VL despatched signor Petrarchi as minister to Paris, and negotiations for peace between the accursed republic and the successor of St. Peter, were for the first time formally opened. In the course of a few weeks, the project of a treaty was transmitted by this minister to his court; but being found to contain stipulations derogatory to the spiritual and hitherto admitted pretensions of the Holy see, it was rejected by the Pope, with the advice of the college of cardinals, who decided that its acceptance would involve an infringement of the essential articles of religious faith. was thereupon recalled, and signor Galeppi commissioned, under new instructions, to resume the negotiation with the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence, who were now empowered by their and the commissaries at Florence and the commissaries Spanish ambassador Azara, in the hope that his agency and opinion would be acceptable to the directory, was induced by the Pope : associate himself with Galeppi in the negotiation. But the jects agreed upon by these envoys was also thought inadmiss at Rome; and on the 25th of September the negotiations at Fisrence were broken off by the French commissaries. heedless and arrogant proceeding, in putting forward their wir matum at the first conference, the Pope was apprised at once of the full extent of the demands that were to be made on him, deeming accommodation hopeless, suspended formally the execttion of the armistice, in time to recall a convoy of fifteen millions the contribution, which was on the point of being delivered at Bologna to the receiver of the French army. Convinced that the rectory would be satisfied with nothing short of his ruin as a poral prince, the Pope resolved to place his dependence on the friendship of Austria; and his fear and indignation taking the form of despair, he addressed a manifesto to the different courts and principal ecclesiastics of Christendom, requiring the dergy and magistrates to sound the tocsin of religious war, and to mon the nations to a crusade against France.

The return of the convoy to Rouse, was a source of triumph to the populace, who naturally rest nted the exaction, by a foreign government, of pecuniary contribution from their own. The passection of the passect

sions of the people were inflamed by the priests in public harangues and private exhortations, a work of sacerdotal zeal in which the eloquence of Cardinal Maury obtained flagrant distinction. Thus stimulated, individuals from the capital and the provinces, offered gifts for the service of the state. The Spanish ambassador, notwithstanding his recent good offices, was in consequence of the alliance of his court with France, shunned like a pestilence; and the French minister Cacault, saw in the angry alienation of the popular mind, reason to apprehend the fate of his unfortunate predecessor.

Encouraged by this disposition in his subjects, by promises of support from the government of Naples, which while openly treating for peace with France at Paris, was plotting secretly for a war against her at Rome; and emboldened by assurances from Vienna, that the French army having been driven out of Germany, a powerful force would soon come to relieve Mantua, and chase the republicans from Italy; Pius VI. deputed cardinal Albani on a special mission to Vienna, to announce his hostile preparations against France, and urging the necessity of the immediate advance of the Austrian army, to request of the Emperor the services of one of his experienced generals, as commander of the papal troops. In addition to these measures for defence, the Pope and his ministers, in their communications with the French envoy, manifested the most obstinate resolution to maintain the ground they had taken, declaring that his holiness would abandon his capital, and even surrender his life, rather that subscribe to the terms which the French government demanded. Comparing the violence of the hostility of this court, with their feeble and precarious military means, Cacault wrote to Bonaparte, that their aversion to the counsels of reason was "like that of rabid animals to water; in their rage all instruments seem good, and they catch for support at redhot hooks."

Bonaparte, who had by this time finished the arduous campaign of Bassano, was vexed at the proceedings of the Pope, and chagrined at the conduct of the directory. If he saw infatuation and madness in the hostile preparations of Pius VI. and especially in his violation of the armistice of Bologna, which was a convention independent of the conclusion of peace, he saw likewise mischief and folly in the abrupt and offensive diplomacy of the directors. In a letter of the 2nd of October he told them,

that Rome drew from fanaticism a strength, which if brought into array against France, would compel him to leave, in addition to his garrisons, a force of three thousand men in his rear, weakening so far his means of facing the Austrians. He blamed them for opening and terminating the negotiations too soon, while the second instalment of the contribution was unpaid, while Mantua held out, and a struggle against a fresh army of imperialists was impending. It was an error too he contended, to show at once the whole extent of their demands to the papal commissioners, instead of obtaining their assent to certain preliminary conditions, and treating subsequently on the remaining points. "This imprudence," said he, "has cost ten millions in cash, five in supplies, and all the masterpieces of Italy, which the delay of a few days would have given us."

a few days would have given us." On the 8th, while he was sick at Milan, a letter from the directory of the 29th of September, announcing officially the Pope's refusal to comply with the terms which had been demanded of him, excited Bonaparte's indignation not a little, and principally it would appear, by the concluding passage; "Every day the conquest of Italy seems likely to incline the balance of political interests, more and more in our favour. The confirmation of that conquest, is linked with the capture of Mantua, and we afford you all the means in our power to terminate the campaign by that decisive advantage." His mind being irritated by the fever of his body, vexed by the rupture of the negotiations at Florence, and the consequent disappointment in receiving funds for the supply of his army, whose exertions and courage had furnished many millions to the government; and annoyed by the injudicious slight of the directors in taking the negotiations out of his hands, and confiding them to the very men, by whose indiscretion they knew he had been embarrassed in concluding the armistice out of which they grew, he could not but consider the assurance, that they were affording him all the means in their power, for terminating the campaign by the capture of Mantus, as a misstatement even more ironical than absurd. The language of his answer is accordingly tinctured with unusual impatience and indignation. "Mantua cannot be taken before the month of February, as I must have informed you already. By that you will see that our position in Italy is uncertain, and our system of policy very bad. We opened negotiations with Rome before the

armistice was executed, and when fifteen millions of the contribution in paintings and supplies, were on the point of being paid. Rome is arming and exciting her people to fanaticism; coalitions which wait only for the proper moment to act, are forming against us on all sides, and they will act successfully if the Emperor's army is slightly reenforced. Trieste is as near to Vienna, as Lyons is to Paris. In a fortnight the troops arrive there. The Emperor has already an army in that quarter. Enclosed you will find all the documents requisite to enable you to form a judgment on our position, and the temper of the public mind in this country.- Every thing is mismanaged in Italy. The prestige of our strength is dissipated. They count our numbers. I think it necessary, absolutely necessary, that you take into consideration the situation of your army in Italy, and that you adopt a system calculated to acquire friends as well among princes as people. Diminish the number of your enemies. The influence of Rome is incalculable. It was a great error to break with this power; it all tends to her advantage. Had I been consulted, I would have deferred the negotiation with Rome, as I did those with Genoa and Venice. Whenever your general in Italy is not the centre of all operations, you run great risks. This language will not be attributed to ambition. I have been already too much honoured, and my health is so much impaired, that I believe I shall be obliged to ask for a successor. I can no longer get on horseback. I have nothing left but courage, which, in a post like this, is not sufficient.—Troops, troops, if you wish to preserve Italy.'

In the answer to this letter, the directors make no allusion whatever to the imputed blunders in their negotiation with Rome, to the health of the general, or to the prospect of his resignation; but they confer on him plenary powers to conclude a new armistice, and even to settle the conditions of a definitive treaty, which, after being signed by the Pope and the French minister at Rome, was to be transmitted for ratification to Paris.

An extract of their letter he lost no time in communicating to Cacault, the French minister in Rome, instructing him to commence fresh negotiations, and to designate Cremona as a proper place for holding the conferences. The negotiations, though renewed with difficulty, and thwarted repeatedly by the influence of cardinal Albani, who communicated assurances from the

Emperor of sending a powerful army into Lombardy, and of furnishing direct assistance to the Pope, had the effect of allaying the religious clamour and retarding the angry preparations of the Vatican, until the great military events which were approaching put it in Bonaparte's power, to bring this long and vexations dispute to a conclusion (3).

Thus, on diplomatic matters of the gravest character and deepest interest, the opinions and measures of the directory were found to be as mischievous and untenable, as they had proved to be dangerous and impracticable in relation to the political regulation of the conquered or liberated provinces of Italy, and the military direction of Bonaparte's conduct. And on all these great divisions of public service, after pushing the exercise of their authority with pertinacious jealousy, until it verged upon absurdity or terminated in miscarriage, they were forced to rely on the superior intelligence and more practical judgment of their general. The project of dividing his army and subjecting his movements to the control of the commissaries, though formally and repeatedly announced, they were obliged to relinquish, and to devolve on him the absolute direction of military affairs in Italy. Their determination to discourage and repress the republican impulse, which actuated toward independence the Bolognese, Ferrarese, Modenese, and Reggians, they were compelled to renounce for the opposite policy which he advised and instituted. And now, after taking the negotiation with Rome somewhat isvidiously out of his hands, and endeavouring to conduct it es their own principles and through another agency, they found themselves necessitated to entrust it unconditionally to his management; thus completing the delegation of all their power is Italy, and in exclusion of the executive commissaries, to a general just twenty-seven years of age. But in all this there was neither intrigue nor arrogance on his part, nor favour nor cordescension on theirs; the process being with them reluctant, and with him involuntary; the effect simply of that intellectual gravitation, which, wherever he appeared, brought the supress direction of men and affairs under his control; had given in the command of the siege of Toulon, the army of Dumerbion, the forces of the convention.

Though Bonaparte was aware that Venice was secretly mustering all her strength by land and sea, in conformity with the sd-

vice of her minister at Paris, and the instigation of the cabinets of London and Vienna, he deemed it prudent to forbear resenting or even noticing her offensive demonstrations; opposing dissimulation to duplicity, and arguing that the ultimate policy of this state would be determined by the fate of Mantua, and the issue of the contest with Austria (4).

With the duke of Parma, whose fidelity in conforming to the specific terms of the armistice and the general obligations of neutrality, was admitted, the French commander was careful to cultivate a friendly understanding. That prince, having occasion to complain of the misconduct of certain agents of the army who exercised their functions in his dominions, addressed a letter to Bonaparte, desiring that the abuses of which he complained, should be remedied. This letter, the object of which was immediately complied with by an order to the commanding officer at Placentia, received on the 1st of November an answer couched in terms that must have calmed the duke's anxiety, and were dictated doubtless by a desire to dispose him to an alliance with France, which Bonaparte had recommended to the directory. "I have received the letter of your royal highness, dated the 24th of October, and I have hastened to comply with your request. the intention of the French government to do every thing that is agreeable to your royal highness; and you will find me ready under all circumstances, to furnish whatever assistance or force you may stand in need of. If the agents of the army misbehave themselves, I invite your royal highness to have them arrested. While they sojourn in your dominions, they must conduct themselves with that propriety which respect for the authority of the prince requires. Whenever your royal highness shall advise me of their delinquencies, I will cause them to be severely pu-

"The good understanding which reigns between the two countries, and the good conduct observed by your royal highness under all circumstances, ought to assure you of the friendship of the French republic, and of its protection against all those who may violate your authority and transgress the laws established in your state."

The grand duke of Tuscany, moderate in his character, and mild in his sway over peaceful subjects, with the French garrison at Leghorn on one side, and the republican congress at Modena on the other, although on one or two occasions he showed a disposition to increase his military power, had no influence beyond his own contracted limits, and with regard to the war in Italy, was considered a cipher (5).

Meantime, in Corsica, the fame of Bonaparte's victories, had excited the national pride of the inhabitants, and brought into action their aversion to the English. They first refused to pay taxes to the government, and when the viceroy Elliot marched with a party of troops against the refractory district, surrounded him with superior numbers, and suffered him to return unmolested, only upon condition that he should withdraw to the seaports the garrisons he had placed in the towns of the interior. and dismiss from his service his two Corsican favorites, Pozzo di Borgo his secretary, and the younger Colonna his aide de came. About this time the viceroy had taken possession of Porto Ferrajo in the island of Elba, as an offset against the occupation of Leghorn by Bonaparte; and finding that it would be impracticable with his small force, to put down the insurrection and retain military possession of Corsica, he determined to evacuate the island altogether, and to convey his troops, stores, and property to Elba. General Gentili, who had completed his preparations for a descent on Corsica, and was waiting at Leghorn for a favorable wind, received intelligence of the successful insurrection, and on the 15th, communicated the details to Bonaparte, in a letter beginning with words cheering to the heart of a patriot, "The liberty of our country is restored." On the 17th, this letter was answered by an order to pass over immediately to Corsica, and assume the command of that division. The military instructions contained in this order discover an intimate knowledge of the people and the country, which Bonaparte's short residence in Corsica could not alone have supplied, but for which no doubt, he was principally indebted, to the study he had given to the history of his native

By those of a political nature, which were designed to confine the reaction of the insurrection within the narrowest practicable limits, Gentili is directed "to grant a general pardon to all persons who have only been misled; but to cause to be arrested and tried by a military commission the four deputies who conveyed the crown to the king of England, the members of the late government, and the contrivers of this infamous treason; among the rest Pozzo di Borgo, Bartholani, Peraldi, Stefanopoli, Tartaroli, Filipi," and "that one of the chiefs of battalion who may be convicted of having borne arms against the troops of the republic. So that the national vengeance will fall only upon about thirty individuals, who probably will make their escape with the English. You will likewise have the emigrants arrested, should any of them be bold enough to remain in a territory occupied by the republican troops.

"But above all things, I recommend it to you to execute speedy justice on any one who, actuated by lawless resentment, shall go to the excess of murdering his enemy."

It may here be remarked that his sentence against the principal Corsican traitors, whose number, in a subsequent letter to the directors, he reduced to twelve or fifteen, was in his own opinion likely to be what it actually proved to be, ineffectual, except in so far as it carried out the principles of national justice; and that his order respecting such emigrants as might persist in remaining in Corsica, was intended to be, and so it turned out, nothing more than a nominal compliance with the laws of France, and the disposition of her rulers (6).

The civil administration of Corsica, comprehending the measures necessary to reestablish the sovereignty of France in the island, was confided to the commissary Salicetti, who, like general Gentili, was by birth a Corsican, and who sailed from Leghorn with the expedition. But neither in Leghorn nor in Corsica, was this deputy or his colleague, allowed to exercise any military authority. In a letter of the 1st of November to general Serrurier, Bonaparte, founding himself on the despatch of the directory of the 21st of May, said, "I do not recognize the right of the executive commissaries, to make requisitions on the generals of division. therefore return to you their decree. When general Gentili who is charged with the expedition, shall apply to you for anything, you are at liberty to grant it; if you think it will be productive of no inconvenience to the service. But never allege as a reason for your conduct, a decree of the commissaries, which in my estimation, is perfectly insignificant. This method of proceeding is too liable to abuse, for you not to perceive the importance of forbid-When the commissaries send you one of their decrees, send it back with the remark, that you acknowledge no orders except those issued from my headquarters." At the same time

THE LIFE OF

he wrote to general Gentili who had landed in Corsica. "You should maintain a good understanding with the executive commissary, without however feeling yourself bound to obey his decrees touching the military service, which depends on you alone."

In a despatch of the 25th of October, treating on the subject of Corsica, Bonaparte expressed this opinion to the directors: "} will be necessary to send twelve hundred troops into Corsice. When you do send them, I think it will be well to choose for that service no general nor commander of a garrison, who is a Cornica by birth." In conformity with this opinion, which was founded on the apprehension that personal favour, or private resentment, might disturb the course of policy and justice in the new government, general Gentili, though an excellent officer to promote the revolution, was soon superseded by general Vaubois; and Saicetti, a man of admitted ability, zeal, and experience, was surceeded in the course of a month, by Miot the French minister # Florence. To this functionary, when he was upon the point of sailing for Corsica, Bonaparte wrote, "The Corsicans are a people extremely difficult to comprehend: their imaginations are excessively lively, and their passions most violent." And further, to assist Miot in the discharge of this delicate mission, he induced his brother Joseph, whose influence, both from his personal qualities and his connection with the commander in chief, was very great in the island, to accompany him. Under their prudent and mtriotic management, the revolution was consummated, and Carsica reunited to France, without difficulty, or the pain of shedding a single drop of blood (7).

On the 11th of October, Spain from being a neutral power under the treaty of July 1795, became an ally of France in the war against Great Britain. This event, together with the alliance with Genes, the peace with Naples, and the recovery of Corsica, overthew the project of naval ascendancy in the Mediterranean, with which the seisure of Toulon had inspired the British cabinet, and gave for a season the mastery of that sea to the combined French and Spanish fleets. In consequence, the opposition against which Bonaparte would have to contend, was limited to the forces of Austria, and such adherents as she might make or preserve in Italy. This change in the situation of maritime affairs, was a source of much satisfaction to him. In a letter of the 17th of October he thus announced it to the minister at Rome. "I have

his moment received intelligence that the English are evacuating he Mediterranean; they have already evacuated Corsica, which ias hoisted the tricolored flag, and sent deputies to me to take the ath of allegiance." On the same day he wrote to Josephine, 'The English are evacuating the Mediterranean; Corsica is ours; good news for France and for the army." And in a letter of the ame date to the directory before he had heard of their treaty of peace with Naples, after enlarging upon the value of Corsica to France, he observed: "The expulsion of England from the Medierranean, has a great influence on our military operations in Italy. You ought to exact severe conditions from Naples, for this event exerts an important moral effect upon the minds of the Italians, and will make Naples tremble to the remotest parts of Sicily." The severe tone of this suggestion, so different from the habitual mildness of his counsels to the government, and so opposite to the moderation of the terms upon which he concluded and recommended the armistice of Brescia, was inspired no doubt by his indignation at the perfidious boldness of the king of Naples in taking advantage of Wurmser's first irruption, and marching a column of troops across the Roman frontier.

Besides these various intricate and weighty affairs of what may be termed diplomatic interest, and foreign policy, which he had to sustain or conduct during the short breathing time allowed him by the Austrians after the battle of St. George, his attention was given, during the same interval and with his accustomed energy, to the interior condition of his army; its health, its finances, and its response ments.

Lingering under the obstinacy of autumnal fevers, and crowded painfully in loathsome hospitals, the invalids became so feeble in body and dejected in mind, that they refused the remedies prescribed for them, and were reduced to a state, in which it may be said, that "despair tended the sick." Bonaparte, himself afflicted with the same fever under which his men suffered, visited the hospitals, and at one of them, throwing a quantity of jesuit's bark into a vessel of water, drank copiously of the infusion before the eyes of the patients. His presence, his example, the words of courage and consolation which he addressed to them; their remembrance of his indefatigable labours, and glorious deeds, revived the soldiers to hopes of health and a relish for life. The draughts prepared by the surgeons, they no longer refused, and

they felt awakened within them, under the languor of physical suffering, a moral strength, which corroborated the salutary effects of medecine. Thus, disease, which unnerves ether generals, and prostrates the force of armies, was disarmed of its most degreeous power by the generous zeal and vivifying energy of this great commander.

In defiance of his example and injunctions, the agents cutrusted with the receipt and distribution of the treasure of the army, had taken advantage of the furious vicissitudes of the war, to com numerous and heavy malversations. The appearance of Www. at Mantua, an event which seemed to displace for ever the thority of France, and to render the retreat or destruction of Binaparte inevitable, was especially the signal for the perpetrales of all sorts of peculation and roguery. But after destroying the two armies of Wurmser, and shutting up that marshal in Mantes, Bonaparte, from his headquarters at Milan, declared war and the thieves of his own army, and prosecuted it with that vigeur and activity, which characterized his contests with less obstine hateful foes. His abhorrence of this species of crime, which had been often expressed, was early manifested. When he took command of the army of the interior, after his suppression of the sections of Paris, a paymaster who had conferred with him and matter of duty, upon making his bow took care to place a realist of gold on the chimney piece. As soon as it was discovered. naparte had the paymaster called back, and upon asking whate meant by the proceeding, was told that it was left for him ceptance, and was nothing but a compliance with constant was To the confusion of the paymaster, the douceur was refused, and himself repulsed with disdain and reproaches (8). It would at ford neither pleasure nor instruction to recapitulate frauds which Bonaparte detected, the delinquents he cause the disorders he remedied, or the criminals he punishe his letter of the 12th of October may be cited, as it furnish animated sketch of the embarrassments of this sort by which he was beset, and of the vigorous mode and independent spirit is which he encountered them.

"Since I have been at Milan, I have been occupied in making war upon the swindlers of the army. I have had many of the tried and punished, and it is my duty to denounce others. I making open war against them, it is clear that I make it the in-

rest of a thousand tongues to pervert public opinion to my rejudice. I understand that two months ago I wished to make yself duke of Milan, that at present I want to be king of Italy. s long as my strength and your confidence remain to me, I will age unrelenting war against the thieves and the Austrians.

"The company of Flachat is nothing more than a nest of naves, without any real credit, without funds or character. I annot be suspected of unfairness toward them, because it was y opinion that they were diligent, honest, and well disposed.

at proof must be yielded to.

"First,—They have received fourteen millions; they have paid f this only six millions; and they refuse to pay the orders of the easury for less than a discount of fifteen or twenty per cent. ransactions of this shameful description, are publicly effected at enoa. They declare they have no funds; but still for this honest

rofit, they consent to pay the orders.

"Second,-They furnish nothing to the army of good quality; omplaints reach me from all quarters. They are strongly susected of having made false deliveries of wheat, to an amount xceeding eighty thousand quintals, by corrupting the keepers of he magazines. Third-Their contract is onerous to the republic, ince one million in silver, which weighs ten thousand pounds, an be transported in five or six post coaches, for five or six housand francs; while their transportation of the same sum, osts nearly fifty thousand francs, as the treasury allows them by ontract five per cent. Yet it is to this company of four names, hat are confided all the interests of France in Italy. They are not perchants but mere stockjobbers, like those of the Palais Royal. ourth, -Peregaldo, a native of Marseilles (one of the company). lisclaimed his character of Frenchman, denied his country, and nade himself a Genoese. He does not wear the national cockade. He left Genoa with his family, spreading alarm by saying we were soing to bombard Genoa. I had him arrested and driven out of Ought we to suffer fellows of this description, who Lombardy. are more ill disposed and aristocratical than the emigrants themselves, to act as spies upon us, be always with the Russian consul at Genoa, and then enrich themselves at our expense? Lacheze, our consul at Genoa, is a knave. His conduct at Leghorn in selling wheat at an under price, is proof of it.

"The merchandize at Leghorn does not sell. I have just sent

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orders to Flachat to have it disposed of; but I am willing to be, that thanks to a conspiracy of rogues, the sale will not produce two millions, although it ought to yield at least seven.

"As to the military commissaries, except Dennièe, the director in chief, Boinod, Mazade, and two or three others, they are the veriest thieves. Three are on trial. It is their duty to inspet and superintend; yet they furnish the means of fraud by signing every thing. It is necessary to purge the army of them and seed us honest commissaries, if honest commissaries are to be found. Such as have wherewithal to live on already ought to be selected. The quartermaster Gosselin is a rogue. He made contracts for boots at thirty-six francs, which have since been renewed at eighteen.

"Finally,—Shall I tell you that a military commissary, Flack, is accused of selling a box of jesuit's bark sent us by the king of Spain. Others have sold mattresses. But I will say no more. Such horrors make one blush at being a Frenchman. The town of Cremona furnished for the hospitals more than fifty thousand else of fine linen, which these villains have sold. They sell every thing.

"You no doubt calculated that your agents would pilfer, has still that they would perform the public service, and have a limb decency in their frauds. But they rob in a manner so ridicules and impudent, that if I had a month's time, there is not one of them that might not be shot. I cease not arresting them and bringing them before courts martial. But they buy up the judges: for it is a fair here, every thing is sold. An agent accused of having imposed a contribution of eighteen thousand france of Salo, has only been condemned to be put in irons for two months. And then, how are we to prove any thing against them; they all support one another. Dismiss, or cause to be arrested, quartermaster Gosselin. Dismiss the commissaries named in the calculated list. It is true they would probably ask nothing better.

"Let us come next to the paymasters. Thevenin is a robber; he affects an insolent luxury. He has made me a present of several beautiful horses, which, as I was in want of them, I took; but for which it has been impossible to make him accept payment. Have him arrested and kept in prison six months. He might per a war tax of five hundred thousand francs in cash. He does not perform his duties. His waggons are filled with emigrants, are called royal, and wear the green collar" (the colour of the cost

'Artois) "before my eyes. You may conceive that I often have hem seized; but they are not always in my way.

"Sonolet, late agent of provisions, is a rogue. The department of supplies was right in dismissing him. Auzou is a thief the never does his duty. Collet performs his duty faithfully. It has zeal for the service and more honour than all these windlers.

"The new agent sent by Cerf-Beer appears to be better than hevenin. I only speak on this occasion of the great knaves. Vould you believe that they try to corrupt my military secretaies, even in my antechamber. The military agents are all cheats. One of them named Valeri, is on trial at Milan; the others ed.

"Faypoult; your minister, Pouissielgue, secretary of legation, nd Sucy, quarter master general, all honest men, are witnesses f the frauds committed by Flachat and company, at Genoa. But am obliged to set off to-morrow for the army; a circumtance that gives great joy to all the knaves, whom a glance the administration of the army has made known to me.

"The paymaster general is an honest man, though of limited apacity. The comptroller is a knave; witness his conduct at clogna.

"The denunciations which I make are sincere and conscienious, like the verdicts of a jury. You must be aware that it would omport neither with my station nor my character, to denounce hese culprits to you, had I time to collect positive proofs against hem. They all cover themselves.

"Desgranges, agent of provisions, is intelligent; but we want aint-Maime who is a man of merit and consideration. The serice would be performed and you would save several millions. I eg you to send him to us. Finally, we require for agents not tockjobbing sharpers, but men of large fortune and established haracter. I have none but spies. There is not an agent in the rmy who does not desire our defeat, nor one who does not correspond with the enemy. Almost all have emigrated under one retext or another. It is they who make known our numbers, and destroy the prestige of our force. So that I guard myself more against them than I do against Wurmser. I never have any of them with me, and during our expeditions supply my army

without them. But that does not prevent their manufacturing stories according to their custom" (9).

In conformity with the suggestions contained in this letter, he had previously sent orders to have Gosselin and Flack arrested and conducted under guard to Milan, a measure which, however salutary in its preventive effects, could not remedy the disorders already existing in the finances of the army. In consequence of their deranged and fraudulent state, when the next series of military operations commenced, the army, notwithstanding the vast resources which it had created, was for a moment not well supplied (10).

Keen in the detection and punishment of cheats and culprise among the fiscal agents of his army, he was zealous in vindicating those who were upright and faithful. A letter to the directory, of the 12th of October, in which he defends the conduct of the intendant, discovers his acuteness and sagacity in matters of business, and exhibits an interesting view of the subsistence and expenses of his army.

"You will receive herewith a statement of the expenses of the army. By it you will discover, that the calumnies which have been unjustly heaped upon the intendant Denniée, cannot reach him. As a man of business, he possesses industry and method, without having, however, transcendant talents. You will observe a great difference between the account of the paymaster general and that of the executive commissaries, and that it ranges from four to five millions. The commissaries allege that they have advanced a balance of five millions to the paymaster general, who, on his side, is in the right, because he says, "show my receipts." Moreover, he knows what he has expended. I suspect this difference is caused by the commissaries themselves giving orders for sums, and making payments of arrears, without passing the amount through the hands of the paymaster, or without the disbursement being asthorized by the intendant. This practice is subversive of all order and accountability. To my knowledge, two or three aljutants general having been taken by the enemy, on their report have had gratifications of three thousand francs allowed them by the commissaries; payments, which you will see clearly, the tendant would not have authorised. They were accorded brave officers, who deserved favour. But the proceeding has be the bad effect of giving rise to claims from all the superior offcers, and unfertunately there is already but too much money speet in indemnification of losses. At the slightest check, every body has lost his portmanteau. The boards of administration sign every thing that is presented, which has made me take the determination to grant no gratifications whatever, without the signature of the minister of war, which will save us a great deal.

"As you will perceive, then, that for the six months which the campaign has lasted we have spent but eleven millions, it remains for me to explain why we have spent so little. It is because, first,—we lived for a long time on requisitions; second,—we have received supplies in kind from Modena, Parma, Ferrara and Bologon; third—France has furnished us, and still furnishes us considerable quantities of provision; and lastly, we often subsist on the snagazines of the enemy."

With regard to reenforcements, his carnest and reiterated appeaks to the government have already been referred to. They pressed uninterruptedly through the series of his military letters. entending from the battle of St. George to the day when the army of Alvinzi came in eight of his outposts, and then gave place only to directions to the commanding officer at Milan, to forward to headquarters, every man, who should arrive from France, or who could be drawn from the various garrisons and depots in Lombardy. Yet, notwithstanding his applications, entreaties, representations, and remonstrances; notwithstanding the ample and repeated promises of the directory, and the imperious necessity of holding their ground in Italy; notwithstanding the great extent of country which he had now to occcupy; it does not appear that, in the interval above defined, more than twelve or thirteen thousand men reached him. In order that an exaggerated impression of their numbers might be communicated to the enemy, the thin battalions were represented to be full regiments, and were marched into Italy in separate detachments and by different But they were not sufficient to repair the losses he had enstained in the campaigns against Wurmser, in the marshes around Mantua, and from the fevers of autumn (11). He was particularly disappointed and chagrined that the 83rd, a regiment mustering three thousand five hundred men, which had been attached at one time to the army of Italy, and had served under his immediate orders in the campaign of 1794, was retained by geveral Willot in the south of France. This officer, who in subordination to Bonaparte, commanded the 8th military division, the headquarters of which were at Marseilles, not only refused to send forward the 83rd, but in defiance of Bonaparte's instructions, detained the 10th battalion of the Ain, a squadron of the 18th dragoons, and the 11th regiment of the line, which, after six months of procrastination, general Chateauneuf Randon had been induced to part with. General Willot's pretext was, that these troops were required to keep down the disaffected population in the south of France. In representing this insubordinate proceeding to the directory, Bonaparte, in a despatch of the 2nd of October, observed: "Nevertheless the general has eight thousand men in his division; troops enough to conquer the south of France were it in rebellion. I hold in subjection, and regulate with a police, an enemy's country more extensive than his division, with eight or nine hundred men. General Willot served in the beginning of the revolution in the army of Italy. He esjoys the reputation of being a brave man and a good soldier, but of being also an outrageous royalist. Not knowing him, and not having time to examine his operations, I am far from confirming this opinion of his character; but one thing appears very clear to me, which is that he acts in the south as if it were h Vendée, which is the surest way of making it so.

"Where no respect is paid to the constituted authorities, and where the inhabitants of several departments are declared an masse to be unworthy of being called citizens, it must be in contemplation either to raise a large army, or to stir up civil war. I can see no middle object. If you leave general Willot at Marseilles, you must give him an army of twenty thousand men, or expect to witness the most afflicting scenes

"When a town is declared in a state of siege, it appears to me that an officer becomes a sort of magistrate, and is bound to conduct himself with a moderation and decorum, suited to the circumstances of his situation; and should refuse to be the instrument of factions, or an officer of the vanguard. I submit these reflections to you, in consequence of the necessity I am under of obtaining reenforcements.

"I beg of you also to take the 8th military division from under my command; because the principles upon which general Willot conducts himself, are not such as become his station; and because I should think myself disgraced at seeing disorder excited in a place under my authority, or at allowing a general subject to my command, to make himself nothing more than a tool of factions."

This severe denunciation of Willot's conduct, conveyed a strong censure upon that of the directory. Balancing between the different parties of the republic, and endeavouring to counteract the violence of one, by the force of another, they had become at this particular crisis, more fearful of the republicans than of the royalists, and were supposed, notwithstanding the general repugnance of their sentiments and his, to have employed general Willot for the special object of breaking the spirit and defeating the purposes of the former. Their reply to this part of the despatch, which was written after several days had been allowed for deliberation, and which avoids all allusion to Bonaparte's equitable and enlightened views of military government, shows that, while they were not disposed to acknowledge the justice of his reflections, they could only excuse themselves by vindicating Willot, who in a few months subsequently they punished for treason. They enclosed the copy of a decree, by which according to Bonaparte's desire, the 8th military division was provisionally separated from his command, and also the copy of a letter to general Willot requiring him to retain within his province, as many troops only as might be indispensable in his discretion for the service committed to him; and to despatch the rest, particularly the 10th battalion of the Ain, as reenforcements to the army of Italy. But this battalion consisted of raw troops and was only five hundred strong; while the 83rd of which they make no mention whatever, was a veteran regiment of seven times that number. Of their praise of the royalist and refractory general, implying a direct approval of his conduct, and an oblique reprehension of Bonaparte's animadversions, the latter abstained from taking the least notice, further than to acquaint them with its fatal consequences. For the contrariety of Willot became, by encouragement, naturally more vexatious and unbending, and the reenforcements ordered from the interior to the army of Italy, were, it soon appeared, like streams passing through a sandy desert, the greater part of them retained in the region they were destined to traverse (12).

But it was not to the matter of reenforcements only that his solicitude extended, as appears by his despatch of the 19th of October, in which, with his usual force and felicity of expression, he draws the attention of government to the quality also of the men to be sent him, and to the character of the officers to be received or retained in his army.

"You will receive herewith the answer of general Chateseneuf Randon, by the return of an extraordinary courier which I sent him. From this then it follows, that I can hope for nothing more than two thousand men, while your order required at thousand. You informed me by your last courier that ten theseand men independently of these two thousand, were about a join me. You ought to let me know the day and place of the departure, and their actual condition. If ten thousand men at out, you may calculate that not more than five thousand will arrive.

"I do not yet know whether general Kellermann has cent on the 40th from Lyons, nor whether general Willot has obeyed my order to send the 83rd. On these two regiments, should they arrive in time, may perhaps depend the fate of Italy.

"We have a great many artillery and engineer officers side. Send us ten officers of each of these corps, and let them be brave and active. Mantua has ruined these two corps for us. I have you to leave in command of them, Chasseloup and Lespissus; they are two excellent officers. I have so many generals of higade wounded, that in spite of your daily promotions, there is all a deficiency. It is true some have joined me who are so stapid, that I cannot employ them in active operations.

"I request you to send me general Duvigneau, and some others of his stamp; send brigadiers rather than generals of division. Those who come from la Vendée are unaccustomed to war en a grand scale. We find the same fault with the troops, but they soon get experience. Mantua is hermetically blockaded and the with seven thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry.

"Send me men who have served in the cavalry, to recruit est regiments; we will get horses for them. Let them come with their uniforms of dragoons, chasseurs, or hussars, with their sabres and carbines, except the dragoons, who ought to have muskets like the infantry. There are so many of the ancient get darmes infesting the streets of Paris, that by means of some assist recruiting officers, I believe it would be practicable to obtain a good number of them, only reminding them that we pay here is hard cash. More than twelve hundred of our cavalry are sist.

r wounded; and their horses are doing nothing at the depots. iend us some cavalry officers, colonels and captains; we will ind employment for them here. Let them be men that will ght. I pray you to allow colonel Gandreau of the 20th dragoons and Sentilhac of the 25th chasseurs, to retire on half pay. They re men who fall sick on the eve of a battle. Such men have no assion for the sword. I pray you also to allow the same in-balgence to citizen Gaugonnier major of the 1st hussars.

"The colonel of the 1st hussars, who is wounded, is a brave man; but he is too old, and should be allowed to retire. In consequence of these officers failing us, duty falls too heavily on the few brave ellows belonging to the cavalry, who end by being wounded, aken, or killed; and the corps is left without commanders."

In a letter of the 25th of October, after telling the directors that he 29th regiment which, upon marching from Paris was reported t four thousand men, had joined him only eleven hundred strong, rging them by promises of great success to send forward the 40th nd 83d, and suggesting the expédiency now that the English were ithdrawn from the Mediterranean, of assisting him by naval ooperation in the Adriatic; he adds. "If you send a squadron f frigates into the Adriatic it will be of advantage for an officer elonging to it to land and concert operations with me in order to hoose a station for the protection of the ships, and for our corespondence. It would be well too if a large lighter could come to he mouth of the Po. I could load her with hemp and ship timber, he might in exchange bring us three thousand muskets, two thouand bayonets, two thousand sabres, four thousand six inch shells; thousand balls for twelve, and six thousand for eighteen, ounders; articles of which we are in continual want. I can see o other means of supplying our naval force with provisions, of rhich there is abundance in the legation of Ferrara and in the lomagna. Should there be an apprehension of a scarcity of grain a the spring, boats may be sent to the mouth of the Po, and I vill send down any quantity that may be required."

Besides its immediate relation to his military operations, this leter is interesting from the evidence it affords of the powerful, but aconscious, tendency of his mind to transcend the limits of subrdinate duty; and of his ability, even from a remote frontier in foreign country, to touch and manage the springs of government a France.

But while he was suffering from the negligence of the government, the knavery of contractors, and the pestilence of the climate, the last of these causes, aggravated by want of food, was operating severely in Mantua. On the 16th of October, this having been ascertained from the confession of prisoners and the reports of spies, Bonaparte directed Berthier to send a flag of truce to marshal Wurmser, and to offer, in his name, if the Austrian commander would give up Mantua, to allow him to march out with all his troops, artillery, and stores, and retire freely into Germany. On this occasion the offer was refused.

As the succours which Bonaparte required, if furnished at al. were likely to be slow in their progress and inadequate in their numbers, he determined to strengthen his position in Italy by works of defence. With this view he fortified Pizzighitone, Tresso. and other eligible points on the Adda, his two bridges across the Po, one near Mantua and the other near Pavia, the forts of Urbino and Ferrara, and the undefended positions on the Adics. His purpose was to cover the siege of Mantua as long as possible. to protect his flank against annoyance from Rome, and in case the weight of the approaching Austrian irruption should compel him to abandon the line of the Adige and the works around Mantee. to retire behind the Adda, and there, with the republican population of Milan at his back and such reenforcements from France # might have time to join him, to dispute the mastery of Italy is a great battle.

CHAPTER XIX.

November 1796.

on made at Vienna, by the victories of Bonaparte-Effect in Italy reverses of Jourdan and Moreau-Perverse conduct, and probable es, of the directory-Disquietude of Bonaparte-Strength and position force-Marshal Alvinzi-His numbers and his plans -Advances to iave-Massena retires-Bonaparte supports his lieutenant-Battle of nvia-The Austrians driven across the Brenta-Disasters of Vaubois naparte marches back to Verona-Reviews the division of Vauboiskes the 39th and 85th-Their grief and mortification-Alvinzi aphes Verona-Takes post at Caldiero-Bonaparte resolves to attack -Action of Caldiero-Bonaparte repulsed-Retires to Verona-Chaand murmurs of the troops—His effort to encourage them—Noble ect of the sick and wounded—Desperate position and distress of Bote-His letter to the directory-His greatness of soul-Sagacity and y of his resolution—He marches for Ronco—Dejection of the troops passes the Adige, and enters the marshes of Arcola-The confidence army revived-Movement of Massena and Augereau-The former the left hand causeway; the latter repulsed at the bridge of Arcolaparte renews the attack in person-Fails-Gallantry and devotion of *-Heroism and death of Muiron-Danger and rescue of Bonapartezi disconcerted by the first day's action-Bonaparte withdraws across dige for the night to Ronco—The second day—Massena defeats one n of the Austrians and Augereau another—The action of the second accessful—Bonaparte again retires to Ronco—Throws a bridge across outh of the Alpon-The third day-Forward movement of Alvinzisitions of Bonaparte - Repulse of general Robert on the centre cause--Bonaparte attacks with the 32nd-Rescues Robert, and destroys ıstrian column-Massena on the left hand repulses Alvinzi with great iter-Augereau passes the mouth of the Alpon-Death of the aide de Elliot-Bonaparte resolves to give battle on the plain-His stras-Defeats Alvinzi in a pitched battle-Marches to Villa NovaEnters a convent—Saves two of his wounded men—Returns in triumant to Verona—Rescues Vaubois who had been surprised and besten—Comparative loss of the two armies—Bonaparte's report to the directory—Letters to Josephine, Madame Muiron, general Clarke, and Carnot—Estatacks Davidowich, and drives him into the Tyrol—Places Jouhart in command of Vaubois's division—Returns to Verona—Abortive movements of Alvinzi—He retreats behind the Brenta—Presentation of the colours to the directory—Merit of Bonaparte in this contest.

"The couriers who bore to Vienna the news of Prince Charles' successes, were followed by messengers with accounts of Wurmser's disasters. The imperial court passed the whole month of September in vicissitudes of joy and grief. satisfaction of triumph, did not make up for the consternation produced by defeat. Germany was safe, but Italy was lost, and the army which was to maintain this frontier, had disappeared. Its numerous staff, its veteran marshal, with the wrecks of several broken regiments, had saved themselves only by taking refuge in Mantua; which reduced to extremities, in want of food, and a prey to pestilence, was on the point of opening its cates to the victor. The Aulic council felt the necessity of making extraordinary efforts. It assembled two armies, one in the Priori. and the other in the Tyrol, and placing them under the command of Marshal Alvinzi, ordered him to march to the relief of Manual, and the rescue of Wurmser (1)."

Such is the well-drawn picture that Bonaparte himself sketched, of the impressions under which the Austrian cabinet was now preparing to contest with him a fourth time, the possession of Lombardy.

On the other hand, the miscarriage and retreat of the French armies on the Rhine, were felt in Italy, not only as an office against the victories of Bonaparte in the general result of the campaign, but as leaving a balance, to be carried to the credit of Austria, in the yet unsettled dispute. It could not be doubted that the Emperor's good fortune on the principal frontier, would dispose and enable him to redouble his exertions on the secondary one; and it was soon ascertained that detachments from the army of the archduke, recruits from the Illyrian provinces, draughts from Austrian Poland and the remotest garrisons of the Danube, were pressing forward on the various routes leading

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into Italy. In the Frioul, the division of Quasdonowich which had escaped from the field of Bassano, was the nucleus on which these reenforcements collected; as that of Davidowich, who remained at Newmark in front of Vaubois, was their rallying point in the Tyrol.

This state of things coinciding with the earnest representations and reiterated appeals of Bonaparte, opened the eyes of the directory to the importance of assisting their general in Italy with something more substantial and efficacious than promises and despatches. But even in this corrected stage of their councils, their acts when compared with the abundance of their assurances, were better calculated to disappoint his expectations, than to satisfy his wants. As late as the middle of November, the whole amount of reenforcements he received, were not sufficient to repair his losses by death, wounds, and disease; and he and his brave army were doomed to engage in a fourth contest, with the odds of two to one against them, and against an enemy whose perseverance was stimulated by the obvious neglect of their own government (2).

When his great services, important position, and perilous exposure, are taken into view, it is difficult to account for this determined neglect on the part of the government. No suspicion was entertained of his integrity or his patriotism; for when certain journalists in Paris accused him of a design of making himself king of Italy, and affirmed that he was to be superseded by general Hoche, the directory not only wrote to him, abjuring and reprobating the calumny, but published their letter in the Moniteur as soon as it was written. In this document they say, "The directory view with indignation the perfidy with which a certain coalition of pamphleteers have allowed themselves to attack the loyalty and constant fidelity of your services, and they owe it to themselves to contradict formally the abourd calumniets which a necessity of ministering to the malignant taste of their readers, has caused these writers to hazard." Nor were they insensible to the value of their conquests in Italy, or to the importence of maintaining them; for from Italy they had derived funds for supporting the armies of Jourdan and Moreau, and equipping the squadrons in Toulon; and they acknowledged that their only chance of establishing by treaty, the constitutional limits of France on the Rhine, depended on the equivalents which they

would have to offer in Italy. Yet although Bonaparte, from the beginning of the campaign, had been soliciting reenforcements, they had never enabled him to bring into the field more than half the numerical force of his enemy. He had gained battle after battle, destroyed army after army, humbled foe after foe, reduced to peace or subjection state after state; and had repeatedly offered, if but moderately reenforced, to pass the Alps, and finish the war in the heart of Germany. All was in vain; the directory not only refused to provide for this adventurous march, but diverting their resources to less feasible projects, failed even to supply the void which the waste of war had occasioned in his ranks; although the Italian Tyrol was added to the extent of country to be covered by his arms, and the retreat of their generals on the Rhine, left Austria free to make her greatest efforts on the side of Italy. With the twenty two thousand men assembled at Brest under general Hoche, added to the army of Italy, Bonaparte, while the archduke Charles was before Kehl and Huninguen, would have reopened that frontier to the advance of the armies on the Rhine. or taken Vienna; and in either case would have forced the Emperor to peace. Still, the directors confined him to Italy; and with a perverseness arising partly from jealousy of the effects of his glory, partly from their own intestine disagreements, and partly perhaps from resentment at the futility, with which the force of his judgment and the rapidity of his successes, had at tainted their most elaborate and positive instructions, condemand him to undergo herculean labours. But supported by his own gen and the devotion of his army, he performed more than hercules. exploits (3).

Though few in number, his troops were animated by the highest spirit, and under his conduct, were ready to meet any force or brave any danger; and with the exception of a momentary want occasioned by fraudulent irregularities in the service, were well supplied with food, clothes, and pay. His artillery was numerous and efficient; his cavalry, though the regiments were not full, was expert and well mounted. Besides, it will be remembered that by a fortunate contrariety to the intentions of the government, he had established on both sides of the Po, under institutions favourable to liberty and an alliance with France, a state of popular feeling, highly advantageous to his military operations. The inhabitants of Lombardy, Bologna, Ferling

rara, Medela and Reggio, had now associated by visible and irrevocable acts, their interests and wishes with the success of his grains; so that he was relieved from apprehension of distarbances in his rear, in consequence either of popular caprice or papal hostility. Witnesses of his astonishing triumph over Beaulieu and Wurmser, the people on both banks of the Po, did not doubt for i memont the fate of Alvinzi, and waited anxiously to share in the triumph of his destined conqueror. This state of opinion enabled him to weaken to the utmost his posts and garrisons in the rear, in feder to supply as far as possible his difficiency of force in the field. . But neither the confidence of his friends nor the courage of his trions, could make up for the lamentable thinness of his ranks. or relieve his mind from misgivings at being placed in continual estilict with superior numbers. On the 25th of October, he whole to the directory. "I believe we shall soon come to blows here. In less than two mouths, Mantua well be taken or relieved. If the 83rd and 40th join me, that is if I get a reconforcement of Eve thousand men, I will answer for every thing. But the hour see late, and it will not suffice. Should I be forced back, Mantue will be succoured."

His army of the siege, half of which was composed of convalescents from the hospitals or patients going into them, was commanded by general Kilmaine, and now amounted to eight thousand five hundred men. His army of observation consisted of twelve thousand under Vaubois in the Tyrol, ten thousand under Massena at Bassano, and as many, including the reserve of sixteen hundred cavalry, under Augereau at Verona. These positions, though separated, were, in reference to the face of the country and the direction in which the enemy's columns were approaching, admirably chosen, whether for attack or defence; enabling him with safety and celerity to unite the mass of his force in resistance on any point at which the Austrians might attempt to break through the line of the Adige; or to assume the offensive and assail their columns in succession; the plan which he preferred and pursued.

The efforts of the imperial government to create a new army in Italy, had been attended by difficulties in selecting a commander. The conduct of an invasion, every march of which was strewed with the wrecks of demolished columns, promised to yield, although it was no longer the garrison of Mantua, but a

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corps d'armée under a fieldmarshal which was to be rescued, at least as much of disaster as of honour; and was therefore not likely to excite very ardent or extensive competition. The choice fell finally upon Marshal Alvinzi, a Hungarian officer of artillery, who having served with credit on the Rhine and in Flanders. during the campaigns of 1794 and 95, was appointed to succeed Wurmser, and it was hoped to save him. He was not endowed with genius, but he possessed courage, perseverance, experience and talent. The army placed at his disposal, exclusive of the force imprisoned in Mantua, consisted of fifty eight thousand men; eighteen thousand embodied by Davidowich in the Tyrol, and forty thousand assembled under his own orders on the banks of the Isonzo. His plan of invasion, though altogether different from the first irruption of his predecessor, and far from being similar to the second, has been judged to be as defective as either. He himself was to advance with the stronger division from the Frioul, and passing the Tagliamento, the Piave, and the Brenta, was to march upon Verona; while Davidowich with the weaker, was to descend the valley of the Adige; and the two corps uniting at Verona, were to force the lines around Mantua.

By this disposition it was evident, that the Austrian commander put his columns beyond the reach of mutual support in defence, or of ready combination in attack; since besides the interior position held by Bonaparte, the roughness and elevation of the interjacent mountains between his own line of movement and that which he prescribed for Davidowich, rendered the connexion of the two corps impracticable (4).

On the last of October, Alvinzi breaking up from the Isomo, crossed the Tagliamento and took post on the Piave. Upon learning this movement, Bonaparte sent orders to Massena to advance against him with a corps of observation; but required him as soon as the Austrians should pass the Piave, to retire before them to Vicenza and Montebello. By bold demonstrations in Alvinzi's front, Massena having compelled him to display his whole force, found it to be full forty thousand strong, and already on the right bank of the Piave. He therefore repassed the Brenta, and according to his orders, fell back into the plains of Vicenza.

Upon receiving Massena's report Bonaparte leaving a garrison at Verona, moved forward instantly to join him with Augereau's division and the reserve of cavalry; and having united his force

licenza, advanced at day light on the 6th, with intention by npt and impetuous assault, to repel and confound Alvinzi at tset; and then reversing his late movement against Wurmpass rapidly up the defiles of the Brenta, and uniting with is near Trent, to overwhelm and destroy Davidowich. as necessary," he wrote to the directory, "to strike like a erbolt, and to sweep the enemy from before us, at his very tep." To obtain a just conception of the vivid resolution ich he was animated, and the haughty confidence of his ofand men, it is only necessary to reflect on the positions he occupied at this moment. Kilmaine with eight thousand undred men blockaded Wurmser with more than twenty and, an odds of two and a half to one, in favour of the Aus-. Bonaparte with eighteen thousand was marching to attack in pen field, forty thousand, a disparity of about the same mage against the French; and Vaubois with twelve thousand, o make head against Davidowich, whose superiority of force s three to two. Yet had Vaubois, who was exposed to the st disadvantage in point of numbers, proved equal to the assigned him, there seems no reason to doubt that this camwould have been decided even more speedily than that of no.

naparte found the army of Alvinzi posted on both banks of trenta. The right under Quasdonowich was divided by the , one division being in Bassano, and the other at Lenove, a poseven miles in front of the bridge of Bassano. The left commanded by general Provera, with a strong vanguard r general Liptay, was on the left bank at Fonteniva. The e placed in reserve, and commanded by general Hohenzollern behind the Brenta at Citadella, and about equidistant from wo wings. With a corps of observation under general Meski, Alvinzi had guarded the gorges of the Brenta at Primolest detachments from Vaubois' division should disturb his flank and rear.

to attack Liptay and Provera, and drive them across the ta; while with Augereau's division, he himself determined to use of Quasdonowich. The action on both points was fiercely obstinately contested; the French assailing with boldness and tuosity, the Austrians resisting with vigour and persever-

Massena who was first engaged, after a conflict of several hours, forced Liptay and Provera across the Brenta with serious damage. Bonaparte was later in reaching Quasdonowich, but sooner in defeating him. The Austrians were thrown into confusion by the fury of the French onset, and after several successive efforts to reestablish the combat, were driven first to the river and then across it in complete disorder. The distance between Lenove and Bassano gave Alvinzi full time to support Quasdonowich at the latter place, with his reserve under Hohenzollern, who upon the approach of the French in pursuit, was found at Bassano, and prepared to defend the bridge. now four o'clock in the afternoon, and Bonaparte was so anxious to get possession of Bassano in the course of the evening, that upon marching from Vicenza, he had instructed Berthier to send after him a supply of pontons by relays of post horses. however, had not arrived; so that in order to pass the Breata, it was necessary to force the bridge. For this purpose the reserve, composed of a brigade of horse and foot, which by the swiftness of the pursuit, had been left several miles in the rear, was ordered up to the front. It happened that a battalion of nine hundred Croats, which in the confusion of the battle and retreat was cut off from the Austrian main body, had throws kself into a village on the route. In attempting to pass though this village, the French reserve was saluted by a fire so severe and unexpected, that it fell back. A few howitzers were then brought up and shells thrown into the place, after which, a summons to surrender having been rejected, it was carried by assault, and the brave Croats put to the sword. But their resistance occasioned a delay of two hours, which made it so late and dark. that the attack upon the bridge was necessarily deferred until next morning, when from other causes it was not attempted; coasequently Alvinzi escaped a total defeat. At it was he lost, besides the battalion of Croats, a number of killed and wounded, five hundred and eighteen prisoners and one piece of artillery. The loss of the victors in killed and wounded was in proportion not less considerable; general Lanusse was severely wounded with a sabre. The troops fought with the most brilliant intrepidity, and carried every position they assailed.

The moment Bonaparte was apprized of Alvinzi's advance to the Piave, and had determined to march against him, he sent his

brother Louis with orders to Vaubois, to dislodge Davidowich from the positions he held between the Adige and the head waters of the Brenta. On the 2nd of November the effort was made. After a hard struggle, General Guyeux took the post of St. Michel, and burnt the enemy's bridge over the Adige. But an attempt of general Fiorella on the right, to carry Segonzano, the same day, was not successful; and the 85th, in an attack in which it failed, was severely handled. The loss on both sides was about equal, amounting in killed, wounded, and prisoners, to near seven hundred men.

On the 3rd, Bonaparte signified to Vaubois, that as the possession of Segonzano was indispensable to the maintenance of his position, it must be carried at all hazards. The next day the attack was consequently renewed, but it was repelled by Wukassowich with gallant spirit and superior force. On the 5th, the Austrians encouraged by these successes, assumed the offensive, assailed Vaubois at several points of his line, and threatening to outflank him, forced him to abandon the Lavis, to relinquish Trent, and finally to fall back to Calliano; where, with his right against the steep mountain, and his left extended obliquely across the Adige to Mori, he again offered battle. This position was designed to frustrate an effort which General Landohn, with a corps of German Tyrolians, was making to turn his flank on the right bank of the Adige. Early on the 7th he was attacked by the whole force of Davidowich and on both banks of the Adige at once. Though outnumbered he maintained a firm and obstinate conflict, and at one time had taken thirteen hundred prisoners, and two pieces of artillery. But at night fall the 39th and 85th, which formed his left wing, owing to some delusion of sight or of sound, yielded to a sudden panic and fled before a feeble attack. A complete rout was the immediate consequence; and as the disaster threatened a separation of the division from all connection with the rest of the army, Vaubois availed himself of the darkness to retreat towards Rivoli, with a speed approaching to precipitation; leaving behind him three thousand of his men, in killed wounded and prisoners, and six pieces of artillery. With the remainder of his force, having passed the Adige on a bridge which by order of Bonaparte, had been recently thrown over the Adige, he established himself during the night of the 8th at Rivoli, posting an advanced guard at the Corosa (5).

Intelligence of Vaubois' repulse from the Lavis and retreat to Calliano, reached Bonaparte at two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, just as he was preparing to force the passage of the Brenta and complete the defeat of Alvinzi. But, in consequence of the miscarriage of his lieutenant, whose retreat he foresaw would probably be continued, Verona, the key of his position was exposed; and he determined at once to sacrifice every prospect of success elsewhere, to the preservation of that central and important place. Instead of advancing, therefore, he ordered an immediate retreat, and marching with his usual expedition, Massena in front and Augereau bringing up the rear, he entered Verona at noon the next day (6).

During the greater part of the 7th the troops filed through the streets of Vicenza. The inhabitants having witnessed the alacrity with which they had just advanced against the Austrians, and the vigour with which they drove them across the Breata, were unable to account for this sudden retrogade movement, and beheld the battalions successively pass by, with hope or apprehension, accordingly as they happened to favor the French or the Austrian quarrel.

But at the commencement of his march Bonaparte had sent colonel Vignolles, an officer who stood high in his confidence, post haste to Verona, with orders to collect whatever troops he could find there, and conducting them to the support of Vaubois, to prevent the probable designs of Davidowich, by occupying Rivel and the Corona. One battalion of the 40th, a regiment detached from the army of la Vendée, had just arrived at Verona, and with this corps Vignolles reached the ground assigned him on the 8th, in time to forestall the Austrians, whose light troops, when upon the point of attacking the small post at the Corona, fell back at his approach. The next morning Joubert, whose health, debilitated by unhealed wounds, bore no proportion to his energy and spirit, came up from the lines around Mantua, at the head of the bth light infantry, and by his presence and support removing all cause for immediate apprehension in this quarter, enabled Vaubois to form and intrench his worsted and weakened division on the plateau of Rivoli and at the Corona.

Alvinzi was awed by the vivacity and success of his adversary's attack on the 6th at Fonteniva and Lenove, and commenced his retreat from the Brenta to the Piave about the hour at which

Bonaparte began his march back to the Adige. But being soon apprized by his scouts of the disappearance of the enemy, Alvinzi countermarched to Bassano in the evening of the same day. The next morning, he crossed the Brenta with his whole force, and moved in pursuit of the French on the road to Verona.

Leaving Massena and Augereau at Verona, Bonaparte on the 9th repaired in person to Rivoli, in order to examine the position and preparations of Vaubois, and to renovate by his presence the broken spirit of that general's troops. He found, that besides six pieces of artillery, Vaubois had lost near a third part of his force. his division being reduced to about eight thousand men, or less than half that of his adversary. Chagrined more at the disgrace than the disaster, and indignant that regiments of the army of Italy should misbehave in the face of the enemy, he reviewed the division on the plateau of Rivoli, and placing himself in front of the two offending regiments, thus addressed them: "Soldiers, I am dissatisfied with you. You have shown neither discipline, firmness, nor gallantry. No advantage of ground could rally you; but you yielded to a panic terror, suffering yourselves to be driven from positions, in which a handful of brave men might have stopped a whole army. Men of the 39th and 85th, you are not French soldiers. Adjutant general, inscribe on their colours-"These men belong no more to the army of Italy."

Pronounced with a stern aspect and a solemn voice, this sentence of degradation and banishment, from a general who had never failed in his duty, and whom the army adored, drew sobs and tears even from the oldest soldiers. In spite of the rigour of military discipline, the accents of their grief and shame burst forth, and several grenadiers who wore arms of honour which they had won in battle, stepped out from the ranks, and in behalf of their regiments exclaimed—"General, we are calumniated. Place us in the advance; and we will show you whether we belong to the army of Italy." Pleased with the effect of his rebuke, Bonaparte replied to the grenadiers in terms of consent and forgiveness. The 39th and 85th soon vindicated their claim to his confidence; and in the course of the campaign, covered themselves with glory (7).

Notwithstanding the severity of the shock which, on the 6th, had repulsed Alvinzi from the right bank of the Brenta, and impressed him with the prudence of an immediate retreat to the Piave, he found himself on the 8th, by an unexpected fluctuation

of fortune, advancing on the high road to Verona, eminently successful in his operations, and in possession of the country included in the triangle formed by the Brenta with the upper and lower Adige. His lieutenant too had recovered Trent, was master of the whole of the Tyrol, and was pushing Vaubois before him between the lake of Guarda and the Adige; an advantage, which, though he was unapprized of its whole extent, had its full effect on the movements of his adversary. Still, before he could form a junction with Davidowich, and crown his operations with the relief of Mantua, it was necessary for him to force the passage of the Adige, in presence of the French army and their formidable chief. Accordingly, continuing his advance, he approached on the 9th within eight miles of Verona, and took a position at Caldiero, on a range of heights, commanding the road and contiguous to the river.

Bonaparte, after completing the object of his visit to Rivoli by reviving the courage of Vaubois' troops, and strengthening the weak points of his position, returned the same night to Verona; when, being made acquainted with Alvinzi's approach, he determined to emerge at once from a system of passive defence under the walls of Verona, and to seize a covering position in front, where he would have room to manceuvre freely between the two hostile columns, and to prevent their nearer approximation. This position, his knowledge of the ground convinced him, was the identical post of Caldiero. He resolved, therefore, to dislodge Alvinzi by an immediate attack.

The road from Verona to Vicenza ran parallel and near to the Adige for about twelve miles, when, passing the Alpon, it turned almost at right angles to the left, and led directly to Vicenza. The Alpon is a small river which rises in the system of secondary mountains north of Verona, crosses the Vicenza road at Villa Neva, and traverses the marshes of Arcola, where completing a rapid and winding course of fifty miles, it falls into the Adige, a short distance below Ronco. Between Verona and Villa Nova and four miles from the latter place, are the heights of Caldiero, upon which the Austrian army was intrenched, its left covered by the marshes of Arcola, and its right posted in a village on Mount Olivetta. Batteries in front and redouts on the flanks, rendered this position as formidable by art, as it was strong by nature.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of the 11th, the French general

marched out from Verona, having Augereau's division in front; and in the course of the evening encountered Alvinzi's vanguard at San Martin, a village within two or three miles of Caldiero. He attacked it instantly with Verdier's brigade, and after a sharp conflict forced it to fall back in confusion upon Alvinzi. This vigorous impression being made on the foe, he continued his movement, and at nightfall, pitched his camp under the heights of Caldiero.

The next morning at early dawn, the two armies were confronted. Alvinzi's reserve under Hohenzollern and Metrowski had not yet joined him, but still he was at the head of twenty two thousand men, while the French fell short of eighteen thousand. Upon reconnoitring the Austrian line Bonaparte, found their left impregnable, but their right in a position which was commanded by an adjacent hill. Profiting by this defect he ordered Massena to seize that eminence immediately, and directed Augereau at the same time to attack the village of Caldiero. General Launay with the leading brigade of Massena's division, mounted the hill under a heavy fire of the enemy's light troops which were thrown forward to oppose him, and got possession of the summit. But the rest of the division, moving from a different point, was stopped unexpectedly by an impassable ravine, and could not support Launay in season. While he was thus exposed, the powerful reserve of Alvinzi came up, and Launay was instantly assailed by overwhelming numbers in front and flank, his brigade broken, and himself and a number of his men made prisoners. Augereau. who had at first penetrated into Caldiero, and made two hundred prisoners, was also turned and forced to retire; and Alvinzi apprized, by the attempt on his right, of the fault in his position, corrected it by occupying the contested eminence in great force, thereby rendering all parts of his line equally strong.

Nevertheless, the fire which had been commenced along the front of the two armies was kept up the whole day, though not to the advantage of the assailants. The rain, which fell in torrents, saturated and softened the ground to such a degree, that the French artillery sunk in the mud and became immovable. The wind shifting suddenly to the north, and blowing in gusts from the snowy Alps, transformed the rain into sleet and hail, which driving full into the faces of the French, chilled and dibilitated the men. The Austrians on the other hand, being in position on the

heights, suffered none of these inconveniences. Their backs to the storm, they felt little of its violence, and their ground, from in elevation, being comparatively firm, their guns, had it been deirable, were susceptible of being moved from point to point on the eminence which they occupied. In addition to these advantages, the arrival of Alvinzi's reserve gave him a force of near forty thousand men, while Bonaparte was reduced at most to seventeen thousand. Encouraged by this great numerical superiority, the Austrian commander, towards the close of the day, descended from the heights and attacked the French repeatedly. But Bonaparte brought up the 75th which had just returned from keeping garrisonatLeshorn and constituted his reserve, and Alvinzi was uniformly repulsed. The storm continued all night with such violence, that in the morning, Bonaparte despairing, for the first time in his life. of making good an attack which he had begun, drew off his weeried and disappointed troops, and conducted them by a slow and silent march to Verona.

In this rude affair, the French loss amounted to one thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Austrians, expesing greater numbers, probably suffered as much. But they held their ground, and as the French desisted and retired, justy claimed the victory (8).

If the French general was chagrined and his army discourse at this, their first reverse, they were both naturally indig at being exposed, after hard and glorious service, by the in cretion or ingratitude of their government, to ruin and diagrace; to calamities which skill could not avert, nor courage resel. He could reproach himself with no fault, no error of judgm slackness of spirit, abatement of activity, nor remissi zeal; and they, besides that they had vanquished a succession of armies, overcoming repeatedly double their own numbers, here many of them the scars of three wounds received since their invasion of Italy. A sentiment of injured honour and highed hope, spread through the ranks, and agitated the men. Their mortification, fiery and stern, exhaled itself in words like the "We alone cannot do the duty of all. The army of Alvinzi which is now opposed to us, is the same before which our troops on the Rhine retreated, and they are undisturbed and idle in their tests. Why are we made to perform their task? If we are beaten, we shall have to fly to the Alps in disgrace; if, on the contrary, we are

victorious, in what will our success result? A new army like this of Alvinzi will be brought against us, as he has succeeded Wurmser, and Wurmser succeeded Beaulieu. In a contest so unequal, our destruction is inevitable." The moral force, the martial tone of the army, though still high, was sensibly lowered,

Bonaparte, who has been hitherto contemplated as the terror of haughty Austria, the hope of liberated Italy, and the pride of republican France, was at this juncture, in a position, better suited to excite sympathy than envy. But it was now that the greatness of his soul displayed itself in its full vigour and amplitude. For instead of yielding, in anger or dejection, to his sense of hardship and unmerited distress, he suppressed all indication of it, and infused into his looks and language, a spirit which rekindled to a blaze, the dying glow of spirit in his troops. Addressing himself to the officers, from whom he had heard the complaints of the men. he communicated through them to the troops, expressions full of confidence and encouragement. "One effort more, and Italy is ours. The enemy is no doubt more numerous than we are, but half his troops are raw recruits. If we beat him now, Mantua surrenders, our labours end, and we remain masters of every thing; for not Italy only, but a general peace is in Mantua. You talk of retiring to the Alps; but you could not stay there. From the high and frozen bivouacs of those rocks, you were able to overrun the delicious Italian plains. But you cannot return from these flowery and abundant camps, to dwell in yonder mountain Reenforcements have joined us, and more are on their march. Then let not those who are unwilling to fight, attempt to justify themselves by false pretexts; for you have only to defeat Alvinzi, and I will answer for every thing afterwards.'

These remarks, repeated by the men of the boldest stamp, touched the souls of all. Their bosoms fluctuated with contending emotions. At one moment in despair, they wished to retreat; at the next, fired with enthusiam and the pride of liberty, they longed to advance. "Are we," they exclaimed, "the soldiers of Italy to suffer taunts and provocations from these Austrian slaves" (9).

No sooner was it known at Brescia, Bergamo, Cremona, Lodi, Milan, Pavia, and Bologna, that the army had received a check, than sick and wounded officers and soldiers, left the hospitals to take their places in the ranks, and share the fate of their comrades and their general, None were more than convalences, and

of some, the wounds still bled. General Lannes, lame from the ball he had received at Governolo, on the eve of the battle of Saint George, was among these heroic men. This sublime spectacles martial and patriotic devotion, excited emotions at once tender and noble.

But, however firm the deportment or spirited the language of Bonaparte, in the presence of his troops, his distress was more poignant and his foreboding more gloomy than theirs. In his despatch to the directory these stifled feelings break forth. "I do my duty, the troops do theirs. My bosom is tortured, but my conscience is calm. Send me succours, I beseech you send me succours. To day, the 13th, we give rest to the troops; to-marrow we must act according to the movements of the enemy. I despair of preventing their raising the siege of Mantua, which is eight days more would be ours. Should this misfortune overtake us, we shall be very soon behind the Adda, and further back att, should no reenforcements come up,

"Our wounded are the flower of the army. All our superior

officers, all our select generals, are disabled. Those who join us are so incapable, that they have not the confidence of the soldiers. The army of Italy, reduced to a handful of men, is chausted. The heroes of Lodi, Millesimo, Castiglione, and Insano, have perished in their country's cause, or groan in heapth, leaving to their regiments nothing but their fame and their public Joubert, Lannes, Lanusse, Victor, furat, Charlot, Dupuy, Insanon, Pigeon, Mesnard, Chabrand, are among the wounded. We are abandoned at the extremity of Italy. The reputation of strength was useful to us; but they pro

ind men.

"In this war I bave k few men; but they were choice tru whose loss it is impossi 3 to supp . The brave fellows who p ıgaiı a continual chances s survive, see in a cont 1 rior force, inevitable de h. ps, the last hour of the Augereau, the intrepid of Berthier, of to strike. Then! then! v become of our brave t The thought makes me ; for I dare not affront a ıti which would be the cause of disc; tragement and misfort those who are the objects of my: rious care.

that we muster only thirty

"In a few days we shall make a last effort. Should fortune smile, Mantua will be ours, and v 1 . aforced by "?

army of this siege, there is nothing I could not undertake. Had the 83rd joined me, three thousand five hundred strong, and well known to the army, I would have answered for every thing. A few days more, and perhaps forty thousand men will not be enough" (10).

No mind can be insensible to the anguish of feeling and dignity of sentiment, expressed in this letter. Conscious, as the writer must have been of his immense services, and sensible as he also was of the ungrateful neglect of the directory, the severe exclusion of self from his complaint, argues a majesty of soul, superior to the insults of fortune, and equal to the mastery of the world. His only solicitude was for his troops, his sole affliction for his brother officers. His own death was to be deprecated, but as a calamity to his army. Had Hannibal, when abandoned at another extremity of Italy. addressed the senate of Carthage, his reproaches could not have been more lofty, his regret more generous, nor his chagrin more acute. But the great adversary of Rome, though long neglected by his government, was allowed to strengthen his army by as many foreign mercenaries, as he chose to enlist or was able to maintain. Whereas, a law of the French republic, prohibited the employment of foreign corps. Some of Hannibal's best troops were Spaniards and Gauls; and after the battle of Cannæ, his ranks were filled with Capuans, Bruttians, and Tarentines. Bonaparte, on the other hand, could not avail himself of the Polish volunteers, nor even of the disbanded regiments of the king of Sardinia, although the territory in which they were raised, was in consequence of his victories, ceded to France.

Against superior numbers and disadvantages of ground he had often contended; but at no time had his situation been so critical, as it now was, or had the danger which environed him appeared so frowning and unavoidable. Wurmser blockaded by less than half his own numbers, was in his rear with more than twenty thousand men. On his left, Davidowich threatened with destruction the overmatched and defeated division of Vaubois; while in his front, Alvinzi emboldened by recent success, and leading nearly three times his own force, was preparing to carry Verona, and with his united columns, to crush all opposition to the relief of Mantua. Worse than all, his troops, valiant as they were, began to shrink under the cold neglect of the government, to confess the hopelessness of the struggle, and to admit that the inexhaustible strength of their hydra-headed enemy must at last prevail.

Aware of the perils of his position, feeling acutely for his army and his country, but superior to distress as well as to danger, the French general, while his followers forgot or indulged their grief. in the repose or murmur's of a camp, applied the full force of his quick and powerful sagacity, to the invention of a plan, by which the path, not of safety only, but of victory, might again be opened to them. Of external aid he had no hope; his resources being confined to knowledge of his ground, reliance on his troops, and confidence in himself. If, in imitation of his campaign against Wurmser, he turned to his left and fell upon Davidowich, he might drive him back into the Tyrol, but from the nature of the country between the lake of Guarda and the Adige, he could not hope to destroy him without a succession of battles. In the mean time, it would be in the power of Alvinzi with his principal army, to pass the Adige, relieve Mantua, and with the cooperation of Wurmser, to envelop and destroy the whole French army. Experience, recent and painful, forbade his turning to the right, and repeating the attempt to dislodge Alvinzi from Caldiero. And as to retreating, abandoning the line of the Adige and relinquishing Mastua, without a decisive battle, he could not brook the humiliating

In this severe exigency, his mind, warmed to the highest glow of its invention, reverted to the marshes on Alvinzi's left, which, in pursuing Wurmser from Bassano, he himself had traversed. They extended, he recollected, from Ronco to Villa Nova, were watered by the Alpon, intersected by dikes, and penetrated by causeways which led from the bank of the Adige to the flank and rear of the Austrians. A march in this direction, and an unexpected assault upon Alvinzi's rear, while he was preparing for a forward movement upon Verona, appeared likely to change the face of affairs, by placing him once more in a situation, where the courage of his troops and his skill in battle, might supply the place of numbers, and combined with the effect of surprise, crewn his arms again with victory. Though the Austrian columns would not be separated, as at Montenotte, by mountains; or as they were upon Wurmser's first irruption from the Tyrol, by a lake and a river, they would be disjoined by an impervious morass. If the movement could be concealed until it was completed, its success seemed almost certain; while should it be discovered, the contest would be decided not by the weight of numbers, but by the intrepidity and

ship of the heads of columns, meeting front to front on the causeways. In a conflict of this kind, there was no reason that the French grenadiers would be worsted. But at all, the manœuvre would divert Alvinzi from his meditated upon Verona, and draw him from his strong position at o.

a these grounds, the bold operation was resolved upon; and ecy was important to its success, no intimation was given orders. The defence of Verona was again confided to Kilmaine, who was instructed to strengthen the feeble garf fifteen hundred men, by drawing as many more from his f the siege; a detachment, that it was hoped could be made. t the knowledge of Wurmser (11). Kilmaine was ordered out, if attacked, to the last extremity, and by shutting his nd closing all communication whatever with the country, ceal as long as possible his own weakness as well as the of Bonaparte. Parties of light troops and detachments of artillery, were sent up and down the right bank of the to guard against a passage being effected by surprise, or ence from the French side reaching the Austrians. tions to Vaubois, to maintain his ground at Rivoli at all s, were emphatically repeated; and as Brescia, Peschiera, rto Legnano, were in a respectable state of defence, Bohad reason to infer that the effort which he was to make on, might have its full effect, before an important impresuld be made by the enemy on any part of his line, or a dedvantage be gained over either of his lieutenants.

his intentions and hopes, like his cares and meditations, makined to his own breast; so that in the dusk of the evening l4th, when his troops were ordered to get under arms and out of Verona by the Milan gate, the officers and men conthat the hour of reverse was at length come, and that their, proud, glorious, and daring as he was, found himself led, after all his triumphs, to turn his back to the foe and Italy to the Emperor.

me shades of night fell around, the army passed the bridges ma, and marched out on the road to Milan. The hour, ection, the silence of the orders respecting an approaching and the sinister state of affairs, concurred irresistibly to a retreat, the very first stage of which involved the loss.

of Mantua. The officers, silent and melancholy, the soldiers, dejected and sullen, obeyed the unusual order and pursued the mwelcome march. The patriots of Verona, whose hopes of their country's independence rested on the success of the French arms. followed, with looks of affliction and despair, the retiring bettalions as they filed through the gloomy streets and disappeared, as it was thought for ever, beyond the walls. But on a sudden, the order was given for the head of the column to wheel to the left. upon the road leading down the Adige. This change of direction produced a glimmering of hope. Before day the leading division was at Ronco, where by command of Bonaparte, colonel Andreosi had already constructed a bridge of boats. By sunrise the whole army, pleased and with surprise, found itself on the left bank of the Adige, and in front of the extensive marshes of Arcola. The it was, that like the glorious light of the East, the daring design of Bonaparte began to dawn upon the minds of his officers and met. He had resolved they perceived, to turn the formidable heights of Caldiero, and to assail Alvinzi in his flank and rear. narrow causeways of the marsh, his troops, who had so often defeated the Austrians on the causeways of Mantua, felt that althou they might be overmatched in aggregate numbers, they would be able by the impetuosity of their charges and their superior provent. to shiver the heads of the Austrian columns. Inspired by prospect of victory, the army recovered its former confidence and all ranks burned with desire to second the enterprise of the unconquerable leader.

The bridge of Ronco was thrown across the Adige, about half a mile above the mouth of the Alpon. This point Bonaparte selected for passing the Adige, because his outnumbered troops would enter at once on the causeways of the marsh; whereas, had the bridge been placed below the Alpon, they would have been exposed in the open plain which borders it on that side. Besides, this stream would have flowed between him and Verten; and Alvinzi, by garnishing its right bank with light troops, might have secured his rear from attack, while he moved with his principal force to the assault of Verona and the relief of Mantua. Another advantage which redounded to the French general, from passis the Adige above the mouth of the Alpon, was, that by bringing his columns into contact with the flank and rear of the Austrian, and within reach of Verona, he saved that important place from



immediate danger. The situation of Ronco in short, relatively to the Adige, the Alpon, and Verona, resembled that of Placentia in reference to the Po, the Adda, and Milan; so that the circumstances which influenced the mind of Bonaparte being similar in the two cases, it is not to be wondered at that the decisions which his sure judgment adopted, were in both, the same (12).

It would appear that Alvinzi, upon establishing himself at Caldiero, had conceived the opinion that the marshy angle between the Adige and the Alpon, was a surface, upon which an army could not in any manner operate. Consequently, instead of occupying the bank of the Adige opposite to Ronco, so as to render a movement upon his rear in that direction impracticable, he contented himself with guarding the bridge over the Alpon at Arcola, and sending by way of observation, patrols of horse down the causeways, three times every twenty four hours. This negligence, like all negligence in war is sure to do, cost him dear.

From the bridge at Ronco, three causeways diverging, traversed the marsh. One to the right, led down the Adige to the mouth of the Alpon, and thence to the ferry at Albaredo. Another to the left, ascended toward Verona, passing through the villages of Monde and Porcil, and emerging near the last, into the plain beweath Caldiero. The third in the centre, passed up the Alpon to the important post of Villa Nova, which it was Bonaparte's object wreach, that he might seize the bridge at that place, get possesdon of Alvinzi's park and baggage, cut off his retreat, and fall spon his rear. This causeway crossed the Alpon on a stone bridge, at the village of Arcola, and then ran up the left bank; w Villa Nova (13). From Ronco, the point of departure, the distimes to Porcil was three miles and a half, thence to Caldiero one and a quarter, and thence to Verona eight. From Ronco to Arcola, it was two miles and a half, and thence to Villa Nova three and a half. From Ronco to the ferry at Albaredo, it was about 'ese mile.

The division of Augereau which first passed the Adige, Bonalpure directed on the centre causeway. He drew from it the 12th light infantry under general Guyeux, who had been transferred from Vaubois' division upon his being joined by Joubert, and posted that a short distance down the right hand causeway, where it could stree as a guard to the bridge, or act as a reserve to the division.

Missena followed, and took the causeway to the left, with orders

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to clear the villages of Bionde and Porcil of the enemy's patrols; so that while Augereau should come down from Villa Nova upon Alvinzi's rear, he was to make a vigorous attack upon his flank. As a reserve to this division, Bonaparte stationed the 75th of the line under general Robert, between Ronco and Bionde, behind a tuft of willows, which grew near the causeway. The corps of cavalry which it was not prudent to expose nor proper to employ. amidst dikes and morasses, with the exception of a few hussars. was drawn up in the village of Ronco, under the orders of general Beaurevoir, prepared to pass by either avenue, to any part of the plain upon which its services might be required. In Ronco, Bosaparte himself remained. At this point, overlooking the wide savanuah to which he had committed his slender but intrenid columns, he stood ready to receive the reports of his valiant liestenants, and to fly to either who should desire his presence to improve victory, or might need his support to prevent defeat (14).

The active Massena first felt the enemy, drove in his patrols from Porcil, got in sight of the towers and steeples of Verona, and gained a position, from which he might observe and frustrate any movement against that important place.

Augereau marched on the centre causeway, with so little obstruction or noise, that his vanguard reached the bridge of Arcole. before it was perceived by the enemy. In the village on the coposite side, were stationed two Croatian battalions, who defended the bridge, with two field pieces, and with marksmen posted in the. houses commanding it. They bivouacked with their right resting on the bridge, and their front extending down the bank of the In consequence, accidentally, of this formation, they discharged a volley from their whole line and at pistol distance. directly into the flank of Augereau's column, before it could wheel upon the bridge. It was like disabling a gallant horse, when in the very act to take a dangerous leap. The stern survivors of the shock fell back in disorder; and the whole column recoiled, until a bend in the causeway withdrew its flank from exposure. The general officers crowded to the front, reformed the grenadiers, and led them forward in repeated charges. It was in vain. The enemy, secure in their position and apprized of its force, threv in each time a fatal fire, which lacerating the flank of the column, deprived it of impulse at the very instant its front was to spring advance. Exasperated by this unexpected difficulty, the courage

of the officers degenerated into fury; and charge after charge was followed by repulse upon repulse. In these vain and sanguinary conflicts, Lannes was twice wounded; and his broken grenadiers falling back out of fire, he was conveyed in a litter to Ronco.

Augereau, unused to defeat and proud of his division, was indignant at seeing it fail before an obstacle which seemed much less formidable, than that which Massena's corps had overcome at Lodi. Forming two battalions of grenadiers into a column of attack, he placed himself at its head, seized a stand of colours and rushed forward on the bridge. Even this bold example was unavailing. The spirit of the men was broke, their enthusiasm subdued, and shrinking at the first volley, they retreated so quickly as to leave Augereau for some moments, almost alone on the bridge.

In the mean time the Austrian general, who, elated by recent success and imaginary triumph, was preparing ladders with a view of scaling the walls of Verona as soon as it was dark, heard the fire at Arcola, and from the adjacent heights and steeples, discerned parties moving through the morass in his rear. first, he was far from comprehending their strength, or divining their object. Finding at last, however, that his cavalry, when sent upon the causeways to gain intelligence, were received at all points by discharges of musketry, and pursued boldly by parties of hussars, he became convinced that a hostile corps had passed the Adige, and got into his rear. Still he could not conceive, that his adversary would draw his outnumbered army from behind the ramparts of Verona, to risk it in an impervious morass: and his mind soon settled on the conclusion, that Bonaparte was annoying his rear with a body of light troops, in order to favour a second attack upon his front. However, as his parties of observation, advanced on the Verona road, continued to report that every thing was quiet in that quarter, he determined to disembarrass his rear at once, by driving the French out of the marshes. Accordingly he ordered Provera with one division, to clear the causeway of Porcil, and Metrowski with another, to free that of About nine o'clock, the former general made a spirited attack on Massena, but he was received by a charge so fierce and effective, that his column was broken and driven out upon the plain, with considerable loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Metrowski met with no better reception: passing the bridge at Arcola he turned along the bend of the causeway, when Augereau, irritated and revengeful, sprang upon him with the bayonet, strewed the causeway with dead and dying, took his cannon with many prisoners, and hurled him back in disorder upon Arcola. But rallying the remnant of his force there, Metrowski strengthened the defence of the bridge.

As the success of Bonaparte's plan depended on his reaching Villa Nova before Alvinzi could discover his intention, it was absolutely necessary that he should carry Arcola, and open the only direct route for his troops. He resolved, therefore, to attack it in rear as well as front, and to force the bridge instantly if possible. and ultimately at all events. With this view, as soon as Augereau's failure was reported to him, he ordered general Guyeux with two thousand men, to repass the bridge of Ronco, recross the Adige at the ferry of Albaredo, and marching up the left bank of the Alpon. to carry Arcola by an attack in rear. For himself, while this protracted operation was in progress, forgetful of the caution which he had professed to the directory, he determined to head the grenadiers in person, and to make another effort upon the bridge. Thus resolved, he left Ronco, and attended by the officers of his staff, rode up to the front of Augereau's division. impatient to reach Villa Nova, and to strike, before it was apprehended, his meditated blow.

The advance of the commander in chief to the head of the column, inspired the officers and men at Ronco, not more with admiration for his courage, than apprehension for his safety. From the sympathy of friendship and heroism, Lannes felt these sentiments with peculiar force. The same generous spirit which led him from the hospital of Brescia, now raised him from his bed at Ronco. His wounds, which were in the limbs, prevented his walking, but left him able to ride. Information that Bonaparte was to lead an attack on the bridge, affected him as the sound of the trumpet does a high-mettled war horse. He rose, was placed in his saddle, and soon reached his general's side.

In a brief address Bonaparte asked the dejected grenadiers, if they were the same men with whom he had passed the bridge of Lodi. At his voice, so familiar and commanding in danger, a movement of enthusiasm thrilled through the ranks. Perceiving this, and determined to employ it, he leaped from his horse, snatched the

colours from an ensign, and exclaiming, as the drums beat the charge, "follow your general," threw himself foremost on the dreadful bridge. The grenadiers rushed forward—but not to vic-A murderous fire on their flank left their front without motion, and Bonaparte exposed to a shower of balls, and without support. At this critical moment, while the French hesitated to advance and the Austrians to retire, a reenforcement joined the latter, who charging furiously in their turn, swept the general and his party, in a promiscuous rout before them. A scene of military martyrdom now presented itself. The grenadiers, though compelled to give way, would not desert their commander; but in the midst of smoke, confusion, and slaughter, encircled his person, and laying hold of his arms and the skirts of his coat, bore him back, through blood and fire over the dying and the dead. His officers with heroic fidelity, shielded his life by offering up their own. Intercepting blows aimed at their general, Lannes fell senseless with a fourth wound, and Muiron welcomed a glorious death.

In this wild and convulsive tumult, Bonaparte was forced off the causeway and plunged to the waist in the morass; where struggling and unobserved, he was passed by the mingled torrent of flight and pursuit. Presently, from among the French grenadiers, a cry arose—"Forward men, to save the general!" and headed by adjutants general Vignolles and Belliard, these brave fellows returned to the charge, drove the Austrians over the bridge, and pulled Bonaparte out of the morass. In this desperate but inestimable rescue, Vignolles and Belliard were both wounded.

The impossibility of forcing this important pass by a direct attack, was now confessed, and the effect of Guyeux's operation, was of necessity waited for. About sun down this officer reached Arcola, and assailing the post with his accustomed vigour, carried it promptly, taking several hundred prisoners and five pieces of artillery. But his success was too late to be important. Alvinzi, several hours before, had discovered that the movement of the French, instead of being the skirmishing of light troops, was a determined attack of their main army, and had withdrawn his reserve, his park, and baggage, across the bridge at Villa Nova, to the left bank of the Alpon. The French officers at Ronco, from the belfry and the tops of houses, beheld the retreat of the Austrians, and, from the haste and confusion of their movements, could estimate the immense consequences which would have at-

tended the full execution of their general's plan. But the prey had escaped; the enemy, from a false position had gained a natural one; and Arcola, instead of opening a passage into their rear, was become only an intermediate post in their front.

Nevertheless, the consequences of this day's action, though not decisive, in spite of the malice of fortune were important. Verona was out of danger, Alvinzi was dislodged from Caldiero, and two of his divisions were severely defeated. Numerous bands of prisoners, filing into the rear, with trophies of cannon and colours, filled the troops with exultation, and renovated in the breasts of officers and men, that tone of exalted confidence, which had made the army invincible.

Davidowich meanwhile following up his success, collected all his force in front of Vaubois, dislodged him from the Corona and from Rivoli, and forced him back to the heights of Bussolengo, situated a few miles to the right of the road from Verona to Per-Should he continue his progress, and drive Vaubois under the walls of Mantua, or compel him to retire beyond the Mincio, he would succeed, it was too probable, notwithstanding the retreat of Alvinzi from Caldiero, in raising the blockade; and after forming a junction with Wurmser, might intercept the retreat of the army on the Adige. Whereas, as long as Bonaparte retained the faculty of reaching the lines around Mantua. before Davidowich could force them, he could join Vaubois, defeat Davidowich, and return to oppose Alvinzi, in time to prevent his carrying Verona, or crossing the Adige. In these circumstances, it was necessary to calculate time, and to compare distances, with precision. It was thirty-six miles from Rivoli to Mantua, while from Ronco it was twenty-seven, by cross roads and through a fenny country traversed by the Molinella. Aware of these facts, and uncertain from hour to hour of the actual state of Vaubois' defence, Bonaparte, with a prudence as intense as the courage he had just displayed at Arcola, determined to reject the persuasions of hope, which invited him to improve the advantages he had gained over Alvinzi, and to act on the safest conclusions of reason; in other words, as if, instead of its being doubtful whether Vaubois could hold his position, it was already certain that he would be forced to abandon it. Adopting this line of conduct, he despatched orders to general Guyeux, to evacuate Arcola instantly and repass the Adige, while he himself withdrev

the divisions of Massena and Augereau across the bridge of Ronco, leaving only a single brigade, with a few pieces of light artillery, as a rearguard, on the left bank. In order to conceal this retrograde movement from the enemy, he had the fires of bivouacs kept burning through the night, at Arcola and on the contested causeways.

At four o'clock in the morning the troops were under arms, and every thing was prepared for removing the bridge of Ronco, disappearing altogether from Alvinzi, and hastening to the support of Vaubois; when the expected courier from that officer, with his report of the previous evening, brought the agreeable intelligence, that he still held his ground at Bussolengo, that Davidowich had not disturbed him, and was quietly posted at Rivoli The inactivity of this general, though injudicious was natural. He had participated fully in the misfortunes of Wurmser, and had been for some days out of communication with Alvinzi. Therefore, however bold when opposed to Vaubois, he became extremely cautious as he approached Bonaparte; who, upon ascertaining his continued hesitation at Rivoli, prepared for penetrating the marshes a second time, and renewing his operations against Alvinzi.

By this time, however, the Hungarian marshal, discovering the retreat of the French, had caused Arcola and Porcil to be occupied in force, and had put two fresh divisions in motion upon the two causeways. At a quarter of a mile from the bridge, they engaged and drove in the French pickets, and pressed on victoriously towards Ronco; when Massena and Augereau, having passed the bridge, met them with the bayonet. The shock was violent, but as numbers scarcely counted, the impetuous valour of the French in both conflicts prevailed. The Austrian columns were routed, and the causeways covered with their slain. sena pushed his pursuit through the village of Porcil, and across the plain, to the gates of Caldiero, taking in the course of the day fifteen hundred prisoners, six pieces of artillery, and four stands of colours. After success equally decisive, Augereau was again stopped at the bridge of Arcola, behind which the Austrians rallied, and repulsed his strenuous and reiterated attacks. the action of the second day was highly successful. Two fresh divisions of Alvinzi's army were routed with severe loss, and his superiority of numbers, besides being found unavailing, was become considerably reduced. Notwithstanding this, Bonaparte adhered to his determination of being prepared for the worst, and recalled his victorious divisions in the evening to Ronco, in order that, if necessary, he might hasten in the morning to succour Vaubois and repel Davidowich.

While Massena and Augereau were retiring through the marsh upon their respective causeways, Bonaparte ordered a regiment of infantry which, under adjutant general Vial, had been held in reserve, to be supplied with fascines, and conducted it in person down the right hand causeway, with intention of throwing a bridge across the mouth of the Alpon, and, should operations on this ground be renewed in the morning, of attacking Arcola on both sides of that stream at once. In this attempt he failed, the current of the Alpon being found too strong to be bridged in this mode, and a caual beyond it, proving unfordable. As however he was resolved not to expose his men to another repulse at Arcola, in the course of the night he had bridges of boats thrown over the Alpon and the deep canal.

Victorious in the second day's struggle, the army bivouacked again on the right bank of the Adige, and while, as before, a small rearguard protected the bridge, the general enjoyed a few hour's sleep in the village of Ronco (15).

During the night, a spy sent into the Austrian camp, with a view of drawing them again into the marth, induced Alvinzi to believe, that the French, instead of halting at Rom o, had retreated to the lines around Mantua, leaving only a rearguard at the Under this impression, at early dawn, the Austrian neral put his army in motion on the two causeways, in the hope of effecting the passage of the Adige, and of destroying Bonapars and rescuing Wurmser, at a single blow. At the same time. Bonaparte, having again received information from Vaubois, the Davidowich remained inactive at Rivoli, and he himself undisturbed at Bussolengo, was in the act of repassing the Adige, and reasuing operations against his principal antagonist. Massena a third time moved up the left hand causeway; the centre, as the attempt to force the bridge of Arcola was not to be repeated, was assigned to general Robert with the 75th regiment only; and Augeress turning to the right, was directed to cross the Alpon on the new bridge, in order that he might carry Arcola by an attack in the rear.

... At a spector of a mile in advance of Ronce, the bes into conflict on the left and contro concerns. The a in, both encounters was obstinute and sungrimary. • It happe that the stronger column of Austrians approached from Ap and was met consequently by general Robert with the wee she French divisions. Notwithstanding the bravery of t 75th and the firmness of its commander, the weight of numb was irresistible; the regiment was thrown into disorder; a forced to retreat. Already the Austrian ballets depped more at more frequent on the bridge, when Boneparte drawing the 8 under general Gardanne, from Massena's rear, placed it in amb by the side of the centre causeway, concealing the most in t reeds and willows, by making them lie flat on their faces. A neral Robert had rallied a rearguard, and, with admi firmness, still resisted though be still retired, pursued by division of three thousand Crosts, who reshed coward in a mass. At a signal given by Bonaparte, the 20nd ress to feet, gave one murderous fire, and fell with the hayonet on a enemy's flank. At the same time, general Robert renewed the action in their front. The surprise and destruction were complete. The whole Austrian column perished, slain upon the causeway, or destroyed, while struggling in the morass and floundering in the canals.

long and arduous contest. He felt the absence of the 32nd, while the Austrians fresh, resolute, and led by Alvinzi in person, fought with vigour, and withstood a succession of furious attacks. At length Massena stuck his hat upon his sword, and in person led the grenadiers to a charge. After a desperate struggle the Austrians were routed, and driven through the village of Porcil out upon the plain. The ground being narrow, the conflict severe, the pursuit keen, and the victory complete, the slaughter was dreadful, the causeway being literally strewed with the Austrian dead and wounded. Having thus cleared the avenue committed to his charge, Massena according to orders, countermarched with his prisoners to Ronco, in order to assist the further operations of his general.

In passing the mouth of the Alpon, Augereau found himself opposed by the enemy's light troops, and greatly retarded by the narrowness of the bridge. To expedite his movement, Bonaparte

who was in the centre, sent down his aide de camp Elliot, with directions to construct a second bridge. In the execution of this order, Elliot was killed; but the bridge was completed, and by noon Augereau, with his whole division, was established on the left bank of the Alpon, and in a position to attack Arcola with undoubted success. So that the long contested marsh with all its avenues, was at last in virtual possession of the French.

It was now that Bonaparte, summing up in his mind the results of the numerous conflicts of this continuous battle, determined. contrary to the advice of his generals, to issue forth from the marshes, to claim for his troops the full advantage of their gallantry, and in a fair fight on firm ground, to bring the struggle with Alvinzi to a final decision. He reflected that if Vaubois had at that moment been defeated, he himself would be obliged to march during the night to his support, in which event, Alvinzi might free his present position return against Verona, with the advantage, # not with the honour of victory. On the other hand, by repelling Alvinzi at once to the Brenta, he himself might march in triumph to Verona, and thence, to the relief of Vaubois. He computed carefully the number of his prisoners, estimated anxiously the enemy's killed and wounded, and came to the conclusion, that if his adversary at the beginning of the contest, had enjoyed a superiority of three to one, he was reduced now to an excess at most of three to twe; and not doubting that this advantage was more than balanced by the high spirit and incomparable soldiership of his own troop. he prepared for a decisive battle on the plain, with full confidence of victory.

Having come to this resolution, he neglected no means of essuring its success. He sent off an express to Porto Legnago with orders to the commanding officer, adjutant general Lorset, to march instantly and rapidly, with a detachment of his garries, turn the enemy's left flank, and fall upon his rear. He then directed Massena to move up the centre causeway upon Arcola, and Augereau to attack it on the opposite side of the Alpon. This combined movement, was effectual. Massena passed the bridge without difficulty, and pursued, with his light troops, the retresting Austrians to San Bonifacio, a village a small distance below Villa Nova. By two o'clock, the whole French army was beyond the Alpon, and formed in order of battle; their left resting of Arcola, and their right stretching across the plain to a resty

hish extended at right angles to their line, down to the hirent was Alvinzi, his flanks also covered by the swamp lipen. A division six thousand strong was formed on his rear, destined to protect his baggage and to cover it; for his hopes subsiding as those of his adversary was now as diffident, as Bonaparte was sanguise, of

mench advanced quickly, and by three o'clock, the light d artillery were engaged along the whole line, who g, fertile in expedients, ordered lieutenant colonel Hercule ides, with twenty five select troopers and four trumpets, the swamp on his right, to gain a position behind it negr y's left flank, and as soon as he heard Lorset's cannon in r, to sound his trumpets and charge, as if he was at the a heavy squadron. The Austrians had already suffered maky in rencounters among reeds and marshes, that they uliarly open to alarm from a strategem of this kind; and gly, the attack of Hercule had full success. Alvinni's left s thrown into confusion, and whilst Lorset pressed upon Bonaparte brought up his line to a close attack in front. moments the battle was decided; the Austrians gave way nts. They endeavoured to rally on their strong reserve, z charged by the French cavalry, which was fresh and in its, they were again routed, and were pursued the whole with a great loss in prisoners. Bonaparte bivouacked on of battle (16).

hstanding three days of victory, his generals were of hat his force was too small to risk further operations in plain. They advised that, satisfied with driving the enemy neighbourhood of Verona, he should march back to that he morning, occupying on his route, with one division of, the strong position of Caldiero, as he had originally ino do, and hastening with the other, to the assistance of

This counsel he rejected, as incommensurate with the es he had gained. He insisted that the strength and spirit i were so grievously enfeebled by the recent battles, that I not dare to face him in the plain; and he declared his n to drive the enemy back upon the Brenta, and then to the support of Vaubois, not with one division only, but 1. Accordingly, early on the 18th, having ascertained that

Alvinzi in the course of the night had retreated to Vicenza, the army marched in that direction. Upon reaching Villa Nova, where the road across the bridge led directly to Verona, Bonzpare halted with his infantry, and sent forward general Beaurevoir with the cavalry only, trusting that as soon as Alvinzi saw he was pursued, he would continue, without stopping to count the force on his track, to fall back, until he got safe behind the Brenta.

While waiting to learn from the report of general Beaureveir, whether the Austrians, when approached, held their ground or

retired, Bonaparte walked into the church of a convent, which during the late actions, had been made use of as a hospital by the Austrians. Into this receptacle, four or five hundred wounded had been crowded, and were, the greater part of them, now The place sent forth a cadaverous stench, from which linaparte was drawing back with horror, when he heard his name faintly pronounced. Two of his own wounded soldiers, after being three days buried in this mass of death, had been recalled from despair to hope, at the sight of their general. By the care of humanity, friendship, and skill, they were soon restored to health and strength. This circumstance, connected with the astonishing success of the mysterious movement on Arcola, made a deep impression on the army. It seemed as if their commander was the minister of health as well as of destruction, and that while he scattered defeat and death through the ranks of the enemy, he was endued with the power of bestowing life and victory on is own soldiers.

By the report of Beaurevoir it was soon ascertained, that in conformity with Bonaparte's conjecture Alvinzi offered no resistance to his pursuers, and that his rearguard had already passed Montebello. The French general immediately wheeled his column to the left, and marched direct for Verona. On the route, his flankers intercepted an officer bearing despatches from Davidowich to Alvinzi, by which it appeared, that for the last three days, the two generals had had no communication, and that the former was totally ignorant of the events which had taken place within that time, on the left bank of the Adige.

The army entered Verona with alacrity and triumph by the Venice gate, four days after having left it in dejection and silence by that of Milan (17). The inhabitants, whether friends or fees to the French, united in expressions of astonishment and admi-

is the enthusiasm excited by such hardy enterprise and loss gallantry, effecing all distinctions of party and griding praise.

me time was allowed either for joy or fee rest, to the view Arcola, for on the morning of the 17th Bavidowich had d and beaten Vaubois at Buscolangs, and driven him in w upon Castel Novo and Peschiera, threatening by his next to raise the blockade of Mantua (16). Not a moment o lost; so that the troops had hardly time to take off their ks, when the order was given to march, for the purpose of the progress of this new enemy. scourse of the night Bonaparte, with the division of the life ble Massena, passed the Adigs on the bridges of Verents vanhois was still retiring, directed his murch to will is order to sustain him and to interpose hetwest Dai ish and the blockading army. Part of Vaubois' division gready behind the Mincio, but during the 20th it was abl-Villa Franca and Castel Novo; for the men though the h by repeated defeat and recent surprise, railied swiftle the approach of their general. On the 21st, with the two pas united, Bonaparte advanced against Davidowich, who back and took a position at Campana, a little below Rivoli. next morning general Joubert with the vanguard of the th, attacked him. The Austrian general with slight resistance d slowly, when Bonaparte with his main body coning up, eded in surrounding and taking the regiment of Berbach, e hundred strong, with the colonel commanding it; and in g off from the Austrian rearguard, another body of four red men, who in attempting to escape by swimming the , all perished. Four pieces of artillery and six caissons, to the hands of the French. Davidowich was driven from i and the Corona successively, and pursued as far as Preawith continual loss of force and of spirit.

the meantime, Augereau, in obedience to orders, had cormided with the operations on the right bank of the Adige,
eving up the other side and defeating on the heights of St.,
a strong detachment of Davidowich's corps, from which
ok three hundred prisoners. Pushing on to Dolce he there
at a more important combat, adding twelve hundred to the
ver of his captives, and to the trophies of the army, nine

field pieces, two bridge equipages, and a quantity of baggage. With these successes, which in that arduous and defensible region, were not obtained without loss, the French commander was constrained to content himself; for bearing, at this late season, to penetrate into the Alps, for the sake of recovering Trent. His troops, by their hardships, valour, and victories, not only deserved but required repose; and Trent, if taken, would probably not be held. Therefore, after giving the command of this division to Joubert, and directing him to occupy Montebaldo and the Corona, he led his army back to Verona.

The loss of Alvinzi in the terrible days of Arcola, amounted to twelve thousand men killed and wounded, six thousand priseners, four stands of colours, and eighteen cannon, beside all the ladders he had prepared for scaling the walls of Verona. French having been victorious in every encounter, excepting the conflicts at the bridge and the momentary repulse of the 75th. suffered but slightly in numbers, though most sensibly in officers. General Vernier, and general Robert, whom Bonaparte described as "a soldier firm under fire," died of their wounds; jutant general Verdeling and the aides de camp Muiron and Elist, were killed on the field; and among the wounded, were general Lannes, Bon, Verdier, and Gardanne, with adjutants general Vignolles and Belliard. In his official report Bonaparte, after praising the conduct of his artillery observed, "The generals the staff officers have displayed unexampled courage and activity: twelve or fifteen of them have been killed. It was, in truth, a fi to the death; not one of them but had his clothes riddled with balls."

Bonaparte, whose habit it was to spare himself neither in abour nor peril, and in these critical operations in which a single false step might entail destruction on the whole army, to leave nothing to the discretion of others which he could possibly attend to himself, had as has been mentioned, accompanied Massess in his march to join Vaubois for the purpose of rallying the division, showing himself to the men, and making sure that the blockade of Mantua was covered (19). Having done this, he returned to his headquarters at Verona about midday of the 19th, and wrote we the directory his report of the battle, which he observed, for the second time, "had just decided the fate of Italy." He began by saying: "I am so much harassed with fatigue, citizen directors, that

it is impossible for me to relate to you all the military movements which preceded the battle of Arcola." It was not however in his nature, to neglect for a moment, though worn out with toil and affairs, to offer consolation to Madame Muiron and general Clarke, and to make known to Carnot, the efficient director in regard to the army, the signal gallantry and devotion of Lannes.

His letter to the desolate widow of his friend, discovers the tact of exquisite feeling. He ventures no direct consolation, nor attempts to arrest the torrent of her grief; but merely tries to dilute its bitterness, by mingling with hers, his own and his country's sorrow. "Muiron has fallen at my side in the field of hattle of Arcola. You have lost a husband who was dear to you, and I a friend to whom I had been long-attached. But our country has sustained a greater loss in an officer, who was distinguished by talents and rare intrepidity. If in any way I can be of service to you or to your child, I entreat you to count on me entirely."

To general Clarke, whose grief was naturally less acute than that of the relict of a youthful hero, he assumes a more disect stile of consolation, but diverts even his mind from the object of pain, by a natural allusion to his own wrongs. "Your nephew Elliot has been killed on the field of Arcola. Though young, he had become familiar with war, had marched frequently at the hand of columns, and would one day have become a valuable offer. He perished gloriously in the face of the enemy, and felt not an instant's pang. Is there a reasonable man, who would not tary such a death, or who, exposed to the vicissitudes of life, mind not compound to leave in this manner, a world so often despicable. Is there one among us, who has not a hundred times regretted, not being thus screened from the powerful assaults of talumny, envy, and those hateful passions, which appear almost reglusively, to direct the conduct of men."

In a letter to Carnot of the same date, he thus describes the lary of the action, and the heroism of Lannes. "The destiny of Italy begins to clear up, and in a few days, I hope to write to rou from headquarters in Mantua. Never was a field of battle disputed like that of Arcola. I have scarcely any generals left; their devotion and courage are unexampled. Brigadier general lannes came to the field with his wound of Governolo unhealed. The first day of the battle, he was twice wounded, and at three riches, was stretched on a bed of pain; when hearing that I was

about to place myself at the head of the column, he got up, mounted his horse and joined me. As he could not walk, he was obliged to remain on horseback. At the head of the bridge of Arcola he received a third wound, which stretched him insensible on the ground. I assure you victory was not to be gained by exertions short of these. The enemy, strong in their numbers, fought desperately, their generals in the front rank. Many of these we have killed."

He found a moment also to write to his beloved Josephine. language was as ardent as his valour. The sense of relief, and the military details of his letter, are interesting. "At length my adorable Josephine I revive; death is no longer before my eyes, and glory and honour are felt in my soul. The enemy has been defeated at Arcal. To morrow we will repair the blunders of Vaubois, who has abadoned Rivoli. In eight days Mantua will be ours; and I shall soon be able in your arms, to give you a thousand proofs of the arden affection of your husband. The moment I can, I shall go to Miles; I am some what fatigued. I have received a letter from Eugene and Hortense. They are charming children. My suite is a little dispersed at present, but as soon as they rejoin me, I will send the letter to you." Upon getting back to Verona he again wrote to Josephine. On the 23rd, after reproaching her gaily for her long silence, te evinced clearly that like most men in love he was no prophet: "I am really unhappy, my beloved friend, at not hearing from you. Write me quickly four pages of those delightful expressions, which fill my soul with sentiment and joy. Before many days are past, I hope to press you in my arms, and to shower upon you kisses, burning as if they fell from the equator. We have taken five thousand prisoners, and killed at least six thousand men for the enemy. Adieu my adored Josephine; think of me often. If you cease to love your Achilles, or if your heart cool toward him, you will be frightful and very unjust. But I am sure, you will always love me, as I shall always tenderly love you. Death alone con sever the union, which love, sentiment, and sympathy have formed.

The next day; "I hope very soon to embrace you my sweet friend. I love you to distraction. I am writing to Paris by the courier. All goes on well. Wurmser was beaten yesterday under Mantua. To make your husband happy, there is nothing wanting but the love of Josephine."

Alvinzi, in his retreat to the Brenta, had got beyond Vicenza

when he received information of the successful progress of his lieutenant on the other side of the Adige; and finding also that the pursuit of the French was relinquished, he suspended his retrogade movement, and after some hesitation advanced cautiously toward Villa Nova, in the hope of deterring Bonaparte from acting with his whole force against Davidowich (20). But he was again frustrated by the activity of his adversary; for, upon reaching Villa Nova, his scouts rejoined him with intelligence, that Bonaparte, after driving Davidowich into the Alps, was returned to Verona, and might be expected to advance upon him immediately. Unwilling, in the present condition of his force, to expose himself to another encounter with an antagonist so formidable, Alvinzi broke up from Villa Nova without delay, and fell back to the Brenta, occupying with his left, Padua, with his centre, Bassano, and the pass of Primolano, with his right.

To complete the disasters of the Austrian army, as Davidowich had remained inactive at Rivoli while Alvinzi was struggling at Arcola, so Wurmser continued quiet in Mantua during the whole time of Davidowich's approach, and with the exception of some slight affairs of posts, stirred not, until Alvinzi had been repelled to the Brenta, and Davidowich to the Tyrol. This it would appear was owing to a miscalculation of Alvinzi, who, upon his first advance to Caldiero, had conveyed information to Wurmser, that for the purpose of cooperation, it would be requisite for him to make a sally in full force on the 23rd. At this time, the campaign was finished by the defeat of all the Austrian forces in the field; but as the veteran marshal had received no subsequent communication, he made punctually the preconcerted sortie. At 7 o'clock in the morning of the 23rd, he issued out of Mantua at the head of a strong column, and attacked the suburb of St. George. Kilmaine, who had now returned with his detachment from Verona, hastened to meet him, and after an action of two hours, compelled him to retire within his walls, with a loss of several hundred slain, two hundred prisoners, two cannon, and one howitzer. concerted and abortive sally closed, for the present, the calamities of the imperialists and the triumphs of the republicans in Italy (21).

The aide de camp Lemarrais, had this time the honour of presenting the Austrian colours to the directory. In a modest address, he applauded the gallantry and conduct of his general;

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but again the answer of the directory was remarkable for containing no mention of his name, nor allusion to his services. For some time he had been the object of dread and consequently of defamation to the royalists, who, after succeeding in corrupting generals on the frontier, and creating a strong party in the legislative councils, had invaded with their influence even the Finding the general of the army of Italy inflexible in directory. his principles, as well as invincible in war, they had assailed him by misrepresentations, in the hope of lowering him in the cotem of the public, and the confidence of the government. At an time it was affirmed that his pretended victories were real defeats; at another that it was his design, after securing the devotion of the army to his person, to overthrow the government by tary force. As it was not unreasonable to suspect that to the fluence of these calumnies, which, on former occasions he had despised, might probably be traced the long and cruel neglect of his brave army, the sense of injustice so indignantly expressed in his letter to general Clarke, glanced doubtless at the condet of the executive. And as, either in justice to the memory of his nephew or to the feelings of Bonaparte, Clarke had the letter published in the Moniteur, it is not improbable the directors requited the allusions of the general, by the invidious omissist observable in their answer to the address of his aids de camp (22).

It is true the flag which Bonaparte bore in his hand, when heading the charge at the bridge of Arcola, was presented to him by the government. But this proceeding was not suggested by the directory. It originated in the popular branch of the legicature; and the same compliment having been paid to Augerent, it could hardly be esteemed more than an act of simple justice to the commander in chief (23).

As it was known to the besiegers, that the garrison of Mastan was weakened by sickness and desertion, and discouraged by constant repulse and disappointment; that a frightful mortality prevailed in the hospitals, and that the troops had long been on helf-allowance. Bonaparte entertained, as he had written to Carnot, sanguine hopes that Wurmser would be forced to surrender before the Emperor could form another army in Italy. But in this expectation he was grievously deceived. The prize for which he had so often fought, and the value of which, difficulty of sequinity.

sition appeared to enhance, was not to be gained without further hardship and heaps of carnage. Rapid marches where yet to be performed, mighty numbers to be encountered, and desperate battles to be won, before the flag of republican France waved over the towers of this modern Ilium.

Comparing this campaign with those against Beaulieu and Wurmser, it may be affirmed, that if the merit of a victorious general be estimated by the difficulties which he overcomes, Bonaparte deserves higher praise for his triumph at Arcola, than for the most brilliant of his previous exploits. In his former contests, his difficulty consisted in a relative deficiency of numbers. At Arcola, to this, in an aggravated degree, was added the discouragement of his troops, wearied out by sickness and incessant battles, oppressed by a sense of neglect and hardship, and by the unusual calamity of a severe check, under his own conduct. Yet, by a bold and original operation, to the conception of which every mind but his own was a stranger, he obtained a victory over the discontent and despair of his own army, and over the numbers and confidence of the enemy.

Perhaps, had this not been his first campaign; had his prudence been consummated by experience, he would have directed Andreossi as soon as the bridge at Ronco was finished, to prepare one for passing the Alpon at its mouth; in which case, Alvinzi would have been defeated the first day, and his destruction been complete.

CHAPTER XX.

December 1796 and January 1797.

Bonaparte's domestic feelings-He goes to Milan-Josephine visits Genes-His chagrin- His felicity-The painter Legros-Bonaparte's two new aids de camp-Madame Muiron-Bonaparte renews the war against the swistlers in his army-Ilis letters and menaces-His conduct in relation to the new republics - Suppresses the revolt of Grafagniana - The congress of Baggio-Bonaparte acknowledged as the founder of the Cispadan republic-His letter to the president-Venice-Bonaparte occupies the citadel of Bergamo-His letter and concession to Battaglia-His compliment to the Italian clergy—Delicacy of his position — Impression of his language and character on the Italians-His vain efforts to reopen negotiations with Rome—Determines to use military force—Assembles troops at Bologue-Puts himself at their head—Obstinacy of the Pope—Manfredini—Efforts of the directors to make peace with Austria-They send general Clarke with overtures into Italy-Bonaparte disapproves the measure-Clarke fails-Alvinzi gets in motion—Number of his troops—His plan of operations—His letter communicating one from the Emperor to marshal Wurmser-It isiatercepted-Number and distribution of Bonaparte's army-Advance of Alvinzi to the Brenta, and of Provera to the lower Adige - Bonaparte erdes Victor to march back to the Adige, and returns to Verona—Massena guist the combat of St. Michel-Gallantry of general Brune and the 75th-Br naparte withdraws Massena to the right bank of the Adige at Verent-Movement of Alvinzi on the upper Adige, and of Provera on the loweruncertainty of Bonaparte at Verona-Marches against Alvinzi-Joint Jesbert at Rivoli-The plateau of Rivoli-Battle of Rivoli-Defeat of the Austrians - Provera effects the passage of the lower Adige - August defeats his rearguard, and burns his bridge-Provera marches upon Mostua, and Bonaparte to intercept him-Sortie of Wurmser-Battle of the Favorita-Wurmser repulsed, and Provera defeated and taken-Jonest pursues and disperses the army of Alvinzi-Takes Trent and punctrates to the Lavis - Augereau returns to Porto Legnago - Marches through Padua to Treviso-Massena drives Bayalitch back to the Piave-General result of the battles of Rivoli and the Favorita—The colours presented to the directory by Bessières - Conduct of Bonaparte.

Having witnessed the battles and triumphs of Bonaparte in the marshes of Arcola, and his combats and success in the mountains

of the Adige, the reader will not be indisposed to contemplate for a moment his private life and domestic feelings.

Soon after returning to Verona, he visited the posts of the blockading army, and then repaired to Milan in the fond hope of meeting his beloved Josephine. But she, either from excessive love of gaiety or from coquettish caprice, foibles from which, with all its virtues, her character was not free, had notwithstanding her husband's late letters announcing his intention of paying her a visit, accepted an invitation from certain magnificoes of Genoa, and was gone on a pilgrimage of pleasure to that proud city. His surprise and mortification were extreme upon finding on his arrival at Milan, that his wife had left there. In a letter he wrote her on the occasion, these feelings were strongly expressed, but without the least harshness; his reproaches, which are those of tenderness not resentment, being conveyed in that tone of magnanimity, with which it appears injuries terminating in himself, invariably inspired his language:

"I arrived at Milan at three o'clock. Quitting every thing else, I hastened to your apartment to see you and clasp you in my arms; when lo! you were gone! You pass from city to city, from festival to festival; you fly from me at the moment of my approach. You care no more for your dear Napoleon. You loved him only from

caprice, and from inconstancy you disregard him.

"Accustomed to dangers, I am acquainted with the remedy for the crosses and ills of life. The misery I experience is incalculable. Had I a right to count on it?

"I shall be here until the 29th: do not disarrange your plans. Follow pleasure; felicity was made for you. The world will rejoice if it can make you happy. Your husband only is wretched; he is truly wretched."

A letter of the next day, the 28th, breathes the same affectionate chagrin.

"I have received the courier Berthier sent to Genoa. You had not time to write to me; that I can easily conceive. Surrounded by pleasure and amusements, you would have been wrong to make the slightest sacrifice for me. Berthier has been so good as to show me your letter to him. It is not my intention that you should alter your plans, or interrupt the parties of pleasure that are offered you. I am not worth such a sacrifice. The happiness or misery of a man you love not, cannot be expected to interest you.

"For me, it is my destiny and the object of my life, to love year only, to make you happy, and in nothing to oppose your inclinations. Be happy, do not reproach yourself, nor take concara about a man whose life depends on yours and whose sole pleasure consists in your felicity. I am wrong to require of you love like mine. Can we expect lace to weigh like gold? When I devote to you all my wishes, all my thoughts, and every instant of my existence, I obey the ascendancy which the charms of your character and person have established over my unhappy heart. If I have not the qualities to captivate you, it is not your fault. But at least I deserve from Josephine regard and esteem, for I love her alone, and I love her to madness.

"Adieu Josephine, adorable woman adieu. May fate concentrate upon me, the cares and sorrows of our common lot, and bestow on you uniform prosperity and happiness. Who better deserves it? And when it shall be too well proved, that you can no longer love me, my grief shall be confined to my own breat, and I will be satisfied with the power of being useful to you.

"I open my letter to send you one kiss. Ah, Josephine! Jesephine!" (1)

By these letters the fair wanderer was speedily recalled, and the happiness of the victorious general, after her return, is described by an officer of his suite as having been perfect. "The general in chief was then in all the ecstacy of married life. Madame Bonaparte was full of charms, nor could all the anxieties of command, nor the cares of governing Italy, prevent her humband from yielding himself up to domestic bliss" (2).

It appears that the hard service to which he had been expected in the late contest with Alvinzi, and particularly a contusion which he suffered in the battle of Arcola, had considerably affected his already enfeebled health (3). Consequently the few days of experative repose which were allowed him at Milan, were not has serviceable to his health than they were delightful to his heart. Here it was that Legros, who subsequently became celebrated as a painter of his battles, executed his first portrait of Bonaparts. He was represented on the bridge of Lodi, with a flag in his head, leading on the grenadiers in their decisive charge. Bonaparts, who dedicated to love all the time which he could spare from duty, was unwilling to give a moment to the artist. So that the only thing like a sitting that could be obtained, was after brush-

fast, just as he was passing into his cabinet. The charming Josephine would then take the conqueror on her lap, and detain him by caresses a few moments. In this way, after a thousand interruptions, Legros finished the portrait, which is said to be in the possession of Josephine's daughter, and to hear a striking resemblance to the original (4).

It was his own observation to the faithful Las Cases, that he was never able to enjoy the pleasure of his victories in this campaign, because as soon as he gained one battle, he was obliged to prepare, with overwhelming odds against him, for fighting another. So that it is probable this interval of quiet and affection, extending from the close of the operations of Arcola, to the beginning of those which preceded the battle of Rivoli, was the longest people from toil and danger which, since his departure from Paris, had been allowed him.

In the sad opportunity of supplying their places. On the recommendation of general Baraguay d'Hilliers, he appointed, in the place of Muiron, the chief of battalion Lavalette, who became subsequently connected with his family and devoted to his fortunes. In the room of Elliot he selected lieutenant Croisier, a cavalry officer of merit and promise. Thus recomposed, his list of sides de camp stood as follows; Junot, Marmont, Duroc, Le Marrais, Sulkowski (5), Louis Bonaparte, Lavalette, and Croisier.

From a letter which he wrote at this time to the directory, it appears that the widow of Muiron made but a modest demand on his benevolence and her country's gratitude. Giving a detailed account of Muiron's services at Toulon, at Paris, and in Italy, Bonaparte adds—"He died gloriously in the battle of Arcola. In consideration of the services he rendered in the different campaigns of this war, I request that the name of Berault Courville, his mother in law, be erased from the list of emigrants on which it was inscribed, although she never emigrated; as likewise that of his brother in law Charles Marie Berault Courville. This youth, when he was but fourteen years old, was put on the list of emigrants, although he went abroad only for his education" (6).

While the imperial government and commander were endeavouring to repair, and preparing to revenge, their losses in the campaign of Arcola, the French general turned the arms of exposure and denunciation against the paymasters and contractors, whose frauds infested his army. The delinquencies of which he complained, and the punishments which of himself he sometimes inflicted, and at others suggested to the directory, are set forth in his correspondence with a distinctness and zeal which, considering the vexatious complexity of the subject, and the weight and variety of his other duties, evince in a remarkable degree, the strength of his common sense, and the warmth of his solicitude for the public good. In a letter of the 6th of December he says, "I have caused to be arrested citizen Auzou, the principal agent for the forage of the army. He has received, in the course of the campaign, one million seven hundred thousand francs, and netwithstanding, has allowed his service to fail every where. I am going to have him tried by a court martial. A great example is necessary; but unfortunately there is such a medly in these courts. that they are not sufficiently severe. A certain Lemosse, who is denounced by public opinion, and has been more specifically accused to me by the monks of a particular convent, from whom he proposed accepting two hundred sequins as a gratuity for not establishing a hospital there, has been set at liberty by a court martial during my absence. I have just ordered him to be deprived of his commission, and driven from the army. But this punishment is too mild."

In a subsequent letter he entered more fully into a history of the evil, and a statement of the remedies by which it should be combated. "The more I reflect, in my leisure moments, on the violent ulcers in the administrative service of the army of Italy, the more I am convinced of the necessity of applying to them a prompt and infallible remedy.

"The accounts of the army in the paymaster's department are in striking disorder. Nothing can be accounted for; and to the comptroller's well established reputation for knavery, is joined the stupidity of the subordinate agents. Every thing is bought and sold. The army consumes five times as much as is necessary, because the magazine keepers make false issues, and go halves with the military commissaries.

"The principal actresses of Italy are kept by the agents of the French army. Luxury, depravity, and embezzlement, are carried to the highest pitch. The laws are not sufficient. There is only one remedy, which is in harmony with experience, history, and the nature of republican government. This is a syndicature of

special magistracy, to be composed of two or three members, whose authority should last but four or five days, and who, during this time, should be empowered to have any administrator of the army shot. This magistracy, sent once a year to the armies, would cause all the agents to respect public opinion, and to preserve decency not only in their manners and expenses, but in their public duties.

Marshal Berwick had the intendant of his army hung, because the supply of provisions failed; while we, in the midst of Italy, having every thing in abundance, and expending every month five times as much as is necessary, are often in want of rations. Do not believe, however, that I am inattentive, or that I betray the country in this important branch of my duty. Every day I cause agents to be arrested, their papers examined, and their strong boxes searched. But no body seconds me, and the laws do not give the general sufficient authority to enable him to impress a salutary terror on this band of rogues. Nevertheless the evil does diminish, and by dint of scolding, punishing, and storming, affairs begin, I hope, to be conducted with a little more decency. But I repeat to you, think of the suggestion about a syndicature.

"You will find enclosed, a record of the interrogatories put to a contractor who was arrested by my orders. From this document you will see to what an extent corruption has been carried, and how much a powerful corrective is required.

"The house of Flachat has set an example to Italy, of buying up at a discount the bills of the army. The commissary general Sucy, who got wind of these jobs, spoke to me of them in detail the last time he made a visit to Milan. These fellows have made probably three millions by fictitious payments, and they owe us five millions accruing from contributions. The paymaster drew on their house in Genoa, for six hundred thousand francs, as remittances for pay, and they had the assurance to allow the bills to be protested. I have regarded this company as bankrupt, and caused seals to be put on their doors in Leghorn and Genoa. I beg you to have their agents in Paris arrested. They are the greatest swindlers in Europe. They have placed us in a situation of great embarrassment. I wished to have arrested Flachat and his brother in law, the agent of the house at Milan; but the thieves fled.

"While speaking of the frauds which are committed, I must not omit to render justice to the agents, who conduct themselves with

good faith and propriety. I am very well satisfied with citizen Pesillico agent for the house of Cerf-Beer. If this company had seet us a man like him, at the beginning of the campaign, they would have gained several millions, and the army still more. I am equally well satisfied with Collot, the contractor for butcher's meat. He is an administrator who performs his duty. Among the military commissaries, the remarkable probity of citizen Beinot, is acknowledged by the whole army. If we had fifteen like him, you might make each of them a present of a hundred theusand crowns, and be still gainer of fifteen millions. I intrest yes to give marks of your approbation to these several agents. Enclosed is a charge exhibited by the commissary Boinot against Thevenin, the former agent of the house of Cerf-Beer."

From an order of the 1st of January 1797, addressed to Berthis, it may inferred that he overstated neither the difficulties to which these frauds subjected him, nor the energy of his exertions to overcome them.

"You will cause to be brought before the court martial of Lembardy, citizens Bockty, Chevilly, and Descriveur, employed in the different administrations of the service, on a charge of having defrauded and exposed the army during the most important operations of the war. It is by their infamous embezzlement, by beying up bills, and by fictitious payments, that they have endangered my operations, and occasioned the loss of a great number of earliellow soldiers. In short, it is necessary to repress this kind of knavery, by severe examples, in order to prevent our soldies wanting necessaries in the midst of Italy, that is, in the most fertile country of Europe; as has several times been the cast.

"I accuse M. Bockty of having introduced corruption among our agents, and of having joined the army for the express purpose of defeating our operations by means of fictitiess payments.

"I accuse citizen Chevilly of being an accomplice in this scheme, and of having gained a large sum of money at the expense of the troops.

"Citizen Descriveur, store keeper at Cremona, offered M. Bockty ten thousand pints of wine, in a false delivery. He known for having carried on this infamous traffic.

"On these charges, I demand that these three agents be condemned to suffer death, not as simple this was culprise who daily the supplies of the army, and cause our best conperations to fail, or at least to succeed only at an expense, which is too precious for us not to take such measures likely to intimidate their accomplices; who are but too is in the army of Italy."

this time a certain Paul Greppi, a citizen of Milan, benoxious to the populace of that city, who, in the rage of zeal and resentment, pillaged his house and forced him o Tuscany. For protection and redress he appealed to te, who reassured him by a letter expressing, with sinrce and vivacity, that abhorrence of public disorder and license, which through life he manifested :-- "I have read ignation, the detail of the anarchy and licence of which e near being the victim. As long as the French troops at Milan, I will never suffer the rights of property or of o be insulted. I request that, after you have finished r in Tuscany, you return to your country at Milan, and be that we will put down the handful of brigands, almost all s in Milan, who think liberty gives a right to murder; who tudy to imitate the French people in their courage, and insports of virtue which have astonished Europe; but seek t those horrible scenes of crime, the authors of which ne objects of everlasting detestation to France, to Europe, Make yourself easy then, and be assured that he French people, nor the army I command, will ever perideous and disgusting form of anarchy to situpon the ruins Our bayonets are destined for the destruction of tyat above all things, for the extermination of crime." This wed up by a letter to the congress of state at Milan, in ist reproach was blended with salutary counsel. trmy will never allow the liberty of Italy to be covered nes. You can, and you ought, to be free without revoluithout incurring the hazards and misfortunes which the eople experienced. Protect property and personal rights, ire your countrymen with love and respect for the laws the warlike virtues which defend republics and prorty. The violence which a certain number of wicked allowed themselves to commit against signor Greppi, has ears and inspired a terror which you ought to exert es to dispel. Restrain the ill-designing; but do not accustom a small number of individuals to entitle themselves 'the people,' and to perpetrate crimes in their name."

The subject which next required his attention was the state of popular feeling in the republics on both sides of the Po, which had just sprung into existence under the warmth of his countenance and the protection of his arms. In a letter to the directory of the 28th of December, he sketches with luminous brevity the various political colours which entered into the aspect of this interesting matter, and the course of policy he had adopted in regard to it. "There are at this moment in Lombardy three parises. The first is led by the French; the second is desirous of libery, and manifests its desire with some impatience; the third is friendly to Austria, and hostile to us. I support and encourage the first, restrain the second, and control the third.

"The Cispadan republics are divided into three parties; fint, the friends of their ancient governments; second, the parties of an independent government; and third, those who are parties of the French constitution or of a pure democracy. I repress the first, support the second, and moderate the third.

"I support the second and moderate the third, because the cond is composed of the rich and the clergy, who in the last r will gain over the great body of the people which it is need to rally round the French party; and because the third part composed of young men, writers, and individuals, who, as in case of France and other countries, desire changes in got ment, and love liberty, only as the means of causing a revol The Germans and the Pope combine their influence, to stir t insurrection in the Appennines. Their efforts are vain. of the district of Grafagniana, together with the little town of C rara, did however revolt. I have sent a small moveable co to restore order there, and to make such terrible examp shall teach those mountaineers not to trifle with us. A rev the Appennines, should it occur while we are engaged with Austrians, would give us a great deal of trouble. tains coming down as far as Tortona, the inhabitants wo able to interrupt our communications; consequently I keep. eyes on them perpetually. The Cispadan repu moment assembled in a congress, which is held at leggio. The moveable column here referred to, and c sisting of

thousand men, was commanded by general Rusca, who market

disaffected country, suppressed the revolt without diffidelay. In a letter to this general, Bonaparte indicated e examples which he thought the crisis demanded, and d his approbation of the manner in which the revolt had dued. "Upon its being proved that the five rebels ar-Concordia, persisted in beating those citizens who wore nal cockade, and in pulling down the tree of liberty, have them all five shot in the centre of the public square na, by the Modenese legion. You will send off the two to the castle of Milan, where they will be strongly I highly approve your conduct in this delicate affair. our promptness, that we are indebted for the favourable

the operation."
Ingress of Reggio, which was the result of the preliminary
odena, was composed of a hundred members, delegated
sople of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, and Reggio, for the
of perfecting the union of those revolted states into a
dependent republic, and of establishing a set of fundaws for its government.

arte, under whose protection this convention of popular took place, with a view of insuring moderation and 7 in their proceedings, deputed his aide de camp Marhis representative, to make known his sentiments to the as occasion might require, to assist in its deliberations to do so, to protect by his presence the freedom of their ions, and to report its proceedings. After several adits, the debates were opened on the 27th of December, he 30th, a letter was addressed by the president and seto the French general, informing him that the desired as accomplished, and that the congress had declared the iblic free and independent. "Receive," they say, "uned general, the eldest daughter of your valour and mag-. You are her father, you are her protector; under pices she will stand steadfast and immoveable, and tyrants e to overthrow her in vain." The glory of founding a e, out of the fragments of despotisms which he had d, was thus formally acknowledged to belong to him. He me in encouraging the members of the new state, to forr independence by the organization of a military force,

ive practical energy to their free institutions.

In his reply to the president's he the moral of the forced and the waggoner, is a number of the forced. **Unitary has been for a long time erased from the catalogue ropean states. If the Italians of the present day are we recovering their rights and of giving themselves a free goment, their country will be seen to figure with glory and powers of the earth. Forget not, however, that laws a strength, are nothing. Your earliest attention ought to rected to your military organization. Nature has given you thing; and after the harmony and wisdom which have a your deliberations, nothing is wanting for the success of y forts, but some battalions, well disciplined and animated

sacred love of country" (7).

The senate of Venice grew more and more impatient of I cupation of their towns and territory by the French 1 and of course, more and more hostile to the cause of I But there were two circumstances which forced them 1 press their enmity; one, the presence of the victorious arm other, the revolutionary spirit which, transmitted from & tiguous states, now actuated the population of their ga towns on the terra firma. In the meantime they went cruiting Sclavonian troops, fresh battalions of which were tinually arriving in the Lagoons; while throughout the firma, the partisans of Austria and France came into cel and maintained an acrimonious conflict of opinions. The of Verona and Brescia were already garrisoned by French (when disturbances which broke out at Bergamo, and thought to be connected with an apprehended movement that place by general Laudohn from the Tyrol, made it w to occupy its citadel also. General Baraguay d'Hilliers, as of Milan, who was ordered to take possession of it. purpose, by a judicious combination of stratagem and fir the 27th of December.

Two or three weeks previously to this event, in a e pondence with Battaglia, Bonaparte had reproached the We government with a too favourable reception of Alvinai t army, had repelled certain accusations of violence and re which were made by the Venetian authorities against the troops, for ravages, committed, as he alleged, by the Am and had threatened to punish severely outrages or i

night be offered to his men or his officers. The seizure of tadel of Bergamo, among the inhabitants of which town the individuals most inimical to France, seemed to carry hreat into execution so effectually, that he willingly re-I, in a short time afterwards, to measures of reconciliation: pon the remonstrance of Battaglia, gave orders for withng a great part of his detachment from that town, for readg the Venetian troops, and confiding the garrison duty of ace to the soldiers of the two republics in common. His in answer to Battaglia, under date of the 1st of January 1797. ats the following explanation of his conduct in the matter. French troops occupied Bergamo, in order to prevent the v, who had the intention of seizing this important post. rankly confess to you, that I was glad to seize the occasion pelling from that town, the great crowd of emigrants who aken refuge there; and to chastise slightly the numerous liis, who, from the commencement of the campaign, have never d preaching up a crusade against the French army, and to a in point have produced that effect; since it is well known, he people of Bergamo have murdered more of the French. all the rest of Italy put together.

he conduct of the Proveditore of Bergamo, has always been tly partial to the Austrians; and he has never even given if the trouble to dissemble in his correspondence, his contion, or his conduct, the hatred he feels toward the French. not his judge, nor that of any subject of the most serene rec of Venice. Nevertheless, whenever there are persons, against the evident intentions of their government, violate rinciples of neutrality, and conduct themselves like enemies natural right authorises me to make reprisals.

beg you to prevail on the Proveditore of Bergamo, who is subaltern, to be a little more modest, more moderate or less ing, when the French troops are at a distance. Persuade also to be a little less pusillanimous, and not to give way to the sight of the headmost French platoons. Had he not governed by this passion, the effect probably of the chasent he is conscious of deserving by his past conduct towards rench, the Venetian troops would not have evacuated the of Bergamo, and matters would have been conducted, as they have been at Brescia and Verona."

But while he was desirous not to provoke the hostility of Venice, he was determined not to be surprised by it; and he closel this letter to Battaglia with expressions calculated at one and the same time, to soothe and overawe the Venetian senate and the Italian clergy generally. "Immediately after the receipt of your letter, I took the situation of Bergamo into consideration, and have caused it to be evacuated by a part of the troops which I have ordered general Baraguay d'Hilliers to rewere there. store the citadel to the Venetian garrison, and to have duty purformed in the town by the troops in common. As to the traquillity of the place, your intentions, those of your government, and the good nature of the inhabitants are security for that. I know the small number of ill-disposed persons who for six months continually, have been preaching up a crusade against us. Wee be to them, if they violate the sentiments of good will and friendship which unite the two republics.

"I avail myself with pleasure of this opportunity, to do justice to the zeal for the preservation of public tranquillity, which the bishop of Bergamo and his respectable clergy have manifested. I am more and more convinced, that had the French clergy been as wise, as moderate, and as devoted to the principles of the gospel, the Roman catholic religion would have undergone to change whatever in France. But the corruption of the monardy had infected even the ministers of religion; and it was impossible to find among them, men of pure morality and examplary like, such as cardinal Mattei, the archbishop of Bologna, the bishop of Modena, the bishop of Pavia, and the archbishop of Pisa. It has sometimes appeared to me, while discoursing with these venerable personages, that I was carried back to the primitive ages of the Church."

This compliment to the chiefs of the Italian clergy, the terms of which his researches into ecclesiastical history in the bookselers' library at Valence, no doubt suggested, corresponds with the policy he observed towards the different parties in the new republics, as announced to the directory in a letter already quoted; and with his general correspondence, shows, that during his command in Italy, he was exhibiting as decided talent and acquiring as rich experience, in the art of government, as in that of war. Nothing could be more delicate, than the task of regulating his language and conduct toward the people of the representations.

Lombardy in particular. For while he was obliged, in order to mbat the partisans of Austria and if possible to destroy her inence, to support and encourage the patriots, he was compelled. fear of committing the faith of his government, to refrain from y thing like a pledge, that in the event of a general peace, France ould insist on their independence. But notwithstanding the diffilty of his position, wherever he appeared, he engaged the conence and captivated the affection both of the eminent citizens and the great mass. The regeneration of Italy and its consolidation o one great state was, it appears from his memoirs, the favorite d frequent subject of his discourse, which, fraught with a theme so ateful and inspiring, acted on the feelings of the Italians with maal influence. In the republican general of France, with an Italian me and with Italian features; in his great actions, magnanimous ntiments, stern selfdenial, commanding character, and classical aguage, they fancied they beheld, revived after the lapse of twenty nturies, Camillus, or Marcellus, or Scipio; as "the Tuscan artist" es, in the pure light of a new star, rays which have reached e firmament, after traversing space from the dawn of creation. The negotiations with the court of Rome, which had failed in e hands of the executive commissaries, the minister Cacault, ting under the instructions of Bonaparte, had not yet been able renew. In a letter of the 17th of November, this agent deribed the peaceful professions of the papal government, as holw and perfidious; and its real sentiments as exhibiting a degree of sacerdotal ferocity difficult to be conceived." He added that pon hearing a false report of the defeat of the French in the acon of Fonteniva, infinite joy was expressed at Rome; that even ardinal Mattei had refused to return his visit; and that he was effect reduced to a state of official nullity.

This evident, though unavowed hostility on the part of the apal government, which, however unfairly treated by the diectory in the negotiations for peace, had put itself flagrantly in he wrong by violating the armistice, kept the public feeling in he centre and the south of the peninsula, where the French asendancy had not yet been established, in disquietude and compotion. And Bonaparte determined, while the preparations of testria for a new campaign were incomplete, to put an end to a tate of things so precarious and menacing. He therefore formed moveable column, two thousand strong, destined to penetrate

28

15

into the papal territory. In order to increase the intimidating effect of the measure, as well as to avoid weakening his force perceptibly at any one station, detachments were directed ipper Bologna, from Leghorn, Milan, Brescia, Mantua, Verona, and Porto Legnago; each of which, rumour swelled into a separate column, and the whole into a force of fifteen thousand men (8).

On the 10th of January, this column, strengthened by four thessand Lombard and Cispadan auxiliaries, being organized at Bologna, was reviewed by the commander in chief who, after issuing orders for his divisions on the Adige to be held in readiness for action, had determined to put himself at the head of the expelition against the Pope, in order to make it as effectual as possible, and to seize the earliest opportunity of reaping its fruits by a successful negotiation.

Upon the first movement of the etachment which was drawn from Leghorn, the grand duke Tuscany had sent his prime minister to confer with Bo rte at Milan; and Manfredizi, after agreeing to pay a contribution of two millions of france for the entire evacuation of Leghorn, returned to Florence under the impression that Bonaparte was about to march upon Ress. But neither this belief, which was industriously communicated to the pontiff, nor the actual presence of the French general and his corps on the frontier of the ecclesiastical state, could overfice Pius VI., or shake the settled hostility of his purpose. Through cardinal Albani, his nuncio at Vienna, he was apprized of the

powerful preparations which the Emperor was making for bring-

ing another army into the field; and he could not but hope t under such repeated assaults the French general most at sink. The Austrian minister at Rome, encouraged his firming and stimulated his animosity, by assuring him that nothing co be more fortunate for the common cause than drawing the French general into lower Italy; and that to gain such an advantage, holy father himself should not hesitate to quit his cantal; much as the success of the Austrians on the Adige or the Mincio, the certain consequence of Bonaparte's advance to Rome, would cause the extermination of the French a----. P-boldened by counsels of this kind, and by secret pron from Napl Pius VI. persevered in his defiance of ; and fatte himself, that the fate of Italy was to be , not in the p

of the Po, but on the banks of the 1

Before leaving Milan on this expedition, Bonaparte communicated to the directory, in a letter of the 28th of December, his intentions, as well in regard to the Holy See, as to the adjoining states.

"I have had an interview with M. Manfredini who, you know, has been governor to the Emperor, prince Charles, and the grand duke of Tuscany. After a conference of two hours, filled with diplomatic finesse, I have agreed with him to evacuate Leghorn, in consideration of two millions of francs. He complained much of poverty. I expect the answer of the grand duke in a few days.

"The Neapolitans have notified me of the peace, and have demanded leave to return to Naples. I have answered that my government had not informed me of the peace; that I should send off a courier and wait your orders. I beg you to acquaint me with your intentions on this subject. I should wish, however, before allowing them to go, to have finished the affair with Rome; for this cavalry is a pledge that the king of Naples will adhere faithfully to the treaty.

"As for Rome, the pope has at this moment united all his forces in Faenza and the other cities of the Romagna, to the number of six thousand men. As this occasions great apprehension at Bologna, and may serve to facilitate the escape of Wurmser from Mantua, I shall, according to the terms of the armistice and the usages of nations, cause such citizens in the different districts, as are most devoted to the pope and most hostile to France, to be arrested as hostages. By this means, the country will organize itself, as Bologna has done. I shall sequestrate all the revenues of the Romagna and the March of Ancona, in lieu of the fifteen millions which were to have been paid us by the armistice.

"The fifteen hundred men I have at Leghorn, I mean to station at Ancona; by which means I shall drive off the corps of the enemy, which seems prepared to connect itself with the position of Alvinzi at Padua, and with the order which the emperor has lately given to Wurmser. Moreover, I shall obtain money for the support of the army. If I delay a little the execution of this project, it is because, first, I think it necessary to wait a few days in order that the impression made on the Venetians by the occupation of Bergamo, may subside; second, that I may be assured that the reenforcements you promise, are actually on their march, and will really join me."

As it appears from his correspondence with the directory, that

he was apprized of the conclusion of peace with Naples, as early as the 25th of October, his answer to the Neapolitan officers, "that his government had not informed him of it," was a precaution taken at the expense of truth; a proceeding, which however much it may have been excused by the bad faith of their court, operated as a hardship on themselves and their men, since they were kept, consequently, in a state of relegation at Brescia, long after their obligation to remain there, under the armistice, had ceased.

The order from the emperor which he here refers to, was contained in an intercepted despatch from Alvinzi to Wurmser; and it directed the latter, in case of absolute necessity, to evacuate Mantan and make his way into the Tuscan or Roman territory, in either of which states, he was assured, he would meet with a friendly reception.

It has been mentioned already, that in the month of September, when the armies of the Rhine were not yet driven out of Germany, the directory had instructed Bonaparte to signify by letter to the Emperor that, if that monarch did not at once send an envoy to Paris to treat for peace, it was his intention to march upon Trieste, and to destroy all the Austrian maritime establishments on the Adriatic. His letter which commenced his memorable intercourse with this sovereign, and which like the communications of Homer's messengers from the gods, was almost a literal repetition of his instructions, was dated the 2nd of October, and was in these words.

"Sire,—Europe desires peace—this disastrous war has lasted too long. I have the honour to inform your majesty that if you do not send plenipotentiaries to Paris to open negociations for peace, the executive directory has ordered me to destroy the port of Trieste, and to ruin all the establishments of your majesty on the Adriatic. Hitherto, I have been withheld from the execution of this order, by the hope of not increasing the number of innocest victims to this war.

"I trust your majesty will feel for the calamities which meases your subjects, and restore to the world repose and tranquility."

From an overture so rude and offensive, as no good was to be expected, so none accrued, and Bonaparte's letter remained unnoticed. At a later period of the campaign, when Jourdan and Moreau had retreated across the Rhine, and the archduke Charles was laying siege to the têtes de pont of Kehl and Huninguen, Moreau by command of the directory, proposed an armistice, which the archduke rejected, by insisting on the inadmissible condition

that the works he was besieging should be surrendered, and these great portals on the Rhine laid open to him. But soon after this, the defeat of Alvinzi at Arcola and the failure of his efforts to disengage Wurmser being known, the directory flattered themselves that the Austrian government would accept an armistice, which should leave Kehl and Huninguen in possession of France, and preserve, during its continuance, Mantua to the Emperor. Sanguine of the success of this project, they despatched general Clarke to the headquarters of the army of Italy, with authority to open negotiations with the imperial cabinet, upon the basis of a general suspension of hostilities, until the month of June, 1797. In the interval, the sieges of Kehl and Huninguen were to be raised, and the investment of Mantua to be left in statu quo, a mixed commission of French and Austrian officers, passing into the place a daily supply of provisions for the garrison.

Although Bonaparte had suffered and risked so much, from want of proper support from the government, as to make him, it might be supposed, heartily tired of the war, he expressed decided disapprobation of this project for peace. He declared to general Clarke and repeated to the directory that, whether the armistice were regarded as a preliminary to peace, or to a new campaign, it would be a disadvantage to France, if entered into before Mantua was taken; and in a note addressed to Clarke, and in duplicate to the government, he stated the following specific objections to the projected truce:

"1st, We shall lose Mantua at least until May, when we shall find it completely supplied with provisions, no matter what measures may have been taken; and in May the heat will render the place impregnable.

"2nd, We lose the contribution of Rome, which, without the capture of Mantua, we cannot obtain. The state of the church is not to be invaded with success in summer.

"3rd, The Emperor being nearer to Italy and having greater resources, will, by May, have an army more numerous than ours. For whatever measures may be adopted, as soon as the fighting is over, every body will leave us. Ten or fifteen days' repose will be useful to our army, but three months would ruin it.

"4th, Lombardy is exhausted. We can no longer support the army of Italy but by funds drawn from the pope, or raised by the occupation of Trieste. We shall find ourselves very much

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embarrassed on this point, at the opening of the campaign, after the expiration of a truce.

"5th, Masters of Mantua, we shall have it in our power to exclude the pope from the benefits of the armistice. For the army of Italy will have gained such a preponderance, that the court of Vienna will be too happy to be able to suspend its movements for some months.

"6th, If, after the armistice, we are obliged to begin a new campaign, it will have been disadvantageous to us; if it is to be followed by peace, it should not be entered into before the fall of Mantua. There is thus a double reason in favour of no armistice, until after taking Mantua.

"7th, To conclude an armistice in the actual state of things, is taking from us the probability of making peace, on good terms, in the course of a month."

However, as the instructions of the directory were positive, general Clarke, after combating in a long and feeble paper the forcible objections of Bonaparte, enclosed in a letter from himself to the emperor Francis, a letter from the directory containing overtures of peace; and this despatch Bonaparte transmitted, under cover from Berthier, to marshal Alvinzi.

The real object of the directory in sending Clarke to Italy for the purpose of opening this negotiation, appears to have been to place him in close, but secret, observation of the commander chief and his principal officers. His astonishing victories, his sense and their own consciousness of the neglect and mismanagement, under the obstruction of which these victories had been won; the independent republics which, in opposition to their wishes, were springing up on the scene of his glory and under the protection of his arms, filled them with doubts and apprehensions, which the conduct of Pichegru and other generals of the republic, naturally strengthened. These suspicions, it was to be the business of Clarke, while conducting the negotiation with Austria, to confirm or remove. His reports were not so secret but that they found their way back to Italy, and exposed him to the resentment of particular generals, and to the dislike of the army. Bonaparte, on the contrary, was of opinion that the government had a right to this sort of information, and that it was fortunate they had employed to procure it a person respectable for character, station, and intelligence. He therefore protected Clarke by sixing him his confidence, and even employing him in the negotiation for an alliance, which he was carrying on with the king of Sardinia. And as Clarke was a man of judgment and integrity, his reports were favourable to Bonaparte and satisfactory to the government.

Upon receiving instructions from Vienna, Alvinzi proposed that a conference should be held between baron Vincent, an aide de camp of the emperor, and general Clarke, the plenipotentiary of the directors. These commissioners met at Vicenza on the 3d of January, 1797. Fortunately for the French arms, the Austrian commissioner declared that the Emperor could not receive at Vienna a diplomatic agent of the French republic, the existence of which he had not acknowledged; that he was determined not to enter into a treaty of peace, nor take any step for an accommodation, without the concurrence of his allies; and finally, that if general Clarke proposed offering any further suggestions, he would do well, instead of proceeding to Vienna, to address himself to the Austrian minister at Turin.

This proud and peremptory rejection, by the Emperor, of the overtures of the French government, connected as it was with the simultaneous rupture of lord Malmesbury's negotiation at Paris, while it obviated the imprudent project of the directors, and forced on them the policy which Bonaparte recommended, falsified in the person of Clarke himself, the main position of his answer to Bonaparte's objections; in which he had insisted that Austria was wearied of the war, and would embrace eagerly an overture for peace. After a second interview, equally arrogant on the side of Austria and fruitless on that of France, Clarke broke off the conferences and returned to Verona. He had hardly reached there before Alvinzi was again in motion.

The exertions made by the Austrian government to furnish Alvinzi with a new army, had been immense and successful. The cessation of active operations on the Rhine, enabled the archduke Charles to detach hirge reenforcements to the Italian frontier. The mountaineers of the Tyrolian provinces were easily persuaded by agents from the imperial court, that it belonged to them not only to defend the passes into their native hills, but to assist in the reconquest of Lombardy, the fertility of which gave prosperity to their mountains. A patriotic impulse was propagated throughout the empire, whose vast and various realms, roused by repeated excitation, began at last to glow with one common ardour of national spirit. The principal towns raised battalions of volunteers.

Vienna alone furnished four battalions, in one of which a chanberlain of the Emperor served as corporal, and all of which here colours presented to them by the empress, and adorned with embroidery by her own hands. Early in January, marshal Alvissi found himself at the head of eight divisions, consisting each of eight thousand men. This body of regular troops was strengthened by six thousand Tyrolian riflemen; so that his whole army, including the corps imprisoned at Mantua, amounted to full missy thousand men (9).

His force in the field was divided into two columns of unequal The larger one, consisting of forty five thousand men, acted under his own immediate orders, and the smaller one, twenty thousand strong, under that of General Provera; who, although he surrendered his sword with two thousand men at Cossaria, it was remembered, had been praised on the occasion by Bonaparte himself (10). The result of Alvinzi's recent operations on the lower Adige, not having been of a character to entice him to a renewal of his personal exertions on the same ground, that theatre of war was assigned to his lieutenant, and the chief scene of the campaign was cast in the country between the upper Adige and the lake Accordingly, in the beginning of December, the field of Guarda. marshal transferred his headquarters from Bassano to Trent; and his divisions, as they arrived upon the Brenta, were directed upon the valley of that river to the Tyrol, and into junction with the corps of Davidowich; while the troops destined to compose the column of Provera, were assembled at Padua. The plan of Alvinzi, on this occasion was, instead of endeavouring to unite his columns at Verona, to make Mantua itself the point of union; and while he himself with the main army marched down by Montebaldo and Rivoli, Provera, with the inferior column, was to pass the lower Adige and the Molinella, and reach Mantua by the route on which Wurmser had effected his escape in September. This independent direction of his columns afforded, he conceived, a double chance of relieving Wurmser, who, if joined by Alvieri himself, would be in force to overpower the French, and if by Provera, to escape them; and by crossing the Po, to unite with the troops which the Pope was collecting in the Romagna.

In order to prepare for this last combination, the emperor of Germany had sent an autograph letter to Alvinzi, containing instructions for Wurmser, which on the 16th of December were addressed to him by Alvinzi from his headquarters at Trent, in the following terms:—

en to do myself the honour of transmitting to your exliteral copy of the orders of his majesty, dated the fifth nth. 'You will take care to notify M. Wurmser withthat he is not to discontinue his operations. You will m I expect from his courage and zeal, that he will defend the last extremity; that I know him and his brave gecers too well to fear that he will surrender, especially dition of the garrison being conducted into France, inbeing sent back into my dominions. It is my desire in s being reduced to extremities, and finding himself desthe means of subsistence, that after destroying to the his power every thing in Mantua, that may be of use emy, he contrive to convey his garrison across the Po, Ferrara or Bologna, and in case of need, march even to into Tuscany. In this direction he will meet with few and will find the people well disposed to furnish him visions; to obtain which, as well as to remove any diffiat may arise, he will employ force if necessary.'

signed 'FRANCIS.'

rson who is to be relied upon, a volunteer in the regiwill deliver to you this important despatch. I will add actual situation and wants of the army, will not allow of operations being undertaken in less than three weeks or without danger of failing a second time.

not too strongly urge your excellency to hold out as long le at Mantua, the order of his majesty serving, in other for the general direction of your conduct. In any event, ur excellency to send me intelligence by a safe channel, of may avail myself in order to correspond with you."

night of the 23rd of December, three men, while endeato make their way into Mantua, and when they had passut the last chain of posts, were arrested by the French, and carried before general Alexander Dumas, comad interim of the siege. This general, finding one of mers more intelligent than the others, after having them hed in vain, charged him with having swallowed his desnd threatened to have him shot and his stomach opened. me little time, the emissary confessed that the suspicion is was just. Being immediately confined and carefully, he voided on the second day a small ball of sealing wax, is was found the letter of Alvinzi. Wurmser, therefore,

With regard to Bonaparte's force at this time, assistance in accertaining its amount may be derived from his letter, refuting an attempt of the directors to justify themselves against the charge of neglect, so pointedly and powerfully conveyed in his depatch of the 13th of November. Besides assurances, calculated to satisfy them that he was neither unacquainted nor dissatisfied with the secret object of Clarke's mission, and that his army continued faithful to the government; this letter, dated the 28th of Becember, contained the following numerical statement of his strength from the beginning of the campaign to the end of the year; which, as it was never disputed nor even denied in the subsequent correspondence, may be assumed as unquestionably correct.

"The state of the army which you have sent me, is full of desble entries and errors. I opened the campaign with a corps darmée of twenty-four thousand men, besides the division of the Cel de Tende, and Fenestrelles, and the garrisons of the markine Alps, amounting together to eight thousand, of which number six thousand joined me by way of the Col de Tende, after the battle of Mondovi. I had therefore thirty thousand men of the former army of Italy, in the plains of Piedmont.

"The army of the Alps furnished me with eight thousand five hundred men; but as the army of the Alps already defended the frontiers of Italy, this could not be fairly counted as a reenfercement. Nevertheless, the army of Italy, properly so called, may be considered as containing originally, thirty-eight thousand five hundred infantry.

"The government has reenforced it with two thousand six hundred men, detached by general Chateauneuf Randon, with the 33rd, 6th, 40th, 58th regiments from la Vendée, and the 15th from Paris, making a total of ten thousand men.

"If then the army had not lost a man, the infantry would amount to fifty—one thousand one hundred. But it has lost four thousand killed in battle as the enclosed return proves, one thousand out of service in consequence of wounds, and two thousand who have died in the hospitals. We have thus lost seven thousand men, of whom one thousand belonged to the cavalry, artillary and pioneers; there remain consequently forty five thousand one hundred, as the actual strength of the army in foot.

"You perceive, therefore, citizen directors, that your army, is-

tead of having received fifty seven thousand men in reenforcenents, has received only twelve thousand six hundred, in a camaign filled up with so many battles; in which the same troops have estroyed the united army of Sardinia and Beaulieu, seventy three housand strong; the army of Beaulieu, joined by thirty thousand nen from the Rhine, commanded by Wurmser; the army of Wurmer, strengthened by eighteen thousand men from Poland, six thouand from the Rhine, and twelve thousand recruits commanded y Alvinzi. And now we are on the eve of a conflict with the uins of all these armies, reenforced by four thousand volunteers rom Vienna, three thousand from the Rhine, three thousand reruits already arrived, and fifteen thousand that I am assured hey count on in the course of next month, besides the recruits hat come in to them from all directions. Good fortune as well s good fighting was required to beat Alvinzi before; how can ou expect with the same troops, to beat him again, reenforced by thirty or thirty five thousand men; while we have as yet reeived but three thousand?

"The curing of our sick is, to be sure, an advantage; but Wurmer's sick in Mantua are likewise cured. You announced to me en thousand men as coming from the army of the ocean, and ten housand from the Rhine. It is two months since you announced hem, and yet not a single man of them has arrived."

It is to be observed, that as this statement comprehended the numerous garrisons in Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Cispadan states, which exceeded considerably the aggregate of his cavalry irtillery and pioneers, which it excluded, it sustains the substantial accuracy of the assertion found in his memoirs, that after he battle of Arcola, two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, which had been stationed through the summer on the seacoast of Provence, joined him, and exceeding somewhat the reparation of his recent losses, raised his army of observation to thirty one housand men, and his entire active force to forty three thousand. This was distributed into five divisions, which were thus posted, commanded, and composed.

Joubert, now promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, succeeded Vaubois, who was found unequal to the conduct of ritical operations in the field and was sent to command in Corsica, n charge of the left division, which consisted of the 14th, 33rd, 19th, and 85th of the line, the 4th, 17th, 22nd and 29th light infantry,



This division, the beadquarters of and the 22nd light dragoons. which were at Rivoli, was posted on Montebaldo, at the Corone, Iivoli, and Bussolengo. Massena held the centre; the 18th, 25th, 28th and 75th of the line, the 18th light infantry, the 1st and 15th dragoons, with two companies of dismounted gendarmes, and a hetalion from the Cotes-du-Nord, formed this division, of which the headquarters were at Verona. Augereau's division was on the right, and his headquarters were at Ronco. The 4th, 40th, 50th and 57th of the line, the 5th light infantry, the 5th regiment of cavalry, the 9th dragoons and the 1st and 7th hussars, were under the exders of this general. General Rey had charge of the fourth divi which was in reserve at Dezenzano, Salo and Brescia, and consi ed of only four regiments; the 58th of the line, the 11th and 22h light infantry, and the 8th dragoons. The last division, constituting the army of blockade, was again commanded by general Serrusia, who, his health being now reestablished, had relieved general IImaine, to whom the command at Milan was assigned. This divities was composed of the 5th, 6th, 11th, 12th, 64th, 69th of the line, the 5th and 20th dragoons, and the 10th, 24th and 25th light cavely.

Joubert had strongly intrenched his advanced position on Membaldo, and had a numerous artillery. Verona, Porto Legago, Peschiera, Pizzighitone, were well fortified. The citadels of Precia, Bergamo, and Ferrara, with the forts of Urbino and Fuents, were occuped by the French, who with armed barges commanded the four lakes of Guarda, Como, Maggiore and Lugano.

In the first week of January, Alvinzi advanced his headquarters from Trent to Roveredo; and those of Provera were established at Padua. Their operations, though separate, were to be combined; of course the movement of one was to favour the progress of the other; and as the principal attack was to be made by the strenger column, Provera first got in motion. On the 8th, his vanguard under general Hohenzollern, attacked in front of Bivalaqua, the advance of Augereau commanded by general Duphot. This gallant officer, though overmatched, stood his ground until the whole division was apprized of the enemy's approach, and then retired in good order, first to Santo Zeno, and next across the Adige at Porto Legnago.

Bonaparte was on the eve of marching from Bologna into the Roman territory, when he was informed, during the night of the 10th, by certain Venetian agents, of the movement of the Austrian the lower Adige. Instantly ordering that the Italian legion ould take a defensive position on the southern frontier of the padan republic, so as to maintain that line against an invasion the Papal force; and directing his column of French troops to so the Po, near its mouth at Lago di Oscura and hasten up to support of Augereau, he himself posted to Roverbello, and aftering the necessary instructions to Serrurier, pushed on to Vena, the point upon which all his operations in the field were to m. He arrived there in the forenoon of the 12th, at a moment the highest interest.

At six o'clock that morning general Bayalitch, with the right diion of Provera's column consisting of eight battalions and six padrons, presented himself in the plains of Verona, and drove the vanguard of Massena, which was posted at San Michel. It s not in the disposition nor the habit of this general, to decline ombat. He issued forth from the walls of Verona, ranged division in order of battle, and without pausing to manœuvre, rched directly to the support of his vanguard, which, overwered by numbers, was giving ground. The 75th first came o action, and stopped the progress of the enemy. But they had eady succeeded in planting on a commanding height, a battery nich was likely to do great execution. General Brune, who had st joined the army, placed himself at the head of the grenadiers the 75th, and continuing the headlong movement of Massena, a brilliant charge in which his clothes were pierced by seven illets, carried the battery, took the guns, and broke the enemy's e. Leclerc, with the cavalry, followed up this bold impression a charge, and the Austrians were driven back, and pursued as r as Caldiero, with considerable loss in slain, leaving behind em six hundred prisoners, and three pieces of artillery. Masna's loss was but slight.

In the midst of the action Bonaparte came on the ground, but stained from interfering with the direction of the troops. He as highly pleased with the gallantry of the 75th under general rune, as well as with the success of Massena, although he conlered his dispositions more fortunate than able. In a letter Josephine that evening from Verona, he observed, "I had rdly left Roverbello, when I learned that the enemy had apared before Verona. Massena made dispositions which proved ry fortunate. We have taken six hundred prisoners, and three

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pieces of artillery. General Brune had seven balls through his dothes, without being touched by one. This is sporting with fornune. I kiss you a thousand times. I am in excellent health. We

had but ten killed and a bundred wounded" (11). The combat being finished. Bonaparte directed Massena, whom on this occasion of rude and hazardous success, he called "the spoiled child of victory." to fall back to Verona, and withdraw his division across the Adige. The enemy was coming on in different direc-

tions, and it was necessary, by having all the troops on the right bank of the river. to preserve the faculty of assembling rapidly an adequate force. wherever the principal onset should be made. At the very time that Massena was attacked at San Michel, Pro-

vers had displayed the mass of his force in front of Porto Legnago, and Alvieri had assailed Joubert on Montebaldo. point the Austrians had at first the advantage, and even got possession of the French redoubt. But Joubert charging at the head of his grenadiers. retook the redoubt, and made three hundred prisoners. After this, the contest which continued until night,

was confined to the indecisive musketry of light troops. Verona being nearly equidistant from Porto Legnago and Rivol. the reports of Augereau and Joubert for the 12th, reached Rommarie about the same hour in the night. The former wrote,

that Prevera with a considerable corps was approaching the bank of the lever Adige, that two bridge equipages had been descried by the French light troops, and that general Duphot who was in

from estimated the force in sight, at more than twelve thousand on his side, Jouhert reported that he had sustained an atand during the whole day; but as he added that he had repelled and continued to repel the enemy, it was reasonable to infer that the principal operation of the Austrian commander was to hem the lower Adige. Still his plan was not sufficiently unmasked: and Renaparte maintained his attitude of suspense, holding Mas-

walk does for every hostile sound, and panting for the signal to spins at the foe. Ewould be unjust not to remark that by these simultaneous kmonstrations. Alvinzi skilfully veiled his real design, and proint of painfully the hesitation of his adversary.

and his brave division, motionless but ready, listening like

In the course of the night, Bonaparte, having ascertained that

was no appearance of the enemy to the west of the lake of

Guarda, sent orders to general Rey to cross the Mincio at Peschiera, and take post at Castel Novo, so as to be in supporting distance of the divisions on the Adige.

On the 13th, he continued stationary at Verona, keeping his troops under arms from ten o'clock in the morning until the same hour at night, although the winter rain fell in torrents. Couriers from Augereau and Joubert now came in, with fresh intelligence. The former general stated that Provera had spread his parties up and down the Adige, and with his sharp shooters and artillery, had kept up a fire across the river at different points, the whole day; but that nothing of importance had occurred. The latter represented, that at nine o'clock in the morning the enemy had renewed their attack in great force, displaying at least twenty-five thousand men. That he had managed to maintain himself until two o'clock in the afternoon; when finding his left turned by a division which had passed along the shore of the lake, while another division on his right, after crossing the Adige at Dolce, was threatening to get into his rear and seize the plateau of Rivoli, he had been compelled to send a brigade from his front, to make sure of this important post. That two hours afterwards, he had been obliged to follow this retrograde movement with the rest of his troops, in order to reach the plateau of Rivoli before dark: and that it was his intention, unless he should receive orders to the contrary, to fall back still further in the course of the night.

By this information the uncertainty of the French commander was terminated; and he felt satisfied that the movement of Provera was only secondary, and that the main attack was to be on the upper Adige. Trusting that, with a broad river in his front, Augereau would be able to hold back Provera, he resolved to fly to the succour of Joubert, where the danger, which was imminent, could best be combated, while the divisions of the enemy which endeavoured to envelop him, were yet separated.

Leaving general Chabot in Verona with the 25th and one regiment of horse, and with orders to hold out at all events until his return, he directed Massena with the other regiments, to push on to Rivoli by a forced march. Augereau had instructions to confine himself to the defensive, and if necessary to employ the reserve of cavalry stationed at Villa Franca; in which case general Victor, with Serrurier's reserve, was to occupy that place. General Rey was ordered not to halt at Castel Novo but to continue

his movement toward Rivoli as far as Orza; and directions were sent to Murat, who commanded the light troops of Rey's division at Salo, if he could collect the means of embarkation, to cross the lake of Guarda and place himself in Alvinzi's rear. Massens's regiments moved in separate columns, and marched with all possible speed: the 18th which was at Bussolengo, being pushed ferward under general Monnier by the route along the lake, in order to clear the left flank of the march, and to occupy until further orders, the village of Garda as a post of defence against the Amtrians on that side, and a point of landing for Murat. Having made these various dispositions for the defence of his line, the maintenance of the siege, and the conduct of his lieutenants, Benaparte, setting off from Verona with posthorses, outstripped the march of Massena, and before two o'clock in the morning of the 14th, joined Joubert on the plateau of Rivoli.

The rain had ceased by this time, and the clouds rolling of, unveiled to the hostile armies a bright moon and a frosty sky. The French general rode instantly to the commanding points in front, in order to examine the enemy's ground, estimate his force, and divine his intentions. The fires of his numerous bivouaces he saw, extended from the Adige to the lake, and infining the broad horizon with their blaze. Five camps were distinguishable; indicating as many columns, and, as it was computed, the presence of more than forty thousand men. Against this host, the utmost force which he could expect to employ, was twenty two thousand; a disproportion which, however, he head to alleviate, by operating with sixty pieces of artillery and avveral regiments of cavalry, before Alvinzi could get his horse or guns into action.

The plateau or table land of Rivoli, which was to be the scare of a great and decisive battle, is situated in the centre of a somicircular valley, lying between the Adige and its tributary the Tasso. Its diameter of about five miles, is a section of the Adige, and its periphery is formed by the course of the Tasso, which running from the Corona near and parallel to the Adige, as far as Lubiara, curves boldly to the west to Affi, where beading its course eastward, it is soon lost in the Adige near La Sega. To the north and west of this plateau, and on the opposite side of the Tasso, is the great acuminated and predominating ridge of Montebaldo, ranging between the Adige and the lake, and dividing

the waters that flow into them. Between Montebaldo and the Adige, and separated by a narrow and deep valley from each, is the lesser mountain called Montemagnone, terminating at its northern extremity, in the rocky and precipitous height of the Corona, and uniting in its southern termination with the plateau of Rivoli, by a narrow ridge, interposed between Incanale on the Adige and Lubiara on the Tasso. On its western side, Montebaldo slopes toward the lake, with slighter inequality of surface, and less violence of descent. In the valleys on each side ran roads and tracks leading from the Tyrol to Verona and Mantua, and to the various villages between the river and the lake. Of these routes the only one that was passable for cavalry and artillery, wound along the right bank of the Adige from the bridge of Dolce as far as Incanale, where it ascended by a steep rise the narrow ridge between that place and Lubiara, and turning to the left, issued out upon the northern or upper extremity of the plateau of Rivoli, where the division of Joubert was posted.

It seems very doubtful whether Alvinzi was apprized of Bonaparte's return to Verona, or even of his having left there for Bologna. But it is almost certain he was unaware of his presence at Rivoli, and made his dispositions for attack, under the persuasion. that he would have to deal with Joubert's division alone. Nothing else can account for the hazardous measure he adopted, for cutting it off from succour or retreat. This object was entrusted to general Lusignan, who with Alvinzi's first or right column, was encamped beyond the crest of Montebaldo, and was destined to turn the left of Joubert and get into the rear of Rivoli. Liptay with the second column was to move along the summit and the eastern side of Montebaldo, and to attack and turn the left of the French. The third column was to advance under the command of general Koblos, through the narrow valley between Montebaldo and Montemagnone, against the French centre and left; while general Ocskay with the fourth, was on the ridge of Montemagnone, pointing his march toward the chapel of San Marco situated at its southern extremity, and in the immediate front of Joubert's right. The last column, led by general Quasdonowich, came down the strip of low ground lying between the Adige and Montemagnone and terminating at Incanale, where the plateau of Rivoli touches the river, and the road by a zigzag ascent leaves it. With this column moved the cavalry and artillery, which, should VOL. I.

Quasdonowich succeed in forcing his way up to the plates, would then be united with the other columns and brought its full operation.

In addition to these masses, a strong detachment commends by general Wukassowich, was posted on the left bank of the Adige, about one mile below Dolce. The artillery attached to it, was placed in battery at Soniamo and was to cover by its fire the march of Quasdonowich, in his effort to ascend from the low grounds at Incanale to the plateau of Rivoli.

From the situation of the enemy's bivouacs, Bonaparte julyal that his onset, if waited for, would be made about ten in the ferencon; for from the distance and direction of Lusignan's column, its detour, it was evident, could not be accomplished before that hour. He also judged that, to maintain the contracted green and defensive plan of Joubert, by allowing the enemy's columns to converge upon him as a common centre, would be fatal; and he determined to assume the offensive while there was yet result for attacking them separately. Therefore, just as his pressed repeater struck two, he ordered Joubert, who had evacuated the chapel of San Marco, to retake that important post instantly, and to repel the column of Ocskay as far as possible from the frest of his right (12).

Ten Croats, who learned from a French prisoner the evacution of San Marco, had just entered it, when it was reached and retaken by Joubert's light brigade under general Vial, who displaying his men to the right, engaged and drove back the rejement to which these Croats belonged. But the whole of Ocalay's column coming up, forced him in turn to retire, until he was sustained by Joubert himself at the head of the 33rd, two thousand strong, and supported by artillery. The action now became never on this point; but the Austrians, who had no artillery to answer the French guns, and who had expected, instead of a furises attack, at most but a resolute defence, gave way about day break, before the sustained impetuosity of the French, and enabled Joubert not only to hold possession of the chapel, but to cover ground considerably in advance of it.

During this time, the third column under general Kobles, had approached with rapidity, in order to take part in the action which was thus prematurely begun, and a little before nine o'clock, rest from the valley of the Tasso, upon the heights of San Giovanni's

front of the French centre and left, formed of the 14th and 85th of the line, the latter regiment on the flank. Each had a battery, and they rested on the 29th light infantry which, in column, formed the reserve. The Austrians came to the attack with great animation and overwhelming numbers. In the centre, where Bonaparte was in person, the 14th sustained the shock; on the left. first the 85th and next the 29th gave away before it. The flank of the 14th being thus uncovered, a battalion of that brave regiment faced to the left and maintained its ground unshaken, the men planting themselves behind walls and hedges, and selling their lives dearly. The Austrians encouraged by the retreat of the 85th and 29th, and confident from the force of numbers, made repeated efforts to carry the battery in front of the 14th. Already they had killed the gunners and were attaching horses to the pieces, when a captain stepping forward, cried out-"Grenadiers of the 14th, will you suffer those fellows to carry off your guns?" At the word the regiment poured in a volley deliberately upon the Austrians, which, with other execution, killed the horses; upon seeing which, fifty grenadiers headed by this gallant captain rushed forward with the bayonet, and crying out, " No. they shall not have our pieces," recovered the guns.

But Bonaparte perceiving that the 85th and 29th were completely routed, the 14th outflanked, and deeming it indispensable for the success of the day, to restore the action in this quarter, which, in consequence of the rapid advance of Koblos, had commenced sooner than he counted on, left the conduct of the 14th and the maintenance of the position, to Berthier, and galloping back to Rivoli, where Massena's division after marching all night, was snatching a moment's repose, called out for the 32nd. To that intrepid regiment his voice was both nourishment and rest. Its formidable ranks were soon arrayed under Massena, and Bonaparte led it swiftly to the support of his left and centre. Rallying the 85th and 29th and clearing the flank of the 14th in its progress, the 32nd supported by these regiments, fell like a hurricane upon the enemy. Every thing went down before it. The face of the action was instantly changed. and in less than half an hour Bonaparte had the satisfaction of seeing the column of Koblos driven from the heights of San Giovanni, flying in disorder across the valley of the Tasso, and seeking refuge with the second column which, under general Liptay. was advancing to its relief. By this time the light infantry and

cavalry of Massena coming up, the charge vernewed, and Liptay was forced, like Koblos to fly. At he in, the French line was securely established on the contested heights, and three of the Austrian columns defeated; when Bonaparte with a body of Massena's cavalry hastened to the right of his line.

Joubert, ardently pursuing Ocskay beyond the chapel of San Marco, had left that post again unoccupied, and Quasdonovich, who by this time had reached Incanale at the foot of the ascent to the plateau of Rivoli, perceiving the chasm which was the occasioned between the extreme right of the French and ther left, the fire of which he could hear on the Tasso side of the plateau, determined to take advantage of it. For this purpose he ordered a proper officer with three battalions of infantry, to scale the precipitous side of Montemagnone and make himself master of San Marco; and he sent, at the same time, two other battalions up the ascent from Incanale, with orders to clear the way for his cavalry and artillery to arrive upon the plateau. This was the critical moment of the conflict; for if these operations succeeded, the battle would be lost to the French, inasmuch as Joubert would be severed from Massena, and the artillery and cavalry of the Austrians, in both which arms they had a great seperiority, would be established on the most commanding position in the field. But the first movement Joubert discovered in season. and countermarched with the 33rd so rapidly, that he reached sin Marco before the Austrians. His horse was shot under him, but seizing a musket he marched on foot at the head of the grenadiers, fell upon the Austrian battalions as they scaled the height, and overthrew them headlong into the valley of the Adige. Quandonowich himself, was not more fortunate than his detachment. Forcing his way up the steep ascent, laboriously but with succes, against the gallant efforts of the 39th which here retrieved its lest reputation, his front was saluted by a discharge of grape det from a battery of fifteen pieces, which Bonaparte himself. "whose eye," as Berthier said in his report, "was every where," epeace point blank upon him. Joubert at the same time pressing on from the chapel of San Marco to the brink of the precipice which is

eye," as Berthier said in his report, "was every where," epsted point blank upon him. Joubert at the same time pressing on from the chapel of San Marco to the brink of the precipice which is crowned, poured a plunging fire of musketry upon his right; and to complete his ruin, Bonaparte ordered a charge of five hundred dragoons under Leclerc and Lassalle upon both his flanks. The violence of these accumulated blows, nothing contrasts.

ponderous and encumbered column, twenty thousand strong, staggered like a wounded giant in the bloody pass. Part of his corps in the agony of their struggle burst forth upon the plateau, and frantic with rage and despair, surrendered to the 39th, a confused mass of infantry cavalry and artillery. The rest, under the mingled slaughter of grape shot, musketry, and sabres, were precipitated back into the ravine, in all the horror of dismay and havoc.

This repulse and slaughter of Quasdonowich, besides destroying the strongest column of Alvinzi's army, separated the corps of Wukassowich, whose vanguard in attempting to cross the Adige had been stopped by the small but strong fort of the Chiusa, and whose guns played unheededly from beyond the Adige, altogether from the battle. Of the other four columns, those of Ocskay, Koblos, and Liptay, having been already defeated; one only remained to be disposed of; and that was so situated, that in the face of such a general as Bonaparte, its fate could scarcely be doubtful.

The column of general Lusignan which was not yet engaged, had, as Bonaparte foresaw, pursued its circuituous march along the lake side of Montebaldo, without cavalry or artillery, and with the intention of cutting off the retreat of the French, by taking post on Monte Pipolo, in the rear of Rivoli, and on the main road to Verona. Passing fron Lumini, by the way of Costerman, Lusignan posted a detachment in the valley of Calcina, for the protection of his rear against a French detachment which he learned was at Garda; and having ascertained in his further progress, the presence of general Rey with the 58th at Orza, he stationed, for a similar object, one of his brigades in observation of that place. With the rest of his column he pushed on to Monte Pipolo, upon the crest of which and across the Verona road, he drew up the main body of his force, after occupying with a small detachment for the security of his left flank, the neighbouring eminence of Brunissi. His right rested on the Adige, and his front looked into the rear of the French. Exulting in the apparent success of his movement, he announced its accomplishment by a general discharge of small arms, the sound of which he was persuaded, would convey terror to his enemies and triumph to his friends. But the smoke of his fire was scarcely dispelled before he learned the defeat and dispersion of the columns of Liptay, Koblos, Ocskay, and Quasdonowich, and had reason to exchange his hopes of victory, for fears of destruction. On the other hand,

so far were the French regiments who were engaged in front, from being intimidated by the appearance of a hostile force in their rear, that without waiting to be reassured by their officers, they cried out of themselves, "so many the more prisoners for us."

Upon leading Massena's division into action, Bonaparte had directed general Brune to remain in reserve at Rivoli with the 75th of the line and a battery of artillery; and sent orders to general Monnier after leaving a party of observation at Garda, to hasten up to Rivoli with the 18th. He despatched, at the same time, an express to general Rey, ordering him to move from Orm up the valley of the Tasso, and come into battle on his left. But the bearer of this last order was intercepted by Lusignan; an accident, which apprized him of Rey's position, and prevented this general from changing it. General Monnier however, with the 18th, forcing the detachment which Lusignan had stationed in the pass of Calcina, reached Rivoli, and formed on the left of the 75th about the time that Lusignan established himself at Monte Pipelo. It thus happened that while the Austrian general supposed he had ensured the destruction of the French army, by placing it between two fires, he himself was actually in that predicament, having Benaparte with a powerful brigade in his front, and general Rey with a fresh regiment in his rear.

The action with Quasdonowich having ceased, Bonaparte gave orders to Massena and Joubert to allow their men a short time for refreshment, and flew back to Rivoli, for the purpose of completing the defeat of Alvinzi, by the destruction of Lusignan's column. Posting and pointing his artillery himself, he cannonaded the Austrians for a quarter of an hour, from fifteen twelve pounders, whose fire they had no means of returning; when perceiving their ranks quivering and shrinking under the shower of balls, he ordered generals Monnier and Brune to form three columns of attack, two in front, and one in reserve, and to dislodge them with the bayonet. The regiments advanced with emulous activity, singing as they closed with the enemy the chant du départ; the charge was fierce and destructive; and after a short conflict but with severe slaughter, the Austrians were forced from the heights. Betreeting upon his detachment ou Mont Brunissi, Lusignan endeavoured again to make battle. But by this time general Rey, who having just joined the army mistook Lusignan's troops for Joubert's division in retreat, had discovered the real state of affairs, and was advancing to attack him in rear, while Bonaparte pressed forward again upon his front. The French moving with their usual impetuosity, Lusignan declined the combat, and laid down his arms. The brigade he left posted near Orza, endeavoured to retreat up the bank of the lake. But in front of Garda it was encountered by the party of the 18th stationed in that village, under the command of captain René, whose address and assurance made his fifty men more imposing than a thousand.

A Belgian officer in command of the Austrian vanguard first approached, and being summoned by René to surrender, in a panic of surprise gave up his sword. The Austrian general with the main body soon after came up, and seeing but a small party of French in his front, called out, "Down with your arms;" to which René promptly returned, "Down with your arms. I have taken your vanguard as your see by these prisoners. Ground your arms instantly, or expect no quarter." The Austrian, confounded at this sudden and awkward turn of the affair, hesitated, stammered, and finally asked for terms. But nothing short of unconditional surrender would satisfy René, who imposed so completely on the disheartened imperialist, that he yielded at discretion,

By this time his troops began to suspect the truth. Some refused to give up their guns, and others getting into boats upon the shore pushed off into the lake; the whole body showing a strong inclination to evade or defy the authority of their commander. Perceiving this, René addressed him aloud—"As an officer Sir, I suppose you know the rules of war, and your duty on this occasion. You are my prisoner, but I return you your sword," (presenting it to him): "I have at my command six thousand men. Now compel your men to surrender, or let us fight it out." This bold challenge, appealing at once to his honour and his prudence, overpowered the imperial officer. Speaking to his men in German, he prevailed on them to complete the surrender, which, when it was too late, he had the mortification to find, had been made to just one thirtieth part of his own numbers (13).

By two o'clock in the afternoon, twelve hours after it commenced, the battle was finished, and Alvinzi retreating in rout and confusion. With two to one in their favor the Austrians had attacked at various points of the semicircular plateau, and had

every where been repulsed by the swiftness and accuracy, with which the French regiments were manœuvred; their dead and wounded strewing the valley of the Tasso, the height of San Merco, and the crest of Monte Pipolo; their guns and carriages, the low grounds of the Adige, and the plateau of Rivoli. was in all quarters of the field and present at each struggle for victory, planning every thing, directing every thing, seeing every thing. Such was the fury of the many conflicts of which the action was composed, and so great his personal exposure, that he was frequently in the midst of the enemy, and had several borses shot under him. But nothing disturbed the coolness of his judgment, or the ardour of his confidence. Upon being told. when in the act of resisting the rush of Quasdonowich with his heavy column, that the corps of Lusignan had got into his rear, he only observed-"Then they are ours."

The destruction of Alvinzi was now to be completed by a general pursuit, and the labours of the day would be finished. But at this very moment a courier from general Guyeux arrived, "breathless with spurring, fiery red with haste," summoning Benaparte on the instant from the charms of victory, to the toils of another march, and the chances of another battle. For Provera had succeeded in passing the lower Adige, and was in full march for Mantua.

Augereau's division, distributed on the right bank, covered the lower Adige; his light corps under general Duphot, being # Porto Legnago, and his headquarters at Ronco. Ever since the 8th, Provera, with the exception of one or two feints, had lain still at Bivalagua. But suddenly advancing on the 13th, and making demonstrations at several points, about midnight he threw a bride across the river at Anghiari, between Porto Legnago and Roscs. General Guyeux, who commanded the nearest brigade, marched instantly to attack him, in the hope of defeating the head of his column, before the passage of the river was accomplished. But the operation was covered by a battery of twenty nine guns, and by clouds of Tyrolian riflemen, posted on the opposite bank; and the effort of Guyeux, although he bore off three hundred prisoners, was unsuccessful. The next day Augereau, with the main body of his division, instead of hastening toward Mantua with a view of intercepting Provera on the Molinella, pushed direct for Anghjari. But Provera had passed the river, and leaving a strong

rearguard to hold possession of the bridge, had taken the route for Mantua. Augereau now committed a second error, for intead of pursuing Provera in the expectation of overtaking him before he could cross the Molinella, he fell with his whole force apon the Austrian rearguard, and after a combat of several nours, burnt the bridge, and demolished the detachment: making two thousand prisoners and taking sixteen guns.

In this affair, the commander of a regiment of hulans, finding himself in front of a single squadron of the 9th French dragoons, called out to the commander, "Surrender." The colonel, Duvivier, answered: "Take me if you dare." The Austrian accepted the challenge, and while the ranks on each side stood still, the two commanders advanced to single combat. They fought with equal spirit, but not with equal address. The Austrian was twice wounded, lost his sword, and was taken. The dragoons then charged, and the hulans like their leader were defeated.

By this time Provera, with nine thousand men and a convoy of provisions, had gained a march, and was in a position to ensure against all the efforts that Augereau could make, the relief of Mantua. But an arm, which it seemed impossible either to elude or resist, suddenly interposed betwixt Wurmser and Provera, and at a single stroke, sealed their common fate.

It was, as has been stated, just after Lusignan's surrender, that Bonaparte heard of Provera's passage of the Adige. He instantly divined the full extent of danger to which the investment of Mantua was exposed, and saw the only infallible mode of averting it. Leaving to Joubert, Rey and Murat, who with two battalions of light infantry had crossed the lake and was under orders to get into the enemy's rear, the comparatively easy task of pursuing Alvinzi; and giving Joubert detailed written instructions for his guidance, he charged himself with the arduous effort of interposing between Provera and Wurmser with Massena's division; which after marching all night and fighting all day, he now directed to follow him, by a forced march of thirty six miles, in quest of a fresh foe and another victory. The boasted labours of the Roman legions and the vaunted prowess of ancient times, lose their importance, when compared with these exertions of modern Frenchmen. It was on this occasion, that Bonaparte said to his troops: "I had rather win battles at the expense of your legs, than of your lives." Insensible to every thing, but the voice of their commander

and the prospect of glory, the regiments obeyed not with submission, but alacrity; and stepping off to the sound of quick and lively airs, the 18th and 75th in front, and the 32nd following rapidly from San Giovanni, they rather flew than marched in the direction of Mantua.

During the day and night of the 14th, Provera pursued his way, and at dawn on the 15th his vanguard, under brigadier general Hohenzollern, came in sight of the suburb of St. George, which being defended only by a simple line of circumvallation, he hoped to take by surprise. In this suburb, general Miollis commanded with fifteen hundred men. Unacquainted with the events of the last two days, he supposed that the French army still held the line of the Adige, and that the Austrians were at a distance beyond The hussars of Hohenzollern were dressed in white clocks, resembling in that respect the 1st French hussars, or the ci-divant regiment of Berchini. An old French sergeant, who had gone out betimes to cut wood, a short distance from the gate of the suburb, observed these hussars approaching, and theught their uniform looked rather too new to belong to the regiment of Berchini. He expressed his suspicion to a drummer who was with him, and who concurred in his remark. In this wcertainty, these brave fellows, determining not to be outwitted, res back to the fortress, and as they closed the gate behind then shouted, "To arms!" The Austrians dashed after them at 1 speed; but it was too late. Instead of being admitted as friends. they were repulsed by rounds of grape shot from the rampers. At midday, Provera, with the main body of his division, arrivel and summoned the place; but Miollis, who was a bold and steady officer, answered that he was put there to fight, not to surrender, and replied to a repetition of the summons, by a fire of reund shot so effectual that Provera, after attempting an assault with 🕍 infantry, found it prudent to draw off toward the citadel; where, during the night, he communicated across the lake with morshal Wurmser. It was concerted between them, that at on early hour of the morning, a sally should be made by the latter, for the purpose of establishing a connection between the garrison and the army of relief, and of raising the siege by a combined attack of

In the course of his night march from Rivoli, Bonaparte met & Castelnovo an express from Serrurier, with intelligence that Pro-

vera had broke through the line of Augereau on the lower Adige, and was advancing to Castellaro, in the direct route for Mantua. He immediately sent his cavalry ahead to Roverbello, and hastening on himself to Villa Franca, ordered general Victor, with Serrurier's reserve, to march instantly on the same point. To Serrurier himself, he sent directions to see that the garrison of St. George was supplied with provisions for at least forty-eight hours; and advising him of his approach, urged him to maintain his lines firmly against any force which might assail them.

The 57th of the line, though belonging to Augereau's division, composed part of the reserve under general Victor. It had recently joined the army, having been stationed through the summer n Provence under the command of general Willot. In comparison with the other regiments, it had therefore a character to establish. From respect for military usage, as well as from a wish to ascertain the condition in which his troops went into action, Bonaparte determined, while the regiments from Rivoli were coming up to Villa Franca, to pass the 57th in review. During the parade, Fugières, the colonel of the 18th, thinking it a fit occasion for the ceremony, presented to the commander in chief the colours which had been taken by his regiment, in the charge on Lusignan at Montepipolo. At the sight of these trophies, the soldiers of the 57th shouted, "Long live general Bonaparte! long live the brave 18th!" "Well said," returned the general, who lost no opportunity of exciting the spirit of his men; "The enemy is before us; behave like the 18th, and present me to-morrow with Austrian colours." These words, which seemed to question as well as to provoke the courage of the troops, silenced their plaudits, and sunk deep into their minds; and they resolved to show on the first occasion, that they could emulate as well as praise the prowess of their com-At midday on the 15th, about twenty hours after he rades (14). left Rivoli, Bonaparte reached Roverbello, with the headmost troops of Massena's division. By five o'clock in the afternoon, the whole corps, with Victor's reserve and the cavalry under general Dugua, which had been withdrawn from the command of Augereau for this occasion, arrived there.

Notwithstanding the celerity of his march and the engrossing magnitude of its object, Bonaparte was far from losing sight of Joubert, whom, on account of his youth and talent, he seems to have regarded more as a pupil than as a lieutenant. Before leav-

ing Roverbello, he wrote to that general the following letter, which, besides describing his own position and that of the enemy, is remarkable, as evincing that in moments of the most energetic excitement, his mind was entirely free from that heat and flarry, which are sure to be generated by the strenuous and continued exertion of intellects less pure and exalted.

"The 18th and 75th are here. The enemy, after passing the Adige, divided his force into two corps. One took the route for Mantua, the other remained at Anghiari to defend the bridge ever the Adige. This was attacked by Guyeux and Augereau, who took two thousand prisoners, several guns and burnt the bridge. The first corps presented itself before St. George at noon to-day. General Miollis replied to a summons by a discharge of artillery. After an obstinate attempt with musketry the enemy failed to carry this essential post, and he is at this moment between St. George and the Mincio, at the village of Valdagno, where he is cadevouring to communicate across the lake with Mantua. I am now causing his position to be examined, and am waiting for the report of reconnaissances I have ordered to be made of the Moinella; after receiving which, I shall endeavour to bring on an action. If general Augereau has pursued towards Castellero, as I suppose he has, the column which escaped him, you perceive that we shall defeat it without difficulty. The 32nd has just reached Villa Franca, which puts it in our power very soon to finish this bloody and violent struggle, that I take to be the most active of the campaign. I shall expect before midnight a short note from you, written at the Corona."

Meanwhile Augereau, after placing a strong garrison at Pere Legnago, formed his division into two columns, and according to orders which had been transmitted to him by express from Castelnovo, on the 15th pursued Provera on both flanks, the brigades of Lannes and Point upon the left toward Castellaro, and these of Guyeux and Bon upon the right toward due Castelli. In the evening of the same day, Bonaparte advanced from Reverbello to the village of St. Antonio, about a mile in front of the ciadel, and at one o'clock on the morning posted general Victor with the 18th, 32nd, 57th, and 75th, between the suburbs of the Faverita and St. George, for the purpose of preventing the junction of the garrison of Mantua, with the army of relief. At the same time he caused Serrurier to collect from his blockading force, after

indred men, in front of the Favorita, in order to be ready to meet furmser, should he venture on a sally and endeavour to break fer his intrenchments in that quarter.

As Provera had failed in carrying the suburb of St. George, hoped to form the proposed connexion with Wurmser by e suburb of the Favorita, which was commanded by the adel, a work which though invested, had never been in posssion of the besiegers. An hour before day on the 16th acrdingly, he attempted to force his way to this suburb. Wurmr, at the same time, with the chief part of his garrison, sallied t from Mantua, and took post at the Favorita to receive him. is was the signal for Bonaparte's attack. Serrurier, with his ual firmness, immediately engaged the marshal, with his batries and musketry, and after a severe conflict forced him to turn into the town, leaving behind him four hundred prisoners. ctor at the same time fell upon Provera with the 18th and 57th front, and the 32nd and 75th in reserve. The pride and fury th which the two leading regiments attacked, were admirable d resistless. As they advanced with rival steps, every thing stantly yielded or instantly fell. The conduct of the 57th which on from Bonaparte himself the surname of the terrible, attested e grave resolve and rapturous valour by which it was impelled. would be no easy task to do justice to this regiment, or to trace e storm-like ravage of its course through the battle. At the st charge it broke Provera's front line, and took three pieces artillery. At the next, it arrested a regiment of Hungarian ussars coming upon it in full career, and compelled the whole rps to dismount and surrender; and then rushing upon the astrian second line, forced it under the guns of St. George. here it took from the Vienna volunteers their embroidered co-At this moment, the 32nd and 75th were advanced into ie; Miollis sallied from his works; Lannes came up with s brigade from Castellaro; and Leclerc with a regiment of cadry was prepared to charge. Provera, finding Wurmser driven to Mantua, his own corps broken and completely surrounded, id down his arms; thus closing the campaign as he had begun

Besides his killed and wounded, he surrendered six thousand fantry, seven hundred horse, twenty guns, a number of caisns, all his colours and baggage, with a large convoy of prosions destined for the supply of Mantua. On the same morn-

ing, a reserve of two thousand men, which he had pend on the Molinella to check the pursuit of Augereau, being attacked and beaten by general Point, surrendered. So that of the whole of Provera's column, the only part that escaped, was the division of Bayalitch which Massena had defeated on the 12th, and which had been left behind the Adige.

Seconded by generals Rey and Murat, Joubert following inplicity the directions of Bonaparte, renewed his operations a day break on the 15th, against the shattered columns of Listy, Koblos, and Ocskay (15). Their only route of retreat by through the narrow defiles which pass by Ferrara, up the rocky face of the Corona, by a passage called "the staircase," so narrow and steep, that a handful of men might hold it age a host. The Austrians, embodied under Alvinzi to the number of ten or twelve thousand, defended their rem as they strucgled along, against the active pursuit of Joubert, and pushed forward in front with the hope of gaining possession of the past up the Corona. But notwithstanding their determined effects, they were anticipated by Murat, who had reached that point from the shore of the lake. Placed thus between two fires, and unch either to advance or retreat, they fell into dreadful confusion. Seven thousand men surrendered on the spot; the rest climbing up the face of the Corona, threw themselves off the precipies, by which that height looks down upon the Adige, into a ravine where numbers perished, and few escaped. Nine pieces of artillery and several colours, fell into the hands of the French. Alvinai unsttended by a single trooper, got off in the confusion. The State and 29th were so forward in this pursuit, and charged so beldy on the enemy's rear, as to redeem the credit they had lost respectively on the plateau of Rivoli and in the defeat of Vanbois.

The wreck of Quasdonowich's column retired up the right bank of the Adige, by way of Rivalta, in complete disorder to the Tyrol, leaving behind many stragglers, who being picked up by the French light troops, swelled the number of prisoners. His cavalry, to ensure a quicker escape, swam the Adige, but their horses were so much exhausted, that many sunk with their riders in the stream, which then was full and is always rapid. On the opposite side, Wukassowich retreated on the main read to Roveredo, and though without disturbance, with precipitate haste-

No sooner was the battle of the Favorita gained, than Bott-

who had been on horseback ever since the night of the announced his victory in a short despatch to the directory, another to Joubert; visited the posts of the besieging army, ad the blockade closely reestablished. Early next morning oceeded to Verona, in order to resume command of the line Adige, and to direct the ulterior movements of his victorious Joubert he reenforced, and ordered to advance imately upon Trent, and to regain the positions on the Lavis. a had been lost by Vaubois. The passes of the mountains now blocked up with snow, and the flight of Alvinzi was co-I by general Laudohn with the warlike riflemen of the Ger-Tyrol. But Joubert, with the French infantry, overcame stacles. He drove Laudohn through Roveredo, expelled from Trent, and after a combat in which he made a thousand ners, forced him over the Lavis. On the right, Augereau ned from the suburbs of Mantua to Porto Legnago, there ed the Adige, passed through Padua, and with little resistfrom the retiring troops of Bayalitch, penetrated to Treviso. e centre, the intrepid regiments of Massena, worn down with ce, were allowed a few days' repose in the vicinity of Ve-Then, conducted by their gallant commander, they forced

passage of the Brenta at Bassano, against the rearguard of litch, and in two subsequent affairs with his division, took we hundred prisoners, and three guns; pushing their light as to the bank of the Piave, and covering all the country ward of that river. Thus the Austrians, after driving Moand Jourdan out of Germany, found themselves completely aded from Italy by Bonaparte, and his posts extended further ever, in the direction of Trieste.

ne general result of the battles of Rivoli and the Favorita, ining the dependant combats, from the action of San Michel on 12th of January, to the closing affairs on the Lavis and the ita, was the destruction of half the physical force of Alvinzi's y, the entire annihilation of its moral strength, and the exion of all hope of relief for the garrison of Mantua. His nuical loss may be estimated in killed, wounded and prisoners, iding among the last the sick found in the hospitals in Trent, irrty-five thousand men. Of these, twenty-seven thousand, iting among them, one lieutenant general, two brigadiers, ity-four colonels, seven majors, fifty-eight captains, and one

hundred and twenty-two lieutenants, were prisoners (25). Twenty-four stands of colours, sixty pieces of artillery, with a vast number of caissons, baggage-waggons, and horses, were taken by the victors. The loss of the French did not exceed two thousand, a fact which accomplished the wish of their cammander, to gain victories at the expense rather of their legs than of their lives.

The prisoners were sent into France under the escort of general Rey with a corps of four thousand men; but on the roste many of them escaped through Switzerland into Germany, there evasion being favoured it was supposed, by the magistrates of the canton bordering on the lake of Lugano.

Bessières, colonel of the guides, who had fought in all the battles of the campaign, and never made a charge without coming off victorious, was deputed to present to the directory the colours taken at Rivoli and the Favorita.

In his official report Bonaparte mentioned with distinguished praise, Berthier, Massena, Joubert, Victor and Duphot, for the two last of whom he solicited and obtained promotion. The behaviour of the 15th regiment at Rivoli, and of the 57th at the Favorita, he warmly applauded; but he gave the highest praise to the 18th 32nd and 75th, whose services he justly said, suppassed the achievements of the Roman legions. "All the regiments have covered themselves with glory, but especially the 32nd, 75th and 18th of the line, commanded by general Massen, who in three days beat the enemy at San Michel, Rivoli, and Reverbello, (the Favorita). The Roman legions we learn, marched twenty four miles a day. Our regiments accomplish thirty, and gain battles in the pauses of their course."

But his eye was too keen in the perception of details, to be confused by the uproar of battle, or dazzled by the blaze of glory. On the 17th, upon arriving at Verona, he wrote to Joubert: "Idd not see the colonel of the 14th of the line, in the battle of Rivoli. It is my intention that the colonels commanding, shall always be with their corps, and that the members of courts martial, whatever be their rank, shall be with their colours in all general actions."

Upon looking at his own conduct it will probably be allowed, that notwithstanding the splendour of his previous triumphs, the power of his genius burned with a radiancy more intense and intolerable, on this, than on any former occcasion. His prospe-

and ability in separating and defeating the Austrians and nians, in the campaign of Montenotte; his boldness and sain passing the Po and the Adige, in that of Lodi; his deand foresight in raising the siege of Mantua, rushing upon lonowich at Brescia, and returning upon Wurmser at Casie; the daring swiftness and consecutive fury of his attacks veredo, Calliano, Lavisio, Primolano, Bassano, and St. e; and his invention, fortitude, and heroism, in the struggles cola, were all admirable, all far excelling the exploits of other modern commander. Yet they appear to sink into dary merit when compared with the celerity, perseverance, ity and precision, of the operations which have just been bed. Before Provera thought he had left Verona, he had nd overthrown Alvinzi at Rivoli; and while Alvinzi supposed as pursuing him along the base of Montebaldo, he had ed Wurmser and captured Provera under the walls of a. The vigour of his attacks, though crashing and irree, was not superior to the accuracy with which they were ed. He joined Joubert just in time by a personal order, event his being enveloped; and he reached the Favorita six miles distant, the very moment it was necessary to ose between the garrison of Mantua and the army of

At Rivoli he saved the victory on his left, by the timely y of the 32nd; gained it on his right, by a seasonable comon of his artillery and cavalry; and completed it in the rear, ading his reserve against Lusignan, before that general either attack or retire; and then, after a forced night and twelve hours fighting, refrained from pursuit, not by n of exhausted energy or slumbering zeal, but that he might take a new enterprise, to which the spirit and resources of ther general of the age, would hardly have proved adequate, fresh troops and at the opening of a campaign. is, and ceaseless, were his exertions; so prompt and exact particular evolution; and so just and extensive the whole ination; that it might almost be imagined the manœuvres of wo armies had been concerted beforehand, and that the h general, instead of inventing movements in the whirlwind proar of contention and danger, was calmly executing a of predetermined evolutions, and filling up a plan, every of which had been agreed upon and studied.

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st of January, and February, 1797.

far with the Pope-Intercepted despatches of cardinal Busca-Bonaparte recalls Cacault from Rome - Assembles a column of troops at Bologna-Leaves Verona for that place, and stops before Mantua-His interview with general Klenau-His generosity to Wurmser-Gratitude of the latter -Surrender of Mantua-Strength of the garrison-Bonaparte vindicates Wurmser's character-Arrives at Bologna-His proclamation and manifesto-General Victor invades the Roman territory-Bonaparte joins him at Imola-Marches to Castel Bolognese-Affair of the Senio-Capture of Faenza-Clemency and prudence of Bonaparte-Converts the inhabitants into friends-Takes Ancona and Loretto-Enters Macerata-Progress of Victor-Consternation of the Pope-Sues for peace-Bonaparte's compassion for the emigrant French priests-Conferences at Tolentino-Terms of the treaty-Bonaparte's culpable weakness in not insisting on the abolition of the inquisition-His moderation compared with the wishes of the directory-His letter to the Pope, sent by his aide de camp Junot-Victor and Lannes visit Rome-Bonaparte devotes himself to the public service-His letter to general Joubert-His remarkable conference with the Neapolitan envoy-Infamy of the latter-The republic of San Marino-Augereau presents the colours of Mantua to the directory-The character of that ceremony-Bonaparte returns to Mantua-Reviews the divisions of Bermadotte and Delmas—Prepares for invading Germany—Repairs and undermines the fortifications of Mantua-The frescos of Titian-Complimentary letters from the directory to the generals-Their invidious neglect of Serrurler -- Their motives -- Bonaparte's portraits of his principal generals.

As soon as the army of observation had cleared the Italian Tyrol, and all the country between the Adige and the Piave, of the remnants of Alvinzi's force; and through the gorges of the

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The number of the Austrians, including Wurmser's force in Mantua, was at least double that of the French. The course and experience of their generals, and the valour and discipline of the troops, were unquestionable. But of what avail were numbers, valour, discipline, and experience, against the divinity of genius? The power of Bonaparte was almost independent of physical means, while that of Alvinzi was chiefly composed of them. The energy of the French general, like the force of lightning, was to be measured only by the extent of its devastation; while the strength of the Austrian, like that of the stubbers oak, was best seen in the fragments of his ruin.

CHAPTER XXI.

The last of January, and February, 1797.

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soon as the army of observation had cleared the Italian, and all the country between the Adige and the Piave, of emnants of Alvinzi's force; and through the gorges of the

Brenta, had established a communication between Massena in the centre and Joubert on the left, Bonaparte prepared with his habitual promptitude, for resuming the suspended expedition against Rome. His desire to terminate this inveterate quarrel, was in no degree diminished by the contents of an intercepted despatch from cardinal Busca, the Roman secretary of state, to cardinal Albani, the special envoy of the Pope at Vienna. It was dated the 7th of January, and on the 10th fell into the hands of a French patrol. Being transmitted to the commander in chief, it convinced him that nothing less impressive than military force, would inspire the papal government with a sincere desire for peace with France; but he was then making ready to receive on the Adige, the second attack of Alvinzi. Thus circumstanced he naturally deferred for the moment, all attention to the affair of Rome.

Cardinal Busca, after assuring the envoy at Vienna, that he was determined to reject or evade all proposals for an accommodation, observed; "It is nevertheless true, that the French have a great desire to make peace with us, of which I have a fresh proof in the enclosed letter from the Nuncio at Florence." In addition, cardinal Albani was informed that the terms of the armistice of Bologna would remain unfulfilled, notwithstanding the demands of the French government; that the Pope would accept the services of the Austrian general Colli, as commander in chief of his army, and hoped he would be accompanied by some officers of engineers and artillery; that instructions were issued for receiving him with distinction upon his landing at Ancona; and that in case the Emperor chose to supend his pay and allowances, during his command of the papal troops, his holiness would willingly furnish them. In aggravation of all this, it was stated in the despatch, that measures for exciting throughout Europe, a religious war against France, were postponed only until the afficece with Austria, which Albani was instructed to press to a condision, was definitively settled (1).

The first thing Bonaparte did, upon turning his mind to this matter, was to despatch a courier to Rome, with instructions to the French minister to quit that capital immediately. Cacault, who had often requested to be recalled, upon receiving this order, announced his intention to obey it in a note to cardinal Basca, who with a readiness and courtesy indicative neither of regret nor alarm, reciprocated his complimentary expressions without making

e slightest effort to detain him. In this the cardinal disappointed e expectations of the French general, who in his letter of the ind of January, directing Cacault to take his departure from ome, had said; "For several months they have heaped insults on you, and used all sorts of pretexts to make you quit Rome. ow, whatever instances they may employ to induce you to stay, sist them, and set off the moment you receive this letter." This rection was strictly obeyed, and Cacault arrived at Bologna on e evening of the 29th (2).

To overawe the cabinet, or reduce the capital of Pius the VI, maparte directed general Victor to assemble at Bologna, a corps mposed of three thousand infantry, six hundred horse, a few ld pieces, and, under the immediate command of General innes, a thousand grenadiers. This force was to be supported the first instance, by the Italian legion, under the orders of neral Lahoz, which was already posted on the frontier of the surch; and subsequently, by a detachment from the garrison of ghorn, which, upon evacuating that seaport, according to the nvention concluded with Manfredini, was to take the route leading the Arno toward Rome. But general Victorwas not to commence stilities, before he was joined by the commander in chief, whose rival he was to wait for at Bologna. Having communicated his inntions in a despatch to the directory, as well as in a separate letter Carnot, Bonaparte set out from Verona before day break on the th, and visiting the works around Mantua in his way, alighted at e headquarters of Serrurier, early in the forenoon (3).

Wurmser, whose numerous garrison had long been a prey to ckness and scarcity, whose expectations of succour had been niformly disappointed, and whose efforts to escape had been conantly repelled, having witnessed the capture of Provera and arned the defeat of Alvinzi, found himself deprived of means of ibsistence and hopes of relief; and compelled, in spite of all his ide and resolution, to look the sad necessity of a surrender in e face. Immediately after the battle of the Favorita, a sumons had been sent into Mantua by order of Bonaparte, the earer of which was accompanied by an Austrian officer, a primer of war, who was instructed to make known to the marshal, he result of the battle of Rivoli. To this communication Wurmer answered proudly, that he was determined to hold out, and ad provisions sufficient for a year. But this answer, suiting

better with the enduring spirit than with the exhausted magnines of the marshal, he was constrained in a very few days to assume a tone less peremptory and repulsive. It happened in consquence, that the very morning Bonaparte arrived from Verens, Wurmser sent out his first aide de camp, general Klenan, with a proposal to surrender the place, on the conditions which had been offered him in October, namely, that he should be allowed to march out with his garrison, all his artillery munitions and haggage, and join the imperial army.

When Klenau entered Serrurier's quarters, Bonaparte was seated in the apartment, and in consequence of the season of the year, the hour of the morning, his recent arrival and immines departure, wore his travelling cloak. Klenau addressed kinsuf to general Serrurier, who being on duty, was of course in uniform, and delivering to him the letter with which he was charged, declared, that although the garrison had ample means for helding out three months longer, yet as Marshal Wurmser thought it doubtful whether the Emperor would be able to relieve him within that period, he had come to the resolution, provided subable terms were allowed him, to surrender the place at case. Serrurier replied, that he would communicate the overture to the commander in chief, and take his orders in relation to it. The conversation continuing between the two generals, the Austria discoursed largely on the means which were yet in possession of Wurmser, and on the quantity of provisions contained in what in called, the magazines of reserve. Bonaparte neither interfered nor made himself known, but drawing his chair to the table ca which lay the letter of Wurmser, he wrote on the margin his decision upon its contents. Then walking up to Klenau, he mid, "If Wurmser had provisions for eighteen or twenty days, and talked of a surrender, he would not deserve honorable terms. But I respect the age, the courage, and the misfortunes of the marshal, and these are the conditions I will grant him, **I** be opens his gates to morrow. If he waits a fortnight, a month, or even two months, he may still have the same terms; he may wait if he chooses, to his last mouthful of bread. I set off this instant to pass the Po, and I march upon Rome. You know my decision; go and report it to your general."

Klenau, though too much surprised to comprehend distinctly the first part of this speech, was not long in finding out with when he had to deal. He read the written decision, and penetrated with gratitude for the generous spirit in which it was conceived and communicated, ceased to dissemble, confessed that the garrison was really reduced to extremities, and declared that the stock of provisions would not last more than three days.

This unexpected liberality; for the terms, it will be seen, were extremely generous; being communicated to Wurmser, relieved his pride and engaged his admiration. He wrote immediately to Bonaparte, inviting him to pass through Mantua on his way across the Po, assuring him that it would give him the advantage of a shorter and better route than the one by Governolo. But as relays of horses had been prepared on the latter, Bonaparte did not avail himself of the obliging proposal. A few days afterwards, Wurmser manifested his good feeling in a manner still more honourable. Having been apprized by his ecclesiastical allies, that an attempt would be made in the Romagna to take off their common enemy by poison, he sent one of his aides de camp all the way to Bologna, to acquaint Bonaparte with the scheme, and gave him such information as enabled him to defeat it.

On the 2nd of February, the capitulation was signed, and the next day, the long defended citadel of Lombardy opened its gates to the republican army. The investment, either by close blockkade or open trenches, had lasted, with two momentary interruptions, more than eight months; during the last balf of which time, the defence had been conducted by a field-marshal of Austria. In maintaining the place, more than twenty five thousand men had perished within or around its walls; in attempting its relief, four powerful armies, averaging at least seventy thousand men, had been destroyed; ninety thousand warriors had suffered captivity. and twenty thousand fallen in battle. To this destruction of the Emperor's military strength, was now added, the surrender of a garrison containing, inclusive of six thousand sick and wounded, twenty one thousand men, with a veteran fieldmarshal and a number of general officers. This was the work of a general, twenty-seven years of age, in his first essay as a commander in chief; and with an army, which slowly and carelessly reenforced, at no time exceeded forty five thousand men; had an extensive chain of fortresses to garrison, a difficult siege to maintain, a long line to defend, to supply itself with pay, provisions and artillery, numerous negotiations to support, and the whole of Italy to control.

The terms granted to Wurmser, while they soothed his mortication and attested his merit, reflected new lustre on his conqueror. The marshal with two hundred dragoons and five hundred other individuals of his garrison, all to be selected by himself, was allowed to march out, subject to no other condition than not to serve against France for the space of three months. He was also permitted to take with him, as heroic emblems of his gallant defence, six pieces of artillery, with the requisite number of men and a proper supply of ammunition. The rest of his troops were to march out with the honours of war, but were to hy down their arms on the glacis, and to remain prisoners until regularly exchanged.

The artillery taken in the place, including that which the French had abandoned upon raising the siege, amounted to ave hundred and thirty eight pieces; and among the trophies of the surrender were no less than sixty colours; so numerous were the regiments which had been introduced or driven into the fortress. These colours, with the honour of presenting them to the directory, were committed to general Augereau, whose services in the campaign, as the reader is aware, had been most brilliant and important.

General Serrurier, who began and terminated the siege, had the honour of presiding at the surrender, of receiving the sword of an Austrian fieldmarshal and generalissimo, and of seeing file out before him and his small beleaguering force, thirty general officers, and fifteen thousand well appointed troops. The six thousand sick and wounded in the hospitals were left to the care of Austrian surgeons. A sentiment of magnanimity which, stissfied with the glory of conquest, disdained the pomp of triumph, and generously turned away from the sight of an aged adversary's pain, induced Bonaparte to absent himself from the scene, and to let the mantle of its distinction fall upon his lieutenant; a loftiness and selfdenial which struck the attention of all Europe.

He mentions in his memoirs, that he was determined to manifest by elemency, his repugnance for the instructions of the government authorising him, to treat Wurmser, who was a native of Alsace, as a French emigrant taken with arms in his hands. His assertion is substantiated by the existence of the instruction in question, and by the following extract from one of his des-

patches. "I have endeavoured to exemplify the generosity of our national character, in my deportment to Wurmser; a general seventy years of age, to whom fortune, in this campaign, has proved extremely cruel; but who never failed to display a constancy and courage, which history will remark. Enveloped on all sides after the battle of Bassano, losing by a single blow part of the Tyrol and his army, he did not despair of being able to take refuge in Mantua, from which he was distant five days' march. He passed the Adige, overthrew our vanguard at Cerea, made his way across the Molinella, and entered Mantua. Shut up in that place, he executed several sallies, which although he was always at their head, were all of them unfortunate. Besides the formidable obstacles which our lines of countervallation, bristling with cannon, presented against him, he could operate only with troops discouraged by numerous defeats, and weakened by the pestilential distempers of Mantua. The majority of mankind, who make it a point always to calumniate misfortune, will not fail to persecute Wurmser" (4).

The nobleness of this conduct to Wurmser, which in delicacy and generosity, has no parallel at least in modern history, the directory could not venture to blame, nor afford to approve; and therefore in their answer to the despatch, a studious silence respecting it is observed. Nor does it appear that the warmth with which Bonaparte vindicated the reputation of a vanquished antagonist, was at any time applauded by his friends, or remembered by his enemies.

On the 30th of January, he reached Bologna, where he found that the court of Rome, instead of being shamed, intimidated, or persuaded, into caution, by the publication of their intercepted despatches, by the peremptory recall of Cacault, or by the tenor of a pacificatory letter which before leaving Verona, he had written to cardinal Mattei, had consummated their alliance with Austria, by placing their troops under the command of general Cost, and were resolved to vindicate by arms the violation of the armistice (5). In an official paper entitled, "Harangue addressed to the brave soldiers, who fight under the standard of the church for the common safety," Pius the VI had made extravagant efforts to excite the fanatical zeal of his people against the French army, saying, "The Lord is in Israel. Joshuas and Gideons will rise up among you; fear nothing; to arms, to arms!" The next morning, Bonaparte issued a countervailing proclama-

remain quiet, and threatening with severe punishment, such as should take part in the contest. This proclamation he supported by a manifesto, reciting the injuries of which the French government complained, and declaring the armistice of Bologna visited by the Pope, and no longer in existence. To enforce these public declarations, general Victor marched on the morning of the fat

of February from Bologna, and passing the frontier in heale array, encamped for the night at Imola, the first town of in-

Before leaving Bologna himself, Bonaparte wrote a letter to the

portance within the papal territory (6).

directory, from which it appears, that the obstinacy and violence of the papal government, both in its measures and language, had effected an alteration in his sentiments; and that he was tempted to depart from that system of moderation, which in relation to this quarrel he had hitherto recommended to the cabinet of the Luxembourg. In his letter of the 1st of February he thus expressed himself. "Should we go as far as Rome, might we not unite the Modenese, the Ferrarese, and the Romagna, into one republic, which would be of sufficient strength? Might we not give Rome to Spain, on condition that she should guarantee this re-

public?" But this disposition to severity disappeared, as soon # he saw the deplorable weakness of his enemy, and the readings

with which the inhabitants could be awakened to a sense of their danger, and of the advantage of conciliating the French army (7). On the 2nd of February, he came up with Victor's column, and established his headquarters in the palace of the bishop Chieramonte, who succeeded to the tiara as Pius the VII. Here he found that by exhortations and emissaries from Rome, the population around his camp, was excited to the wildest rage of hostility. To counteract this phrenzy of the multitude, he had copies of bis proclamation posted on the walls of Imola, and distributed among the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages. On the 3rd, the march was continued to Castel Bolognese, opposite to which, and on the right bank of the Senio, the Papal troops were intrenched in defence of the passage of the river, and behind batteries commanding the bridge. This army of the church, consisted of six or seven thousand men, part regular troops, the rest peasants, mests and fanatics; the whole commanded by a cardinal, who serious proposed to abide a conflict with a general, to whom the box commanders and the chosen troops of Austria, had been repeatedly opposed in vain. As the march had been long and the day was far spent, Bonaparte ordered general Victor to take up a position for the night. While this order was in the course of execution, a herald from the army of the church presented himself, and declared on the part of the commanding cardinal, that if the French ventured to advance a step further, he would fire on them! This menace surprised in one sense at least, the heroes of Arcola and Rivoli. Bonaparte's reply was, that his troops, unwilling to expose themselves to the thunders of his eminence, were only selecting ground upon which to pass the night.

At four o'clock in the morning, Lannes with the vanguard, ascended the left bank of the Senio to a ford, where at day break he crossed over without opposition. He then pushed on, and getting into the enemy's rear, drew up his men on both sides of the road leading to Faenza, Corresponding with this movement, general Lahoz with the Italian legion, throwing out skirmishers to the right and left, opened a fire of cannon and small arms across the river, under cover of which he passed the bridge in close column, followed by Victor with the French infantry and horse. Before this vigorous onset the Papal troops instantly gave way, and being driven back upon Lannes, four or five hundred of them were quickly Among the slain, were several mendicant monks; destroyed. armed for battle with crucifixes. Such of the regular troops as had not fallen, with all the artillery and baggage, were taken, but the cardinal general escaped. The resistance was so slight, notwithstanding the interposition of the river, that Bonaparte's list of killed and wounded, only amounted to forty. After the tremendous conflicts of the campaign, this combat was a mere farce for the French soldiers.

The same afternoon, the column marched on to Faenza, the gates of which city they found closed, and the ramparts crowded with men and armed with cannon. The tocsin was sounded; and the populace excited by the priests to a state of religious fury, provoked the French by insults and defiance, rejecting with disdain a summons to open their gates. A few pieces of artillery being brought up, the gates were soon forced open, and the grenadiers entered the town with fixed bayonets; crying out, "Just as it was at Pavia," and counting on the place, being given up to pillage. "No," said Bonaparte, whose mind remained serene and discri-

notation in the mass of the smooth was Pavin, the inhabitant repeated after maintrant the raths or inmittee and wished to manner our a client, who were their mests. These people are ignoral erwiner, enion we must manner be discourse? (8). With the exception is some it the extreme, which is first were insulted by the suffered the town was seems true the violence which the felty of the trieses that trivialist firms a registrous interpretation of the ave of var. Bentaname, would never been justified in allowing

the main in he senses. But, is he wrote to the directory, "How count I make to my mind to ruman a water city, for the fashed

a care omesta 🦈 🙀 The great room of oresiders used at the combat of the Socie, were indected in the named if a pursual. Under the first access to harm, and the impression when they had received of the foremone lemmer of the French. The unhance captives were in terror for their orest and the way themselves en their knoes as Bottparts appendicated, with multiplier suppliered his mercy. He spoke to them in Fungal, and in their reflect and astonishment, in the knows manner. "I am the irregal of the Italian people. It is for

assure them, that the French are inemis to religion, public order, and the took. The joy and gradinate of the prisoners, were now as uvery, as past before had been their fears. From the garden be directed his steps to the refectory, where the capace officers were assembled. Some of them were forespons, has about him belonged to the best families of Roma With these he conversed for some time, contrasting the advan-

year good, that I have some here. Return to your families and

tages of a free and independent government for Italy, with the weakness and abuses of the Papal cabinet; which trampled on the most sacred precepts of religion, and had the folly to defy an army flushed with conquest, and composed of the most warlike troops in the world. Allowing the officers also, to go home, he furnished them with copies of his proclamation, and required, as the only return they were to make for their liberty, that they should communicate to their countrymen his real sentiments. This was lighting the pope with weapons like his own, though of a better temper; and was the most efficacious mode of extinguishing the blind and fanatical rage, which it had been the business of his Holinss to kindle. The liberated prisoners were of course loud in their praise of the generous conqueror, from whom they had experienced

such unexampled clemency; and retiring to all parts of the parimony of the church, conveyed his pacific proclamation and unicable assurances, to the most polished circles of the capital, and the rudest huts of the Appennines (10).

Next morning, he had the principal priests and leading monks atroduced to his presence. Pointing out to them the danger, as well as the folly, of their conduct, in raising a storm which they and no power to resist or to allay, he exhorted them to abstain rom interference with military affairs, and to attend only to their sacred duties. The superior of the order of the Camaldules, a nan of piety and influence, he sent to Ravenna on a mission of peace, with instructions to engage the people of that town, to refrain from proceedings which might provoke a visit from his army. The prior of the benedictines, he despatched before him on a similar embassy to Cesena, the native place of Pius the VI. These provident and peaceful measures of the French commander. had all the success they deserved. A revolution in public sentiment, extending even to the most enlightened of the priesthood, was quickly produced; and the rage of the populace subsiding as rapidly as it had risen, the French column, instead of being met with demonstrations of enmity and revenge, was received every where with signs of welcome and joy (11). It is delightful to observe the same genius, which had just been smiting with military destruction, the warlike hosts of Austria, now subduing the passions of the enervate Roman people, by the bland impulsions of reason and humanity.

Taking the direct route to Ancona, the army marched from Faenza, through Forli and Cesena, and thence along the Adriatic coast, by Rimini, Pesaro, and Sinigaglia. In passing through Cesena, Bonaparte had a second interview with the superior of the Camaldules, with whose services at Ravenna, he was so well satisfied, that he charged him to repair to Rome and assure the pontiff, whose confidence he was aware the superior enjoyed, that the French general did not aim at his overthrow, that he venerated his person and revered his office, that his holiness might remain at Rome in perfect safety; and that all that was required of him was, to change his ministry, the flagitious hostility of which was betrayed by their intercepted despatches, and send plenipotentiaries to Tolentino, to treat for peace.

In the mean time general Colli had taken up a strong and com-

manding position, in front of Ancona, at the head of three then sand men. But knowing his adversary, and probably not confiing in the steadiness of the papal troops, this general, felialize some plausible motive, retired with his Austrian officers to Leretto, as soon as the French column approached. Bonaparte hel not come up to the front, when general Victor sent a flag of true, requiring this headless fragment of the papal force to surrender: and while the conference, to which this measure led, was preceding, he pushed forward detachments on both flanks, and conpletely surrounded the Romans, who then fortunately suffered themselves to be taken without firing a shot. When Bounnate joined him, Victor was already in possession of Ancora. The same liberal treatment was extended to these prisoners, as we experienced by those taken on the Senio. Furnished with prodemations, breathing a desire for peace, they were dismissed kindy to their respective homes.

Upon entering Ancona, Bollaparte proceeded, with his characteristic energy, to correct the abuses of the local government. That town, fronting the coast of Albania, or ancient Macedonia, was the resort of a number of Jews and Mahometans, engaged in commerce with Italy, who on account of their religion, were subjected by the absurd jealousy of the catholic magistracy, to a variety of inhospitable and degrading exactions. These, the Frank general, caused to be instantly abolished. It was on this occasion of a transient visit to Ancona, that he perceived the immense importance of that port, the only one on the Italian shore of the Adriatic, from Venice at the head of that sea, to Brindini at the foot of the peninsula; and observed the necessity of deepening the harbour and strengthening the fortifications, in order to develop its great natural advantages.

Notwithstanding the presence of the French army, the people of Ancona ran in crowds to one of the churches, and presented themselves at the feet of a madonna, which shed in abundance miraculous tears, at the overthrow it was supposed, of the army of the cross. Upon being informed of this superstitious concourse, Bonaparte sent Monge to examine the prodigious idea. The geometer reported, that the madonna actually did shed tears! Bonaparte then ordered the image to be brought to his quarters, when it was soon discovered that the miracle was an illusion, produced by an artful adjustment and motion of bits of glass. These

wept, it was found, no more. The priest who contrived deception, was arrested as a disturber of public order (12). he town and citadel, the French found ninety nine pieces of llery, a quantity of military stores, and three thousand must, which the Emperor had recently sent, as a warlike present he pope (13).

rom Ancona, the French column, preceded by a vanguard of alry under Marmont, moved on in sight of the Adriatic, a day's ch to Loretto, where in reverence for the Santa Casa, the rings of pilgrims accumulating through a succession of ages, formed an immense treasure. The greater part of this had n removed by orders from Rome, as soon as the fears of inon became serious, but there still remained in articles of gold silver, the value of more than a million of francs; which Boarte appropriated to the service of his army. The virgin herthe godhead of the temple, was found to be a grotesque ge, awkwardly carved in wood. This, with a broken porger, and a tattered piece of camlet, which had the reputation having once composed a part of the virgin's wardrobe, Bonato had carefully packed up by Monge, and sent to Paris, proly in ridicule of an absurd suggestion, which, on his first enace into Italy he had received from the directory, that he ald send a secret expedition across the peninsula, for the pure of bringing off the treasures of Loretto (14).

'urning westward from Loretto, the invading column passed sugh Macerata, crossed the Appennines, and marched on to igno, where the roads from Florence and Ancona to Rome, te, and where a battalion of the 63rd from Leghorn, was to Victor's division.

by this time, intelligence of the defeat of his army on the Senio, of Might of Colli, the taking of Ancona and Loretto, the rapid tance of the invaders, and the change no less rapid, wrought the prudence and clemency of the French general, in the rule of the people, had reached Pius the VI, and affected him this cabinet with surprise and alarm. Upon hearing that the mers of Victor's column were already flying on the Appendant, they exclaimed—"The French do not march, they run." It first thought was turned towards their personal safety, and parations were made for escaping to Naples. The horses

were harnessed to the pope's carriages, when the superior of the order of Camaldules arrived, and throwing himself at his Hoiness' feet, acquainted him with the message of Bonaparte, besought him to remain in his capital, and to terminate the war by the best peace he could make. This advice being seconded by the representations of cardinal Mattei, was without much hesintion adopted. Cardinal Busca, now become the object of general scorn, was superseded by cardinal Doria, a man of prodesce and patriotism; and a commission composed of cardinal Mattei, signor Galeppi, the marquis Massimi, and the duke of Brachi the pope's nephew, was furnished with full powers for the negotiation of peace. Bearing a letter from his Holiness to the French general, these envoys repaired to Tolentino with all convenient speed (15).

Meanwhile the progress of Victor was not interrupted. Having strengthened his column at Foligno, by the detachment from Leghorn, he overran the provinces of Camerino and Umbria, and pushed his vanguard under Lannes within three days' march of Rome itself. As there was no longer any appearance of resistance, Bonaparte remained behind at Macerata, organizing a provisional government for the conquered country, and adopting measures for the sustenance and protection of the emigrant French clergy, whe, in great numbers, fell into his power. Of his conduct to these his unfortunate countrymen, he has left the following interesting account, the accuracy of which is confirmed by his correspondence with the directory, and other contemporary documents (16).

"Several thousand French priests banished from their country, had sought refuge in Italy. As the French army advanced into the peninsula, they had retired in crowds towards Rome. But the army having invaded the states of the church, they found themselves thenceforth, without an asylum. Some of the most timid among them, had passed the Adige in time, and flad into Germany. Naples refused them shelter. The superiors of the different convents in the territory of the pope, who submitted unwillingly to the charge of maintaining them, made the arrival of the army, a pretext for escaping from the expense; and affecting to fear that the presence of the emigrants, would draw upon their convents the resentment of the conqueror, drove these unfortunate exiles from their walls. Napoleon made an order on the subject, and issued a proclamation reassuring the French

priests, and ordaining that the convents, bishops, and different chapters, should receive them, and furnish whatever was necessary to their decent and comfortable subsistence. He enjoined on his troops to behold in these priests, their friends and countrymen, and in this character, to protect and cherish them. The army imbibed these sentiments, and numerous touching scenes were the consequence. Several of the French soldiers, recognized their former pastors; and these unhappy old men, banished hundreds of leagues from their country, received, for the first time, marks of respect and tenderness from their fellow citizens, who, up to that moment, had treated them as enemies and criminals. The report of this measure was echoed through Europe, and especially throughout France. A few censorious persons carped at it, but their cavils were stifled by general approbation, and by that of the directory in particular."

This conquest of Bonaparte over the ferocious spirit of the revolution, and the misdirected temper of his troops, was more glorious, and in the eyes of all good men, more enviable, even than the fame he had acquired by victories in the field. And his influence over the soldiery, when thus consecrated to offices of beneficence and consolation, reflected a mild and redeeming light on the martial virtues by which it was acquired.

From Macerata, the scene of this act of patriotism and compassion, he transferred his headquarters, on the 15th of February, to Tolentino, where the commissioners of the Pope arrived the same evening, and where, next morning, the conferences of peace were opened.

By their despatches of the 3rd and 12th of February, the directory impressed upon him the expediency of destroying altogether the temporal power of the Pope, and while they made no attempt to limit the exercise of his discretion, suggested the advantages of extinguishing, if practicable, the influence of the Pontiff, as the head of the catholic church. In the first of these despatches, they observe,—"You are too much in the habit of reflecting, not to have felt as deeply as we do, that the Roman religion must always be irreconcilably hostile to our republic; first, by reason of its essence, and secondly, because its followers and ministers will never forgive the blows which France has struck, at the fortune and credit of the latter, and the prejudices and habits of the former. There are without doubt, means to

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be employed for abolishing in the interior this influence in sibly. It is for the government to endeavour to find out these means. But there is one point, not less essential probably, for accomplishing this desirable object, and that is, to destroy, it's be possible, the centre of the Roman unity; and it is for you. who have thus far known how to unite the most distinguish qualities of a general with those of an enlightened politicism to realize this object if you judge it practicable." The language of the second despatch, is equally strong, and at the same time equally discretionary; but as it could not have reached Bonparte when his letter of the 15th, from Macerata, was written. this last document can only be regarded as his reply to their despatch of the 3rd. As it recites his reasons for preferring a peace with Rome to a total destruction of the papal power, and recapitulates other of his intentions and proceedings, extracts of it will serve to continue and authenticate the narrative of the expedition.

"You will receive herewith an account of the measures I adopted, for organizing the administration at Ancona, and these which I have taken here, for the organization of this province; as well as the order I have given in favour of the recussit priests. This order is not contrary to the law, while it comperts with our interest and the dictates of sound policy; for these priests are greatly attached to us, and much less fanatical these their Roman brethren. They are accustomed to an existence in which priests do not govern, which is a great advance. They are very miserable; three fourths of them shed tears at the si of a Frenchman. Besides, by driving them away, we should compel them to take refuge in France. As here we do not touch, in the slightest manner, affairs of religion, it is much better that they remain where they are. If you approve this measure, and it is not opposed to the general principles of year policy, I shall derive great advantage from these priests, in the second policy, I shall derive great advantage from these priests, in the second policy, I shall derive great advantage from these priests, in the second policy, I shall derive great advantage from these priests. ducting the affairs of Italy.

"Ancona is an excellent port; twenty-four hours' and from Macedonia, and ten days from Constantinople. It is my intention to collect there as many Jews as I can; and I am putting the fort in the best state of fortification. It will be necessary for us to retain Ancona at a general peace, and that it remain for ever a French port. It will give us great influence over the Or-

Marseilles, and the islands of Corfu and St. Pierre, we ady of the Mediterranean (17). With a garrison of undred men, and an expense of two or three hundred francs, to fortify a neighbouring height, this town will le of sustaining a long siege.

is what I mean to do. I shall grant peace to the Pope se conditions;—that he shall cede absolutely to the rene legation of Bologna, the legation of Ferrara, the legation of Bologna, the legation of Ferrara, the legation of Ancona; he pay us, first, the three millions at which the treasures to are valued; second, the fifteen millions which remainer the armistice; that he surrender to us all his cavalry lery horses; that he dismiss Colli and the rest of the Auand that he deliver up to us all the arms of the new regicated since the armistice. If these conditions are not, I shall go to Rome.

efer an accomodation to marching to Rome; first, because oid a discussion with the king of Naples, which may bey serious; second, because the Pope and all the Roman lying from Rome, I shall never get from them the objects 1; third, because Rome cannot exist after being despoiled lest provinces, and a revolution will come about of itself; he court of Rome, yielding to us all its rights to these s, our property in them cannot be regarded at a general a momentary success, since it will be an affair entirely and lastly, it will render the division we have here at posable for the operations in the Frioul, and will give me fore I am engaged in a new struggle with the Austrians, ude a secret arrangement with the senate of Venice." s the information which this correspondence furnishes ig the campaign against the Pope, it affords an interesting on of the origin and progress of Bonaparte's power. addressing him as a general subject to their orders, and ing rules for his conduct in war policy and negotiation. and done in the months of March, April and May, the s approached him in February as a personage of at least ite authority, susceptible of their advice, but independent control, and entitled to the irresponsible direction of af-Italy. This admitted authority deserves to be remarked,

since it may be said to constitute the first decided step in his advancement to supreme power. And while the ease of his ascent denoted the involuntary nature of the process, the firmness of his attitude was no obscure indication of the immense elevation he was able to attain. It may be doubted whether at any period of his life he ever expressed himself in language more unconstrained and positive than in the passage of this letter refusing to comply with the wishes of the directory, that he should march to Rome and destroy the Papal government.—"I shall grant peace to the Pope on these conditions."—"I prefer an accommodation to marching to Rome."

When the plenipotentiaries met at Tolentino, the discussion was opened by signor Galeppi, who had been previously engaged in the abortive conferences with Salicetti and Garrau, at Florence. A decorous attention was yielded by Bonaparte to the florid and redundant discourse of this envoy; who, as he was obliged to admit, that the Pope was the offending party, could not deny that he was bound to make reparation either by cession of territory. or by an equivalent in contributions. The three legations of Ferrara, Bologna, and the Romagna, the march of Ancona, or as it was otherwise called, the province of Macerata, the dutchy of Urbino, and the district of Perrugia, had already submitted to the republican arms. When Bonaparte proposed contributions, Galeppi protested the poverty of the Roman treasury; but when the cession of the conquered provinces was alternatively insisted en, it appeared that funds to a large amount could be produced. The negotiation being confined to one or the other of these sacrifices. or to a combination of both, it was soon terminated by a treaty, which was signed on the 19th of February.

The Pope obliged himself to renounce all alliances with the powers at war against the French republic, and to close his parts to their military flags. He renounced the ancient claim of the holy See to Avignon, and the county of Venaissin. He ceded the legations of Bologna, Ferrara and the Romagna; and agreed to the occupation of Ancona by a French garrison, until the conclusion of a general peace. In addition, he bound himself to pay thirty millions of francs, instead of the fifteen millions which were due under the armistice of Bologna; to deliver up the masterpieces of the fine arts enumerated therein; to disavow solemely the murder of Basseville, and pay an indemnification of three

idred thousand francs to his family. He further agreed to at liberty all persons imprisoned within his dominions, on act of their political opinions, and to allow the French school arts at Rome to be reestablished on its ancient footing. These ditions being fulfilled, the French troops were to evacuate territory. Thus by preferring an alliance with Austria, and ar with France, to the faithful execution of the conditions of the instice of Bologna, with which Bonaparte would originally have a satisfied, the Pope lost fifteen millions of francs, the Roma, and temporarily, the port of Ancona; exclusive of his claim erritory in France.

fter relating in his memoirs the mode and result of this neation, Bonaparte observes, that he insisted a long time that court of Rome should engage to suppress the inquisition. It represented to him that the inquisition was no longer what nee was, that at present it was rather a tribunal of police than eligious faith; and that the Auto da fe existed no longer. "These uments, he says, he appreciated at their just value; but he isted from the demand in question in order to gratify the Pope, , in his private correspondence, opened his mind on the sub-

. He contented himself with the legations of Bologna and rara, and the Romagna, and the military occupation of Ancona. s was the consequence of his principle to respect the temporal tence of the Pope. If, as the patriots of the Cispadan relic desired, he had enlarged their state by adding to it the chy of Urbino, Ancona, and the province of Macerata, and ended its limits to the province of Tronto and the Appennines, ould have been brought into contact with the kingdom of les. A war with this power would have been the inevitable sequence, even if the governments of France and Naples had n opposed to it."

lis reasons for not gratifying the appetite of the new republic an accession of territory, appear to be perfectly sound; but deference for the personal and atrocious wishes of Pius VI is not be vindicated. The rule which he had prescribed for general abois at Leghorn; "While we support the interests of our own ntry, we ought to be generous and just," should have governed own conduct at Tolentino: and surely it was neither generous even just, when he had it in his power to extirpate an institution ich perverts the religion of God to the most diabolical purposes

of men, to refrain from doing so out of respect for the false representations and fanatical wishes of a doting priest, who, upon asy change of fortune or temper, might have renewed the inquisition in all its horrors. But a respect for the weakness of the varquished, originating in conscious strength and innate generosity, appears to have been a feeling which he could at no period of his life resist.

On this occasion it is probable, his forbearance was the less reluctant in consequence of a despatch from general Joubert informing him that the Archduke Charles had arrived in the Tyrol, and was making active preparations for opening a new campaign.

A letter which he wrote to Joubert on the 17th, while it discovers the anxious vigilance with which his mind reverted to his army on the Adige, is too rich in military instruction to render its length unacceptable.

"You must have been joined by the 11th and 5th regiments. The 25th light infantry ought to be now at Verona. It has orders to follow the 5th, being intended for the same division. I had thought that the headquarters of this division ought to be at Borgo du val Sugana; nevertheless if you think it would be better situated at Lenico or Pergine, you are authorized to give directions accordingly.

"I have received your letter of the 9th. I entreat you to reflect, and to observe more closely the localities. For I cannot conceive, supposing your line on the Lavis forced and your retreet executed during the night, that you should not have an intermediate line as near as possible to your former one, where you would he able to hold out a whole day, put your troops in order, and collect together the scattered men or straggling corps that had not been able to join you in the night. The next night, if necessary, resume your march, and reoccupy the line of Mori and Torbele, holding the enemy in check there several days. Then fall back to the Corona, next to the intrenched camp at Castel Nove; and finally under the walls of Mantua or Verona. To act otherwise would not be making war, the art of which consists wholly, when one operates with an inferior force, in gaining time. To prevent the enemy from attacking Mori and Torbole forthwith, it appeared to me that the best plan was to throw a bridge over the Adig between Roveredo and Trent, and fortify its head. By this means, the enemy could make no attempt against Mori and Torbole, even after having forced general Rey, who ought, at all events to retreat to Torbole.

"I beg you to give me a positive answer to this question: Is there a good line from Torbole to Mori? It ought to rest on the lake and the Adige; and I had directed, first, that the works necessary for this line should be constructed; second, that in the most favourable point a redoubt should be established, and that ditches should be cut across the roads, so as to make this position the same as that of the Chiusa and Rivoli; with this exception, that the enemy not being posted on the bank of the river next to Mori, there is no occasion for the same force to defend this position, as for the defence of Rivoli,

"I desire you to read over again the instructions which I transmitted to you at the moment of your entering Trent, and to make with exactness the preparations they call for; since they form a part of a system of war, for the campaign which we are about to enter upon. I rely entirely on you and the superior officer of engineers, to whom I have given an order to repair to Trent, as to the particular positions to be taken, and for the application of the general ideas contained in my instructions.

"My plan for the defence of the Tyrol is this. The instant you are obliged to evacuate Trent, rally in front of Roveredo, ocsupying with the whole division of general Rey the heights of Mori. After holding out here during the whole day, pass the Adige and post your three divisions between the Adige, Mori, and Torbole, placing only a few pieces of cannon and some small detachnents in the narrowest passes between Mori and Rivoli to prevent the enemy from reaching Alla; and even to construct at this last place a good redoubt, taking care to cut up the roads all around t and to erect a bridge opposite to it, with the head thereof for-Whoever is master of one bank of the Adige and has a bridge over it, is master of both banks. Afterwards, should the occupation of the line of Mori and Torbole become useless, in consequence of events that may take place with the other divisions of he army, then Mantua, Peschiera, or some other place, will afford protection to your corps.

"The line of Rivoli is therefore of no use to me, unless it be as a momentary position to gain a few days' time. It is too remote from the gorges of the Brenta to admit of the corps occupying it, ever to be succoured by a flank movement upon Trent. This.

I should think, will suffice to make you feel the importance of the line of Mori, where nature must be assisted by art. Should any circumstance arise which should cause you to be forced in the line of Mori, sooner than ten days after you had been driven from the Lavis, the campaign would be lost.

"In a few days I shall return to the army, where I feel that my presence is becoming necessary. The troops are within three days' march of Rome. I am in treaty with the priesthood here, and this time again the Pope will save his capital, after ceding to us his finest provinces and his cash, by which means we shall be in condition to perform the great task of the approaching campaign."

Although the sacrifice of territory and treasure, to which the Pope was compelled to submit in the treaty of Tolentine, was, as cardinal Mattei wrote to his government, "extremely severe," it was really moderate when compared with the unsparing intentions of the directory, and the unquestioned power of their general to execute them. Sensible of this fact, and conscious of the forbearance from which it arose, Bonaparte, as soon as the treaty was signed, despatched his aide de camp Junot to Rome, with the following answer to the letter of his holiness, which had been delivered to him by the papal commissioners. "It is my duty to thank your holiness for the obliging expressions, contained in the letter you took the trouble to write to me. The peace between the French republic and your holiness is just signed, and I cangratulate myself on having contributed to your repose. I cutrest your holiness to distrust those individuals at Rome, who are either sold to the courts hostile to France, or are led away by these odious passions which induce the ruin of states. All Europe is aware of the pacific dispositions, and conciliatory virtues of your The French republic will prove to be, I hope, among holiness. the best friends of Rome. I send my aide de camp, who beers the rank of colonel, to express to you the perfect esteem and veneration I entertain for your person; and I beg you to be assured of my desire, to testify on all occasions, my respect and reverence." The language of this letter, so different from that which the French government was in the habit of employing towards the Pope, while it was calculated to cause his mind to dwell rather on what he had saved by the treaty than on what he had lest by the war, was the subject of remark both in the army and st Paris.

Junot was accompanied by the minister Cacault, and followed the course of a few days by generals Victor and Lannes, who nbraced this opportunity of visiting the eternal city. On resumg his functions near the court of Rome, Cacault was received ith marked attention, by the ministers of state and the members the sacred college. The two generals were presented to the ope, and passing through the streets with their escort of cavalry, ere followed by crowds of the citizens, who having been taught regard French soldiers as ruffians, were as much struck with neir courteous deportment, as with their martial appearance (18). But Bonaparte himself, superior to the temptations both of iumph and curiosity, advanced no nearer to Rome than Tontino, devoting his time and attention, as appears from his prrespondence, altogether to the public service.

The court of Naples, though not venturing on open interference, ok so deep an interest in the issue of this expedition, that their avoy the Prince Belmont Pignatelli, attended Bonaparte on his arch from Bologna, and indulged in diplomatic artifices, of which ie general left in his memoirs the following account, which is conrmed by one of his despatches to the directory.

"When Napoleon was on his march through the papal territory, nd threatened Rome, the minister of Naples who followed the eadquarters, showed him confidentially a letter from the Queen. nnouncing that she was about to cause thirty thousand men to parch to cover Rome. "I thank you for this confidence," said ne general, "and I will return it by equal confidence." nen rang for his secretary, and made him bring the bundle of apers endorsed Naples, from which he took a despatch he had ritten to the directory, before the taking of Mantua, and read s follows; 'The embarrassment caused by the approach of Alinzi, would not prevent my sending six thousand Lombards and oles to punish the court of Rome. But as it is evident that the ing of Naples might send forward thirty thousand men, for the lefence of the holy see, I will not march against Rome until after santua is taken, and the reenforcements you promise me, shall ave arrived; so that if the court of Naples should violate the reaty of Paris, I may dispose of twenty five thousand men to take ossession of the capital, and oblige the court to take refuge in An extraordinary courier despatched in the night by the rince Pignatelli, was charged, no doubt, with a communication informing the queen of the manner in which his insinuation had been received." From Bonaparte's despatch it appears, that Pignath by a sort of diplomatic legerdemain, changed his character upon this return of confidence for confidence, "and resuming his official tone, disavowed all that he had himself said in confidence."

Notwithstanding this awkward discomfiture, so unacrapalous and insatiable was the desire of this envoy, to penetrate the secret intentions of the French general, that on several occasions, but particularly at Loretto and during the negotiations at Tolentine, he was surprised in the act of listening at the keyhole of Bemparte's quarters, and was subjected to the disgrace of being driven off by the doorkeepers. The infamy of the minister was not, it may be supposed, an unfair indication of the character of his court.

On his march from Faenza to Ancona, Bonaparte found himself in the neighbourhood of the little state of San Marino, whose territory, embraced within that of the pope, whom it acknowled as a protector but not as a sovereign, was composed of a si mountain, and contained a population of seven thousand sev To the regent of this microscopical republic, the French gas deputed the geometer Monge, with his assurances, as the of the directory, of peace and inviolable friendship; and with an offer of his services, which was thus expressed, "If any part of your frontiers is in dispute, or if any part of the undisputed territory on your borders, be absolutely necessary to your existence, I am charged by the general in chief to request you to inform him of it. It will be with the greatest readiness, that he will exert himself to give you proofs of the sincere friendship of the French republic." The sages of San Marino modestly and pradently declined any accession of territory, as "a gift which might endanger their liberty." They expressed a desire, however, to establish a commercial intercourse with their sister republic, and finally accepted a present of four pieces of artillery, which after the peace of Tolentino, Bonaparte sent them in testimony of his respect (19).

While negotiations for peace were going on at Tolerino, Angereau was conveying to Paris, the trophies of war. His mission was announced by Bonaparte to the directory, in a despatch of the 18th of February. "General Augereau has act off with the sky colours, taken from the garrison of Mantua. In this brave gar-

ral, to whom the republic is indebted for such distinguished services, you will see a citizen, extremely zealous in support of the government and the constitution. I will not repeat to you a detail of his exploits in this campaign. But there was scarcely an affair, in which he and his intrepid division, did not contribute to our victory. I beg that, as soon as his mission is fulfilled, and he shall have profited of the short interval, during which our operations will be less active than usual, to attend to his private affairs, you send him back to the army without the least delay."

The presentation of these colours, which took place on the 1st of March, was attended with circumstances of uncommon pomp and solemnity; as it was justly deemed a celebration, not only of the triumph of the army, but of the conquest of Italy. The minister of war, upon introducing Augereau to the directory, pronounced an address, in which, while full justice was done to the services of this general, the genius and exploits of Bonaparte were duly applauded. But Augereau in his oration, made not the slightest reference to his commanding general, dwelling exclusively on the republican creed and military virtues of the army, which he averred, had gained in eleven months, twenty seven pitched battles and sixty four combats. It happened that Jerome Bonaparte, then in appearance about twelve years old, had been permitted to witness this spectacle. Notwithstanding the great interest which Augereau, who had on one side of him his aged father, and on the other a brother that was also his aide de camp, excited, the boy bearing the name of Bonaparte, was not the least commanding figure in the exhibition. In the Moniteur of next day, the circumstance was thus noticed: "The public was impatient to hear general Augereau. Upon beholding him, the spectators reverted in imagination, to the battles in which he had been distinguished. Beside him were his father, an old soldier, whose face in spite of his gray hairs, seemed still to respire the ardour of battle, and his brother, who as his aide de camp, had shared his toils. Near him also was remarked, with a lively interest, a brother of the general in chief Bonaparte, about twelve years of age, in whose countenance the spectators were studious to trace the features of the conqueror of Italy."

In the expedition against Rome, twelve stands of colours had been taken from the papal troops. These trophies cost little more than a military promenade. With five others, which the Austrians had lost in the last affairs in the Tyrol and on the Brenta, they were sent to Paris, and presented to the government with less than the customary pomp

With the treaty of peace with the pope, terminated this memorable campaign of Italy; which besides the military episodes of Pavia, Leghorn, Bologna, and Tolentino, was divided into in great periods, distinguishable under the celebrated names of Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione, Bassano, Arcola, and Rivoli.

Leaving general Victor in command at Foligno, in order to superintend the execution of the treaty, Bonaparte himself, as soon as he received the pope's ratification, returned by Ancom and Bologna, to Mantua, for the purpose of organizing the remforcements which had recently joined his army, and preparing for the invasion of Germany; a project which it will be remembered he had early conceived, and of which it appears, he had never lost sight.

Upon reaching Mantua, he reviewed the two divisions which, under generals Bernadotte and Delmas, had been detached to his support from the armies on the Rhine. The extreme danger to which the directors had exposed Italy, and the small army the held it, at the period of the battle of Arcola; the murmurs of the troops and the censures of the public, at this error of policy or absence of principle; and the apprehension of the effect which the loss of Lombardy, coming on the back of the failure of the campaign and the taking of Kehl and Huninguen by the archidental Charles on the Rhine, might have on their own position in France, had forced them at last to send important succours to their general in Italy.

Bonaparte found the new regiments, well disciplined and in good condition. The musterrolls exhibited an aggregate of thirty thousand, but the actual strength of the divisions, was only seventeen thousand; so great had been the desertion, particularly from the corps of Delmas, in traversing France and crossing the Alps (20). But even thus diminished, this resoforcement, added to the liberation of Serrurier's division from the siege of Mantua, made Bonaparte deem himself capable of forcing his way across the Julian Alps. Nevertheless, he did not fail to represent to the governement, the wide difference which, as usual, existed between the nominal and actual strength of his reconforments; and in doing so, made an application which shows his

constant solicitude to preserve the discipline of his army, and his uniform repugnance to military plunder. "I intreat you to send to the army citizen Champeaux, formerly colonel of the 10th chasseurs, but appointed by me colonel of the 7th hussars. This corps is violently given to plundering, but Champeaux will reduce it to order."

With respect to Mantua, he gave directions to the chief engineer to have the fortifications repaired and augmented, and at the same time, to prepare mines for blowing them up, in case it should enter into the views of the directory to restore that place to the Emperor. The hospitals were crowded with the Austrian sick and wounded, who, their own provisions being completely exhausted, were subsisted, by his direction, out of the stores of the French army.

A great many paintings by the Italian masters, were found in the various palaces of Mantua. These Bonaparte had carefully packed up, and sent to embellish the capital of France. Above the rest, the beautiful frescos of Titian, representing the wars of the Titans, excited the admiration of the French officers and artists, who had been actors or spectators in the late gigantic conflicts. A commission of the latter presented several projects to Bonaparte, for detaching these masterpieces from the walls, and conveying them to Paris. But he was so fearful they might be destroyed in the attempt, that although they were in an unsafe and perishing condition, he would not suffer it to be made (21).

In communicating to the government, the capitulation of Mantua, Bonaparte made honorable mention of generals Serrurier and Kilmaine, as in previous reports, he had recounted the ample services of Massena and Augereau. Founding their proceeding on these representations, the directory addressed to three of these generals of division, the following complimentary letters, which were published in their official journal of the 18th of February.

"To general Massena."

"The executive directory congratulates you, citizen general, on the fresh successes which you have obtained over the enemies of the republic. The brave division which you command, covered itself with glory in the three successive days which forced Mantua to capitulate; and the government makes it a matter of duty to rank you in its esteem, among the most able and successful generals of the republic."

"To general Kilmaine."

"The surrender of Mantua, citizen general, reminds the encutive directory that you most happily contributed to that event while commanding the blockade. After giving repeated press of courage and talent in the field of battle, you at present find in the command of Lombardy an interesting opportunity to display new, and not less useful abilities; and the directory continues to count on the wisdom and purity of your republican principles."

"To general Augereau."

"You continue to sustain, citizen general, the brilliant reputation, you have acquired. The directory acknowledge that the ability of your manœuvres, during the second attempt of Alvini to relieve Mantua, contributed very much to the success of the republic. New opportunities of signalizing your military talents and republican devotion will be afforded you; this being the most honorable reward for services rendered to the country."

A complimentary letter was also addressed to colonel Duvivin, who retorted the defiance of the colonel of hulans, and overcome him in single combat (22). The marked and injurious silence observed towards Serrurier, who besides gaining the battle of Marked dovi, had commenced and finished the siege of Mantua, doubling arose from the political aversion of the directory for an effect, who with perfect fidelity to the republic, retained notions of subtribution and forms of deportment, which he had acquired under the monarchy. But a just estimate of the qualities of this general, as well as of his comrades, Berthier, Massena, Augereau, Elimina and Joubert, may be found in the character left of them by Bonaparte himself, who knew perfectly their virtues and deficits. These graphical portraits, will form an appropriate concludes to the history of a campaign, in which the originals were so eminently distinguished.

"Berthier was now about forty-two years of age. His father, a geographical engineer, had enjoyed the honour of seeing occasionally Louis the XV. and XVI., in consequence of being charged with sketching the plans of their hunts, on returning from which, they took pleasure in pointing out the errors they had discovered. While young, Berthier made the campaign in America as lieutenant attached to the staff of Rochambean. At the breaking out of the revolution he was colonel, and he commanded the national guard of Versailles, where he showed him-

self violently opposed to the party of Lecointre. Employed as adjutant general in la Vendée, he was there wounded. After the 9th Thermidor, he acted as adjutant general to Kellermann, in the army of the Alps, and followed that general when he passed to the command of the army of Italy. He it was who caused that army to take up the line of the Borghetto, which arrested the progress of the enemy. When Kellermann returned to the army of the Alps, he carried Berthier with him. But when Napoleon took command of the army of Italy, Berthier applied for and obtained the place of chief of his staff. In this capacity, he followed him in the campaigns of Italy and Egypt. Subsequently, he became minister of war, major general of the grand army, and prince of Neufchatel and Wagram. He married a princess of Bavaria, and was loaded with favours by Napoleon. He possessed great activity; he attended his general in all his reconnaissances and excursions, without intermitting in the least, his labours in the cabinet. He wanted decision of character. was not qualified for a command in chief, but had an excellent capacity for the place of adjutant general. He was familiar with maps, understood well the duty of reconnoitring, attended personally to the despatch of orders, and was accustomed to exhibit with clearness the most complicated movements of an army. first it was endeavoured to make him the instrument of detracting from his chief, by describing him as his Mentor, and giving out that the adjutant general directed the operations. efforts did not succeed. Berthier did all he could to hush them up, as they exposed him to the ridicule of the army. After the campaign of Italy, he had command of the army which went to take possession of Rome, and he proclaimed the Roman republic in that city."

"Massena was a native of Nice. He entered the French service in the royal Italian regiment. At the moment of the revolution, he was an officer, and by a rapid promotion became general of division. In the army of Italy, he served under the commanders in chief, Dugommier, Dumerbion, Kellermann, and Scherer. He was of a robust frame, indefatigable, night and day on horseback among the rocks and in the mountains. In mountain warfare he was particularly expert. He was of a decided character and of intrepid courage, full of ambition and self-love. His distinctive characteristic was obstinacy; he was never dis-

couraged. But he neglected discipline, was inattentive to the administrative service, and was therefore not beloved by his troops. His dispositions for attack were not made with skill, his conversation was void of interest. But at the first sound of the cannon, in showers of bullets and the midst of danger, his intellect acquired its proper force and clearness. Was he beated, he renewed the battle with the air of a conqueror. At the conclusion of the war in Italy, he was charged with the daty of bearing to the directory the preliminaries of Leoben. During the campaign of Egypt, he commanded the army of Helvetia, and saved the republic by his victory of Zurich. Afterwards, he was created marshal, duke of Rivoli, and prince of Essling" (23).

"Augereau, a native of the faubourg St. Marceau, was a sergeant at the beginning of the revolution. He must have been a remarkable noncommissioned officer, since he was selected to go to Naples, and instruct the Neapolitan troops. He served in in la Vendée. He was made general in the army of the casters Pyrennees, where he commanded one of the principal divisions. At the peace with Spain, he conducted his division to the any of Italy, and there made all the campaigns under Napoleon, who on the occasion of the 18th Fructidor, sent him to Paris. that, the Directory gave him the command in chief of the army of the Rhine. He was incapable of such a charge, had no knowledge, was of a contracted mind, and had but an imperfect education; but he maintained order and discipline, and enjoyed the respect of his soldiers. His attacks were regular and in good order, his columns were judiciously divided, his reserves wall posted, and he fought with intrepidity. But all this lasted but a single day. Whether victorious or vanquished, he was generally discouraged in the evening, either from a peculiarity of constitution, or in consequence of defective judgment and penetration. In political principle, he was attached to the party of Babouf, or the wildest anarchists; by a number of whom he was surrounded. In 1798, he was elected to the legislature, mingled in the intrigues of the manege, and often made himself ridiculous. For the members of this party were not ignorant, while no one was less qualified than Augereau for political debates and civil affairs, although liked to take part in them. Under the Empire, he became date of Castiglione and marshal of France" (24).

"Serrurier was born in the department of the Aisne, and was major of infantry at the commencement of the revolution. He preserved all the rigid forms of that rank and period. He was severe in his discipline, and passed for an aristocrat; circumstances which exposed him to many dangers in the camp, especially in the first years of the revolution. He gained the battle of Mondovi, and took Mantua; and he had the honour of seeing marshal Wurmser file out of that place before him. Personally, he was braye to intrepidity, but as a general, he was not fortunate. He had less enthusiasm than Massena or Augereau, but he surpassed them both in the morality of his character, the wisdom of his opinions, and the safety of his intercourse. He had the honourable mission of conveying to the directory, the colours taken from the archduke Charles. He became afterwards marshal of France, governor of the Invalids, and senator."

"Kilmaine, of Irish descent, was an excellent cavalry officer. He possessed coolness and coup d'ail, and was well suited to command on parties of observation, and all such delicate commissions as required discernment, sagacity, and presence of mind. In the insurrection of Prairial, he was employed against the faubourg St. Antoine. In the campaign of Italy, he was about fifty years old. He rendered important services to the army, of which, but for the feebleness of his health, he would have been one of the principal generals. He was well acquainted with the Austrian troops, and so familiar with their tactics, that he would never allow himself to be imposed on by the false reports, which they are in the habit of circulating in the rear of an army, nor by the heads of columns which they show in all directions, on the communications of their enemy, in order to create a belief in the presence of large forces at points where there are none. His political opinions were very moderate."

"Joubert, a native of the department of the Ain, had studied for the bar; the revolution made him adopt the profession of arms. He served in the army of Italy, and was there made brigadier and general of division. He was tall, slender, and seemed naturally of a feeble constitution. But he had strengthened it in the toil of camps, and in mountain warfare. He was intrepid, vigilant, and active. In November 1796, he was appointed general of division, to supersede Vaubois. He commanded the corps of the Tyrol. It will be seen that he distin-

APPENDIX.

CHAPTER I.

PAGE 1.

(1) From the manner in which sir Walter Scott records this cardinal event in his story, one might infer that his hero was a foundling—for instead of establishing the date of his birth by positive affirmation or undeniable proof, he settles it by a vague circumstantial conjecture (v. iii, p. 6). "The subject of our narrative was born, according to the best accounts and his own belief, in the town of Ajaccio, upon the 15th day of August, 1769." This hesitating, circuitous language, which might be proper to remove doubts concerning a remote or uncertain event, is evidently calculated to inspire them, when applied to a fact of recent occurrence, signal notoriety, and infinite attestation. Yet he had before him not only the Memorial of Las Cases, and the memoirs of Antomarchi, but Benson's sketches of Corsica, in which (p. 3) the record of Napoleon's baptism, stating that he was born on the 15th of August 1769, is given for the declared purpose of removing all doubt.

PAGE 2.

(2) For this lineage of the Bonaparte family, see le Mémorial de St. Hélène (t. i, p. 142 et sequente); Memoires de la Duchesse d'Abrantes (t. i, ch. 3); La Famille Bonaparte, par M. Foissy, Avocat; and Zoph's summary of universal history.

After the first publication of this part of this, work, I received a letter from the count Survilliers, in which he denies that his family is descended from the Christian Emperors of Constantineple. As he was acknowledged by Napoleon himself to be the genealogist of the family, his statement may be taken as conclusive.

(3) "Interea ad templum non æquæ Palladis ihanit"...
Crinibus Iliades passis, peplumque ferebant
Suppliciter tristes."

VIRGIL. Æn. 1, 484.

4) This account of the birth of her son, was communicated to me, by the mother of Napoleon herself, at Rome, long before the preparation of this work was thought of. She expressly contradicted the story about the appropriate of the apartment being ornamented with designs from the Iliad.

PAGE 4

- 5. Madame Mere. In the interview with which I was honoured by this venerable lady in the autumn of 1830, she conversed much about the hirthred infancy of her great son; whose full length portrait in his imperial robes, we at the head of the bed on which she was reclining. The portrait of her heband, representing a very handsome man, was on the right of her bed. Among other particulars she mentioned the extreme fondness and indulgence of Napoleon's father; who often saved his favourite from her correction, and controlled him frequently by threatening to tell her of his disobedience, saying, "Very well, sir, I shall tell your mother, and she will teach you to behave better." She added, as well as I can remember her remark: "This threat usually checked Napoleon; but sometimes I had to switch him well."
- (6) This fact mentioned to me by Madame Mère, is repeated on her authority in Montbel's notice of the Life of the due de Reichstadt (p. 357).

PAGE 7.

- (7) Bourrienne (t. i, p. 35), an author, whose spirit of detraction and ingratitude makes his testimony unexceptionable, when favourable to his benefactor.
- (8' From a fear of multiplying notes unnecessarily, I beg to observe, the account given in the text of Napoleon's disposition, conduct, and standing, while at the military schools, is taken from his own consistent statement to Las Cases. O'Meara, and Antomarchi, the authenticated notes and sayings of the professors, and the admissions of Bourrienne, and sir Walter Scott himself. This last author, however, at the expense of his consistency, takes case to represent Napoleon's reserve, superinduced by circumstances, as the effect of a character naturally cold and unsocial—omitting those causes of pale to his sensibility and offense to his pride, which, for a season, "chilled the genial current of his soul."

PAGE 10.

(9) Bourrienne (vol. i, p. 40) denies this anecdote, and attempts to discretic it by saying it is dated in 1783, and that Napoleon was then at Brienst, "where certainly he never was in company, especially in the company of ladies." Yet at page 37, he states that, in the year 1783, the dake of Orient and Madame Montesson came to Brienne—that for more than a month is magnificent château of the count de Brienne was "a little Versailles;" this

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brilliant fêtes were given in honour of the visit of the prince and Madame Montesson, who, together presided at the examination of the pupils of the royal school—that Napoleon divided with Bourienne himself the mathematical prizes, and that Madame de Montesson complimented Bourrienne's mother on the frequency of her son's academical triumphs.

Now here was a company of ladies to which Napoleon was admitted. The observation was doubtless made on this occasion, and probably by the countess de Brienne, of who m Napoleon was a favourite, not the less for having been recommended to her, as the reader will recollect, by a dignitary of the church and minister of the crown.

The count de Las Cases also discredits this anecdote (though not on the emperor's authority) and for the same reason which Bourrienne advances; that is, that while at Brienne Napoleon could not have been in the company of ladies. Yet the count repeats this conversation of Napoleon (t. vii, "He talked while in bed of his early years at Brienne; of the pp. 127-8). duke of Orleans, of Madame de Montesson, whom he remembered to have seen there; of the family of Nogent, of that of de Brienne, who were connected with the details of his boyhood, etc." The reasons for denying it being thus ascertained to be unfounded, the anecdote which does not appear to have been the offspring of a malicious purpose, becomes from its existence highly probable, the more so as it is consistant with the energy of Napoleon's character, the vigour of his judgment, the vivacity of his expressions, and his well known admiration of Turenne, as a commander, a sentiment which at filteen must have been warmly associated with his professional pride. In his letter to the deputy Buttafoco, one of his first productions, he goes out of his way to speak of Turenne as the greatest of captains, so strong and insuppressible was the admiration he felt for him; and among the last of his dictations at St. Helena is a careful analysis of Turenne's campaigns.

(10) With respect to the date of his examination, and consequently the age of Napoleon at the time he left Brienne, an error which seems to have prevailed, is corrected in the text. Las Cases, on his authority says (t. i, p. 174) the examination took place in 1783—and that he was designated by the Chevalier de Keralio for the school of Paris, "although perhaps he was not of the requisite age." Now the customery age was 15—and it is certain that he could only have been 14 in 1783. So that it is probable Napoleon made a mistake of one year in referring by memory in 1815, to this remote event. This inference is strengthened by two documents quoted at length by Bourrienne; one, the report of M. de Keralio to the king on the result of Napoleon's examination, which is dated in 1784 (v. i, p. 28) the other, the register of the principal of the school of Brienne, stating that Napoleon was born the 15th of August, 1769—" entered the school of Brienne the 28d of April, 1779, and left it the 14th of October, 1784."

Again, as the examination was annual, and as the chevalier de Keralio rejected the proposal of the professors to detain him another year at Brienne;



it's examination could not have been a year emilier than his departme famile school. It would appear therefore, that he was examined a little below is was fifteen, and that he entered the school of Puris shortly after the enmeatement of his sixteenth year wir, in October, 1734.

Since writing the above I have conversed with the count d'Hobardh, who was himself an elève of the military school of Paris, as well are counts of Napoleon in the regiment of Grenchle. The count confirms this correction of the date, by the assertion that he left the school of Paris in 538, and that Napoleon entered it at the time he, the count, quitted it.

PAGE 11.

11 Stimulated by the enthusiasm of military genius to take part in the war in which Great Britain was then engaged, he had pressed so cannot to enter into the navy, that, at the age of fifteen, a midshipman's warms was obtained for him. The interference of a timid and affectionate mather deferred the commencement and changed the direction of his military cares." Marshal's Life of Washington, 2nd ed.; v. i, p. 2.

PAGE 13.

12 The 24th February, 1785.

Page 14.

13 It appears that he was examined in August, and commissioned in fortember. It may be proper to mention that the story imputing to Napoleon, while a military student, the quixotic absurdity of attacking a believe of Blanchard, the aeronaut, with his sword, was false as to Napoleon, but the as to one of his comrades. Dupont de Chamhon.—See Vie Politique et Bitaire de Napoleon, par Arnault [p. 3]. This statement about Dupont is entirmed to me by the recollection of the count de Las Cases.

CHAPTER II.

PAGE 19.

1 The author of Waverley, to give a mean and sordid colouring to the early life of his hero, speaking of his residence at Auxonne, says, (v. II. p. 368), "M. Joly found the future emperor in a maked harrack room." "His brother. Louis, whom he was teaching mathematics, lay on a wretise mattress in an adjoining closet." In answer to which, Louis Bonapier observes (Réponse, p. 28): "This passage contains almost as many falchous as lines. I recollect very well that, on my account, a larger and mat

amodious apartment was assigned to my brother than to the other officers of rank. The furniture could not be either better or worse than that of his grades, because they were all in barracks, and of course lodged and nished by the state. I remember that I had a very good chamber and an ellent bed. My brother directed my studies, but I had proper masters, n in literature."

With respect to the accident of Napoleon being nearly drowned while hing in the Saône at Auxonne, there is a difference, in regard to some ht particulars, between the relation of it in the text and the recital of the nt de Las Cases (t. iii, p. 433). But inasmuch as the count's journal seized by the governor of St. Helena, before he had written out his notes arious conversations, I have adopted the account of the same incident nd in the journal of O'Meara (v. ii, p. 227) and confirmed by the re-ection of Louis Bonaparte (Réponse p. 127). It happens to be in more ided contradiction to the story on the same subject introduced by sir liter Scott (v. iii, p. 18), who with dramatic dexterity, transposes the ident to the city of Lyons and the river Rhone.

" Modo me Thebis, modo ponit Athenis."

PAGE 20.

2) For this anecdote I am indebted to count d'Hedouville. In the Méres of Napoleon (Montholon t. ii, p. 207) it is said that he was made captain 789. This is an erroreither of himself or his amanuensis, as the army list reperiod shows that in 1789 he was a lieutenant. Count d'Hedouville says oined the regiment of Grenoble as lieutenant. Las Cases (t. i, p. 224) is his promotion to a captaincy in February, 1792, as does Norvins (t. i, 12).

PAGE 23.

- 3) This interesting anecdote, which shows the unbounded confidence ch the young Napoleon inspired in his own family, sir Walter Scott distrds. Louis Bonaparte in his reply to sir Walter (p. 9) in alluding to the ndancy of Napoleon in his family says, "I feel myself obliged to declare e, as the brother of the emperor Napoleon, that it was in his own family he began to exhibit that great superiority; not after glory and power elevated him, but in his early youth."
- i) This fact is stated in a memorial addressed by Charles Bonaparte to shal Segur, minister of war, applying for a place for a younger son, in of the royal military schools. The memorial is recited in Bourrienne, p. 20).

PAGE 27.

i) The conduct of Paoli in the French revolution cannot be justified.
 π resisting the forced incorporation of Corsica with France, be had a

perfect right to acquiesce in it as Charles Inches he himself for a time did. But he had an right, older accepting the most held out by the law of the national assembly and a second of the French government, an appointment of high tract and house has nounce his allegiance to France, and in financial the possible, by delice. ing up the province committed to his superintendence, to a nired and belle nation. Be had sanctioned the ameration of Corsica with France, is demost solemn and binding manner; and if he was justifiable in transfering Corsica to England, the authorities of any solar presence of France, was lave been blameless, bad they committed the same act. Yet more factor treasen than they would have committed, can hartly be tonceived. From respect for Paoli's general character, his conduct has been treated with a collecte even by French authors, and in that spirit, is nestired in the int. sir Walter Scott extols it as nobly contrasted with the conduct of that pation of the Corsicans, who continued faithful to their allegiance, and cally appears to esteem perjury and treason in favour of England, the first oil highest duties of a French citizen.

PAGE 30.

- 'S "The great and well-carned influence possessed by Paoli over his countrymen became the ground of jealousies." "Towards the end of the year 1795, Paoli was informed that it was his Majesty's pleasure that he should immediately leave the island, and go to England. He did so, and arrived in London towards the end of December."—(Benson's Statches, p. 215). So that Paoli was banished by the English government, after having banished his friends for their advantage; a retribution at more attraction and just.
- (7) Paodi died in England, on the 5th of February, 1807, of course, after the compaigns of Italy, Egypt, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, the close of the committee, and the commencement of the empire. His manifestations a melanocholy delight at the prodigies of his filial friend were not approved, it has been said, by the British government.—(Vide Antomurchi, t. i. p. 197-

PAGE 33.

(8) It has been alleged that Napoleon proposed, after the wolding of his brother, marrying mademoiselle Desirée Clary, but that her father releved his councut saying that "one Benaparte was enough in the same family. This is doubtless an overation subsequent, for at St. Helena, Napoleon demail ever having thought of this marriage (Las Cases, t. i, pp. 181, 2). Haling resources this story, and imputes to this attachment, his favour to Bernaddie, which proceeded, no doubt, from the well known arts of Bernaddie nourties and intriguer, from his connection with Napoleon's family, of from the interest of Joseph, the link of that connection. The vanity what

uld persuade a lady to imagine that she had once captivated the great aqueror, cannot provoke censure nor excite surprise.

After the first publication of this note, a gentleman of great and deserved erary celebrity in England, suggested to me that Hazlitt's statement was rrect, and mine erroneous, and referred to a passage in the London edition Montholon's memoirs of Napoleon, in support of his assertion. Upon dowing his reference I discovered, not only that it was accurate, and fully stifled the statement of Hazlitt, but that it was perfectly different from the ct of the Paris edition (See London edition t, i, p. 212. and Paris edition i, p. 242). The last, which supports the narrative in the text, is confirmed the impressions of count de Las Cases as well as by a letter I received on the Count Survilliers.

In reference to the disdainful expressions attributed to M. Clary, the count rvilliers thus consigns the story to disbelief and contempt. "M. Clary, the her of my wife, never could have uttered the ridiculous expressions atbuted to him by libellists. He died several years before my marriage, and never knew him."

CHAPTER III.

Page 35.

(1) The documents, explanatory of the means by which Lord Hood got seession of Toulon, may be found in the Annual Register for 1793, State pers, pages 171, 72, 73 and 99.

PAGE 36.

- (2) In the Annual Register for 1793 (History of Europe, p. 284), the ied force is estimated at 12,000 men "bearing firelocks." This excludes cannoneers who must have been employed in great numbers. Thiers 6, p. 49) rates the land troops of the allies at 14 or 15,000. These anionist accounts appear to confirm the computation of the emperor: viz.— 100 Spaniards, 4,000 Neapolitans, 3,000 English, and 2,000 Sardinans—all, 14,000. See Mémoires de Napoléon, Montholon (t. 3, p. 8).
- (3) Norvins says (t. 1, p. 32), that these ships conveyed 5,000 seamen of ittany, and that their presence at Toulon was feared by lord Hood. The mual Register for 1793 mentions that the ships were sent round to Brest, with the hope of effecting a similar revolt in that quarter."—History of trope, p. 284.

PAGE 37.

(4) Various dates have been assigned for this promotion. Las Cases (t. 1, 221) makes it the 19th October, 1793. But in the same volume (p. 194.),

ready a chief of battalion. In Montholon (t. 3, p. 11) Napoleon states that he was chief of battalion before he was appointed for the siege of Toulon. The same statement he repeated to Gourgaud (t. 1, p. 11) which is adopted or confirmed by Norvins (t. 1, p. 33). Scott, with his usual indifference to facts, and contempt of accuracy, asserts (v. 3, p. 30) that on occasion of Napoleon's being ordered to Toulon, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Yet, at page 44, after calling him "the young general of artillery," he declares that, in conformity with the recommendation of Dugommier, upon the conclusion of the siege, "he was confirmed in his provisional situation of chief of battalion, and appointed to hold that rank in the army of Italy." This is rewarding by injury, and promoting by degradation. Hazlitt on this point is vague and defective.

PAGE 41.

(5) See letter to general Kleber of the 21st of August, 1798 (Correspondence inédite de Napoléon, Egypte, t. 1, p. 326). In his reply of the 28th, Kleber, says, "I was aware of your defence of Toulon. It would have been a brilliant example for me." (t. 2. p. 29.)

PAGE 43.

(6) Sir Walter Scott says, this party consisted but of three thousand men (v. 3, p. 37). Norvins (t. 1, p. 40) raises the number to seven thousand. Napoleon, in the dictation to Montholon and Gourgaud, makes it from at to seven thousand (t. 1, p. 16, and t. 3, p. 29), an estimate the lower number of which is adopted by Hazlitt (v. 1, p. 359), and by Thiers (t. vi, p. 55), authorities which I have followed. The military career of general O'Bara would not have been more distinguished than his talents, but for the remarkable fact of his having surrendered to Washington and to Napoleon. The anecdote respecting his sullen dignity in misfortune, is related by Repoleon himself in a letter to Kleber, of the 10th September, 1798.

PAGE 45.

,7) In this picturesque language Napoleon himself describes the general under whom he gained his first laurels. Yet, sir Walter Scott, after denouncing the bad taste and worse French of Napoleon, retails it without exercise and without acknowledgment, as his own (v. iii, p. 34), although by so doing he deflowers the compliment to Dugommier's memory of all is grace and spirit.

PAGE 47.

(8) This fact rests on the assertion of Napoleon at St.-Helena (Les Cart. 1. i. p. 206), evidence, which if it were not convincing, the invidious sep-

pression of his name by these deputies in their despatches, would confirm.

They were unjust to him because he would not be ungenerous to Dugommier.

PAGE 53.

(9) That this was the course of public feeling, no one who considers the enormity of the crime committed by the Toulonese, and the advantage taken of it by the English admiral, can doubt, especially after examining the terms of his proclamations, referred to in a former note; his attempt confessed in the Annual Register, to seduce from their allegiance the people of Brest and Rochefort; and the declaration of the king of Great Britain of the 19th of October 1793, encouraging other towns of France to follow the example of Toulon.

CHAPTER IV.

PAGE 60.

- (1) This analysis of the plan is derived chiefly from the narrative of Napoleon himself (Montholon, t. iii, chap. II). A reference to the Annual Register for the year 1794, as well as the sketch of Thiers, has been found useful.
- (2) The most remarkable and successful exhibition of talent, in this sort of warfare, of which military annals preserve the record, was furnished by Cæsar, in his campaign against Afranius and Petreius, the lieutenants of Pompey, in the mountains of Catalonia. Without fighting, he compelled these resolute and experienced generals, by skilful choice of ground alone, to surrender at discretion an army equal in numbers to his own, which besides a large body of auxiliaries, contained five Roman legions; this before the battle of Pharsalia, and while Pompey was in the pride of his strength. The great Condé deemed this exploit such a master-piece of military skill, that he visited and studied the ground. Cæsar de Bello civili, lib. i, chap. 68, 71, 84.—Bossuet, (Oraison funèbre de Louis de Bourbon).
- (3) For these two facts, besides the Annuals of the period, see Thiers (t. vi, p. 289).

PAGE 61.

(4) Mémoires de Napoléon-Montholou, t. iii, p. 68-confirmed by the Annual Register for 1794-chap. 4, History of Europe.

PAGE 63.

(5) It would be difficult, were it required, to determine, whether from carelessness the French, or prejudice the English, biographers of Napoleon,

ful operations of their hero, in this his novitiate as a general officer. There operations evince a higher degree of military talent, than can be discovered in the entire career of Bernadotte, Joubert, or even Moreau; or of any Enlish general from the death of Marlborough to the appearance of Wellingto. They are introductory, too, to a brilliant series of Napoleon's subsequenterploits, and their importance unquestionably contributed to saye him fun the axe of the revolution. Yet Norvins 't. i, p. 49) assures his realer that Massena took Oniclie, traversed the territory of Genoa, beat the Autrians at Ponte-di-Nave, and made himself master of Ormea and Garesia Whereas it appears Massena did not cross the Taggia, or go near the letritory of Genoa, but wheeled to his left in the neighbourhood of Vingtimia, and penetrated into the rear of the Sardinian camp at Saorgio. Novin, who professes see his preface' to have studied the actions and meditated the biography of Napoleon for many years, merely gives him credit for the plan of this campaign, and from the moment of its adoption, makes him a cyphe. Respect for the superiority of Massena's rank could not justify this depression of Napoleon, for on that principle general Dumerbion should have been the officer commemorated; as he was in fact at the time the event test place (See Annual Register 1794, History of Europe. chap. iv). When we reflect that the great captain himself, in his last days, recollected these sarly efforts of his martial genius, with interest enough to dictate a clear though brief account of them, in his Memoirs of the war of Italy (Montholon, L E, chap. 2) it would appear that his countryman and admirer could scarcely think them unworthy of recital, without regarding them as fabulous. Ys had this been his opinion, respect for his readers demanded its avowal. So that in reference to this part of Napoleon's life, there is in the work of Nervins, an unjustifiable omission. It is true that Jomini in his account of these operations t. v, chap. 33, mentions Napoleon only as the adviser of the measure, contining his details to the officers commanding regularly the 4vision, its columns, brigades, etc. But he was writing a general history, not the life of Napoleon, and prepared his work before the Memoirs of Napoleon appeared.

have given the more defective accounts of these active, daring, and secon-

Isazlitt, whose book is written with more impartiality than judgment. furnishes but a meagre account of these important successes of the column conducted by Napoleon; adopting the slight allusion to them, which concludes a chapter on a different subject, in the dictation to Gourgand (t. i,—chapter on the siege of Toulon) in preference to the connected narrative found in Montholon. Yet both these authors describe the plan clearly as Napoleon's, and as being bold, ingenious, and original. But sir Walter Scott (v. 3, p. 46) completes his account of this successful series of marches and actions which threw the court of Turin into such alarm, that a levy of masse of the inhabitants of Piedmont was ordered, in two sentences and see short note. "Bonaparte had influence enough to recommend with second

to the general, Dumerbion, and the representatives of the people, Ricord and Robespierre, a plan for driving the enemy out of this position, forcing them to retreat beyond the Higher Alps, and taking Saorgio; all which measures succeeded as he predicted. Saorgio surrendered, with much stores and baggage, and the French army obtained possession of the Higher Alps, which being tenable by defending few and difficult passes, placed a great part of the army of Italy, at disposal for actual service." The important note is in these words—"The Sardinians were dislodged from the Col de Tende, 7th May 1794." Here the reader will observe Napoleon's influence, not his talent nor enterprise, is mentioned.

PAGE 64.

- (6) This incident in the campaign, omitted altogether by the four biographers above mentioned, is not unworthy of notice, as it contributes to demonstrate Napoleon's ascendancy in the army; and as its misrepresentation by Albite, Salicetti, and Laporte, was made one of the prelexts for placing the general of artillery under arrest.
- (7) Thiers (t. vi, p. 271).

PAGE 65.

(8) A slight allusion to this project and the successful movements which grew out of its adoption, may be found in Norvins (t. i, pp. 52, 3), a more imperfect one in Hazlitt (v. i, pp. 375, 77), none at all in Scott, and none in Lockhart. The particulars in the text are derived from Napoleon's own account, dictated to Montholon succinctly (t. ii, p. 211), repeated in detail to the same amanuensis (t. iii, chap. 2), from the Moniteur and Annual Register of the period, that very useful work, Bourrienne et ses Erreurs (t. i, ch. 3), and from the well designed sketch of Thiers (t. vii, p. 77).

Page 66.

(9) Thiers (ibid.) says Colloredo "retired shamefully, accusing the English, who accused him in turn."

PAGE 67.

(10) In the first volume of the Mémorial de St. Hélène, the reader will find this circumstance of military folly, and amorous infatuation, related in the words of Napoleon himself (pp. 217, 18), with an ingenuousness and a self reproach, which alone would carry conviction of their truth. He says "the idea came suddenly into his head," of entertaining his fair companion with a spectacle of war, and that the remembrance of his folly was ever after accompanied with regret; showing that he acted from a momentary impulse, which, had there been time for reflexion, his good sense and good feeling would have repressed. The existence of this lady, her name, connection with Napoleon, and the effects of it on his conduct and

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APPENDIX.

fortune, are all unnoticed it would appear by Norvins, Hazlitt, Scott, at Lockbart.

(11) Napoleon himself (Las Cases, t. i, p. 215, 451); and Thiers (t. n. pp. 452, 54). The last describes his conduct towards his brother as affectionate and even noble. The language of the first does not imply that his acquaintance with this unfortunate man, ever ripened into friendship, but the Robespierre conceived, as was natural, an enthusiastic admiration for Kepoleon.

PAGE 69.

- (12) Norvins t. i, p. 57.
- (13) The dutchess d'Abrantes (t. i. p. 241) publishes his note to Junet: and it is supposed to be genuine.
- (14) The variety of misrepresentation to which this distinct and remarkable fact of Napoleon's being placed under arrest, has been subjected, is truly astonishing. Norvins (t. i, pp. 56, 7) makes it happen in the winter of 1794, 95-and describes it as the consequence of the plan which Napoken furnished during that winter to the deputy Maignier for fortifying the megazines of Marseilles. Hazlitt (v. i, pp. 375, 76) describes Napoleon as having been in great danger of being summoned to the bar of the convention. being placed under temporary arrest, in the month of September, in comquence of this same plan furnished to the deputy Maignier, which plan was not applied for until some months subsequent to September; thus confounding two unconnected events, and approximating as many remote dis-Scott's account is almost as defective and much more confused. He (v. H. pp. 46, 47) avers that while Napoleon was employed in directing the operations, which forced the Sardinians from Saorgio, and in making himself acquainted with that region of the Alps, he was involved in the accustion before the convention which grew out of the plan he furnished for fartfying the magasines of Marseilles. This is putting together events which was separated by several months, and making the last in succession the cause the first. He then proceeds-" In the remainder of the year 1794, there was little service of consequence in the army of Italy," " and the 9th and 10th Thermidor of that year brought the downfall of Robespierre and threatened unfavourable consequences to Bonaparte," — thus not easy annihilating a number of important military events, but while apparently carrying forward his narration from the end of 1794, returning without notice to midsummer of that year. He then affirms that Bonsparts was in consequence of his friendship for the younger Robespierre, and his suspected connection with the party of his brother, superseded and put under arrest; and that being liberated by the influence of Salicetti he repaired to Marseilles, "in a condition to give or to receive little consolation from his family," and that he remained with them until May, 1785, when he came to Paris. Here, not to notice the incoherency of the language, 40

arrest in August, 1794, and the reorganisation of the armies of Italy and the Alps which took place in the spring of 1795, and by which Napoleon's service as general of artillery in the army of Italy ceased, are arbitrarily brought together; and his military life from the beginning of September until May, totally extinguished by the dash of a romantic pen. As to his incapacity to console, or be consoled by his family, there appears to have been little room for consolation on either side. Joseph had married a rich and most amiable lady, the daughter of a banker of great wealth and credit at Marseilles, and Napoleon himself, after acquiring increase of fame and consideration, was returned safe from the dangers of war and proscription. It may be supposed, therefore, that while he himself was far from being dejected, his family was at this particular time one of the happiest in France.

PAGE 70.

- (15) Norvins (t. i, p. 5); Montholon, (t. iii, p. 76).
- (16) He himself mentioned (Las Cases, t. i, p. 215) that he was outlawed by the order of one of the deputies with the army, because he would not allow him to employ the artillery horses in posting; but neither the name of the deputy nor the date of the order is given; nor does the fact appear to have led to any serious consequence.

PAGE 72.

(17) This circumstance in the life of Napoleon, which is so particularly mentioned by himself (Montholon, t. iii, p. 80) is not noticed by Norvins. Hazlitt, or Lockhart. The ludicrous distortion to which it is subjected by Scott (v. iii, p. 99), is as remarkable as it is absurd. Yet the selection of Napoleon for such critical service, so soon after the accusation to which he was exposed, and his influence in counteracting so injudicious an enterprise. were facts honourable to his character as a patriot and an officer. His presence at Toulon on the occasion too, led to an act of the most intrepid humanity. Thiers, who thought the event of importance enough to form a part of his great work, thus records it (t. vii, p. 458): "The government had projected a ridiculous coup de main against Rome. Anxious to revenge the assassination of Basseville, they had embarked ten thousand men on board the squadron at Toulon, which had been entirely refitted by the care of the committee of public safety. It was designed to send them to the mouth of Tiber in order to lay a contribution on the papal city, and then to retire promptly to the ships. Fortunately a naval action with admiral Hotham, from which both squadrons retired equal sufferers, prevented the execution of this project."

PAGE 73.

to Designing at MA

(18) There are few indisputable events in the life of Napoleon, which have suffered more diversified and wanton mutilation, than this rescue of

two representatives of the people and a family of unfortunate emigrath from a mob. It is related by himself (Montholon, t. iii, p. 36) in a unrative as distinct and graphical as any part of Cassar's Commentaries, and is mentioned to have taken place in March, 1795, when he had been called to Toulon by this projected expedition against Rome. On another excession he introduced it by way of illustration in a conversation with the falkful Las Cases (t. l, p. 210), mentioning the gratitude of the persons when he saved, and though not proposing to fix its date, referring it incidentally to a period considerably posterior to the siege of Toulon. Las Cases alt of his own accord (p. 211) that after Napoleon's death the Chabrillant family, who had preserved as a precious relic the order for their embarkation, here grateful testimony in an interview he had with them, to this noble at of humanity; adding a number of touching details of Napoleon's generosity on the occasion, which he himself had forgotten, or neglected to relate.

PAGE 74.

(19) This is the progress, and this the date, which Napoleon himself assigns to his journey to Paris, making his arrival at the capital very distinctly subsequent to the insurrection of the first of Prairial (Mostline, t. iii, p. 88°. Neither Scott nor Hazlitt mention whether he reached Paris before or after that event, both saying (v. iii, p. 49, and v. i, p. 379) that he arrived there in May 1795. Norvins, however, dates his arrival hehre the 1st Prairial (t. i, p. 61); while Lockhart, with his usual confidence in error, asserts positively (v. i, p. 23) that "before the end of the year (2790) he came to Paris to solicit employment."

Bourienne (t. i, p. 71) not only places him in Paris before the 1st Pririal, but implicates him remotely in the defeated conspiracy of that day, for the sake of which calumny, he probably ventured on the anacronism.

PAGE 75.

(20) This fact is asserted by himself (Montholon, t. lii, p. 80) very emphatically, and is made the cause of his tendering his resignation. In that excellent work (Bourrienne et ses Erreurs) the anthor of a most conclusive refutation of Bourienne's misstatements on this part of Napoleon's Mb, after proving that he was never cashiered, says, he was not ordered to the army of the west as general of infantry (t. i, p. 30), but as "commander in chief of the artillery of the army of the west." This last assertion is prevent to be accurate by an order of general Hoche mentioning the fact, but it does not disprove the positive assertion of Napoleon himself, that he previously received an order to join the army of the west, and take the command of a brigade of infantry. If this assertion could leave any doubt on the mind, it would be removed by referring to a speech of Fréron in the conventions.

3th Vendémiaire, when, remonstrating against the proceedings of Aune said, that "general Bonaparte had been withdrawn from his aplate line of service, in order to be put in the infantry."

PAGE 76.

l) Thiers states (t. vii, p. 459), that Kellermann, although the corps of housand men which had been destined to embark at Toulon for Rome restored to his army, was so weakened by detachments employed in ressing the renewed insurrections of Toulon and Lyons, that he could resist the attack of the Austrians and Sardinians. But it is evident, the instructions drawn up by Napoleon, and despatched to Kellermann se committee of public safety, that he did not comprehend the nature dvantages of his position, which was taken for offensive, not defensive oses; for falling upon the enemy the moment he placed his foot on parrow tract of Genoese territory between the Alps and the sea; and with a view of waiting the maturity of his preparations, and receiving ttack. It is fair to observe, that Jomini's account is totally at variance This view of the subject. He alleges that the defensive was not only cious on the part of Kellermann, but sanctioned by the committee of ic safety (t. vii, pp. 81, 82). The operations he relates are rather inistent with this allegation, which is in direct contradiction to the state. t of Napoleon, and the extract which he produces of the despatch written simself, and after being signed by the committee, forwarded to Kellern (Montholon, t. iii, p. 93). In this despatch the absurdity of acting on defensive is thus forcibly demonstrated. "The committee observed to lermann, that the army was not extended in 1794 beyond the heights of Tanaro, and had not prolonged its right by Bardinetto, Melogno, and acques, except for the purpose of preventing the Austrian army connectitself with the English squadron, and of being in a situation to advance ne succour of Genoa, if the enemy should attack that city, either by sea y the pass of the Bochetta. That the army did not occupy Vado as a nsive position, but an offensive one, and to be able to fall upon the my if he should show himself on the narrow tract between the Alps and sea (la rivière). That the moment the Austrians had set foot at Savona, ought to have attacked them, in order to prevent their getting possession hat place, and thereby cutting off his communication with Genoa; but whe had failed to do these things, nothing was left but to evacuate Vado." [apoleon's character of general Kellermann is, no doubt, perfectly fair ntholon, t. iii, p. 92): "Kellermann was brave, extremely active, and owed with many excellent qualities; but he was perfectly destitute of se talents which qualify a man for the chief command of an army. In ducting this war in the Alps, he committed nothing but faults."

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PAGE 77.

(22) This fact is substantiated by the following order of general Hecke, commander of the army of the west, dated the first complimentary day of 1795 (17th September). "The committee of public safety having called to its bureau ("près de lui,") the general of brigade, Bonaparte, I hereby cause him to be replaced by the the chief of brigade Dutol, whom I have directed to take command of the artillery, which had been confided to that general" (See Rourrienne et ses Erreurs, t. i, p. 30).

CHAPTER V.

PAGE 80.

(1) This is evident, not only from the state of public sentiment disclosed by the votes on this occasion, but from the fact, that after the 18th Bramaire, when the nation had become disgusted with the directory, was thought necessary to appoint three consuls. Sir Walter Scott (v. III, pp.54, 61) expends a profusion of loose and rambling sophistry, to prove the there existed at this time in the body of the French nation, a "general todency" in favour of the restoration of the Bourbons, and a strong there reluctant admiration of the British constitution; with all the about by which it was then infected. Arguing, however, with that freedom from the restraints of reason and consistency, which is natural and becoming in a writer of romances, he demonstrates the very reverse of what he unitstakes to prove; showing conclusively (pp. 60,61) that the nation generally abhorred both the persons and the power of the Bourbons, and that me narchy itself was so odious, that although princes who were not personally detested, such as the dukes of Orleans and York were mentioned, their names received not the slightest support. It is scarcely worth while to observe, that Lockhart adopts with implicit deference the absurdities of Scott, infringing with constancy and courage the moral of the old sayingamicus Plato, sed magis amica verilas. For a just representation of the state of public feeling in France at this period, the reader who may have forgotten the fate of the expedition to Quiberon in the summer of 1795, is referred to the 1st chapter of the 8th volume of Thiers. This is the access he gives of the friends of the Bourbons (p. 3). "The royalists concealed themselves behind this mass of malcontents. They consisted of a few co grants, and returned priests, some creatures of the ancient court who is lost their places, and many indifferent and dastardly persons who dreaded stormy freedom."

PAGE 81.

rvins (t. i, p. 10) observes "a third decree submitted these two disto the acceptation of the people, as inseparable from the new con-

the exposition of this supplementary provision of the constitution of 3, there appears to have prevailed a remarkable indistinctness of n. Thiers states (t. viii, p. 17) "that the new legislative body was aposed of two-thirds of the convention." Scott expounds them in manner (v. iii, p. 67) "the first (decree) ordaining the electoral France to choose as representatives to the two councils under the stitution at least two-thirds of the members presently sitting in con-' language which is adopted by Lockhart (v. i, p. 27). Napoleon on, t. iii, p. 103) explains the provision more accurately-" The conattached to the constitution two additional laws, by which they prehat two-thirds of the new legislature should be composed of members nvention." Norvins (t. i, p. 70) gives a third interpretation : "By reseadditional laws, the convention formed two-thirds of the legislaphraseology which leaves it uncertain whether they were to be comthe members of the convention, or of persons chosen by the convenen if the numbers of the convention and of the new legislature were he statement of Napoleon is the more clear, and is therefore followed xt.

PAGE 84.

his last term was afterwards shortened to the 27th October.—Thiers i, p. 73).

PAGE 86.

apoleon says (Montholon, t. iii, p. 109) that Mariette, one of the deie had rescued from the mob at Toulon, and who was at this time a
of the executive committee, recommended his appointment on this
i; and he told Las Cases (t. i, p. 216) that the husband of Madame
iu was also in favour of his appointment, a fact which shows the imof the danger, the vivacity with which it was felt, and the conwhich the talents of Bonaparte already commanded.

he course of his reflections is sketched in the most lively colours by —(Las Cases, t. ii. p. 246).

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mong the proofs which might be furnished in support of this assertion, usive one may be drawn from the speech of Fréron, which has been referred to and may be found in the debates reported in the Moni-

teur, and in the proces-verbal of the convention. According to these documents it appears that on the 18th of Vendemiaire or the 10th of October, five days after the insurrection and when every thing in relation to its suppression was known to the convention, this distinguished member, in arging the propriety of correcting the arrangement of Aubry respecting the amployment of general officers, said—"Forget not (n'oubliez pas) that the general of artillery, Bonaparte, appointed on the 4th to replace general Mensa, and who only had, to the morning of the 5th, tomake the skilful dispetitions of which you have seen the happy effects, was taken from his appropriate line of service to be put in the infantry."

Here Napoleon is mentioned without hesitation by the orator, as he was recognized without question by the assembly, as the successor of general Menou, who had just been displaced as commander in chief of the interior and in that capacity, as the saviour of the convention; while not a word was said of Barras, who had been exhibited evidently by the executive committee as an absorbent to take up the annoyance of the superintending deputies.

PAGE 89.

(8) Sir Walter Scott, it is evident, was almost as well qualified to contmand an army, as to canonize the virtues of a French hero. He insists upon it. that the best policy for the insurgents was to barricade the streets, block up Bonaparte and his troops within the circuit of his posts, and wait the effect of famine. As an army of two hundred thousand men, and a population of several millions, might be daily expected in such a conjuncture, to pour their strength into Paris, this would be like advising a pack of sheep-stealers to surround the fold, and wait quietly until the shepherds with their dogs, should come upon them in the morning. It is singular that Thiers, who asserts a emphatically what Sir Walter attempts to conceal, the favourable dissortion of the great majority of the nation, and the enthusiastic acquiencement in army in the proposed constitution and the decrees, should have adopted the idea (t. vii, p. 49) that Bonaparte, after having provided for a retreat to Meudon, would suffer himself to be shut up in the Tuileries, while his cannon commanded the bridges, the Champs Elysées, and the plain of Grenelle; or that there would have been time to reduce him by famine in the centre of a country, of which the army and a vast majority of the people were on his side. Danican and Lafond, knowing the state of public feeling, and the natural tendency of the turbulent passions to subside, saw that delay would to them be ruin.

PAGE 92-

(9) It will be remembered that, on witnessing the violence of the popular on the 20th of June, 1792, he said, if the king had, at the beginning, swept of

undreds of the rioters with cannon, "the rest would be running

PAGE 93.

he invidious meanness of Barras, and the reluctance with which he the confirmation of Napoleon's appointment, are very evident from act in the convention.

past nine on the evening of the 13th, he entered the hall of the conand gave an account of the operations, and success of the day, all st person, without the slightest allusion to Napoleon, and in a strain cal, that had he himself really achieved the defeat of the insurgents, have been unbecoming. On the 14th, he spoke on the same subin the same strain, saying not a word of Napoleon, although he d his own colleague, Talot. On the 17th, he spoke three times in to the conflict with the sections, altogether omitting his nominal secommand. Finally, when Bonaparte and the other officers were ed, he declined an opportunity that was afforded by another member, he slightest distinction in his favour. For when Baraillon proposed of arms should be presented to the officers who most distinguished es, Barras said, "they all had distinguished themselves-it was imo discriminate;" slighting at once the associated rank which Bonad, and the committee who had conferred it. However, after Bonathe other officers had retired, and when Fréron, in debating another mentioned incidentally and by way of illustration, the real command ent and admitted services of Napoleon, "the happy effects of whose spositions, as successor to general Menou, you have seen;" then, nce could no longer serve his purposes, Barras spoke out-ale subject did not require it—and attempting a transition from selfo liberality, from jealousy to patronage, said,-"I will call the atthe national convention to general Bonaparte; it is to him, it is to il dispositions that we are indebted for the defence of this hall hich he had distributed the posts with great ability. I move that ention confirm the nomination of Bonaparte to the place of second ind of the army of the interior."

eech of Fréron confirms another fact in the history of Napoleon, hat he was never dismissed the service; for had the injustice of Auso far, Fréron would certainly have mentioned it.

diculous stories of Sir Walter Scott (v. 3. p. 14) and Lockhart (v. 1 1.) about "the little Corsican officer," are not worthy of refuta-

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1 the pile of defamatory ordure, which the British press and the coteries, created respecting Napoleon's life and character, one of

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the foulest materials was that which derived this appointment from the prestitution of his wife when she was madame Beauharnais. Considering the value which was attached to this literary filth during the war, in Englant, and after the restoration, in France, neither its quantity nor fetidases on occasion surprise. Perishable as it was putrescent, the light shed on the personal history of Napoleon by Las Cases and O'Meara, quickened the natural process of its destruction, and it would have long since disappeared entirely from the face of the earth, but for the delicate researches and vivifying ganius of the author of Waverley. From this steaming mass, he occasionally condescended to extract materials in order to variegate, enlarge, and finite the biographical patchwork, with which, to fulfil a profitable contract, and to please the taste of lordly ministers and legitimate kings, he had undertaken to shroud the memory of Napoleon.

The calumny in question, as far as its outlines can now be traced, imputs that madame Beauharnais was, at the time Napoleon married her, the mitress of Barras, and that Napoleon agreed to take her off the hands of the director and make her his wife, upon Barras engaging to procure for him to command in chief of the army of Italy-or, as sir Walter furtively infinite -make that appointment "the dowry of the bride." He says (v. 3, p. 🦚) "The marrying madame Beauharnais, was a mean of uniting his fertees: with those of Barras and Tallien, the first of whom governed France as a of the directors," etc. On the next page, this implication is reenferred by the assertion already quoted, that the command of the army of Italy, er, # sir Walter with euphonic boldness says, "of the Italian armies," was, "the dowry of the bride." Thus it is impossible for the reader to shake from he mind the impression that the rumour in question had, in the opinion of the author of Waverley, foundation in truth. As this slander is effectually though slyly sanctioned by sir Walter, and is connected with his previous effects to make Napoleon, on the 13th Vendémiaire, an obscure "little Corsiem officer," indebted for notice and distinction to the patronage of this same fitras, it will not be improper to expose its falsehood. In the first place, midame Beauharnais is represented to have been "in the full bloom of beauty and extremely agreable in her manners. Can it be supposed that Burns, in possession of such a woman, would not only transfer her to another un but pay this other man for accepting her. Beauty and grace and social charms were never so disposed of before. Achilles did not bribe Agustian to force Briseis from his tent. But it may be said that as Bonaparte agreed to marry her, and Barras did not wish to form that sort of connection, Justphine preferred becoming the general's wife to remaining the director's mistress. Had that been the case, it cannot well be supposed that Barres would have rewarded Bonaparte for depriving him of his mistress, or would have endowed her liberally to induce her to desert him. If she preferred Bonaparte to Barras, the latter would not have recompensed her that the might gratify both the love and ambition of his successful rival. If the

ot prefer Bonaparte, but married him for convenience, and at the instance of Barras, admitting that so proud and promising a general as Bonaparte is aid to have been, would accept as his wife the mistress of another man, it is prossible to conceive that, loving Josephine as sir Walter declares Bonaparte did, with excessive ardour and "peculiar affection," he would have there a few days after their marriage, at Paris, in the society of her old protector, and hastened away to a distant frontier.

Lockbart instead of circling and hesitating like sir Walter, "with all the ght of gravitation blessed" in stories like these, plunges at once up to the es into the slander (v. i, p. 33). It was commonly said, indeed it was pipersally believed, that Josephine, whose character was in some respects ferent, possessed more than legitimate influence over the first director. Bosparte, however, offered her his hand; she, after some hesitation, accepted and the young general by this marriage cemented his connection with the iety of the Luxembourg; and in particular with Barras and Tallien, at t moment the most powerful men in France" (p. 34). "Bonaparte was einted to the splendid command. It is acknowledged in one of Josephine's ers, that Barras had promised to procure it for him before their marriage place. 'Advance this man,' said this personage to the other directors, , he will advance himself without you." The words of this extract which have underscored, convey the calumny in all its dimensions—the more than egitimate influence and indifferent character of Josephine. Bonaparte's hand Mered, however, and his connection with Barras the libertine, cemented by he marriage; and Josephine acknowledging, not mentioning, that the appointment had been promised, make up in a resolute but insidious form, the allegations—that Barras kept Josephine at the time Bonaparte offered her his hand—that Bonaparte believed in the existence of this concubinage, but nevertheless offered to marry her-that by taking to wife Barras' cast-off mistress, he cemented his connection with that director; and as Josephine berself confessed, obtained the promise of commanding the army of Italy.

However these cruel and unfounded insinuations, put forward with pretensions to historical truth, must excite the reader's indignation, the last part of the falsehood by its ludicrous absurdity, may well compose his temper completely. Every body believed, and most people said that Barras had bribed Bonaparte to marry his cast-off mstress, by procuring him the command of the army of Italy, and of course the other directors, who were at the head of the society of the Luxembourg, must have believed and spoken of it. Yet, to these directors—the virtuous Larévellière, the stoical Carnot, and the tenacious Rewbell—(Thiers, t. viii, ch. 2.—Montholon, t. iii, ch. 3), Barras very coolly said, "I have got Bonaparte to marry my mistress, and therefore you must give him the command of the army of Italy!!" And more wonderful, still, these directors obeyed the dictation, and became parties to the contract; although except Carnot, they were all more popular than Barras, and Carnot was infinitely more respected. Now, to believe this slander,

as the out to some a to reministrate majored by sir Wales for our first of some or some and transaction letter large and its some opinion letter large and its some opinion letter large and its some opinion of the same of the opinion of the same of the large of the large large of the large large large large of the large lar

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- for T after for at same reading, so. Napoleon left Paris for the day to countries of the narrange.

There is a present of mass as to this event. The marriage register process is we was married in Pure on the Rh. of March. Tet Nervins asserts (t.), it was to set Pure on the Mira of February. In the Memory of September 1 to the mass of the Ah of March 1 to the month of the memory of the Ah of March 1 to the month of the month of

It may be would while it reserve that admitting the date assumed by it. We there and sample and consequently that Napoleon left Paris on the 13th of Martin. It is very mean from a stirst letter to the directory from Nico, daid the distance Martin, that he could have had no time for idle desplay at like senses, and he seem mothered to make so contemptible a figure. In this left directs produced mediate to a put the says: "I have been for several days which are canoniments independent account of the army, his means and yesterday. He then gives a minute account of the army, his means that plans. If a mutury which he had suppressed, and of others matter, showing that he must have been some time in the neighbourhood of Nico. Now Nice is see hundred miles from Paris, so that even if he left Paris in the 15th, which is not probable, and reached the army several days lefter he to be discussing display invented for him by the "British histories."

In the F ictures at Conquetes [1, v, p. 169] it is expressly and carefully secreed that Bonaparte arrived at Nice the 20th of March, the date which I have adopted

CHAPTER VI.

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(1) Sir Walter Scott, prefaces the immortal campaign of 1796, by repreenting the invasion of Italy as unjust (v. iii, p. 88). "The French nation, in the times of which we treat, spoke indeed of the Alps as a natural boundary, of far as to authorise them to claim all which lay on the western side of the mountains, as naturally pertaining to their dominions; but they never eigned to respect them as such, when the question respecting their invadage on their own part the territories of other states, which lay on or beyond the formidable frontier. They assumed the law of natural limits as an unhallengeable rule when it was made in favour of France, but never allowed to be quoted against her interest."

Does a nation, by claiming a river or a range of mountains as a natural coundary, especially after having extended its conquests to this limit, resource the right of passing that boundary in time of war?

When a nation claims a chain of mountains or other natural limit, in time of war, as its boundary, it can only be understood as declaring its intention not to make peace without establishing this claim; as France had done in rehrence to the countries conquered on her side of the Alps and the Rhine. It neither denies to its enemy nor renounces for itself, the right, in time of war of passing this boundary in martial array. Danger and difficulty are hen the only obstacles.

The war, in prosecuting which Napoleon, was then engaged, was on the part of France, a defensive one. Now, that the cloud of political falsehood and imposture which the British press had spread over the civilized world, has been dispelled by the French revolution of July and the English pariamentary reform, no publicist of reputation or writer of common sense will venture to deny this position. In support of it, concurring authorities of both nations may be referred to. Thiers (t. ii, p. 82) says: "It must be confessed that this cruel war, which so long lacerated Europe, was not rovoked by France, but by the foreign powers. France in declaring war, bid no more than recognize by a decree the state in which they had placed wer." Colonel Napier begins his manly and luminous work by asserting hat (v. i, p. 1) " up to the treaty of Tilsit the wars of France were essentatilly defensive."

As Napier's history is a work not to be mentioned without a sentiment of espect for its author, less cannot justly be said in his commendation, than hat in all the substantial qualities of an historian, clearness of narration, lignity of sentiment, respect for truth, and sympathy for human virtues, he s the very opposite of Scott and Lockhart.

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(2) This affirmation is contained in one of the notes made in pencil by Napoleon while at St. Helena, at the foot of the letter of instruction of the 6th of March. It appears, that in dictating his campaigns of Italy, he made use of two volumes containing this letter of instruction, one of which fell into the possession of Montholon, and the other was preserved by Marchand. The notes attached to that of Montholon are published in his fourth volume (p. 396). Of those preserved by Marchand, a copy has been taken by general baron Pelet, the officer so well known for his merit in letters and in arms, and who is at the head of the dépôt général de la guerre.

It contains the affirmation in question, and is, when translated, as follows:

"This instruction is an indifferent amplification, full of contradiction and absurdity, of a luminous and original memoir, which Napoleon had presented to the directory in January, 1796." The memoir here alluded to was dated January 19th, 1796, was addressed to general Clarke, the secretary to the directory, and is on file in the war department.

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(3) In the debate in the house of commons on the address in answer to the king's speech in October, 1795, Mr. Fox said—"It was ridiculous to insist upon danger from treating with France, because they had subverted their former, and adopted a new, constitution; the permanence of a treaty depending on its equitableness, and correspondence with the reciprocal interests of the contracting parties. It was become nugatory to talk of our allies; we had, indeed, mercenaries in our pay, whom we could only such by excessive bribes, and who were every moment, hesitating whether is accept of them, or of the terms proffered by our enemies, to detach them from this country." (See Annual Register for 1796. History of Europa, p. 44).

These assertions of the parliamentary luminary of his country, which the course of events more than the lapse of time have inscribed on the tablets of history as the irreversible judgments of wisdom, were then accused by a great majority in the house of Commons; while the sentiments and policy of his successful rival, Mr. Pitt, notwisthstanding the splendour of his tablets, the greatness of his character, and the authority of his name, if proposed to the house of Commons at this time, when the legitimate King of France is again expelled from his throne by a revolution, would be received as the ravings of a political bedlamite. So vast is the difference between the influence of the crown and the privileged classes in Great Britain at the present day, and their influence at the close of the last century. So perishable are the works of statesmen who build on temporary passions and factitions interests; and so steadfast the creations of minds, which employ the selid materials of reason, truth and justice. In relation to these subsidies, levished by

he British government on the continental despots, it is certain that with half heir amount lord Wellington, lord Grey, or lord Melbourne might have urchased as large a quantity of war and slander against the French nation and government, since July, 1830, as Mr. Pitt and his disciples had done efore that epoch.

- (4) Norvins appears to have misconceived the plan of the directory. He ays (t. i, p. 85) "The directory prescribed to their general, as a preliminary peration, the conquest of Piedmont, the object of which was to be to force he Austrians to evacuate that country, and defend themselves in their own erritory." This was the plan Napoleon adopted, not that which the diectory prescribed; for they instructed the general not to pass the exterior arrisons of Piedmont, to mask them, and pursue the Austrians into Lomardy, in order that the King of Sardinia, left to his natural inclinations, night enter into an alliance with France against Austria; or if unnaturally nclined to adhere to the coalition, might be forced to abandon it. Jomini, n speaking of these instructions (t. viii, p. 59) says, " They form one among he most remarkable documents in the history of this war." The ambiguity of this language is to be lamented, when the admitted ability of the writer is aken into consideration, especially as at a subsequent page (p. 88) in speakng of Bonaparte's advance upon Ceva he says: "The conquest of this floufishing country (Italy) depended then in the first place on success against be Sardinian army; and the general in chief, more wise than the directory, Who had enjoined him not to operate upon his left, resolved to direct the greater part of his army against Colli."
- (5) In reference to this clause of the instructions Napoleon, in one of his rayon notes, observed, "The first interest of the court of Turin was to tifle revolutionary sentiments, and to oppose the success of the French resublicans.—How stupid this is!" And the directory in their reasoning laving asked the question, "why, since it is the interest of the Piedmontese join with the French in driving the Austrians out of Italy, does not the wort of Turin hasten to unite its forces with those of the republic for that harpose."—Napoleon answers in a note, "In order not to be guillotined—The directors reasoned just as Louis XVI might have done."

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(6) Napoleon's concluding remark on the instructions is—"It may be een from these stupid instructions that if Napoleon was victorious, it was n spite and in defiance of the instructions of the government." These nstructions are said to be the work of Carnot (Thiers, t. viii, p. 236.) If so, hey demonstrate the truth of Napoleon's description of Carnot's vaunted apacity as minister of war (Montholon, t. iii, p. 125). "In the committee of public safety, he directed the military operations, and was useful, without neriting the praise bestowed on him. He had no military experience, and its opinions were false, upon every part of the art of war," etc.

(7) This estimate of the strength of the two armies it must be confessed, is only a conjectural one. The numbers given by various respectable authorities range through many degrees of enumeration. Napoleon states his own fighting force fit for duty (Las Cases, t. ii, p. 266; Montholon, t. iii.p. 176) at about thirty thousand and the allies at eighty thousand. This estimate which is no doubt correct as to his own army, may have overrated that of the allies. Itis, however, adopted by Norvins and Hazlitt (t. i, p. 87-v.i, p. 417). Jomini (t. viii, p. 59) rates the French force at forty-two thousand, four hundred. But in his enumeration he includes the detachments under generals Macquart and Garnier or d'Almagne amounting to six thousand nine hundred, which were in garrison on the coast, or posted at the passes of the Alps on Bonaparte's left, and no part of which entered Italy until after the occupation of Cherasco. This would leave for the army of Italy thirty-five thousand, five hundred mea-Deducting the sick, the active force would not exceed thirty thousand mea-The strength of the allied army Jomini puts at fifty-two thousand, an estimate Iower than is to be found in any other writer, and inconsistent with probability from the inference that, considering it was an allied force, its small superiority of numbers would not have made it an overmatch for the French estimated by him at forty-two thousand four hundred. Consequently the victories of Bonaparte, instead of being the effects of his great military genius and the incapacity of Beaulieu, as Jomini himself describes them to be (t. viii, ch. 56) would have been nothing more than the ordinary results of a contest between combined forces on one side, and an army of one nation the other. It is possible that Jomini gave the number actually in the field, excluding the numerous garrisons. But these garrisons furnished detachments to increase the field force, and were recalled as the French advance menaced the fortresses. Thus Colli, upon abandoning his intrenched came at Ceva, threw a detachment into that fortress.

In the work entitled Victoires et Conquetes des Français, (t. v, pp. 163 et 164) the effective force of the French army is estimated at thirty-four thesand men, upon the authority of a specific return signed by Berthier. With regard to this voluminous work the account it contains of this first campaign of Italy is so very defective, conjectural, and confused that very little instruction can be derived from it. It was prepared, it would seem, beforethe Memoirs of Napoleon, or the Memorial of St. Helena were published.

In a letter to the directory dated the 28th of December, 1796 (Corr. Incl. 1. 2, p. 312, 13), Napoleon says, that on entering the plains of Pickmont he had thirty thousand infantry; and that the Austro-Sardinian army under Beautieu was seventy three thousand strong. Of these inconsistent estimates I have adopted a medium as the nearest approximation to truth in my power. It does not differ materially from that of Napoleon.

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(8) This fact, mentioned by Napoleon in his dictation to Las Cases (t. ii, p. 283) and to Montholon (t. iii. p. 192) a fact so honourable to the Spartan patriotism and courage of the French army, is strangely caricatured by sir Walter Scott (v. iii, pp. 95, 96). "Berthler preserved, as a curiosity an order dated on the day of the victory of Albenga, which munificently conferred a gratuity of three louis d'or upon every general of division."

As to the principal assertion contained in this passage, it may be observed that "the victory of Albenga" never was heard of before, being a later discovery than the sea coast of Bohemia. Napoleon's peaceful phrase (Montholon, t. iii, p. 192, and Las Cases, t. ii, p. 283): "Un ordre du jour d'Albenga," an order of the day of Albenga, that is, dated at Albenga, this romantic historian has heroically translated, "an order dated on the day of the victory of Albenga"—making the harmless words, "day of Albenga," equivalent to day of Marengo, day of Austerlitz, phrases familiar in the annals of French glory.

It is thus that "the victory of Albenga," is noticed by Lockhart (v. i. p. 35); " Berthier used to keep, as a curiosity, a general order, by which three louis d'or were granted as a great supply to each general of division, dated on the very day of the victory of Albenga." This author's excellence in absurdity and falsehood is indisputable. Bourrienne in his Mémoires says (t. i, p. 71) that Napoleon when oppressed by poverty and neglect. "envied" his brother Joseph's good fortune in marrying the rich Mademoiselle Clary, and would exclaim, "How fortunate is that rogue Joseph." Admitting that the exclamation was really made and was fairly repeated, the word coquin (rogue), was evidently used in a favourable and even a fond sense, as a man says of his child "you dear little rogue," or of his friend, "what a lucky dog." Yet Bourrienne, who was engaged in a very laborious and incongruous chapter of calumny, headed it, in reference to this anecdote aukwardly enough (ch. vi), "Bonaparte is jealous of his brother." Out of these clumsy materials Lockhart, with less felicity than assurance, contrives an original slander of his own, which has the advantage of belying both brothers at once. Referring indefinitely to Bourrienne, this faithful translator says (v. i, p. 24) "How fortunate," Napoleon would exclaim " How fortunate is that fool Joseph."

- (9) This fact which is stated by Thiers (t. viii, p. 228) and Jomini (t. viii, p. 61) will recall to the mind of the American reader the patriotic conduct of general Jackson during the last war between the United States and England.
- (10) The existence of this natural feeling has been often mentioned by well informed French writers. Thiers (t. viii, p. p. 228) says: "Massena bore him ill will for having exerted an ascendancy over the mind of Dumerbion

in 1794." Traces of this sensibility may be discovered in the answer both of Massena and Augereau to Napoleon's letter from Nice, annualize to them his assuming the command (Cor. Ined. t. i, l. 1).

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(11) General Colli in sending an emigrant Frenchman in the character of a Sardinian officer, and under the protection of a flag of truce, about the privilege attached to messengers of peace in time of war, inasmuch as France could not be at war with her own citizens. Napoleon was justified an general principles, and a fortiori, by reference to the mutiny in his army, in detaining Moulin. His letter to the directory of the 8th of April announcing this fact, shows that he was not disposed to enforce the law against this imprudent Frenchman, whose punishment it appears consisted only in temporary confinement. For a full account of the object and intrigues of the conspiracy carried on between Pichegru on one side, and the prime of Condé, the Austrian general Klingin, and the British envoy at Berns, Wickham, on the other, see the volumes entitled: "Correspondence trustic à Offenbourg"— and the corroborating documents in the "Alliance des Jacobins avec les Anglais."

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(12) Thiers (t. viii, p. 229; Jomini, t. viii, p. 62). An English affect who was then a lieutenant in Nelson's squadron, mentioned the fact terms as it is here related. It is not alluded to by Scott or Lockhart.

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(13) Scott and Lockhart (v. iii, ch. 3, and v. i, ch. 4) seem to have supposed that Cervoni's movement upon Voltri, was directed by Napalean; whereas his correspondence shows, it was made before his taking the command, and in direct opposition to his plans and wishes. But Norvins wands farther from the fact, and (t. 1, p. 92) expressly asserts that it was one of Napoleon's first operations. In his despatch of the 6th of April, Napaleas tells the directory: "The movement which I found commenced applied Genoa, has drawn the enemy from their winter quarters. I have been very sorry and extremely dissatisfied with this movement upon Genoa, so much the more inopportune, that it has obliged that republic to assume a hastile attitude, and has awakened the enemy whom I wished to take by surprise. It will cost us a sacrifice of men."

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(14) We are told by sir Walter Sott (v. iii, p. 104), whose descriptions of battles in poetry and prose have been universally adm. , that "Argo-

teau descended upon Montenotte;" the famous village of that name, being situated on a mountain of the Apeninne range. It might as well be said that a traveller in Switzerland descended on Mont-Blanc. The truth is, that Argenteau occupied Dego and Sassello, and ascended by the route of Lower to Upper Montenotte. Even this ludicrous oversight does not arrest the prone imitation of Lockhart, who (v. i, p. 39) says—"On the 10th of April d'Argenteau came down upon Montenotte." He must have dropped from the clouds. Jomini, in describing the descent of Argenteau (t. viii, p. 67) thus expresses himself. "He moved in three columns with the main body of his troops, to force the intrenched positions which a detachment of Laharpe's division occupied on the summits of Montenotte and Monteligino." And he adds:—"In order to give a just idea of the event we are going to describe, it is indispensable, that the reader should be convinced of the importance of the position of Montenotte. It is composed of a small chain of heights situated on the summit of the Apennines, etc."

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(15) Las Cases (t. ii, p. 293) justly observes that differences will be found between the official reports of Napoleon and his account dictated and St. Helena. Among them be says is one resulting from the statement in the former, that Argenteau had but fifteen thousand men when he attacked Rampon; while he had left a division of ten thousand in the rear to maintain his communication with Colli at Ceva. And he adds that it was against this division of ten thousand men that Massena fired the first shot on the morning of the battle. It is obvious that in many respects Napoleon's reports were necessarily founded on what he supposed to be, at the time, the situation and intentions of his adversary,

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- (16) Jomini says (t. viii, p. 72): "The general in chief placed himself on a ridge in the centre of his divisions, the better to judge of the turn of affairs, and to prescribe the manœuvres which might become necessary."
- (17) Lockhart's account (v. i, p. 39) is a meagre and close imitation of sir Walter's—both intimating that Augereau's division was in the action, though they both assert the contrary immediately afterwards (v. iii, p. 106, and v. i, p. 40). It is but fair to acknowledge that on this subject Thiers is not behind the *British historians*, in solid information or vapid romance (t. viii, p. 231). He says—"Bonaparte that very night withdrew his right formed by the division Laharpe, at this moment engaged with Beaulieu along the coast, and advanced it by the route of Montenotte, in front of Argenteau. He directed on the same point the division Augereau, in order to support that of Laharpe. Finally he caused the division Massena to march

by a circuitous route across the Appennines, so as to gain a position in the rear even of Argenteau's corps. The 12th of April in the morning, all his columns were in motion : placed on a lofty hill himself , he saw Lakers and Augereau marching on Argentean." Now so far was Augereau from being with Laharpe and in the hattle of Montenotte, that a physical imposibility existed to prevent it. For on the afternoon of the 11th, as all esthorities agree in stating, his division was at Leann, from which places would have required a march of thirty-six miles through the Alos and appennines, between evening and day break in the month of April, to plan him in front of the Austrians with Laharpe, while this general had be about eight miles and Massena fourteen to reach their respective position. This wanton error of Thiers is the more exceptionable, as it assigns to bapoleon an overwhelming superiority of force in the battle, and efface from Augereau's conduct at Milessimo that colour of flerceness, which course. exasperated by emulation, would be likely to take, in a character so anistions, selfish, and yain.

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(48) This active and intrepid officer appears to have been but sementarily disabled on this occasion, for Napoleon in his report says :—"He soldiers believed him to be dead, but his wound is not dangerous," and the next day we find him engaged at the head of his brigade. Although he we under Massena's command in the battle of Montenotic, he seems to have been generally attached to the division of Augereau. However, from the prompt dispositions and rapid movements of the French commander and olumns, the brigades belonging to the several divisions in these Alpine opentions, were occasionally interchanged. Thus in the battle of Montenotics, the brigade Dommartin was with Massena, at Mondovi, with Serrurier.

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(19) In the original publication of this chapter it was stated, in conformity with previous accounts, that Stengel was killed on the spot in the charge on the rear of the retreating Sachinians. But he was morally wounded and survived two or three weeks; for in a despatch of the ma of May to the directory (Moniteur of the 10th May 1790), Napoleous said, "Citizen president; the brave Stengel has died of his wounds. I have forwarded to his family, the letter you addressed to him."

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(20) No kingdom was ever before conquered by troops in the state 2 parte's were in, during this victorious campaign against the kine of Sandous and his allies, in the close of which, as sir Walter Scott absence it is

p. 113), that monarch "had no means of preserving his capital, nay, his existence on the continent, excepting hy an almost total submission to the will of the victor." Their distress for subsistence and clothing is thus noticed by the Annual Register of the period. "No class of men had signalized their attachment to republican principles with such fervour and constancy as the French soldiery "". Hunger and nakedness had frequently been their portion in the midst of their most splendid successes. "" The army of Italy, in particular, had exhibited astonishing examples of fortitude in the most trying situations, that their enemies concluded, from the report of the difficulties to which they were reduced, in procuring the means of existence, that nothing else would be needed to compel them to abandon their positions and withdraw to France." The coarse and disgusting food on which they subsisted, was compared to the Lacedemonian broth of old, and none it was said, but Frenchmen, Greenlanders, or Scotch highlanders, could have fed on such messes."

The legions of Cæsar in the civil war, were reduced to great extremity while investing the camp of Pompey in the neighbourhood of Dyrrachium. and lived for the most part on bread made of the root of a plant called chara or wild cabbage. Loaves of this bread, the reader will remember, they were in the habit of throwing to the outposts of Pompey, in order to convince their adversaries that they were not likely to relax in their exertions, for want of food. But at this time Cæsar made no conquests. On the contrary Pompey made a sally in which he gained a victory, destroyed a number of Cæsar's best troops, and forced him to break up his camp, change the plan of the war, and march into Thessaly (Cæsar, Bello Civili, l. iii). In the Parthian war, Antony and his troops exhibited, under privations of this kind, great courage, fortitude and patience; but it was in a retreat, in which their efforts were confined to self-preservation, in which they suffered great loss, and the Roman soldiers pillaged their commander's tent (Plutarch, Life of Anthony). In sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna, although his troops came to their colours whenever the enemy appeared, and constantly repulsed, and finally defeated marshal Soult, the British commander had renounced all hopes of conquest and fought only for safety (Napier's Peninsular War, v. i, ch. 5). Bonaparte's short campaign of Montenotte and Cherasco, in which, with an army half as numerous as the one opposed to him, he subdued a strong kingdom in a fortnight, and, notwithstanding his exertions to procure regular supplies, comparatively speaking, without rations, cannon, or cavalry, stands alone in the annals of warfare.

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(21) Maria Louisa confessed to the emperor that when their marriage was first talked of, she experienced a certain insuppressible fright, in consequence of the bad terms in which she bad been accustomed to hear the members of Vol. 1.

her family speak of Napoleon, and that when she reminded them of it, he uncles, the archdukes, who urged her very much to consent to the uncles, replied, "All that was true only while he was our enemy, but he no longer our enemy now." "Indeed, to give an idea," said the empure, "of the benevolent feelings toward me in which that family was educated, there was one of the young archdukes who often burned his puppets, saying that he was reasting Napoleon" (Las Cases, t. i, pp. 418-19).

CHAPTER VII.

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(1) In weighing the severity of reproach and strength of denunciation to which a commander, while anxious to encourage the ardour and dere of his troops, ventured for the sake of their discipline and character; how sidering such expressions as these-" As to myself, and the general vis enjoy your confidence, we shall blush to command men without disclaim without self-denial, who acknowledge no right but that of the street "I will not suffer your laurels to be tarnished by a parcel of rol "Pillagers shall be shot without mercy or exception-" "Already at offenders have suffered death"—the reader will at .once perceive to falsification which they establish against the assertion of sir Walter and (v. iii, p. 93) repeated by Lockhart, and by the same important historian isterpreted to mean (v. i, p. 37) that Napoleon "accustomed his men to # lage at the obvious risk of destroying their character and discipline." The great novelist had this proclamation before him both in the Monitour of the 17th May 1796) and in Las Cases (t. ii, p, 284) as is evident from his frequent reference to those authorities, as well as from the fact of his affecting, in the passage of his work, now under consideration, to furnish his renders with its substance. This is the version be gives of this admirable evidence of his hero's probity and eloquence (v. iii, p. 121). "To encourage this arder, Bonaparte circulated an address in which complimenting the army most as victories they had gained, he desired them at the same time to comb thing as won, so long as the Austrians held Milan; and while the sales of those who had conquered the Tarquins were soiled by the presence of the assassins of Basseville. It would appear that classical allusions are either familiar to the French soldiers, or that without being more learned and others of their rank, they are pleased with being supposed to un them. They probably considered the cratory of their great less like words, and words of exceeding good command. The English self if addressed in such flights of eloquence, would e e lang

or supposed that he had got a crazed play-actor put over him instead of a general." To this, after several remarks upon the national vanity of the French, sir Walter adds the intimation, that the proclamation, instead of being "genuine eloquence," was "only tumid extravagance."

As to his ridicule of classical allusions the only one which it contains is so remarkably appropriate, that it must have struck full on the common sense and national feelings of the soldiers, even had they been recruits instead of volunteers and conscripts. There could hardly have been a man in the ranks, ignorant of Basseville's murder, or insensible to its alrocity, or unacquainted with the character of the war in which the French people were then engaged;—that is, that foreign kings, cruelly seconded by the pope of Rome, were endeavouring to resubject them to the modern Tarquins. It was impossible to represent to their minds these enormities in a manner more picturesque and energetic than was done by these words. "The assassins of Basseville still trample on the ashes of the conquerors of Tarquin."

The French army in 1796, instead of being a mass of ignorant recruits, was the élits of the nation, the most intelligent and enthusiastic youth of the population. As early as 1793, all the citizens between the ages of twenty and twenty-five inclusive, were called into its ranks; so that in the campaign of 1794. France was able to oppose to the coalition, which was not kept off by encircling seas, eight hundred thousand of her sons in arms; a burst of patriotism which no other country ever equalled. Hence sprung the best soldiers and most accomplished officers of modern times. General Daumesnil, the famous defender of the castle of Vincennes, was a common soldier in this very army of Italy. General Pelet, whose admirable historical work is known to all military readers, and referred to by sir Walter Scott himself, and who so nobly seconded Ney in his retreat (Victoires et Conquêtes, t. xxi, p. 280, et Norvins, t. iii, p. 455) mentioned to me that he joined the army with a knapsack on his back; yet in fourteen years the young conscript was a general of the imperial guard. Men of this stamp were not below the range of Napoleon's noble and glowing eloquence, nor likely to mistake it for the "tumid extravagance of a crazed play-actor."

Sir Walter Scott seemed to have forgotten that, in his preface to "The tales of a grandfather," dedicated to grandson Hugh Littlejohn Esq., he declares he found that a style considerably more elevated was more interesting to his juvenile reader. "There is no harm, but on the contrary there is benefit, in presenting a child with ideas somewhat beyond his easy and immediate comprehension." This is good sense; and appears fully to justify the style of Napoleon's proclamations. But there is better authority in its favor. Colonel Napier, a scholar and a soldier, in noticing one of Napoleon's addresses to his troops, says—(v. i, p. 312, 2nd ed.). "In the tranquillity of peace it may seem inflated, but on the eve of a battle it is thus a general should speak."

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(2) This historical reference of Napoleon is not strictly accurate. That VI-lars kept his army in positions on the Oglio and the Po, at the time aliased to was sorely against his will, and at the instance of the King of Sardinia, the was then in the French camp. Villars, though not aware of the value of the line of the Adige, was fully sensible of the importance of Mantus, and urging the propriety of laying siege to that fortress, maintained his spinion with such energy as to excite the displeasure of the monarch—(Mémoirus de duc de Villars, t. iii, pp. 290-92).

The manner in which sir Walter Scott, incorporates this reflection will his own fanciful narrative, shows that he felt himself at liberty to distance with error any subject which he chose to take up. (v. iii, p. 119.) * ht Bonaparte had studied the campaigns of Villars in these regions, and was at opinion that it was by that general's hesitation to advance boldly into Enly, after the victories which marshal de Coigny had obtained at Parma and Gontalla, that the enemy had been enabled to assemble an accumulating face before which the French were compelled to retreat." So far was this frum being consistent with the opinion of Napoleon, or the truth of history, that it is very certain marshal Villars, instead of declining to profit by the vistories of Parma and Guastalla, was dead and buried before they were galact. In consequence of age and infirmities, he resigned the command of the an to marshal de Coigny, on the 27th of May 1734, went to Turin, and d there on the 17th of June. Subsequently his successor fought the successful battles of Parma and Guastalla, and as Napoleon says, overlooked, like Villes had done before him, the great advantage of seizing the line of the Adias.

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- (3) Augereau, who is understood to have been one of these counselles, was extremely factious and disorganizing in his political temper, and as a general, anxious and desponding, even after the most brilliant success. See his character by Napoleon (Montholon, t. 3, p. 228).
- (4) "Relating at table one of his affairs in Egypt, the emperor maned on by one the different numbers of the eight or ten regiments that were engaged in it. Upon which Madame Bertrand could not refrain from interrupting him, by asking how it was possible, after such a lapse of time, to recall the different regiments to mind. 'Madame; it is the memory of a lover for his fermed mistresses,' was the ready reply of Napoleon.' (Las Cases, t. iv, p. 384.)

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(5) Letter of Napoleon to the Sardinian general in chief 2nd, of May 1786. (Correspondence inédite, t. i, p. 108).

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- (6) Jomini observes of this project (Guerres de la Révolution, t. viii, p. 111) that it "overleaped the bounds of prudence; "but he overlooked its distinctive features, as they are unfolded in Napoleon's letters to the directory and to Carnot of the 29th of April, and the 11th of May. From these documents it is clear, the project was based on the presumption that his army was to be immediately and strongly reenforced, that he would have taken Mantua, and that the armies of Jourdan and Moreau would have crossed the Rhine, and operated in concert with him, in the valley of the Danube. In the letter of the 11th of May he says expressly, "It is possible I may very soon attack Mantua. If I carry that place, nothing will prevent me afterwards from penetrating into Bavaria; and in three weeks I can be in the heart of Germany. I suppose at this very moment the armies of the Rhine are engaged in hostilities. Were the armistice to continue there, this army would be crushed. If the armies of Jourdan and Moreau do commence the campaign, I entreat you to keep me informed of their progress, in order that it may serve for a rule for me to determine, whether to penetrate into Bavaria, or confine myself to the Adige." Nothing can be more plain than the conditional character of this project, or more just than the note which Napoleon affixed at St. Helena to Carnot's despatch declining and deprecating its adoption. "Never was the madness committed of suggesting such a project, as long as Mantua was not taken, and the armies of the Rhine, had not arrived on the Danube." (MS. note to Carnot's despatch of the 7th May, 1796—furnished by general Pelet from Marchand's copy of the Correspondance inédite.)
- (7) I have seen no direct authority for carrying back to so early a period the conception of an expedition to the East, which eventually was directed against Egypt. But I can conceive no other object for the exaggerated value attached by Napoleon to this small island. The words-"In the course of events, may be of more value than Corsica and Sardinia both together," show that its importance was regarded as remote and contingent. Sir Walter Scott (v, iv, p. 44), Lockart (v. i, p. 123), and Norvins (t. i, p. 363), date its conception in September, 1797. Jomini (t i, p. 513) refers its origin particularly to Napoleon's letter to the directory of the 16th of August, 1797. It is remarkable, however, that the turn of expression used in the letter cited by Jomini, is the very same found in the one of April, which I have referred to, as may be seen by comparing them. In the letter of August, 1797, Napoleon when recommending an interference with the affairs of the east, and the taking possession of Egypt, says, "The islands of Corfu, Zante and Cephalonia, are of more interest to us than all Italy together." In the letter of April, 1796, he says, "The small island of St. Pierre may, in the course of events, be of more interest to us than Corsica and Sardinia both together " (Thibaudeau, Mémoires sur le Directoire, t. ii, pp. 343-4) refers it to the

period of the correspondence between Napoleon and Tallyrand. Upon the whole, it seems probable that an expedition somewhere to the Eastern shares of the Mediterranean, was thought of by Napoleon as early as April 1796. But absolute certainty on the subject being unattainable, each reader must judge for himself, as to the degree of probability which the suggestion have offered, carries with it.

(8) Letter from count Survilliers to the author.

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(9) Sir Walter Scott's account of the manner in which Napoleon surprised the passage of the Po, besides being very imperfect, is full of errors. Among them is the assertion (v. iii, p. 123) that Massena, aware of Bonaparte's diforts to mislead Beaulieu, assisted them by movements of his own. It is evident, nevertheless, from Massena's reports to Napoleon, and especially from that of the 6th of May, the very day the march for Placentia was conmenced, that Massena was as ignorant of the real project of Napolesa . Beaulieu was. In this report written at Alexandria he says, "I role along the Po and the Tanaro yesterday, and have seen but two boats. An offi of artillery arrived here yesterday charged to construct flying bridges. I know not what materials he will have, but I will render him all the antiance in my power." This shows that Massena supposed the feint of pering at Valenza was a serious intention; sir Walter also places the vangust of grenadiers under Andreossy instead of Lannes, and attributes the success of the bold undertaking of the French army to "the subtle genius" of the "subtle general." Had Napier recorded Napoleon's passage of the Pa, in would not have characterized it by a low and furtive epithet.

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(10) Wellington's passage of the Douro at Oporto, just thirteen years after Napoleon passage of the Po, approaches near to it in magnitude and difficulty, and exhibits, as described by Napier in his history of the penisular war (v. ii, b. 8, ch. 2) an admirable example of coolness, and city, and judgment, on the part of the English general. But the Douro is less rapid than the Po, and little more than half its width; and Soult, though in Oporto with his army, was known by Wellington to be surrounded by conspirators, and was moreover guilty of such gross negligence, that hat for his subsequent conduct, he might have been himself fairly suspected of treason.

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(11) Jomini in three of his works—Histoire des Guerres de la Révolution (t. viii, p. 115), Traité des Grandes Opérations (t. vii, p. 53), Alepstin

au Tribunal de César ou Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoléon (t. i, p. 98)
—notices the choice of Placentia as the place for passing the Po; and in the first and second censures it; alleging the Cremona was the true stratagetical point for the operation. But Napoleon, in his observations at St. Helena, on the Traité des Grandes Opérations (Montholon, t. i, p. 4), having exposed the futility of Jomini's objections, the latter, in the latest of his works, appears to admit, that under the actual circumstances of the occasion, which in fact constitute the entire case, Placentia was the true point of operation. This able and spirited writer seldom errs, except from the dogmatical application of absolute rules.

(12) Letter of Napoleon to the French minister at Genoa, 1st May 1796—
**Beaulieu passes the Po, and is going to seek in the lower end of Lomhardy, refuge from the French army. He told the king of Sardinia that he should not pull off his boots, until he got to Lyons; he does not take the right road."

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(13) This account of the active military operations by which Napoleon signalized his first day's presence on the left bank of the Po, is taken principally from his reports, and those of the commissary Salicetti, which are found in the Moniteur of May, 1796. It is one of the many proofs of sir Walter Scott's complete neglect of facts, that he describes the rencentre-of Codogno, and the death of Laharpe, as occurring in the day time (v. iii. p. 126, 7). The summary of Lockhart, the translation of Hazlitt and the sketch of Norvins, are indistinct and insipid. Jomini, in his Napoleon au Tribunal de Cesar, commits the gross error of representing Napoleon as staying two whole days at Placentia (t. i, p. 98).

In his report to the directory of the 9th of May (Moniteur of the 14th) written in the midst of these pressing operations, Napoleon says, "I recommend to the directory the son of general Laharpe for the place of lieutenant of cavalry."

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In his report of the battle of Lodi (Moniteur of the 20th May 1796) Napoleon says his column of attack was formed of grenadiers with the "2nd battalion of carabiniers in front." In the French service there are both horse and foot carabiniers, the latter being grenadiers of the light infantry.

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"When the officers of Alexander the great, dissuaded him from attempting

the passage of the Granicus, and particularly at a late hour of the day, he exclaimed—"The Hellespont would blush, if after having crossed it, i should be afraid of the Granicus."—Plutarch.

(16) Announcing to his readers a minute description of the battle of Loi, (v. iii, p. 128) the author of Waverley prefaces it by assuring them that the Adige falls into the Po at Pizzighitone, a town about thirty miles above its mouth; one of the obvious errors of the father-in-law most piously repeated by his son-in-law (Lockhart, v. i, p. 45). Another error into which Sir Water falls, requires more serious notice, because he founds on it a general prospective imputation of untruth against Napoleon, in reference to his military reports, and posthumous works. At page 134, this free and fancial historian says, "Bonaparte states that they only lost two hundred men during the storm of the passage. We cannot but suppose that this is a very mitigated account of the actual loss of the French army. So slight a loss is not to be reconciled with the horrors of the battle, as he himself detailed them is his despatches; nor with the conclusion, in which he mentions, that of the sharp contests which the army of Italy had to sustain during the campaign, nose was to be compared with "that terrible passage of the bridge of Lodi."

But the truth is Napoleon never "details" nor even mentions "the horrors of the battle " of Lodi in any of " his despatches." In that of the 11th of May (Moniteur of the 20th) he says, "Although, since the commencement of the campaign, we have had some severe affairs, and it has freque been necessary to expose the men to fire in the freest manner, none of our struggles have come up to the terrible passage of the bridge of Lodi." Here cartainly is no "detail" of the "horrors of a battle," implying a conflict and carnage of some duration. On the contrary, in the body of the same depatch, he had previously described the severity of the affair as existing early for a moment: "The grenadiers presented themselves on the bridge, which is two hundred yards in length; the fire of the enemy was terrible; a mement's hesitation, and all would have been lost. The generals, sensible of this, threw themselves in front, and decided the struggle while it was pr balanced. This formidable column overthrew every thing opposed to R: the enemy's artillery was instantly taken. In the twinkling of an eye, his army was completely dispersed. Salicetti's report is conceived in similar terms. "The charge was made with the rapidity of lightning." "The column hesitated for an instant, and renewing the charge carried the enemy's artillery in a moment." In his account dictated to Monthelen. (t. iii, p. 214) Napoleon who could not have foreseen a calumny of this kind says: "The column traversed the bridge at a running pace, in a few exconds, and was not exposed to the fire of the enemy except at the very moment when it wheeled to the left upon the bridge." All this shows that "the storm of the passage" was a momentary, but a terrible fire, which swept off in an instant from the head of the column, near two handred men. Now the head could only have been a small part of the whole column.

As the 2nd battalion of carabiniers was in front, let us suppose it constituted the head of the column, and was on the bridge. From a previous statement of Napoleon (Montholon, t. iii, p. 205) which is not disputed, we learn that the ten battalions of grenadiers collected at Tortona, composed a force of three thousand five hundred men. They had been marching and fighting ever since; but let us count the 2nd battalion of carabiniers still at three hundred and fifty men. Supposing them all upon the bridge when the Austrians fired, and we have more than half killed and wounded in a single instant! If this was not a severe affair, a hot fire, a terrible passage, it may be questioned whether the annals of war furnish any thing that is. In the battle of Pharsalia Cæsar lost but two hundred men, though the affair was so severe, that the brave Crastinus and thirty centurions fell (de Bello civili, lib. iii, p. 699).

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(17) In relation to the conduct of the French cavalry at Lodi, two great military authorities are opposed. Napoleon, who commanded the French army, says in his report of the action; "The ford being found very bad, the eavalry was greatly retarded and could not charge." Lockhart who edits the Quarterly Review (v. i, p. 47) describes the commander of the French cavalry as "pressing gallantly with his horse upon the Austrian flank."

(18) Neither in the report of Napoleon nor in that of Salicetti is it stated, that they were personally engaged in this charge; the former only saying that "The generals threw themselves forward," and that, "Salicetti was constantly at my side; the army is under real obligations to him." But at St. Helena some one having read an account of the battle of Lodi, in which it was said Bonaparte displayed great courage, and that Lannes passed the bridge after him; "Before me said Bonaparte with much warmth; Lannes passed first and I only followed him. It is necessary to correct that on the spot;" and the correction was accordingly made in the margin of the book (Hazlitt, t. i, p. 449.—Thibaudeau, Guerre d'Italie). In this extract first must mean before me; for in a despatch to the directory of the 22nd of July 1796 (Moniteur of the 1st of August) reporting a successful assault on the outworks of Mantua, Napoleon says, "The chief of battalion Dupas who commands the brave 5th battalion of grenadiers, is the same officer who passed the first the bridge of Lodi."

The word real, no doubt referred to the false credit that had been assigned to Salicetti and his colleagues at Toulon.

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(19) (Las Cases, t. i, p. 209).

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(20) After this anecdote, the author of Waverley lugs into his narrative, the following compliment to soothe the national vanity of his English countrymen (v. iii, p. 137.) "This somewhat resembles the charge which foreign tactitians have brought against the English, that they gained victories by continuing with their insular ignorance and obstinacy to fight as long after the period when, if they had known the rules of war, they english to have considered themselves as completely defeated." Such imperiments and bad taste deter imitation; or it might be said that this charge was nature made by the officers of the army or navy of the United States, neither as land nor water, on the lakes, nor on the ocean, at Saratoga nor at like Orleans.

" Testis Metaurum flumen et Asdrubal Devictus, et pulcher fugatis Ille dies Latio tenebris."

CHAPTER VIII.

PAGE 165.

(1) A degree of obscurity prevails respecting these transactions with Per arising in some measure from the indistinct position of the dake; which res from the feebleness of his character and resources. But the hostile miles of his designs and attitude are attested by two facts. One, that though vited by France and Spain, to join in the treaty of Basic he refused, that's refused to make peace with France; and the other, that in the appreach the French army under Napoleon, he employed the mediation of the Spenish minister, and solicited, not the immunities of neutrality, but a supersist of arms; as is attested by Napoleon's letter of the 6th of May, in seply to the Spanish minister at his Court. (Cor. inéd. t. i, p. 137). "As R ... neither with my disposition nor the intentions of my countryma, to inflat unneccessary injury or distress on the people of other states, I consent to suspend hostilities against the duke of Parma." Besides, he was evidently regarded as a belligerent by the directory. In their instructions to Napole of the 7th of May (Corr. ined. t. i, p. 152), which, though dated after Nopoleon had consented to the armistice, were written several days before the could have received notice of it, they thus express themselves: "As to the

nduct you are to hold towards the duke of Parma, it is just that he should y for his obstinacy in not separating from the coalition; his states ought to rnish all the supplies we stand in need of, with money besides. But our lations with Spain require that we should abstain from all unnecessary destation in his territory, and treat his dutchy with much more moderation, an the other possessions of our enemies.

Thus it appears that Napoleon, even before he was apprised of the precise two of his government, acted of his own accord in conformity with a sturusly inoffensive policy, and within the limits prescribed by his instructors—a fact which of itself would have been sufficient for his justifition.

Disregarding these circumstances, sir Walter Scott treats the subject in i peculiar historical manner, that is with spurious expressions of sentiment, d contradictory statements of fact (v. iii, p. 144). "But excepting Naples d Austrian Lombardy, no state in Italy could be exactly said to be at open ir with the new republic. Bonaparte was determined however, that this build make no difference in his mode of treating them. The first of these imbering potentates with whom he came in contact was the duke of Parma. Its petty sovereign, even before Bonaparte had entered Milan, had depreted the victor's wrath; and although neither an adherent to the coalition, r at war with France, he found himself obliged to purchase an armistice heavy sacrifices."

In the first sentence, Farma is included in the category of "states, which uld not be exactly said to be at open war with France," that is "could be actly said to be at secret war with France; while in the last sentence it is sitively affirmed that "the duke of Parma was neither an adherent of the alition nor at war with France." But the directory declared that he was obstinate adherent of the coalition; and sir Walter confesses he was actly at secret war with France.

Lockhart (v. i, p. 50), adopts the falseness of sir Walter's representation. zlitt, whose translation, like the original, which was dictated before sir alter wrote, contains nothing on the subject. Indeed the part of his work the relates to the campaigns of Italy, is too meagre and parasitical to reire further reference to it. Jomini, in his latest work on the subject, ie politique et militaire de Napoléon t. i, p. 99), says; "It was just that duke of Parma should pay for his attachment to the enemies of France." wrons merely mentions, and that very loosely, the fact and conditions of armistice. But Thiers disfigures his narration by alleging, that Napona affected displeasure at the duke's refusal to join Spain in the treaty of sle. The following letter from Napoleon to the directory of the 18th of ay, shows however, that his displeasure on the occasion was as sincere as was natural. "The duke of Parma is paying his contribution, he has aldy paid five hundred thousand francs, and he is exerting himself to pay rest. Our minister at Genoa is of opinion that we ought not to have

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made this prince pay any thing; but the Spanish ambassador at Turin, who has come here to see me, confesses that we have been moderate. I suspent, notwithstanding, the duke will complain; but toky did he refuse the mediation of Spain?"

(2) This subject has been grossly misrepresented both as to the facts and the principles which it involves. Sir Walter Scott dwells on it (v. iv, p. 146 to 152), as evidence of Napoleon's barbarism and rapacity. The impact of his disquisition is that works of art are not so much the property of their actual possessor, as of the civilized world; that consequently they had been, and of right should be, exempted from the chances of war, or even the qualities of transportation; that by the removal of statues and paintings from the places in which they were originally situated, the most favorable effects of light and shade, as well as the mental associations connected with their creation, are destroyed, and their power of imparting pleasure and reflectment diminished. But as usual his statements of fact are unfounded; and beconclusions, which, were his statements correct would be erromeous, are absolutely absurd.

In the first place, the objects of the fine arts, are, at least as accessible to the civilized world, in the gallery of the Louvre, as in the cabineteef Paras or the collections of private gentlemen in England. In the second place, scarcely any of the great pieces of sculpture of which Italy or any other country of Europe, boasts, are in their original places. It would be needless to mention the Apollo Belvedere, the dying Gladiator, the Venus, or the Laocoon. In the third place, several of the finest paintings which contains that country, are in danger of being lost, for want of removal; and though remaining in their original places, are unfavorably situated. The last apper of Leonardo de Vinci, already nearly ruined, and the Aurora of Guile, likely soon to be so, are notoriously ill placed. In the fourth place, it is ust easy to conceive that works of art which, by private individuals, are treated a commodities of bargain and sale, and transported, according to their capita or interest, from place to place, suffer abatement of dignity, preciousess, et safety, by being made considerations of national compact. Canova's Marcules adorns the palace of a Roman banker; would it depreciate the most of the work, or the fame of the artist, were it to be demanded and received by a polished conqueror, instead of ample territories or populous towns, # the price of forbearance and peace?

Sir Walter goes on to describe the affair, as if Napoleon had marched his army into Parma, and torn the paintings from the walls. But the truth is, it was an amicable transaction, fairly proposed on one side, and freely acceded to on the other, as the price of peace, given by the party who had most to lose by war, and accepted by the party who had most to gain. The fer of the duke to repurchase the St. Jerome shows that he did not think the paintings a sine qua non in the convention, and that the contribution of two millions of france, compared with his resources, was small.

At page 454, the author of Waverley says: "The classical prototype of Bonaparte in this transaction was the Roman consul Mummius, who violently plundered Greece of those treasures of art, of which he and his countrymen were insensible to their real and proper value." This modest reflection on "our polite neighbours," is repeated by Lockhart, who like his "classical prototype," says it was (v. i, p. 51), the duke of Modena, who offered two millions for the St. Jerome; thus betraying ignorance of the fact, that Correggio was the glory of Parma; an error it must be confessed, that smacks a little of Mummianism. What would be said of a French or American writer, who should represent the Waverley novels as the works of a great Irishman?

On the subject of these paintings, I have to refer to the work of a third north Briton, who to the nonsense of Scott and Lockhart, adds his own peculiar share of misstatement and defamation. His work is thus entitled: History of Europe from the commencement of the French revolution in 1789, to the restoration of the Bourbons in 1815, by Archibald Alison, F. R. S. E. advocate. At page 42 of his third volume, he alleges very gravely, that "Napoleon has himself confessed that this species of military contribution was unparalleled in modern warfare," and that "the duke offered a million of francs, as a ransom for the St. Jerome." In the very passage of Napoleon's memoirs which he refers to, the words are: "It was on this occasion that Napoleon imposed a contribution of objects of art for the museum of Paris. It is the first example of the kind to be met with in modern history. Parma furnished twenty paintings, at the choice of the French commissioners; among them was the famous St. Jerome. The duke caused two millions to be offered as a ransom for this painting."

Thus, while this writer reduces the duke's offer one half, he transforms Napoleon's assertion of merit into a confession of guilt. But some allowance is to be made for his errors in consequence of his "unparalleled" simplicity He obviously relies on the dutchess d'Abrantès and the memoirs "d'un homme d'État" as authorities, and supposes the trash of the latter to be the work of the Prussian statesman, prince Hardenburg. He labours also under the impression, that whatever pretends to be history, is history; a delusion from which his own work will infallibly preserve all his rational readers.

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(3) The interpretation given in the text to this letter, which is consistent with the plain meaning of its language, and the nature of the circumstances under which it was written, is violently at variance with that adopted by sir Walter Scott, who represents it (v. iii, p. 151) as the language of "insulting triumph," without stating however, in what the imputed insolence consists.

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(4) As a specimen of the careless statements and fallacious reasoning atmitted by the author of Waverley into his History, it may be mentioned, that
he describes the archduke as leaving Milan (v. iii, p. 139), in consequent
"of the passage of the bridge of Lodi, and Beaulieu's subsequent return to
Mantua." Whereas the archduke departed Monday the 9th of May, the day
before the battle of Lodi, and the day after the action at Fombio, (Missian
1st June 1796). It is obvious, that had he waited until he beard of the passage
of the bridge of Lodi and Beaulieu's subsequent retreat to Mantus, he such
have fallen into the hands of the French.

Again, from the admitted fact that the people of Milan "showed neither, joy nor sorrow" at his exit, sir Walter reasons that they felt neither. The natural conclusion is however, that as they did not express sorrow, they fill joy. But such is the difference between loyalty and truth.

The abject imbecility of the Archduke, in crying like a woman on the casion, is dignified by the author of Waverley into—"the royal pairwo observed to shed natural tears;" thus prostituting the noble languaged Milton, and profaning the grief of our first parents:

"Some natural tears they dropt, but wiped them soon."

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(5) Extract from the Gazette of Milan, (Moniteur 7th June 1796).

PAGE 171.

- (6) For the proclamation at length, with a number of official data, at taining the narrative in the text, see extracts from the Gazette of Min is the Moniteur of the 7th of June 1796.
- (7) This is reluctantly admitted by sir Walter Scott himself in the following distorted passage, in which the word obnozious is used instead of hostile (v. iii, p. 145). "To levy on obnoxious states or princes the passage of paying or accomodating troops would have been only what has been practised by victors of all ages." A graver if not a better authority for the practice is to be found in Vattel. "Instead of the pillage of the country, and defenceless places, a custom has been substituted more humans and more advantageous to the sovereing making war. I mean that of contributions." (B. iii. ch. 9, s. 165.) Alison, at page 48 of his 32d volume, is delivered of the following gross and emphatic misstalement "In the midst of the general joy a contribution of twenty millions of frames, of 800,000l sterling, struck Milan with astonishment and wounded the limited

in their tenderest part, their domestic and economical arrangements. So enormous a contribution upon a single city, seemed scarcely possible to be realized; but the sword of the victor offered no alternative; great requisitions were at the same time made of horses for the artillery and cavalry in all the Milanese territory; and provisions were amassed on all sides, at the expense of the inhabitants, for which they received nothing, or republican paper of no value." In the margin, he cites as authorities, Thiers and Jomainl, although they are far from supporting his error. In the proclamation (Moniteur 7th, June 1796), Napoleon and Salicetti say expressly, "It is this which has determined us to impose a contribution of twenty millions of francs, which will be apportioned among the different provinces of Lombardy." The proclamation, in which it is added that contributions in kind would be received for cash, is clear and persuasive, and to any impartial render, will justify the measure it announces and sustains the statement in the text.

But this historian is as rational in his views and elegant in his language, to be is faithful in his assertions. In describing Napoleon's military operations after passing the Po, he says (v. iii, p. 43), "On the 10th, Napoleon merched towards Milan, but before arriving at that city, he required to cross the Adda." How he was to reach Milan from the ferry of Placentia, or from Fombio, or Codogno, or Casal Pusterlengo, by crossing the Adda, all these places being like Milan itself, on the right side of this river, the Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, did not require to show. In the beginning of his work, he recommends it by a reference to more than two hundred different authorities for his statements, which, as far as relates to Napoleon are like those already exposed, for the most part, absurd or unfounded.

Were it not for the biographers of Napoleon, Scott and Lockhart, it would be matter of surprise, that in a country which boasts of Hume, Robertson, and Napier, such a writer as this should appear.

(8) Las Cases, (t. v, p. 77, and t. i, p. 226).

PAGE 172.

(9) Corr. inéd., t. i, p. 139.

PAGE 173.

- (10) Despatch of Napoleon to the directory 21st June in the Moniteur of the 2nd July 1796. Desjardins, t. iv, p. 131-33.
- (11) See Napoleon's letter on this subject to the minister of finance, dated the 21st May (Corr. inéd., t. p. 180.)
- (12) Letter of Napoleon to Carnot, 9th May 1796 (Corr. inéd. t. i, p. 138.—
 Montholon, t. iii, p. 219).

PAGE 174.

- (13) Lallement, the French minister at Venice, wrote to Napoleon under date of the 14th May, "The duke of Modena arrived here three days ap, with considerable treasures. He is avaricious, and has no heir but his daughter, who is married to the archduke of Milan. The more many you exact from him, the more you take from the house of Austria." (Cannied. t. i, p. 169.)
- (14) This distinction between the paintings obtained by negotiation with the dukes of Parma and Modena, and those taken under an order of the directory and by right of conquest, from the galleries of Milan, deserve to be attended to, because it has been generally overlooked. Sir Walter Scott represente the two cases, as constituting one process of sweeping rapine, and makes he hero equally culpable, whether acting of his own free will or under instructions from his government. That the reader may be able to impress clearly on his mind, the real character of the proceeding, it may be proper tools serve that Napoleon first suggested to the directory his design of extending monuments of the fine arts, in his letter of the 6th May published in the Moniteur of the 17th, and left unfinished in the Corr. ined. (t. i, p.136); and that the same subject is first mentioned by the directors in their two despatches of the 7th of May (Corr. ined. t. i, pp. 153,155). Consequently, although the design was original with the directory, it originated with Napoleon, and was sanctioned by his government.

PAGE 175.

(15) See Napoleon's despatch to the directory of the 9th of May, there of the directory to him of the 16th and 18th, that of Napoleon to Kellerman of the 9th of June, and that to Moreau of the 11th. (Corr. ined. t. 1.)

PAGE 176.

(16) The author of Waverley alleges (v. iii, p. 159) that Napoleon received this despatch at Milan while summoning his troops to "active exertises;" that is, at the time of issuing his proclamation. He received it however helen he entered Milan, as is evident from his answer of the 14th May, written from Lodi: "I have this instant received the courier who left Paris the 7th May, etc., etc." By disregarding the date of events, air Walter act only misrepresents their connection, but loses sight of their influence on the mind of his hero.

CHAPTER IX.

PAGE 178.

1. In relation to this famous despatch of the directory, sir Walter Scott nazards the following remark (v. iii, p. 159). "He received orders from Paris, which must have served to convince him, that all his personal enemies, all who doubted and feared him, were not to be found in the Austrian ranks." Could the despatch convince any one that either of the directors was Napoleon's personal enemy, it would still be ridiculous to suppose, that the Austrian general or any of his troops, were personally hostile to the French general. The whole of sir Walter's dissertation about the proect of the directors and Napoleon's dissent from it, is a tissue of puerilities. Iomini, in his history of the wars of the revolution (t. viii, p. 133), gives a natural account of the affair, condemning the plan of the directory and approving the conduct of Napoleon. Thiers does the same (t. viii, p. 274). Hazlitt, not altending to dates, postpones the subject till after the passage of the Mincio and the recall of Beaulieu (t. i, p. 461). But Norvins disfigures it excessively, representing Napoleon as assuming in his reply to the directory. the superiority of a dictator, and treating with them in the style of a sovereign. He cites several passages of the reply which are far from justifying his interpretation but omits the following which utterly destroys it. " In the present state of things in this country, it is indispensable that you should have a general in the full possession of your confidence. If he be not myself, I shall not murmur, but will redouble my zeal to merit your esteem in whatever other post you may confide to me." Does this language, or the fact of his committing his letter to the friendly discretion of Carnot. look like arrogance or dictation? The truth is it was impossible for a general endowed with the military sagacity of Bonaparte, and conscious of such great services and capacity, to express his refusal to cooperate in this ruinous project, with greater calmness of mind or moderation of manner than he actually exhibited.

PAGE 180.

2. The revolt of Pavia and the disturbances in the imperial fiefs, prevented, it will be found, the exact accomplishment of this conjecture.

PAGE 183.

3. In a MS. note which Napoleon wrote while at St. Helena, at the foot of his printed copy of the despatch of the 21st of May, in which the directors vol. 1.

give up the project of dividing his army, he says "Some attributed the order to a rising jealousy of himself, others to ignorance of the art of war, and of the scene of action"—and then adds—"However this may be, Napoleon in asking his recall rather than subscribe to a measure so disastrous, saved Italy and his army once more. Not a single soldier would have escaped from Italy." In his memoirs (Montholon, t. iii, p. 225), he says the successive tidings of the passage of the Po, the battle of Lodi, the occupation of Lombardy, and the truces with the dukes of Parma and Modena intoxicated the directory who adopted the fatal plan of dividing the army of Italy." This is a mistake and an obvious one, for the despatch announcing the plan of dividing the army (Corr. Inéd. t. i, p. 145) is dated the 7th of May, the vary day Bonaparte's vanguard passed the Po, and of course several days before the other events he mentions had taken 'place, much less, been communicated to the directory.

PAGE 184.

(4) See the letters of Napoleon to citizens Bonelli, Braccini, Paravisis, and Sapey, on this subject, all dated at Milan the 21st of May (Corr. Inid. L. i, pp. 182-83).

PAGE 185.

(5) The account, given in the text, of the origin and suppression of the insurrection of Pavia, is taken from the despatch of Salicetti of the 29th of May (Moniteur of the 10th of June) that of Napoleon of the 3rd of June (Moniteur of the 14th) from Jomini's history (t. viii, pp. 135 et seq.), and Montheles (t. iii, pp. 233-40).

PAGE 186.

(6) Extract of a letter from Berthier to Napoleon, dated, at Creme, the 24th of May, "In returning from Soncino I met your staff officer, who brought me your orders in pencil to send off for Milan during the night, the regiments of cavalry, two battalions of the 21st, one battalion of grandles, and four pieces of light artillery."

PAGE 188.

(7) Report of Berthier from Soncino 26th of May 1796 (Corr. Incl., Li, p. 212). The French include officers in their returns, whereas the English and Americans include only non commissioned officers.

PAGE 190.

- (8) The proclamation is found in the Moniteur of the 12th June, and is cited in Montholon (t. iii p. 240).
 - (9) Corr. Ined., t. i. pp. 153-200.

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CHAPTER X.

PAGE 192.

(1) Napoleon in his memoirs (Montholon, t. iii, p. 242) makes the Austrian reserve fifteen thousand strong. This his probably an error of the copyist or the printer; for otherwise the reserve would have been nearly half his army in the field, and there would have been only about fifteen thousand men for the right division under Leptay; the centre under Beaulieu and Pittoni, and the left composed of the divisions Sebottendorf and Colli.

Again; he says on the same page, that Pittoni had seven thousand men at Borghetto; so that the troops with Beaulieu in Valeggio, together with the divisions Liptay, Sebottendorf and Colli, only amounted to eight thousand; and Beaulieu would thus have near half his army in reserve, and near half the residue in his vanguard. Napoleon probably dictated ten thousand men. The error is less improbable as the number is printed in figures.

PAGE 193.

(2) These fine manœuvres, by which he introduced the battle of Borghetto, are not detailed by Napoleon in his memoirs, where (Montholon, t. iii, p. 242) he simply says that Beaulieu was induced, by various movements, into the belief that the French would endeavour to pass the Minslo at Peschiera. But they are related in his report to the directory of the 1st June, published in the Moniteur of the 12th. In regard to the division of Augereau, Jomini in his history (t. viii, p. 142) insists that he did not pass the Mincio at Borghetto, but near Peschiera, where he was detained by Liptay, until Beaulieu, had retreated from Villa Franca to Dolce. He repeats this statement in his Tratité des grandes opérations (t. vii, p. 75), but in his life of Napoleon (t. i, p. 111) abandons it, and silently adopts that of Napoleon.

PAGR 194.

(3) This is Napoleon's account of the passage of the Mincio, and of the admirable conduct of Gardanne and the grenadiers, as well as of the effect it had on the Austrians, both in his report already referred to, and in his Memoirs (Montholon, t. iii, p. 243). It coincides with that of Norvins (t. i, p. 135), of Desjardins (t. iv, p. 103), and of Jomini (t. viii, p. 141). Sir Walter Scott, however, rejects it, and omitting all mention of Gardanne and the grenadiers, says the French repaired the bridge before they passed the

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HAPTER XL

Page 139.

that the Memours of Napoleon Montholon, t. iii, p. 266) it is alleged that Massena their passession of Verona, on the 3rd of June. But this has serve of memory, or accidents for in his despatch of the dist of June from Pesamera Managers of the 12th . Napoleon says to the directory, "Gastel Massena, with his division, occupies Verona." There are other slight decrepancies between the narrative in his memoirs, and his report of the operations immediately after the passage of the Mincle. But they we not material. I have followed the official reports.

PAGE 201.

'2, This fact is related by Jomini with some pertinent details (Mission, t. viii, p. 158).

PAGE 202.

(3, Thiers (t. vifi, p. 294). Mémoires d'un homme d'état (t. 11, p. 267).

PAGE 206.

 lard. From this memoir, as well as from the papers taken by Moreau, on the 21st of April 1797 in the baggage waggon of the Austrian general Klingin, it appears that Pichegru had been in treasonable correspondence with the exiled princes, as early as the autumn 1795, and that the Austrian generals, the archduke Charles, Wurmser, Latour and Klingin, and the English envoys Wickham and Crawford, were privy to it. Intimations of its existence, before proofs were obtained, had reached the directory, who in consequence displaced Pichegru from the command of the army of the Rhine, and offered him the embassy to Switzerland (Thiers, t. viii, p. 208). They were naturally unwilling to have similar machinations carried on with their army in Italy, and in the line of country in which it was to operate.

The author of Waverley, paying no attention to these circumstances, ienounces the demand of the Directors for the removal of the Pretender from Verona, as an act of wanton cruelty. He also states that Louis the 18th joined the army of the prince of Condé, with the purpose "only of lighting as a volunteer, in the character of the first gentleman of France v.iii, p. 172)." The truth however is, that "the first gentleman of France v.iii, p. 172)." The truth however is, that "the first gentleman of France v.iii, p. 172). Montgaillard, who had the best opportunity of observing him at this period, in the memoir referred to, thus describes his military properties (p. 83). "This prince shudders at the sight of arms; and yet he has the name of Henry the 18th continually in his mouth. He is intriguing in peace, and imbecile in war."

- (5) Moniteur of the 17th of June 1796.
- (6) In his letter to the directory of the 7th of June, Napoleon says (Corr. incd., t. i, p. 233): "I am at this moment causing Peschiera to be put in a state of defence, and in a fortnight, it will require heavy artillery and a regular siege to take it." This measure, as well as the entrance into Verona and the occupation of a line of military posts in the Venetian territory, was amply justified by the free passage and unobstructed operation, which had been previously allowed to Beaulieu and his army. With respect to he conduct of Napoleon as a general, there can be no question, since the rafety of his army and the success of the war, were the great points which be was bound to pursue according to his best judgment, and as every step he took, was sanctioned by his government. But the right of the French government to the same military uses of the Venetian posts and territory as had been permitted to the Austrians, neutrality consisting in impartial lealing with powers at war, seems also clear and incontestable. Yet the proceedings of Napoleon, on this occasion, have not only been represented as lawless and atrocious in themselves, but as enormities for which he alone was accountable. These absurdities are found in their most glaring and repulsive shape in the work of sir Walter Scott (v. iii, ch. 5), and Botta's, History of Italy since 1789 (t. ii, 1. 7).

PAGE 208.

- (7) This account of the situation of Mantua, is taken chiefly from that dictated by Napoleon (Montholon, t. iii, ch. 7, sec. 8) after comparing it with Latour Foissac's in his justificatory memoir. It is surprising that with Napoleon's description before him, the author of Waverley should have placed Mantua, not on its own small island formed by the lakes of the Mincio, but below it, on the large artificial island called the Seraglio, which he describes as being surrounded by three lakes, instead of the lower Mincio, the Po, and the canal. (v. iii, p. 169.) "The town and fortress of Mantan are situated on a species of island five or six leagues square called the Seraglio, formed by three lakes, which communicate with or rather are formed by the Mincio and the Po." It might have been supposed that "the Aristo of the North," however abusive of his readers' confidence, and distrible on most occasions of fact, would have felt proper respect for the birthplace of Virgil.
- (8) Jomini (Guerres de la révolution, t. viii, p. 161) rates the garrisse et thirteen thousand, and the number of guns mounted as early as the 4th of June, at three hundred and sixteen. Napoleon (Montholon, t. iii, p. 250) makes the garrison at the same period, fourteen thousand effectives, of when ten thousand only were then under arms.
 - (9) Jomini, Histoire, t. vili, p. 161.

PAGE 209.

(10) Report of Napoleon to the directory dated the 8th of June. Mealler of the 17th.

PAGE 210.

(11) Idem.

PAGE 211.

- (12) Reports of Augereau and Berthier of the 5th and 7th of June (Cart-Inéd., t.i, pp. 255-58).
- (13) The destruction of Beaulieu's army in rendering it necessary to detach a new force under Wurmser, from the upper Rhine, is admitted to have caused the cabinet of Vienna, to renounce their plans of effective operations on the side of Germany. The letters of the directory abundantly prove, that without the funds furnished by Bonaparte, their armies on the Rhine could not have assumed the offensive, at the soonest until after hervest. See for example their despatch of the 18th May (Corr. inid., t. i, p. 199).

CHAPTER XII.

PAGE 216.

entions (Guerres t. viii, p. 149) and repeats (Traité des grandes ii, p. 85), that ever since the murder of Basseville, an open isted between France and Kome, and that Pius the 6th had crusade against the republic, exhorting the faithful to combat the throne and the church. Napoleon, in a despatch of the 1s the directory (Corr. Inéd. t. i, p. 230) in speaking of the mistice with Naples; "Already the court of Rome is emring a bull against those, who under pretence of zeal for reching up civil war with France."

PAGE 217.

amber it is probable, the division of Serrurier, blockading out seven thousand strong, though not specified, was in-

's apprehensions on the score of the autumnal climate in the aly, correspond with the experience of Cæsar, who says that r quitting, as the French army had done, the healthy districts in, suffered much from the climate in the southern extremity gravis autumnus in Apulia circumque Brundisium, ex saluet Hispaniæ regionibus, omnem exercitum valetudine tencivili, Lib. 111, C. 2.

PAGE 220.

lated the 7th and 8th of June. In their despatch of the roving the armistice with Naples, the directors say: "The eccived, citizen general, your letters from Verona of the 3rd, of the 4th, and from Milan of the 7th and 8th of June." Of te letters to Carnot and Clarke of the same dates must also ved.

PAGE 224.

tifies these severe measures by very sufficient reasons drawn s which the insurgents had perpetrated, and the exposed siench army on the Adige, with the Austrians collecting in its spirit of exterminating revolt, raging in its rear. (Guerres te). 552

(7) See his order to Berthier of the 16th June. (Corr. Ined. t. i, p. 244)

PAGE 225.

(8) Desiardins (t. iv. p. 121).

PAGE 226.

- (9) Letter from Napoleon to the directory of the 15th of June, published in the Moniteur of the 26th. In their reply of the 22nd, the directory says "The column you sent toward the lake of Como, produced the effect yes calculated upon, and gave uneasiness to the enemy for Snabia." (Cor. ined. t. i, p. 283).
- (10) In the memoirs of Napoleon (Montholon, t. iii, p. 256) Augusta's passage of the Po, is dated the 14th by mistake. In his despatch of the 21st of June (Moniteur of the 2nd of July) it is dated the 16th.

PAGE 227.

(11) Napoleon's despatch above mentioned, in which this singular summons and surrender are reported.

PAGE 230.

(12) In a letter of the 30th of June to Napoleon, (Corr. Ined. L. i, p. 305)
Augereau, speaking of the clergy of Ferrara, calls them: "Monsion to
Cardinal and his infernal clique."

PAGE 231.

(13) See the order Leclerc. (Corr Inéd. t. i, p. 275.)

PAGE 235.

(14) For the details of this expedition to Leghorn and of Napoleon's will to Florence, see his despatch of the 2nd of July, in the Moniteur of the 12th, and consult the following references; Corr. Inéd. t. i, pp. 149, 282, 345. Las Cases, t. i. pp. 148, 49, 50. Montholon t. iii, ch. 8. sec. 5 and 6.

In Scott's life of Napoleon, the character of both events, is of course discoloured (v. iii, p. and 177 et. seq). The expedition is described as undertaken and executed voluntarily by Napoleon, when in truth it was expressly and repeatedly ordered by the directory, who although they were induced to vevoke their instructions on other points, insisted on the march, some or lakes, to Leghorn. (C orr. Inéd. t. i, p. 203). In the same work it is pretended, that the French government had no cause of complaint against Tuscany. Yet as early as the 7th of May, they state a very material cause in the following clear and specific instruction to their general (Corr. Inéd. T. 1, p. 149)

This is the conduct, you are to pursue at Leghorn and in Tuscany. You are to make the expedition a collateral project and to enter Leghorn when you are least expected. The republic is not at war with the grand duke, and t is important to preserve our relations with him. But his minister at Paris loes not conceal the constraint in which his country is held by the English, nor the tyranny they exercise in the port of Leghorn. It becomes the republic o free him from this subjection, and it is of especial importance, that our national flag should be respected in the ports of Tuscany. Let your troops enter Leghorn under that discipline, which commands confidence, and is indispensable in neutral countries. Notify the grand duke, of the necessity which compels us to march into his territory, and to place a garrison in Leghorn. Calculate the departure of your courier and the arrival of your troops, in such a manner, that your courier shall reach Florence, at the time or but little before your troops enter Leghorn." This instruction is repeated in the despatches of the 15th, 18th, and 21st of May and 11th of June, and, as the reader has seen, was not transgressed by Napoleon.

In addition to the assertion of the directory that the Tuscan minister at Paris confessed his master's inability to maintain his neutrality at Leghorn, we have the assertion of Napoleon at St. Helena, that Manfredini the prime minister of the grand duke made the same confession to him. This, though admitted by sir Walter Scott, is thus perverted by him, (v. lii, p. 178) "While Manfredini, the Tuscan minister endeavoured to throw a veil of decency over the transactions at Leghorn, by allowing that the English were more masters in that port, than was the grand duke himself." Thus, if two opposite parties in a controversy, agree in a particular statement concerning it, one is endeavouring "to throw a veil of decency" over the conduct of the other. The habitual excesses of British naval commanders in neutral ports, at the period alluded to, were notorious in Europe and America.

[It would be useless to disentangle the confusion or expose the injustice of this part of sir Walter's work at length. But there are two misrepresentations which deserve notice, one on account of its bold absurdity, the other, of its sly unfairness.]

The first is thus presented to the world, (v. iii, p. 178). "Bonaparte, during an entertainment given to him by the grand duke at Florence, received intelligence, that the citadel of Milan had at length surrendered. He rabbed his hands with self-congratulation, and turning to the grand duke observed, 'That the Emperor his brother had now lost his last possession in Lombardy.'" Whether the slander be original or derivative, it falls to the ground before the fact, that poleon and the grand duke both knew, at the very time spoken of, that Mantua, the most important of all the Austrian possessions in Italy, the citadel of Lombardy in fact, still belonged to the Emperor.

The second exemplifies one of the most reprehensible of sir Walter's historical tricks, which consists in employing, by dexterity of phrase, Napo-

leon's own authority to countenance libels on his character. After themcreated anecdote just quoted, the author of Waverley makes this med aflection. "When we read of the exaction and indignities to which the same reduce the weak, it is impossible not to remember the simile of Nagel himself, who compared the alliance of France and an inferior state, wa giant embracing a dwarf. The poor dwarf, he added, may probably be at focated in the arms of his friend; but the giant did not mean it and on not help it." Now in this case France made no exaction of Tunesty, a was the grand duke treated as an ally; but as a neutral too feeble to m tain his neutrality. Nor had the remark of Napoleon, either in into in fact, any application whatever to the grand duke or his possessions. It was on the contrary a hypothetical remark made in reference to the su situation of the king of Sardinia. In speaking of his different negotiations is 1796, (Montholon t. iii, ch. 13, sec. 2), Napoleon demonstrates the at of the project, which many of the leading politicians in France embraced, & dethroning the king of Sardinia, alleging that he himself preferred as 45 ance with that prince, and that he answered the opposite assumptions in the manner: "If it is true that the king cannot maintain himself, when plant between the democratic republics of Liguria, Lombardy and France, his all will be the result of the nature of things, and not of policy on our past da character to alienate our allies the kings of Spain and Prussia." Then it illustration of this hypothetical observation, he says he added: "The ance of France with Sardinia, is a giant embracing a pigmy. If he suffe him, it is against his will, and altogether owing to the extreme different of their organs." The reader will perceive that an observation made by Mepoleon to prevent violence to the king Sardinia, is perverted by his biograph into a species of proof, that he perpetrated injustice and indignities age the grand duke of Tuscany.

This trash is of course reproduced by Lockhart (v. i, p. 59). Thiers all into the gross error of asserting that Napoleon, who knew so well the value of time, and on this occasion had so little to spare, staid several days at Florence, (t. viii, p. 307), and still alleges that he was absent from his army only "about twenty days;" when the truth is that he was but one day at Florence, and was absent from his army, thirty.

Page 237.

(15) Letter of Napoleon to the directory of the 14th of July, and Appercau's report to Napoleon of the 8th. (Corr. 1888 t. i, pp. 321, 374).

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APPENDIX,

CHAPTER XIII.

PAGE 239.

tle fought by Labienus against the people of Paris (Lutetia) soldiers to behave as if they were under the eyes of Casar ortatus milites ut ipsum Casarem, cujus ductu sæpe numero ent, præsentem adesse existimarent." (De Bello Gallico,

PAGE 240.

etails of this affair; which is not mentioned by Scott, Lock-, see Massena's report to Napoleon of the 28th of June (Corr. 10), Napoleon's to the directory of the 6th of July (Moniteur mini's History (t. viii, p. 157) and Desjardins (t. iv, p. 164), eneral "means, not Melas, but undoubtedly Wurmser, who mmand on the upper Rhine to general Latour on the 18th et out for Italy. (Jomini's Histoire, t. viii, p. 203).

details authority may be found in the despatches of Napoand 12th of July (Corr. Inéd. t. i, pp. 315-18).

tisition, with the application of Napoleon prefixed, may be he Corr. Inéd. (t. i, p. 274). Its failure is ascertained by ches of the 30th of June and 17th of July in the same volume, from the last of which it appears, that of another reenforce-or Italy, two thousand men were given to Kellermann.

PAGE 241.

icts here stated see Napoleon's letters of the 7th, 8th and 9th Venetian proveditore, (Corr. Inéd. t. il, pp. 332-33,) his desectors of the 12th of July (p. 320) and his letter of reprehenent (p. 276).

PAGE 243.

lays after the sortic of the 16th the governor received a mesmser announcing his arrival in the Tyrol, and promising him .'' (Jomini's Histoire, t. viii, p. 162.)

a facts authority is found in the letters of Napoleon to Bernd Bonelli (Corr. Inéd. t. i, pp. 335, 36, 37, 38). In the inappropriate reference, which sir Walter Scott makes to I efforts for the recovery of Corsica, (v. iii, p. 224,) he re-

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Ones sering more facts. In appears protonic, that had ar Walter not began as to tend or by solidly impening to be here, want of affection for the tend of the expedition again. Corners as format to for the opposite shader; would have represent the poless, as the two first Georges were represented, with personal interests, and with wasting in the recovery of Corner, manual what second have been employed in the war against Americ, and the fence of France.

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5 Mémoires de Napoléon Montholon L. i.i., p. 269,

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'9 Despatch of Napoleon, 22nd of July, published in the Monitour of the M of August, and his letter to Josephine of the 18th of July, in the collection published in 1833, by F. Didot frères, in two volumes. Having referred by these volumes as authority, it may be proper to observe that the letters of Napoleon hear internal evidence of authenticity in most instances, and in all, as far as I can judge, with the exception of their dates, an exception, and applying to the one referred to in this note.

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'10 At an advance I state of his work, (v. iii, p. 336,) the author of Water-ley introduces what he calls, "Napoleon's Amatory correspondence with Josephine," and proceeds at once to the commission of blumders and called nies. Among the former, is the assertion, that "Bonaparts was yet a belief

groom" though he had now been maried two years and upwards. But Josephine joined him in Italy early in July 1796, that is about four months after their marriage, and from that time to the period of which sir Walter is here treating, that is between April and October 1797, had never left Italy. Again, the interval from March 1796 to the signature of the treaty of Campo Formio, October 1797; he calls "two years and upwards." The truth is that, in two years and upwards after his marriage, Napoleon had embarked for Egypt.

The principal calumny is put forth in the following terms (p. 338). "We cannot suppress the truth that (in passages which we certainly shall not quote) it (the Amatory Correspondence) carries a tone of indelicacy, which notwithstanding the intimacy of the married state, an English husband would not use, nor an English wife consider as the becoming expression of connubial affection." The only authority for this reluctant "truth," is a London publication containing letters of which he says "there is no reason to doubt the authenticity." The then adds a specimen affording reasons "plenty as blackberries" not for doubting their authenticity, but proving their spuriousness. For example, Napoleon is made to say: "I am at Port Maurice near Oneille; to-morrow I shall be at Albenga," and, "I am pretty well satisfied with Beaulieu: if he alarm me much, he is a better man than his predecessor." As Bonaparte arrived at Albenga the 5th of April, this letter could not have been written later than the 4th, about a week after he took command of his army, and before he had in the remotest manner felt Beaulieu; who did not move any part of his line from their winterquarters, until the 5th (Jomini histoire t. 8, p. 64). This absurd misrepresentation, in which, upon the supposition that the letters were genuine, no allowance is made for the effect of translation, or for the difference of national temperaments and manners, acquires, as may be supposed, no mitigation of folly or falsehood, in passing into the management of Lockhart (v. 1, p. 108). "It would be painful to show, as might easily be done, from this correspondence, the original want of delicacy in Napoleon's mind. Many of his letters are such as no English gentleman would address to a mistress." The modest felicity, with which these loyal authors assume, as the standard of delicacy, the habits of English love, reflected so fairly in "The amatory correspondence" of the duke of York, cannot be too much admired.

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(11) Enough has been said to show that this is the character attributed to him by the three Scotch historians, Scott, Lockhart and Alison. Botta, in his history of Italy from 1789, treats of these abuses at Leghorn, in a manner most disgustingly unfair (t. 2, p. 49). In reference to the frauds alleged to have been practised in selling, for the benefit of the army, the property which was seized and confiscated, he says: "The sale of the property which

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had been seized, was conducted with a great deal of fraud by the agust in whom it was confided. The interest of the conquerors suffered particularly, and this republic which triumphed over foreign soldiers, could not triumph over its own thieves. Belleville, the French consul at Leghorn, and Boneput himself, were very indignant, and made great complaints about it, the first from a sentiment of honour, that was proper to him; the second became he saw this pillage was indulged at the expense of his army. On his part, pneral Vaubois, who had been appointed by Bonaparte governor of Leghen. was ashamed of these dilapidations, and exculpated himself from the in putation of them, as he would of an infamous crime. In a word, the wiskedness which dictated the occupation of Leghorn, was introduced into all the transactions resulting from it, and only served to place in a more strong light the virtue of Vaubois and Belleville." Yet we find Napoleon, when conduct is unfavourably compared with the bonour of Believille and the virtue of Vaubois, writing to the latter on the subject of these very about: "While we seek to promote the interest of our own country, we could be he generous and just. The vexations committed against the committed Leghorn, have occasioned me as much distress as surprize."

Alison's misrepresentations are still more extravagant and abourd. (v. II., p. 63 note). The rapine and pillage of the French authorities, consequent on this irruption into Tuscany, knew no bounds. "If our administrative conduct," said Napoleon to the directory, "was detestable at Leghern; our political conduct towards Tuscany has been no better." His views establed even farther, for; on the 25th of July, he wrote to the directory: "Reputs are in circulation, that the Emperor is dying; the grand duke of Tuscany, the heir to the throne, will instantly set out for Vienna. We must established him by taking military possession of the whole of Tuscany." The meaning of the former part of this, when connected with the words "his views extended even farther," though dim, undoubtedly connects Busparte's spirited denunciation of the malversations at Leghorn into a surfession of having authorized them.

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(12) Botta calls this an act of treachery to the grand duke, (t. ii, p. 20), not perceiving, apparently, that it was directed against him as Emperor, and not as grand duke. Had Tuscany belonged to the Emperor Francis, on it be supposed that the French, who were at war with him, would not be entitled to take possession of Florence, as they did of Milan. The right was the same whether the Emperor was Francis or Ferdinand. In the same purblind and distorted style, this subject is treated in the manneires of the homme d'Etat, (t. iii, 419). For Napoleon's letter to the directory, that order to him, and his letter in consequence of it, to the French minister it Florence; see Corr. inéd. (t. i, pp. 324, 357, 402).

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(15) Desjardins, t. iv, p. 115. He cites the orders referred to in the tent. That of the 6th of July, which is transcribed, may be found in the Corr. Inéd. (t. i, p. 331).

CHAPTER XIV.

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- (2) For a detailed narrative of the operations of the French and Austrian armies on the Rhine in the campaign of 1796 up to the middle of July, the reader is referred to the history of the wars of the revolution by Jomini (t. viii, ch. 58-59), and the Memoirs of Napoleon (Mentholon, t. iii, ch. 14). By comparing them with the events, during the same period of Bonaparie's campaign in Italy, he will perceive that the influence attributed in the text to the latter, on the course of the war in Germany, is not overstated.
 - (2) Annual register for 1796—State papers, p. 280.

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- (3) Mémoires de (Napoléon Montholon, t. iii, p. 272). It has been already mentioned, that about the middle of May, eight thousand five hundred men had been detached from the army of the Alps to the army of Italy, but that they were employed almost entirely in garrisoning thelarge and numerous fortresses ceded to the French in Piedmont, conquered by them in Lombardy, and occupied at Leghorn. As to the reenforcements from the interior of France, which had been continually promised by the directory, the first notice of the arrival of any part of them that occurs in the official correspondence, is found in Napoleon's letter to the directory of the 13th of August (Corr. Inéd., t. i, p. 439): "I wait for the succour you announce to me; as yet very little has arrived." This was a week after Wurmser's defeat at Castiglione. It is true, however, that from the various depôts of the army in Italy, in Provence, and the maritime Alps, small parties of convalescents, volunteers or recruits, were occasionally received at Milan, mustered, and forwarded to the army in the field. But these were supplied from the district under Napoleon's command, and from resources belonging to his army, and were not more than sufficient to make up for the ordinary wear and tear of the service.
- (4) Mémoires de Napoléon (Montholon, t. iii, p. 273). In this passage, Napoleon estimates his army of observation at thirty thousand present under arms, and that of the siege at between seven and eight thousand; which falls two thousand below the statements in his letters to the Directory of the 6th and 12th of July 1796. (Corr. Inéd., t. i, pp. 315-18.) in the former of

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which the division of Sauret is, by a typographical error in figures, make eight instead of three thousand. Jomini makes the two armies forty two thousand strong (t. viii, p. 305).

Again, Napoleon estimates the force of Wurmser at eighty thousand, he garrison of Mantua included, but the numerous sick of that garrison net included (Montholon, t. iii, p. 272). At page 322 of the 4th volume, he pas it down at between seventy and eighty thousand exclusive of the garriers of Mantua altogether. And at page 8 of the 1st volume, he says Wurmer had eighty-five thousand men exclusive of the garrison of Mantua which he states at fifteen thousand. But this was his first rough estimate from memory, upon hearing Jomini's under statement read. However, this last stimate includes the reserve of ten thousand men, left by Wurmser in the Tyrol, while the two former refer only to the force with which he invalid Lombardy. So that, substantially, they all agree. Jomini, both in his his tory (t. viii, p. 302) and in his Traité des grandes opérations (t. vii, p. 251), estimates Wurmser's whole force collected in the Tyrol, at sixty thousand men; and of course, as he left a reserve of ten thousand at Trent, the army with which he marched to the relief of Mantua, was only fifty thousand strong. In the Traite des grandes opérations (t. vii, p. 250), he gives Mepoleon an active force of thirty one thousand two hundred men, independently of the 85th, two thousand eight hundred strong, which joined him in time for the battles of Lonato and Castiglione, and raised his fighting forth to thirty four thousand, besides Serrurier's division, which had now &continued the siege. This inferiority, less than two to three, is inconsistent with the infinite credit and great results he attributes to the operations of Napoleon, while it implies against Wurmser, a degree of folly in dividing his force into three columns, that amounts to madness, when it must be presumed that he knew exactly the strength of his own army, and prehably exaggerated the force of his adversary. It may be remarked too that, while Jomini gives the muster rolls of the French army, he offers nothing but a rough estimate of the Austrian. So that his enumeration is liable to three objections; one, that it is inconsistent with admitted facts in his parrative; another, that it is inconsistent with the reputation and experience of Warnser; and the third that it is loose and conjectural, when, as he was in conmunication with the Austrian generals and archives, it might have been authentic and exact. Further; Jomini admits (Histoire, t. vili, p. 263) that Wurmser brought into Italy from the upper Rhine, from twenty-eight to thirty thousand men. He says (Traite des grandes opérations. L. vii, p. 283) that even after the disastrous campaign of Wurmser, the Tyrolesa provinces, "still offered incalculable resources to repair his losses." Beaulicu, after all his defeats, wrote to the Aulic council that he had twenty thousand men. So that here were, besides the incalculable resources of the Tyrol, forty-nine thousand men; even if Beaulieu did not underrate his force. Let us add to these the numerous wounded who would in the

months leave the hospitals, and we would have a force of fiftymen, exclusive of the incalculable, and at that time untouched, the Tyrol to make up with recruits and detachments from other two months, only five thousand men. This is incredible, and sively that Jomini understates the Austrian force.

s estimate is consistent with the events of the campaign, and r of Wurmser. In reference to that of Jomini, he makes serations that appear to be just. The first is, that he relied too reports of the Aulic council, who endeavoured to palliate the their defeats. Another, that Wurmser was an experienced solod officers under him, and knew well that his plan of operations ensive, but thought it justified by his immense superiority of then adds, in relation to Jomini's general narrative of this cam-Wurmser had had but an equal force, or only an inferiority of e would not have extended his line so far. If he had lost as few officer seems to think he did, at Lonato and Castiglione, he have abandoned the line of the Mincio. He would have mainelf there, with his left resting on Mantua, his right on Peschiera, ig this fortress, would have saved the honour of his arms. But ere too considerable, and he was obliged to retreat to the Tyrol n Italy." (Montholon, t. i, pp. 8, 11.)

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assertion that Napoleon's force had been augmented by reento an amount but little more than sufficient to garrison his forto supply the consumption of disease and battle, may appear inwith the previous statement (chapter 9) that the whole force with aediately after the revolt of Pavia, the contest with Beaulieu was wed, was about thirty thousand men; that whole force including division. But, at that time, Despinois was at Milan; whereas he her reducing the castle, rejoined the army with five thousand men; actual addition to Napoleon's army, was the difference between er and the division Serrurier, or two thousand five hundred

as the 28th of April (Corr. Inéd. t. i, p. 93) the Directory says: "It n that, convinced of the absolute necessity of the measure, we nted to retain the troops under general Châteauneuf-Randon.' gress of the correspondence this corps is repeatedly asked for by and as often promised by the Directory. Still on the 25th of g after the battle of Castiglione, Napoleon writes (Corr. Inéd., t. i. 'The arrival of no part of the division of general Châteauneufas yet been announced to me. Only the 10th regiment of the undred strong has arrived at Nice." As to their demands of ı.

money, the Directors, after having received twenty millions from Raly, is vited Napoleon by letter to send a gratuity of six thousand frames, in the indulgence of a fanciful philanthropy, to the monastery of St. Bernard. (Car. Inéd., t. i, p. 343.)

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(6) Extract of Massena's report made the night of the 29th July: "Our troops are harassed, they are absolutely exhausted, having fought mere the fifty different combats. I have never seen the Austrians fight with such fary. They were all drunk with brandy. Our men, though fasting, fought with astonishing courage. If you will send me a reenforcement of seven er eight thousand men I will almost promise to reoccupy the Corona to morrow; but they must be fresh troops. I have just sent to see if the enemy are in the neighbourhood of the Chiuza.—I sleep at the bridge, Pigeon and Victor & Rivoli. Jouhert is sick.'' (Corr. Inéd., t. i, p. 413.)

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- (7) General Sauret, in a letter of the 3rd of August, in which he endeavours to excuse himself for having abandoned Salo, after disengaging pneral Guyeux, says,—"I have learned with pain that you are dismissible withmy having abandoned Salo, after taking it. You ought to recollect general, that for a moment you were undetermined whether I should go there, and that you decided afterwards that, if it was for nothing but to relieve general Guyeux and his troops, I should go." From this it would seem that even then Bonaparte began to doubt the value of Salo as a position in his questions. In his observations at St. Helena on this campaign (Montholes, t. iv, p. 328), he says: "It must be confessed that the position which Saurat half at Salo defended and covered nothing; and that this division was hadly peth?" it having been occupied though, and become a point of contact, he thought it necessary to hold it. It was at one extremity of the line to be defined, whereas the proper position would have been in the centre of that then st Guardo.
- (8) Napoleon in his memoirs (Montholon, t. iii, p. 279), speaking of the affair of Salo, says that general Guyeux with but fifteen hundred men, "contended for forty-eight hours, against a whole Austrian division which five times assaulted him and was five times repulsed. Samet arrived at the very moment they were making a last effort, fell on their fink, and defeated them entirely, taking colours, cannon and prisoners." This is confirmed by his official report of the 6th of August 1798 (Monteur of the 15th): "Sauret succeeded completely in delivering general Guyeux after having defeated the enemy, taken two guns, and two hundred prisoners. General Guyeux and the troops under his orders held out forty-eight hours without bread, and constantly engaged in fight with the enemy." With

regard to the two colours taken by Sauret, there is a letter from that general of the 17th of August, written for the purpose of establishing that fact: "I have the honour to inform you, general, that the two colours I took from the enemy were carried to Castiglione by two chasseurs of the 24th. Their receipt is acknowledged by the signature of an adjoint, at the foot of an order of route. I have had the two chasseurs brought before me, and they say, they were delivered to an officer of the staff, a person of middle size, of pale complexion, and with the pocket flaps of his coat embroidered."

(9) Las Cases, t. v, p. 266.

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(10) In the Correspondence Inédite (t. i, p. 398), where this letter is found, it is dated the 4th Thermidor or 22d of July, evidently by mistake, as its contents prove it was written the 1st of August, the day Napoleon entered Brescia.

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(11) Moniteur 14th of August, 1796. It may be well to remark, that when a letter is cited in this work, without a special reference in the notes, it may be found in the Correspondance Inédite, or the Moniteur.

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(12) Report of Napoleon of the 6th of August, Moniteur of the 15th.

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(13) Jomini in describing this evolution (Traité de t. vii, p. 266) affirms "This movement, which would have disconcerted an ordinary general, appeared to him on the contrary, a sure guarantee of victory."

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(14) In his official report, already referred to, Napoleon says: "Junot wounded the colonel whom he wished to take prisoner, when he was himself surrounded, and after having killed with his own hand six of the enemy, was overcome, thrown from his horse into a ditch, and wounded with six sword cuts, none of which I am allowed to hope is mortal." His secretary, in a dispatch of the 5th, to the commissaries at Milan says: "Junot, who will arrive at Milan some hours after this letter, has received six sabre wounds, three on his head and three on his arms. Though severe they are not dangerous."—Moniteur of the 15th of August.

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(15) This account of the battle of Lonato is taken from the official repairs of Napoleon and Berthier, in the Moniteur of the 15th of August 1785; then the memoirs of Napoleon (Montholon t. 3, p. 283) from Jomini repairs narrative (Histoire etc., t. viii, p. 320, et Traité etc., t. 7, p. 265) and from the reports of the generals concerned in the action which are found in the list volume of Correspondance Inédite. By reference to these authorities, 2 will be discovered, that it has some pretensions to accuracy, especially as Junhi may be said to represent the Austrian side of the account, and by his general concurrence with that of Napoleon to confirm it.

As might be expected, it is very different from the account fabrical by the author of Waverley; who after a variety of false but positive assertions, assigns to Massena the conception and conduct of the decisive charge male by Napoleon in person on the Austrian centre; and even asserts that Aspereau was engaged in it under the orders of Massena (v. iii, p. 199). "But in thus manœuvering the Austrian general weakened his centre; an error of which Massena instantly availed himself. He formed two strong columns under Augereau, with which he redeemed the victory by breaking through and dividing the Austrian line."

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(16) Letter of Dallemagne (Corres. Inéd. t. i, p. 427) and letters of Bappinois of the 4th of August from Brescia (pp. 429, 30).

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(17) All accounts agree as to the general character and principal runks of this rencounter, so glorious for Napoleon, and shameful for the Austrian general. But Jomini, in his Vie politique et militaire de Napoleon (t. i, p. 21) asserts, that the Austrians consisted of detachments of Quasdonowich's column, who had penetrated to Lonato in endeavouring to unite with Wunsser. This is impossible from the positions occupied at that time hy the corps of Sauret, St. Hilaire and Guyeux. The account of Napoleon is confirmed by the report of Berthier written two days after the occurrence, which contains a statement of the number of prisoners, cannon and colours, that were taken—a statement adopted in the text.

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(18) It has already been mentioned that Joubert was reported sick by Massena, as early as the night of the 29th of July. On the 5th of August the day of the battle of Castiglione, Serrurier wrote to Napoleon from Cre-

it was impossible for me to follow the movement of the division ored by your letter of yesterday, at 8 o'clock in the morning, I caused
elf to be conveyed to Cremona, and shall proceed as far as Placentia,
ere I shall endeavour to reestablish my health and strength." On the
eday Kilmaine wrote from Montochiaro (p. 435): "The total exhaustion of
strength, prevents me, my dear general, from joining you and partaking
our glory. Fevers and pains have reduced me to such a state, that I
not stand, much less mount a horse. I am going to Brescia in order to
c medical assistance. With the aid of rest and bark, I hope to rejoin
soon."

his last extract demonstrates the error of Jomini, who exhibits Kilmaine commanding the reserve in the battle of Castiglione, and pursuing the trians in their retreat across the Mincio. (Traité etc., pp. 274, 75, 77.) It sts the accuracy of Napoleon, who, in his report, makes no mention of maine, and assigns the command of the cavalry to Beaumont.

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19) The commissary Garran in his report to the Directory, dated at Milan, 4th of August, writes: "Salicetti departed last night for the army." miteur of the 13th of August) and in the Moniteur of the 15th is found Satti's report of the 5th from the field of battle.

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- 20) Jomini asserts in his history of the war of the revolution (t. vili, p. 332) I in his Traité des grandes opérations (t vii, p. 277) repeats the assertion, talthough the combinations by which Napoleon gained the battle of Casione were admirable, the manner in which they were executed was definit in vigour, and therefore that the results of the victory were incomble. Napoleon, in his memoirs, remarking on this assertion, observes ontholon t. i, p. 10): "Wurmser had still near thirty thousand men, and excellent corps of cavalry to which ours was inferior. The French army need twenty two or twenty three thousand men; but they were the same ups that had fought at the Corona, at Lonato, and at the battle of the 3rd. By officers had been killed, and many were disabled. Every thing therese that it was possible to do was done that day." This observation seems have satisfied Jomini of the error of his remark, since, in his third work somitted. (Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon t. i, p. 132).
- 21) In this report, dated on the evening of the 5th, and published in the niteur of the 15th of August, the private secretary says: "The general in ef charges me to give you the news of the army. His duties and his reme fatigue (for he has not slept since the 28th of July, and he has not put off his boots) prevents his communicating them himself."
- 22) Las Cases, t. i, p. 232.

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(23) Napoleon's Memoirs (Montholon, t. iii, p. 289), and Berthier's ellcial report of the 8th of August, 1796, published in the Moniteur of the 18th.

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- (24) In a letter of the 19th of August (Monitour of the 29th) Berthier says to the commissaries: "I hope, in the course of two days, to have exchanged all our brothers in arms, who are in the power of the enemy, amounting to one hundred and sixty three officers, one hundred and sixty mine surgeants, three hundred and sixty corporals, and sixteen hundred and eight privates."
- (25) Letter of Napoleon to the Directory of the 25th of August. (Corr. hid. t, i, p. 441). "We have fifteen thousand sick in the army, of which not more than fifteen or twenty die daily. But it is said, September is the mank in which the diseases become fatal. As yet we have nothing but slight fevers. I have not yet received any troops from the coasts of the coast. We have only had announced to us the arrival of three thousand men composing the 6th regiment which reached Milan the 3rd."
- (26) These facts respecting the strength and position of Serrurier's division, are mentioned in a report of the 9th of August from the chief engineer Chasseloup to Napoleon (Corr. Inéd. t. i, p. 466).

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(27) The strictures of Jomini on the conduct of Wurmser, are viliated by inconsistencies growing out of his underestimate of the Austrian force. In the latest of his works, (Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon, t. i, p. 1986) he reiterates the statement, contained in his two previous productions, that the whole force collected by Wurmser at Trent, amounted to sixty the men; and not allowing for the reserve of ten thousand which was left to guard the Tyrol, he adds that the Austrian commander opened the campaign with the full number of sixty thousand; assigning to Quasdonewich twenty five thousand, and to Wurmser thirty five thousand. Admitting this to be the real amount, and actual distribution of the Austrian force, Reguleur's movement against Quasdonowhich, which Jomini vehemently and reputedly extols, must have been a false one. For, with forty one thousand two himdred men, the stated amount which he gives of the French armies of chestvation and the siege, Napoleon had it in his power either to crush Warms himself in the first instance; when it would have been easy to desire? Quasdonowich.

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8) In his history of the wars of the Revolution (t. i, p. 343) Jomini says: fferent accounts agree in stating that the general in chief, alarmed at everses sustained by Massena and Sauret, was inclined to retreat behind o, and that he proposed it in a council of war the following day. Augereau not satisfied with representing forcibly the dangers to which neasure would expose them, and with drawing a gloomy picture of the ortunes which would be the consequence, declared that his division was ous to revenge the defeat of the two others, and loudly demanded to be o battle. Other accounts without contesting the title of Augereau to bonour, affirm that Bonaparte had already ordered the necessary pretions for an attack, and that he only wished to sound the dispositions is generals and his troops." In his next work in the order of time, ini repeats neither of these stories, but in his latest (Vie politique et aire, t. i, p. 127) he rejects the first and adopts the second, conveying mpression, that, after Napoleon had resolved on raising the siege of lua, attacking Quasdonowich, and then returning upon Wurmser, he ulted his generals merely to ascertain their dispositions-that Kilmaine for retreat and Augereau for battle. As far therefore as the authority mini is important, the claim set up for Augereau, of having prevented oleon's retreat across the Po, and suggesting the plan of operations ast Wurmser on this occasion, falls to the ground.

at soon after the first restoration of Louis the 18th, Augereau himself is a memoir on the battle of Castiglione, published in the second volume collection entitled "Mémoires de Tous," in which he asserts that Napoupon the irruption of Wurmser from the Tyrol, had determined to idon Italy, and that he prevented it. In the preface to his memoir are his words, p. 286: "The question was should we abandon Italy. as the opinion of general Bonaparte that we should." "I alone, I pronit with a just pride, I dared to take it all upon myself; I restored to army its enthusiasm and its energy, and I forced general Bonaparte by immoveable resolution, to fight, and to change his dispositions for retinto an attack which reestablished every thing."

his broad and positive assertion is attempted to be maintained in the meritself; but by statements which are either in themselves incredible, or at variance with well established facts. Augereau first alleges that, on 30th of July, Napoleon ordered him to abandon the line of the Adige, e a garrison at Porto Legnano, march up to Verona, and uniting to his sion the six thousand men at that place, prepare to give battle to the so of the enemy advancing on Verona. That in consequence of this order division was in motion at day break on the 31st, but that after one hour's ch, he received a second order from Napoleon, directing him to retreat

to Roverbello, to destroy his batteries, and by breal the bridge at Perb Legnano, to secure himself from pur That he re sed to Purb Lagnano, and after breaking the bridge, ched for Roverbello, with all the magazines he could carry off. He then at s, that after an interview which he had with Napoleon at Roverbello at 3 p. a. on the 31st of July, his division took up the line of march in silence, and crossing the Mincle rendel Goito at midnight, so that between day light on the 31st of July and midnight, his division marched from Porto Leguano for one hour up the Adige towards Verona, then marched buck to Porto Legnano, heale the bridge, burnt the platforms, carried e magazines, and passing threat Roverbello and crossing the Mincio, reached Golto. This assertion is incredible, as the distance from Porto Leguano to Goito, by the most di route, is at least fifty miles. Add to this the two hours' march up and a the Adige, the delay of destroying the bridge and batteries at Porto Leguna, and of crossing the Mincio, and it would be necessary to believe that in about eighteen hours a division of infantry marched fifty-five or sixty miles, panel a river, and conveyed their artillery with them. But besides the a impossibility by which this story is opposed, it is contradicted by Ansa himself. In a letter to Napoleon, dated "Roverbello, 31st of July 1796," he says (Corr. Inéd., t. i, p. 418): "My troops arrived here this member at three o'clock, after having marched two nights and one day;" so that, init of leaving Porto Legnano on the morning of the 31st, he reached Revuluis at that very time, and had left Porto Legnano thirty-six hours previously, in the afternoon of the 29th, which agrees exactly with the narrative of Ilpoleon. Again, in his memoir (p. 290) Augereau asserts, that Napoleon his letter ordering him to retreat to Roverbello said: "This is the un tunate position of our army. The enemy has pierced our line at three points. He is master of the Corona and Rivoli, two important posts. Man Joubert have been obliged to yield to superior force. Sauret has abandued Salo, and has made his retreat to Dezenzano. The enemy has get penell of Brescia and Ponte San Marco. You see our communications with I and Verona are cut off. Wait for further orders at Roverbelle; I latend to go there myself." Now in Augereau's letter from Roverbelle, shorty cited, he says: "I beg you to let me know to what point I am to return ! case I am forced, for I know neither the positions of the army, nor year intentions." Yet, according to his memoir, Napoleon had just written to him-"This is the unfortunate position of the army." "Wait further crass at Roverbello; I intend to go there myself." Further, in his mencie, Augereau asserts that Napoleon arrived at Roverbello at half-past three p. ... and asked him what he thought ought to be done, and that he advised a once driving the enemy from Brescia, and Ponte Sen Marco, and the

once driving the enemy from Brescia, and Ponte San Marce, and the reopening their communications with Milan. But, in his letter from Revubello, after mentioning that his troops had reached there that merning, he adds: "They are about marching for C. 3" says is fourteen

miles off, and is precisely in the opposite direction to Ponte San Marco and Brescia; and the order under which he marched to Roverbello had, as he admits, informed him that Ponte San Marco and Brescia were in possession of the enemy. So that, although he knew this fact, he sent his troops down to Castellaro in order to cover the siege of Mantua; yet, when asked for his advice by Napoleon in relation to the same fact, he insisted that they ought to take the opposite course, and drive the enemy from Brescia, and Ponte San Marco. Other inconsistencies and erroneous statements might be exposed in this part of his memoir, but there is one so glaringly false that its mention is enough to discredit the memoir altogether. He says (p. 293) that when asked his advice by Napoleon at Roverbello he replied: "Rally the troops, make examples of the wretches who spread terror through the ranks, and especially talk not of retreating. As for me I declare I will not retreat."

No man can believe for a moment that Augereau would have ventured on, or Napoleon tolerated, a remark so insubordinate and insolent as this ;-Napoleon, whose success, he had himself written to the Directory, was owing to his absolute control of the movements of his army, his having preserved the unity of military thought, his having refused to consult even the commissaries, and made his motions as rapid as his thoughts. However, they did retreat, as Augereau admits, as far as Brescia, where he affirms Napoleon called a council of war, and submitted to his generals the question, whether they should cross the Po and take up a new line, or whether they should wait where they were for the enemy; and that, while all the rest of the generals advised a retreat across the Po, he alone opposed it, and recommended marching against the enemy. Then he says, after insulting General Despinois, he threw himself on a bed; and that, at two o'clock the next morning, hewas sent for by Napoleon, in order to consult him upon affairs; that upon reaching head-quarters he found Napoleon sitting up, anxious and dejected; and asking him, "Well, what did you decide upon yesterday with your council of war?" Bonaparte replied, "Nothing; but, after having reflected on the question a long time, I think with you. We must march upon the enemy and attack him wherever we find him, It is a thing determined on. You will march to Montechiaro with your division. I will repair with Massena to Lonato. Sauret will go and re-take his former position at Salo, and deliver General Guyeux, who is blockaded there." As Angereau entered Brescia on the 1st of August, this consultation with Napoleon the next morning, at two o'clock, must have been on the morning of the 2d of August. Yet, on the 1st of August, Napoleon wrote from Brescia to Salicetti, who was at Milan :-- " I have raised the siege of Mantua, and am here with nearly my whole army. I shall seize the first opportunity of attacking the enemy. The battle will decide the fate of Italy. Vanquished, I shall retire behind the Adda; victorious, I shall not stop in the marshes around Mantua." So that the day before he consulted Augereau he had already decided to march against the Austrians, while a retreat across the Po had never occurred to him.

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Again—Augereau alledges that, in the morning consultation of the 2nd of Asgust, Sauret would be ordered to return to Salo to deliver General Gayars. Yet, in his official report of the 6th of August, Napoleon said to the Birectory: "On the 31st of July, I ordered General Sauret to return to Salo, to deliver General Guyeux,"—a statement which is confirmed by the report of Berthier. In his report, Napoleon adds:—"Sauret succeeded completely in delivering General Guyeux;" and Sauret, in a letter of the 3d of August (Corr. Inéd., t. i, p. 421), mentions that it took him four hours to march from Lonato to Salo, so that Guyeux was delivered, at least, twenty four hours before. Augereau makes Napoleon say, he would order Sauret on that arvice.

It thus appears, that every material assertion by which Augereau attent to establish his broad and positive statement, "that Napoleon was dia to abandon Italy to Wurmser, and that he forced him to fight, and to change his dispositions for retreat into an attack, which re-established every thing," is positively and incontestably false. In a general point of view, there is no difficulty in believing, that a subordinate officer may suggest the most important measures to a commander in chief, and may be the means of saving the army, or of effecting a conquest. But he must be an officer of talents - of a strong, active, and fertile intellect, before a pretension of the kind, w ported by rigorous proof, can be tolerated. Now, on what other cessal a long military life, did Augereau ever show mental resources of this &scription? or on what other occasion of his career did Napoleon exhibit the degree of sterility and indecision which the memoir of Augurean attribute to him? For, according to that document, this great commander had not made up his mind to attack the Austrians, and dispute the possession of Ruly, although incessantly prompted to do so by Augereau himself, until the mateing of the 2d of August-that is, five days after Wurmser's first advance; and then the decision was so unexpected, that Augereau declares, "I we transported with joy, and cried out, 'I will answer for victory.'" The moir goes into great detail upon the battles of Lonato and Castiglione; and, if it were worth while, might be shown to be, from one end to the other, a tissue of absurdity, vanity, and falsehood.

Let us now look at the other side of the question. In his report and in his memoirs Napoleon says, that, after finding the Austrians had got to fals, Gavardo, and Brescia, he determined, instead of endeavouring to over the siege of Mantua, to raise it, and beat the Austrians in detail—attaching first Quasdonowich, and then returning upon Wurmser. Now, with this assertion, all the material facts agree—such as his leaving a garrison in Peachiera; his ordering Vallette to hold fast at Castiglione; his discontent with Search for abandoning Salo after he delivered General Guyeux. Is it to be supposed, if he had not intended to march back from Brescia, he would have left all these detachments behind him to be sacrificed, particularly considering the anxiety he had shown to have General Guyeux delivered?

But what removes all doubt upon the question is the following letter, which, after the struggle was over, Napoleon addressed to the Municipality of Milan (Moniteur of the 18th of August) :- " When the army was retreating, and the partisans of Austria and the enemies of liberty believed it lost without redemption-when it was impossible even for you yourselves to suspect that this retreat was nothing but a stratagem, -you displayed an attachment for France, and a love for liberty-you exhibited a zeal and character which have acquired for you the esteem of the army, and will entitle you to the protection of the French people." This letter was not only published in the Moniteur, but in the Gazette of Milan, and most have been circulated through the army, and read by Augereau himself, and the other generals who composed the pretended council of war at that time. Yet it was not contradicted or disputed by any one of them, although it contained a public declaration, that the march to Brescia, which, in one sense, was an advance upon Quasdonowich, was a retreat from Wurmser, made with the intention of returning upon him. Can any reader, whatever be his credulity, believe that a commander of Napoleon's pride and celebrity would have exposed himself to the derision of his officers, by making a declaration of the kind, had it been false, when there was no necessity for it?

The probability is that, when Napoleon ordered the troops to countermarch immediately from Brescia, Despinois, who was an imbecile officer, condemned the movement, and Augereau, who was a gallant officer, approved it. It is also probable that, after the restoration, when it was the fashion to maintain that Napoleon was the son of a butcher—that his real name was Nicholas—that he was a rank coward, etc., etc., Augereau, who had just betrayed him at Lyons, determined to take advantage of the praise which Napoleon had lavished on him, and to rob him of the credit of the great manœuvres at Castiglione, the real merit of which, although he bore so great a part in their execution, he does not appear to have understood.

CHAPTER XV.

PAGE 291.

(1) Jomini, Traité des grandes opérations, t. vii, p. 279.

PAGE 292.

(2) In a letter from the chief engineer of the 9th of August, the force of Serrurier's division is stated at two thousand seven hundred men fit for duty, a decrease of about one thousand three hundred since the 5th.

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tempers of Varionesia Ministribus, t. iii, p. 202) confirmed by his dias report at he init of anythe and that of general Dallemagne of the 200. .ar. and . . . 70. 434 341 .

Page 233.

- Desputes of Napoleco to the Directory of the 8th of August, (Monit a 'he 18th . Despardies t. 1v. p. 206. and Memoires de Napoléon, (Monthain i. 11. p. 297 .
 - 5. Moniteur of the 18th of August 1794.

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6 Mémoires de Napoléon (Montholon t. iii, p. 294).

In a letter to the Spanish ambassador at Rome of the 12th of August, Nopoleon says: "His royal highness, the archdule of Parma, has conducted himself with the greatest frankness, and the most sincere friendship towns. the French army. Corr. Ined. t. i. p. 400).

(7) Letter of Napoleon to the senate of Bologna. (Corr. Ined. t. 1, p. 40) (6) The principal facts related in this paragraph are found in the M

of Napoleon Montholon t. iii, p. 294, and all are mentioned in the en pondence between Napoleon and the French and Spanish ministers at R during the period referred to. Corr. Ined. t. i. dernier livre. See also for Annual Register for 1796. History of Europe, ch. 8. The letter of Napoli upon releasing the cardinal is dated the 5th of October, and is found in 100 Corr. Ined. t. ii, p. 99.

PAGE 296.

- 19 Desjardins gives a notification of Nelson threatening to head crew of the lugger, and the order of Vaubois in answer to it denouncing ** taliation (L. iv, pp. 208, 9).
 - 10 Las Cases. t. v, p. 267.

PAGE 297.

(11) Despatch of Napoleon to the directory of the 25th of August, and ister of the Chevalier de la Flechère. Corr. Inéd. t. ii, pp. 442, 516, and 6 der of Napoleon to Berthier (t. i, p. 448).

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- (12) Order to Berthier, (Corr. Ined. t. i, p. 446).
- (13) (idem 449). idem

CHAPTER XVI.

PAGE 304.

(1) Jomini, in his Traité des grandes opérations (t.vii, p. 285), says "The cabinet of Vienna, attaching the greatest importance to the preservation of Mantua, and not knowing to what cause its military disasters were to be attributed, had conceived the idea of repairing them by appointing general Louer, chief of Wurmser's staff, and charging him with fresh instructions for the delivery of the place."

PAGE 305.

(2) Napoleon mentions more than once with interest the instructions which on this occasion he drew up for Kilmaine (Montholon Liii, p. 298). "These instructions which ought to be in possession of the family of Kilmaine, constitute a real monument of history (t. i, p. 12). Kilmaine, who had been charged with the duty of observing the Adige, received from the general in chief, upon setting out on the march to Trent, detailed instructions which excited his attention in a lively manner. They are worthy of being examined and ought to be found among Kilmaine's papers. Every thing, that happened on the Adige was exactly foreshown in them." I have made enquiry but can find neither the heirs nor papers of general Kilmaine.

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(3) These observations are taken chiefly from the Memoirs of Napoleon (Montholon, t. iv, p. 328). See also Jomini *Traité des grandes opérations* (t. vii, p. 289).

PAGE 307.

(4) Despatch of Napoleon to the Directory, 6th of September, (Moniteur of the 17th). In his memoirs (Montholon t. iii, p. 300), Napoleon says of general Dubois: "He was a brave officer who had distinguished himself in the previous campaign on the Rhine."

PAGE 311.

(5) The account here given of these bold and sanguinary successes of the French is founded on the official reports of Napoleon and Berthier, and the Memoirs of the former; both being collated with Jomini's narrative of the same operations (Histoire des guerres de la révolution, t. ix, ch. 54, and Traité des grandes opérations, t. vii, ch. 31). There is an obvious and uniform

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inconsistency pervading Jomini's relation of this campaign, between the praise he bestows on Napoleon, and the small force and the slight loss which he assigns to the Austrians. Sir Walter Scott's narrative of this part of the war, though sketchy, rambling, and romantic, is better than that of Jonini. That of Thibaudeau (Guerres d'Italie, t. iii, ch. 13) is faithful.

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(6) This admirable proclamation had no doubt considerable effect in quieting the minds of the Tyrolians, and allaying their hostile spirit. For we find Vauhois remained in undisturbed possession of the province until the court of Vienna sent a fresh army into Italy. On the 21st, Vanhois wrote to Napoleon (Corr. Inéd. t. ii, p. 57), that he had administered the oath of allegiance to the council, and caused them to receive it from the subordinate authorities. As late as the 25th of October, when the new Austrian army began to show itself, Napoleon wrote to the Directory (Corr. Inéd. t. i., p. 149): "It is not impossible I may evacuate Trent. I shall he sorry for it, as the inhabitants are much attached to us. I shall not do it before it is necessary and do not think of it as yet."

It thus appears that the single division of Vaubois held the Italian Type in subjection without disturbance or even apprehension. Yet, sir Walter Scott, with that disposition to romance, which when indulged in metters of history is worse than folly, declares (v. iii, pp. 210, 11): "As for the preclamation, the French general might as well have wasted his words on the rocks of the country, etc. etc." "But besides this prudent calculation of easequences, the Tyrolians felt the generous spirit of national independent and resolved that their mountains should not be dishonoured by the much of an armed enemy, if the unerring rifle guns of their children were able to protect their native soil from such indignity. Every mode of resistance was prepared; and it was then that those piles of rocks, stones, and trushed trees were collected on the verge of the precipices which line the valley of the Inn, and other passes of the Tyrol, but which remained in grim report. till rolled down to the utter annihilation of the French and Bavarian invalid in 1809 under the direction of the valiant Hofer and his companions in arms." It is amusing to think that the Tyrolians should pile up atoms is 1796 to roll them down in 1809. But the piling and rolling both took pl in the German Tyrol, which Napoleon did not attempt to penetrate in 1706. but which was subdued in 1809 by the French and Bavarian invalue, although they were "utterly annihilated by the valiant Hofer and his conpanions in arms." Lockhart is less ridiculous than this.

(7) Lettres de Napoléon à Josephine, t. i, p. 68.

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(8) Corr. Inéd. t. ii, p. 5. There is no quality by which great commandes at

more distinguished from other men than by a close attention to the physical circumstances around them; a constant sympathy in fact with external nature. By means of it, they learn to overcome whatever natural difficulties may be surmounted, and to yield to none which are superable. It was the approach of the season of long nights and continual storms, which caused Cæsar to return from Britain to Gaul so soon, upon his first invasion of the former country. (De Bello Gallico, c. iv. c. 36).

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(9) Montholon, t. iii, p. 305.

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(10) Las Cases, t. ii, p. 36. Arnault in his life of Nappleon fixes the scene of this incident on the field of Bassano.

PAGE 326.

(11) In preparing this account of the movements of the French and Austrian armies from the time Napoleon left Trent, to Wurmser's reaching Mantna, I have consulted principally Napoleon's reports published in the Moniteur of the 21st and 26th of September 1796; his narrative and observations dictated to Montholon (t. iii, ch. 10); the narrative of Thibandeau (Guerre d'Italie, t. ii, ch. 13); of Desjardins (t. iv, ch. 5); and those of Jomini in his three works—Histoire des guerres de la révolution (t. ix, ch. 64), Traité des grandes opérations (t. vii, ch. 31), and Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon (t. i, pp. 143, 4). It would be remarkable that Jomini calls the battle of Bassano in which Wurmser's army was destroyed, and the campaign decided, an "affair," if he had not committed the same absurdity in respect to the battles of Lodi, Lonato and Castiglione.

He describes in the second of these works, Wurmser's passage of the Adige, at Legnano, without mentioning the folly of the French officer who abandoned that place. Napoleon, in remarking on this error, observed (Montholon, t. i, p. 15): "It appears the author was ignorant of the combat of Verona and the events at Legnano." Yet in the last of his works, in which he makes Napoleon speak for himself, he reproduces his own erroneous account. Further; Jomini on all occasions understates the Austrian force. Napoleon repeatedly corrects his errors, which are obvious enough from their inconsistency with his applause of the operations by which the Austrians were overcome. Yet when he comes to write in the name of Napoleon, he puts into his mouth the very misstatements which he had exposed and corrected. As an example—in correcting Jomini's account of the battle of Bassano, Napoleon says (Montholon, t. p. 12): "The battle of Bassano was more important than it is represented to be, the loss sustained by the enemy more

considerable," and in his narrative he observes that besides a great may killed and wounded, they lost "six thousand prisoners, eight coleans, two bridge equipages, two hundred baggage waggons, thirty-two gass, one hundred ammunition waggons, all the waggons with four horses." Yet lomini, affecting to make Napoleon speak for himself (Fis politique et militaire de Napoleon, t. i, p. 142), represents him as saying: "This effoir cannot two thousand prisoners, thirty cannons, and an immense quantity of baggage to fall into our hands." This unblushing indecency is not relieved by any examination of the question whatever.

In describing his first blockade of Mantua, Napoleon says (Montheim, t. iii, p. 250): "It was determined not to establish lines of circumvallation and that was a fault. But the engineers gave us hopes of the place surrendering before the Austrians could come to its relief. Doubtless then lines would have been of no use against Wurmser when he revictualled the place just before the battle of Castiglione. Napoleon who on that occasion raised the blockade and abandoned his besieging train, would also have abandoned the lines of circumvallation. But when Wurmser was driven into Mantua after the battle of Bassano, it is probable that had there been lines of circumvallation he would not have been able to force them, and would have been obliged to lay down his arms." Opposed to this confession of an error and statement of its probable consequences, we have the positive assertion of the author of Waverley that no such error was committed (v. 55, p. 170). "Lines of circumvallation were formed, and Serrurier was latter blockade of the fortress."

PAGE 327.

(12) In describing the battle of St. George, I have followed the results Napoleon published in the Moniteur of the 26th of September, after ed it with his posthumons narrative and observations dictated to Monthelen. de accounts of Jomini in his three works and those of Thibaudeau and Dudsdins. Yet Massena, one of the principal actors, upon reading Napoleon's seport, warmly excepted to it in a letter of the 10th of October (Corr. Infl., t. ii, p. 123), as giving too much credit to Leclerc, Marmont, and castis generals, and too little to himself, Rampon, and adjutant Chahran. In the same letter, he complained also of the reports of Lonato and Castielless. allusion to this reclamation Napoleon, said to Dr. Antomarchi (Li, p. 201): "Massena had a boldness and a coup d'œil peculiar to himself. But he was greedy of fame, and could not endure being denied the praise which be thought he deserved. The reports were written in baste to setisfy the curiosity of idle readers, and of course occasionally failed to assign each officer his just part. Massena thought his services before Mantua were not fairly appreciated."

PAGE 320.

(13) In his observations on this compaign, Napelson (Manthelen, t. iv; p. 331) admits that had Porto Leganno been fartified Warmer weakl prichably not have escaped, and says that, sensible of this omission, he afterwards had it fortified.

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(14) These discourses are found in the Menitsur of the 4th of Ostober. The reader will observe the error of the war minister, in making Mapelson two years younger than he really was.

CHAPTER XVII.

PAGE 333.

(1) For an account of the repulse of Jourdan from the neighbourheed of Ratisbon and the retreat of Morean from the environs of Munich, the reader is referred to Jomini (Tratté des grandes opérations, t. vili, ch. 22 et 23), and to the Memoirs of Napoleon (Montholon, t. iii, ch. 11). By both these authorities Moreau is commended more for courage than judgment, and his celebrated retreat is described as fortunate, rather than skilfully conducted, or judiciously persevered in when he came to blows. Moreau, however, exhibited admirable coolness and intrapidity.

PAGE 339.

- (2) The publication of the invaluable collection of letters entitled "Correspondance inédite," and often referred to in this work, is so scandalously inaccurate, that the task of giving correct dates, and a rational translation, is a severe one. In one sentence of this despatch for instance, Napoleon is made to say, that the 10th battalion of the Ain "is at Toulon." In the next sentence he is made to say of the same battalion, "which is at Nice." In the translation these last words are omitted.
- (3) This is thought to be the embryo of the corps, which in the consulate, was completed under the title of soldiers of the train, and which proved very useful to the service.

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(4) Letter of general Kilmaine (Corr. inéd., t. ii, p. 78).

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(5) Corr. inéd., t. ii, p. 72. In this letter Chasseloup suggests that the better mode of overflowing Mantua, " of making a Venice of Mantua," was VOL. I.

to erect a dam across the lower Mincio, giving it at the top the form of an overfall. Napoleon says (Montholon, t. iv, p. 345) that his engineers preposed turning the course of the Mincio above, so as to dry up the lakes of Mantua; but he seems to have listened to neither suggestion.

Page 347.

- (6) In his letter of the 11th of October, from Milan, Napoleon said to the directors: "Should my health be restored ever so little, rest assured that I shall spare no effort in my power to preserve Italy." In one to Josephine from Modena, of the 17th, he says, "The day before yesterday I was in active duty the whole day. Yesterday I was confined to my bed. Fever and a violent headache prevented my writing to my adorable friend. I am now a little better, and to-morrow I leave here." (Lettres de Napoléon à Joséphine, t. i, p. 76). His disease was evidently what is called in Virginia the ague and fever.
- (7) "During these transactions Bonaparte arrived at Modena. The people to enjoy a sight of him collected in crowds from Ferrara, Bologna, and especially from Reggio." (Botta, t. ii, p. 125).

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(8) His letter to the commissaries respecting the convocation of this emgress, is dated the 9th of October, and is in these words: "I think it socessary that a congress should be assembled at Modena or Bologna. That & should be composed of deputies from the states of Ferrara, Bologna, Medius. and Reggio, and that deputies should be nominated by the different greatsments in such a manner that the assembly should consist of one bunded members. You should make the distribution in proportion to the pepulation, favouring Reggio a little. It will be necessary to take care that there be among the deputies nobles, priests, cardinals, merchants, and persest of all professions and conditions, of those who are generally esteemed patriots. They will determine: 1st, The organisation of the Italian legist. 2dly, The formation of a sort of confederacy for the defence of the several districts. 3dly, That deputies be sent to Paris to demand their liberty and independence. This congress should not be convoked by us, but selely by private letters. This would produce a great effect, and lay the foundation of suspicion and alarm among the potentates of Europe; and it is absolutely necessary that we neglect no means of counteracting the fanaticism of Bosse, of making friends, and securing our rear and flank. It is my with that this congress be assembled the 14th of this month. I beg you to take this subject into serious consideration. I shall manage to be present at the time of meeting." The congress met on the 16th (Botta, t. ii, p. 126).

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(9) The disbanded troops were those which the king of Sardinia had decharged. The constitution of the French republic, from a jealous result.

lection of the ancient Swiss guards, interdicted the employment of foreign troops; and therefore the directory had recommended that the dishanded Piedmontese should enter the service of the Transpadan congress.

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(10) Napoleon says of Beurnonville, that he "was scarcely capable of moving a single battalion (Montholon, t. iii, p. 341).

CHAPTER XVIII.

PAGE 356.

(1) In his despatch of the 2nd of October, Napeleon observed: "Here is another negotiation which becomes indispensable; it is a treaty of alliance with Piedmont and Genoa." In one of the 8th: "I think peace with Maples essential, and an alliance with Genoa or the court of Turin necessary." On the 11th, he wrote: "I return to what I began with, by urging you to treat before a month passes over with Genoa and Turin." On the 24th, after he had heard of the conclusion of the treaty with Genoa: "I make you my compliments on the treaty with Genoa; it is advantageous in all respects." (Corr. inéd. t. ii, pp. 90, 92, 97, 147). In his memoirs (Montholon t. iii, p. 418) he intimates that better terms might have been obtained, and that, but for the repugnance of the democrats of France for the aristocracy of Genoa, a contingent of four or five thousand troops might have been added to his army.

PAGE 359.

(2) "I have written to citizen Cacault to reassure the court of Rome, and to signify to that of Naples, that if the king of the Two Sicilies advances into the Roman territory, I will consider the armistice as null, and march a division of my army to cover Rome. The English have made the king of Naples think himself something. I have written to M. Azara at Rome, and said to him that if the King of Naples, in contempt of the armistice, puts himself again in the ranks of our enemies, I engage in the face of Europe to march against his pretended seventy thousand men, with six thousand grenadiers, four thousand cavalry, and fifty pieces of artillery." Letter from Napoleon to the directory of the 26th of August (Corr. inéd. t. ii, p. 3).

PAGE 364.

(3) See despatch of the directory to Napoleon of the 18th of October, and his letter to the minister Cacault of the 24th. (Corr. inéd. t. ii, pp. 160, 174).

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(4) In a despatch of the 2nd October, 1796, Napoleon said to the directors: "The republic of Venice is alarmed, and is scheming with the king of Naples and the Pope. She is fortifying and intrenching herself at Venice. Of all the people of Italy the Venetian is the one that hates us most. They are all armed, and there are districts of which the inhabitants are brave. Their minister at Paris writes them that unless they arm all is lost. We shall never be able to manage them until Manton is taken." See also the letter of the agent Ailleaud, of the 19th of October, from Venice. (Corr. inéd. t. ii, pp. 88 and 208).

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(5) In a letter of the 2nd October, Napoleon declared to the directors: "The grand duke of Tuscany is in all respects a nonentity;" and on the 4th Serrurier wrote to him from Leghorn: "In Tuscany large popular assemblies are held, the people instructed in military evolutions, and great activity discovered in the manufacture of arms." (Corr. ined. t. 5, pp. 88, 111).

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(6) For these details respecting the reconquest of Corsica, see Napoleon's letter of instruction to general Geutili (Corr. inéd. t. ii, p. 151), and his memoirs (Montholon t. 4, p. 62).

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(7) The execution of Giafferi in 1798 forms no exception to this remark; for the island had then been recovered to France more than a year. Name leon thus relates and censures this catastrophe: "In the early part of 1786 certain malcontents, under the protext of religion, raised an insurrection in a district of Fiumorbo; and wishing to dignify themselves with a great name, put at their head general Giafferi. General Vaubois marched against them, put them to rout, and took their general prisoner. He was ninety years old, and governed by his confessor. He had been educated at Naples, where he served and rose to the rank of major general. For eight years he had hose on half-pay, living quietly in his village. Vaubois had him brought helice a military commission, which condemned him to death, and he was shall This catastrophe drew tears from every Corsican. He was the sen of the famous Giafferi, who had commanded there for thirty years, in the war of independence, and his name was eminently national. It was a case for considering age like infancy, and for letting the national vengeance fall on the hypocritical monk, who governed this old man."

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(8) Las Cases.

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- (9) Corr. inéd. t. ii, p. 135.
- (10) See Napoleon's letter to Faypoult, the minister at Gence, and his order to Berthier, both dated the 6th of October, desiring these arrests. (Corr. ined. t. il, p. 100). In a letter of the 3rd of November to the executive compilesary, Garrau, Napoleon, who was then at Verona, said: "We are totally estitute of money, all our chests are empty, and every branch of the service shackled. Even the pay of the men is not regular. Your clerks make out beautiful statements, which never agree with those of the paymester, and for three months that efforts have been made to reconcile your respective accounts, no means have been found of showing in what manner the three er four millions of difference have been disposed of. For the last two months, the paymaster general has only received two millions. Every body is suffering, and we are in presence of the enemy." In a letter to the directory of the 17th of October, he reminded them that "the army of Italy had furnished to the republic during the campaign of the summer twenty millions in cash, besides its own pay and subsistence." (Corr. ined. t. ii, pp. 141, 251).

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(11) See memoirs of Napoleon (Montholon, t. iii, p. 386) confirmed by his letter to the directory of the 28th of December, (Corr. inéd. t. ii, p. 312) in which he contests and exposes the returns which they transmitted to him of the reinforcements that had been sent to his army. In this letter he shows, conclusively, that since the beginning of the campaign in April, he had received, excluding the eight thousand five hundred men which had been detached from the army of the Alps to garrison the ceded and conquered fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy, but twelve thousand six hundred men up to the period of the battle of Arcola.

This statement was never disputed by the directory, although the letter containing it was acknowledged. (Corr. inéd. t. ii, p. 357). The assertion in the text, which it supports, is indirectly confirmed by Jomini, who in the tables he gives of the force of the French army at the epoch of Castiglione, and for that of Arcola, makes it several thousand men weaker at the latter period than at the former. See Traité des Grandes Opérations, t. vii, p. 251 and t. viii, p. 444).

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- (12) General Willot was an accomplice of Pichegru in the royalist conspiracy of the 18th Fructider, and with him was banished. (Thiers, t. ix, pp. 292, 312).
 - (13) Letter of Berthier to Wurmser. (Corr. inéd. t. ii, p. 150).

CHAPTER XIX.

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(1) Montholon, t. iii, p. 384.

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(2) When to the absolute losses by wounds and death in the field and in the hospitals, is added the reduction of force occasioned by the numerous sick, who ultimately were restored to health and the service, it is very clear that the reenforcements which Napoleon received sufficed not to repair the full amount of his losses. It was by weakening his garrisons in Lomburdy and Piedmont, which he was enabled to do, in consequence of his confirmed ascendancy in Italy, that he brought an equal force into the field at the latter period.

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(3) Napoleon uniformly states that he never had less than two to one against him in this campaign, whether contending with Beautieu, Wurmser, or Alvinzi. Jomini as uniformly gives estimates of the Austrian force, so much lower, that, as has been already observed, he diminishes the different against Napoleon to such a degree as to render his admiration of the gents and successes of the great captain in Italy absurd.

Respecting this campaign with Alvinzi, Napoleon, in speaking of his reinforcements, says (Montholon, t. iii, p. 386) that in the course of September and October twelve battations, which had been detached from the army of La Vendée, reached Milan, and that "the directory promised much, he performed little."

That the former part of this assertion is true no one who reads his memorus despatches will hesitate to believe. The latter part will not be difficult to substantiate; for it was admitted by the president of the directory himself in his message to the council of five hundred, announcing the victory of Arcola. In that document it is stated that "the enemy had been able to form in Italy an army more considerable than his two former armis, before the succours sent from the interior of France had been able to join the army of Italy. (See Moniteur December 1st, 1796).

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(4) Napoleon observes (Montholon, t. iv, p. 333); "Nothing could be more faulty than this plan. To remedy its error, Alvinzi, as soon as he was master of Bassano, and Davidowich of Trent, should have ordered this general to join him at Bassano by the gorges of the Brenta, with his regular force, leaving the Tyrolian militia at Trent; and with his united divisions

esented himself on the Adige." With this opinion, the mini coincide (Traité des Grandes Opérations, t. viii,

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ort to the directory of the 13th of November, Napoleon says: If Vaubois, took a position at Rivoli and the Corona on the which I had thrown across the Adige expressly for that inéd., t. ii, p. 248.) The account given in the text of Vauis taken from his reports, and those of Louis Bonaparte and is, found in the same volume, from the narrative of Napomoirs and in his official report, and from that of Jomini 2., t. viii, ch. 34).

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icial report, as it is printed in the Correspondance inédite is stated that the army entered Verona at day break on the which would appear to be impracticable. Napoleon at St. d this by a pencil note into midday, and on the margin of the word, verified ("vérifié)," which corresponds with the report, as it is published in the Moniteur of the 23rd of Noles, Augereau, who brought up the rear, was only as far as break on the 8th, as appears by his report of that morning rr. inéd., t. ii, p. 278). The error here noticed, is one of the coofs of the carelessness with which the compilation of Napondence was prepared for the press by general Beauvais, the 'ictoires et Conquétes des armées françaises, a work of the racy.

Scott represents (v. iii, pp. 228, 229) these first operations as unsuccessful, and Bonaparte's sudden return to Verona! a failure in his attacks of the 6th at Fonteniva and Lenove. rienced considerable resistance, and it is amid complaints of misadventures, and miscarriages of different sorts, that he he name of a victory for his first encounter with Alvinzi." ever is that Napoleon represents, both in his official report ii, p. 248) and in his memoirs (Montholon, t. iii, p. 388), his he Brenta as highly successful, and says not a word about the error is adopted by Lockart (v. i, p. 75).

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s de Napoléon (Montholon, t. iii, p. 391). On this occasion apoleon had in recollection the reproach of Cæsar to the 10th mutinied at Capua, upon being ordered to Africa after the n, and when he called those veterans "citizens."

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(8) This action at Caldiero, remarkable for affording the first instance in which Napoleon failed in an attack conducted by himself, sir Walter Scott despatches in a single sentence dedicated to a misrepresentation failing in with the main design of his work (v. iii, p. 232). "A strong French division under Massena attacked the heights amid a storm of rain, but their most strenuous exertions proved completely unsuccessful, and left to the ganeral only his usual mode of concealing a check, by railing at the chments." Now, not only had Napoleon never before felt a check, but a is perfectly certain that on the occasion upon which sir . Walter erronsenty intimates he had experienced a check, he made no allusion whatever to "the elements." So that this, the first instance of his failure, and of his reference to the weather, is boldly expanded, by the wonder-working had of romance, into a common liability to failure in his operations, and an etablished habit of "railing at the elements." That this was not an accidental or careless misrepresentation, the reader will admit upon reflecting that the sneering calumny it conveys was intended to extend from Neventer 1796 to November 1812, and to vilify and degrade the grandeur and calmity of the Russian campaign. But it is difficult to conceive by what cess of moral sentiment a biographer, after attending his hero from his his to a degree in the scale of glory so high as that to which Napoleon had now attained, would bring himself to treat his name with sneers and detreets. upon his first exposure to reverse and misfortune.

With regard to the simple fact of Napoleon's mentioning among the cases of his failure at Caldiero the unfavourable state of the weather, acthing is more consistent with probability. It was the middle of November; the armies were close under the snow-covered Alps, the French confession facing the north, when a sudden change of the wind to that quarter, highly probable at that season, would have all the effects he attributes to it. The influence of the weather under such circumstances might be illustributes to influence of the Romans at the battle of the Trebia as much to their long seposure to cold, as to the tactics of Hannibal. (See the general history of Polybius, v. iii, c. 8). Jomini (Traité des Grandes Opérations, t. viii, p. 40) gives full weight to this obstacle to Napoleon's success at Caldiero. Indied, an historian who, without evidence, would undertake to doubt or decide it, must know little of war, and feel little for men. Napoleon expressly admits that the victory belonged to Alvinzi (Montholon, t. iii, p. 394).

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(9) This account of the feelings of the army after the combat of Caldier is deduced from Napoleon's narrative at the time, in his report to the erectory, and, subsequently, in his dictation to Montholon. The directory.

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(10) This report is found in extense in the Correspondence inid. t. ii, p.246, where it is mis-dated (à la mode Beauvais) the 14th of November. Extracts of it under the correct date (13th) were published in the Moniteur of the Sird November. On the margin of his copy of the Correspondence inidite, Therefore made various corrections at St. Helena, of which, in referring to the document, I have availed myself.

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MALL) In his official report of the battle of Arcola (Moniteur of the 3d Decembra), Napoleon says, he had left Kilmaine, in Verona, with three thousand men. In his memoirs (Montholon, t. iii, p. 399), he says, "Kilmaine required in Verona, with fifteen hundred men of all arms." In a subsequent electrostic, dictated at St. Helena (Montholon, t. iv, p. 343), he repeats the last statement—"Kilmaine had in Verona only fifteen hundred men." To reconcile this inconsistency, it may be observed, that although Kilmaine had but fifteen hundred men upon Napoleon's leaving him, a detachment drawn from the army of blockade raised his force to three thousand before the French army returned to Verona. Jomini (Traité des Grandes Opérations, t. vili, p. 461) says, erroneously, that the three thousand men were all drawn from the army of blockade.

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- (12) It is remarkable that Jomini, on both occasions, overlooks the strong ebjections stated by Napoleon to passing the main river below the mouth of the tributary, the enemy and the position contended for being above (Traité des Grandes Opérations, t. viii, p. 466). In fact, a fondness for the application of his rules and maxims too often induces this admirable military historian to lose sight of the essence of things, and the true point of the question of which he treats.
- (13) Napoleon repeatedly mentions (Montholen, t, iii, pp. 409, 402) that the bridge was of stone. Jomini (t. viii, p. 465) states, positively, that it was of wood. The difference is not material. But it may be remarked, that Jomini was not present in the affair; and further, that had the bridge been of wood, the Austrians, who were obviously aware of the importance of the post, might have taken up the planks to prevent the passage of the French, and replaced them whenever they themselves wished to pass.

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(14) Napoleon, in his Memoirs, makes his whole force at Arcola thirteen thousand men. (Montholon, t. iii, p. 399.) Adopting the numbers of Jemini's tabular statement, and deducting the estimated losses in the hettle of Fonteniva, and the combat of Caldiano, with the fifteen hundred men left under Kilmaine in Verona, his force at Arcola would not exceed forteen thousand five hundred men, including the reserve of cavalry, which did not act on the causeways.

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(15) Napoleon said to Las Cases:—"For example, they represent manduring the night at Arcola, taking the post of a centinel who had false asleep. This is, no doubt, the story of a citizen or a pettifogger—certainly not that of a soldier. The author of it, doubtless, wished to do me a service, and thinks there is nothing in the world more beautiful than the act he attributes to me. He wrote it most certainly to do me honour; but he is ignorant that I was scarcely capable of such an exertion. I was to much fatigued, and was probably asleep before the centinel he speaks of Memorial, t. vi, p. 89.) This sorry invention of a cit or an attornsy Lethnart eagerly adopts, and transfers to the Tornato, where he makes the imaginary centinel not only fast asleep (t.i, p. 88), but faller on his bases.

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(16) In constructing this account of the battle of Arcola, include preliminary operations, the memoirs of Napoleon (Montholon, t. ili, a. ili, a. et t. iv, ch. 24., observation 5), his reports to the directory of the 13th and 19th November, (Corr. Inéd. t. ii, p. 246, and Moniteur of the 2nd December), his letters to Carnot, General Clarke, and Madame Muiron (Months) of the 4th and 9th December), the official report of Berthier (Monitour of the 3d December), the history of Thibaudeau, and the various narratives Jomini, have been collated and relied upon. The works of Scott, Leckhart, Norvins, Haylett, Thiers, Desjardins, Botta, and Alison, with the anatti register for the year, Victoires et Conquetes, and the Memoires d'un house d'Etat, have been consulted. This last, which is followed devostly by son, is singularly false and absurd, both as to facts and motives, the selfconfounding the events of one day with those of another, misjoining example and effects, and attributing, by an inference drawn wholly from his own for tions, the defeat of the Austrians, not to the conduct of Napoless and the valour of his troops, but to "concealed objects and secret intelligence" # the part of Alvinzi (t. iv, p. 74). It would be a waste of time, and a misapplication of attention, to point out his errors in detail; it is enough to say, that his account is totally chimerical.

That of Sir Walter Scott, though spirited, is imperfect and full of error (v. iii, p. 234, et seq.), some of oversight, some of design, all indicately

"Verona, it must be remembered, is on the left bank of the he same with the point it was Bonaparte's object to attack."

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the Memoirs of Napoleon (Montholon t. iii, p. 442) it is stated, my returned to Verona three days after it had left there. This is It left there the evening of the 14th, and returned the afternoon i, the three intermediate days having been filled up by the battle. The night between the 14th and 15th they marched to Ronco, and 16th encamped there, the 16th and 17th the same, and the 8th they encamped on the field of the last day's action, on the f the Alpon. On the 18th, that is, four days after leaving Verona, and,

PAGE 413.

ther in the official report, nor in the posthumous account of Nait stated that Vaubois was surprised at Bussolengo. But at St. upoleon wrote on the margin of Vanbois' report: "He was surthe morning of the 17th."

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have this moment rallied and reinforced the division of Vanbois. stelnovo, Augereau is at Verona, Massena near Villa Franca." 'Napoleon's official report of the 19th November (Moniteur of the aber), where it is said, "Massena is near Villa Nova," an error so obviously, for Villa Franca.

er of the same date to Josephine, cited in the text, does not appear collection, but is found in the 1st volume of Bourrienne (p. 106). ticity is guaranteed by internal evidence, and its date the 19th at

PAGE 417.

mini, Traité des grandes opérations, t. viii, p. 483. em. p. 484.

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ne letter to General Clarke was published in the Moniteur of the 9th per. The presentation of the colours took place on the 1st of January se Moniteur of the 2nd. The indifference with which Bonaparte these calumnies is apparent from the light and careless tone of his he directory, in acknowledgement of their formal and earnest den of them. It is dated the 13th August. "I have received with the new testimony of esteem which you have given me, by your is 31st of July. I know not what these gentlemen, the editors, have e. They attacked me at the same time the Austrians did. You have them by the publication of your letter. I have completely beaten ans; so that, up to this time, these double attempts of our enemies rtunate."

(23) See Debate in the Council of Five Hundred on the 30th November, 1796. (Moniteur of the 1st December.) Among the reports to which, is this campaign, the invidious journals of Paris gave currency, was one that General Hoche was to be sent to Italy to supersede Napoleon. The prevalence of this rumour drew from Hoche a letter to the Minister of Police denouncing it, and doing ample justice to the success and mark of the conqueror of Italy. The letter, which is bonourable to the memory of the writer, is cited by Thiers (t. viii, p. 338), and Desjardins (t. iv, p. 175).

CHAPTER XX.

PAGE 422.

- (1) Lettres de Napoléon à Josephine etc. Collection published by F. Edst. i., pp. 85, 87.
 - (2) Mémoires du comte Lavalette, t. i, p. 193.
- (3) "General Bonaparte is still at Milan, confined to his apartment by an indisposition, which is said to be the consequence of the fall of his hand to the battle of Arcola. He has been out but once, and then to review same squadrons of cavalry which have lately arrived." Milan Gazette of the the of December 1796, republished in the Moniteur of the 30th. The contains was probably received when he was forced off the causeway into the morass.

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- (4) Mémoires du comte Lavalette, t. i, p. 193.
- (5) Idem. pp. 188, 191. "Next came Sulkowski, of chivalric value, ppsionate enterprise, and of a temper restless and romantic. He was full disformation, spoke all the languages of Europe, and was a true Pole. He was scarcely emerged from infancy when he fought for the liberty of his country. Wounded at the siege of Warsaw and forced to fly, he came to France. He was soon sent to Constantinople, in the suite of our Ambastar. The committee of public safety wished to have an agent in India; Sulkowski undertook the mission. He had scarcely arrived at Aleppo. when the English got upon his trace, and had him robbed by the Arabs, in order to get possession of his instructions. Escaping from their hands, he returned to Paris, and then obtained letters of service for the army of Italy. He was at duty before Mantua, when one of his reports to the adjutant general and under the eyes of the general in chief. The next day, Sulkowski was he aide de camp."
 - (6) Letter to the directory 28th of December 1796. Corr. inid. t. #, p. ***

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m the Milan Gazette of the 4th of January 1797, republished in the of the 26th.

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ini Traité des Grandes Opérations, t. viii, p. 519), also the report r of the 19th of January 1797, in the Moniteur of the 31st.

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s is less than the estimate of Napoleon in his Memoirs, which whole force of Alvinzi at ninety six or a hundred thousand men. raité des grandes opérations, t. viii, p. 526, et Vie politique et mi-Napoléon, t. i, p. 183) makes the army under the orders of Almer more than forty thousand men, exclusive of the corps of in Mantua, which he estimates, the sick included, at thirteen or thousand men. (Traité des Grandes Opérations, t. viii, p. 565). aays (p. 517); "If the directory had better understood their inay would have raised the effective force of the army of Italy to isand combatants, and created a reserve of twenty five or thirty" All this for Bonaparte with his acknowledged superiority of ip, and the high spirit of his troops, to contend against fifty five often defeated or newly recruited Austrians! His inconsistency nother occasions, falsifies his estimates.

General Provera had been taken at Cassana the day after the battle imo. He had given proof of little talent, which was the real cause sed Napoleon to extol him, in order to give him credit. This suc-Provera was employed again, and allowed himself to be taken a set, at the Favorita. One ought to suspect the praises of an enemy ntil after hostilities have ceased." Mémoires de Napoléon (Moniv, p. 341). Napoleon seems not only to have deluded the Ausinet, but the author of Waverley, who, in describing the district advance of Alvinzi's forces, says (v. iii, p. 248): "Provera, hed for his gallant defence of Cassano during the action of Milmmanded the divisions which were to act upon the lower Adige."

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is is the second letter in the collection published by F. Didot, in a dated 23rd Messidor, year IV, answering to the 11th of July 1796, ate was the 12th of January 1797, as is evident, not only from its out from the fact that in the Moniteur of the 27th of January 1797, of this date from Napoleon to general Clarke, which, the kisses is word for word the same with that to Josephine. The phrase oth respecting Massena's military dispositions is remarkable. In

his report of this affair, Napoleon observed of Massena, "he marched arect upon the enemy." In the biographical notices of Massena it is stated that "he was christened by Napoleon the spoiled child of victory;" and it was no doubt on this occasion that the christening took place. For in Berthier's report of the battle of Rivoli he speaks of Massena, for the first time, as "l'Enfant gdté de la victoire." In the character left of this grat officer by Napoleon it is observed: "His dispositions for attack was ast made with skill."

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(12) When, at St. Helena, the Emperor did General Count Berkund to honour to exchange watches with bim, he impressed a glorious recellation on his present,—"Take it, Bertrand," said be, "it struck two e'chak at night at Rivoli, when I ordered Joubert to attack." (Précis des Genera, par Marchand, p. 19). This anecdote is also recorded by Las Caus in the memorial (t. iii, p. 40).

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(13) The account which sir Walter Scott furnishes of the mane the column of Lusignan, besides its importance as a military narrative, gests a new view into the mysteries of natural history (v. iii, p. 254) "Amid this confusion the division of Lusignan, which was the most result of the Austrian columns, being entrusted with the charge of the attack and baggage of the army, had, after depositing them according to make, reached the heights of Rivoli, and assumed a position in the rear of the French." Now, as it is impossible to conceive that Alvinzi would sale his artillery to be left near the lake of Guarda, while be was to fight the battle on the plain of Rivoli without an object of consequence, it my inferred that be had it deposited on the lake shore, as turtles deposit the eggs, for the purpose of hatching little guns for the next campaign. The obvious inference is strengthened by Alison, who, although he does not at firm cannon to be oviparous, describes them as endowed with the faculties of volition and locomotion; an opinion which, if he is an orthodox "fellew," we may suppose prevails in the Royal Society of Edinburgh. In his mi of the battle of Borghetto this ingenious historian says (v. iii, p 34) is Napoleon "made prisoners twelve hundred men and five pieces of cases."

The fate of captain René was a sad and cruel one. In the Spanish was he was taken prisoner by the patriots, and horrible to relate, was glaced between two planks, and sawed in two lengthwise!! But how such he cruel is a Spanish murderer than "a British bistorian?" It is thus the Lockhart mangles the memory of René (v. i, p. 88). Such was the pavailing terror, that one body of six thousand men, under René, surranted to a French officer, who had hardly five hundred men with him." Builds making René, an Austrian, a prisoner and a poli n, to reach the requirements

mediard of Romance, he multiplied the Austrians by four, and the French labor. Again, of the battle of the Favorita, this critical and conscientious favorian asserts, on the same page, that it was "a hot skirmish, recorded the battle of St. George;" an action that took place four months preplayally as is expressly, recorded in his own book (p. 72). What would beagene of the fame of Scotland in history, were it not for colonel Napier.

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(14) This is related on the authority of general Domanget, who was a lieuteness in Massena's division, and shared in the glories of this immortal personne.

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(25) In his report of the 15th of January, giving an account of his pursuit third in Joubert wrote: "I have followed implicitly your dispositions for it attack of the Corona. The success has been beyond my hopes. Three less of cannon, four or five thousand prisoners, Alvinzi himself precipited among the rocks, and escaping unattended by a single soldier; such is a summary of the result of this affair."

The next day he wrote: "I mentioned to you yesterday that we had made pur or five thousand prisoners, but I can assure you they exceed six thousand." (Corr. inéd. t. ii. pp. 389, 91.)

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(16) This is the number of generals, majors, captains, and lieutenants, seturned by Berthier in an official list, containing all their names, and pub-Tabled in the Moniteur of the 1st of February. He adds: "this list is not complete." It is signed and certified by "Defresne, the adjutant charged with the exchange of prisoners," and by Berthier himself. The number of Colonels is taken from the statement of Napoleon. Jomini, always disposed to diminish the numbers and losses of the Austrians, the allies of his new master, the Emperor Alexander, makes no estimate of their killed and wounded in the Rivoli campaign, but says: "the French took about eighteen thousand prisoners."—(Traité des Grandes Opérations, t. viii, p. 554.) In the Moniteur of the 30th January, 1797, there is appended to Napoleon's Report to the directory, the following certificate of Berthier, dated at Verona, the 19th January: "I certify that in the different battles that have taken place from the 8th to the 16th of this month, the list of the Austrian prisoners of war who have passed under review amounts already to more than twenty thousand, of which seven hundred are cavalry, and that others are arriving every moment. That the enemy has left us forty-four guns with their caissons, all the baggage of General Provera's column, and all the colours of his corps, some of which were broken by the enemy. I certify that, in obedience to the orders of the General-in-Chief, I have given in charge to General Rey a column of twenty-thousand prisoners of war,

to be conducted as far as Grenoble, by convoys of three thousand man, marching one day's distance apart, under the escort of the 58th, and a syndron of cavalry." At this time the prisoners and trophies taken by Joshet and Massena, subsequently to the 16th, could not have been reported, mask less reviewed at Verona.

CHAPTER XXI.

PAGE 468.

(1) This despatch of cardinal Busca, which is found in the Corr. inid. 2.5. p. 520), enclosed two other documents, which it refers to, viz.: a copy of the letter from the nuncio at Florence, and a copy of Cardinal Busca's asset to that letter. It is, therefore, that Napoleon in his letters and memoirs, alluded to it as "the intercepted despatches of cardinal Busca." The later of the nuncio, and the answer to it, were published in the Moniteur of the 20th February, 1797.

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- (2) See his letter to Napoleon of the 30th January (Corr. inéd. t. ii, p. 538), in which he says: "I arrived yesterday evening at Bologue, where I await your orders."
- (3) These dates, which correspond with the narrative of Kapel (Montholon, t. iii, p. 464), are confirmed by his correspondence at the time. His latest letters from Verona, at this period, are dated the 28th of January, and the letter of Wurmser, which was handed to Serrurier by Klassa, is dated the 29th (Corr. ined. t. ii, pp. 436, 42 and 65). Again, in a letter of the 30th of January, Serrurier, in speaking of a conference he had held with Colonel Wurmser, observes to Napoleon: "I adhered to the seneral conditions which you offered yesterday, I promised to render you an account of his proposal, but mentioned that the answer would not be received in less than four days." Further, in a despatch of the 1st of February, from Bologna, Napoleon mentions to the directory his having received this communication from Serrurier and that he had rejected the proposal it contained. (Corr. inéd. t. ii, p. 438.) It thus appears that he arrived at and departed from the head quarters of Serrurier, on the 29th January, and on that day had the conference with Klenan. The establishment of these dates and stages in Napoleon's progress from Verona to Bologna is material, in order to show the extent of error into which, from carelessness or impartinence, sir Walter Scott fell in his account of that event. In the first place, affecting to give a version of Napoleon's own narrative, he makes him say to Klenan (v. iii, p. 260): "To-morrow I pass the Po, and march upon Rome;" implying, as the Po was about twelve miles below Mantae, that it was his intention to stay all that day at Mantua; whereas Napoleon's week

: "I set off this instant, to pass the Po, and I march upon Rome." This pr of Sir Walter, if not corrected; would disturb all the succeeding dates the expedition.

But the next passage which requires notice, is more characteristic of this mirable novelist and detestable historian. Referring to the generosity of poleon to Wurmser, he observes, on the same page: "This trait of gene-My towards a galiant but unfortunate enemy, was highly honourable to naparte. The taste which dictated the stage effect of the cloak may be, heed, questioned." It required the exuberant fancy of a pregnant nolist, to see a theatrical trick in the ordinary circumstance of an officer aring his cloak, during a journey in the dead of winter, and while within by's ride of the snow covered Alps. Instead of seeking for stage effect paleon seems to have been willing to the delay of a long and fruitpalayer with the Austrian Aide-de-Camp; and anxious to let him know, proceeding on a distant expedition, the best terms which Wurmser ht expect. The trick of muffling himself up in his cloak, like a secondector, never occurred, we may safely affirm, to the imagination of the heral, while it was probably familiar to the memory of the author of Wa-Boy, who, in one of his divinest publications, employs it, though with less his usual dexterity and grace. "Lord Evendale rode in the rear of the ty with Major Bellenden, and seemed to abandon the charge of immediate mdance upon his lovely niece to one of the insurgent cavaliers, whose military cloak, large flapped hat and feather, which drooped down m his face, concealed at once his figure and his features." In this sching masquerade, Henry Morton carries on a dialogue of several pages the beautiful Edith Bellenden, in which these lovers talk to and at a other through several pages, affecting all the while by their manner be strangers. "The stage effect of the cloak," sir Walter had a perfect to assign to the hero of "Old Mortality," even in the midst of summer; t the lovers of truth and taste, must equally protest against his transferring e stale trick to the generous conqueror of Wurmser.

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'4) Respecting this act of unparalleled generosity and self denial, sir Walter att expresses himself in the following singular and significant manner (v. p. 261). "This self denial did Napoleon as much credit nearly as his tory, and must not be omitted in a narrative, which, often called to stig-tize his ambition and its consequences, should not be the less ready to herve marks of dignified and honourable feeling. The history of this retrable man more frequently reminds us of the romantic and improbable tories imputed to the heroes of the romantic ages, than to the spirit of chilry which contributed to them; but in this instance, Napoleon's conduct Wurmser may be justly compared to that of the Black Prince to his royal isoner, King John of France."

38

Here appears to be a formal apology, on the part of sir Walter Sc not omitting in his narrative, all mention of this instance of Napoleon's nanimity. Would a biographer of the Black Prince think of apol for the mention of his generous treatment of King John? Hume, the co man of Sir Walter, certainly offers no such apology in his history; a Polybius excuse himself for relating instances of the moderation and nence of Scipio. But it may be asked, to whom is this apology office Not to the mass of his readers certainly; for he could not suppose that people of Great Britain, or of any other country, would be unwilling to template an act of magnanimity, by whomsoever performed. Let this q tion be answered as it may, sir Walter not only pleads forgiveness. endeavours to descrive it, from the tribunal to which he deemed himself a mission in favour of his bero, with an swerable, by following up this swerable, by following up this denission in favour of his hero, with a stant effort to counteract its effect. Alleging that this creditable facts not be omitted in his narrative, he adds "which called to stigmatize his bition and its consequences, etc." Now, up to this point of his narra neither Napoleon's ambition nor its consequences have been stigment So that his real meaning may be fairly interpreted in these words: "I a not have the face to suppress the mention of this generous conduct of I poleon. It was a fact too well known and too interesting to be omitted or misrepresented; but I have taken care to obscure its lustre by direct against him vague, violent, and prospective imputations of mischievens execrable ambition; and by intimating that the fact in question is an inst of rare and accidental generosity in the history of this remarkable u

By his distant reference to an event in the fourteenth century, it would appear that he fairly despaired of finding any thing like a parallel to the computer of Napoleon, in the recent annals of English princes; while he seems to forget that King John was conveyed to London, there detained a prisoner several years, and not released until he had subscribed a dishonourable passes, and that the personal courtesies which he received from his conquests were extended to him, more in his character of monarch than of captive (Hume, Edward the 3d, chap. 16). Napoleon, on the contrary, although it was the desire of his government that he should treat Wurmser with uncommon severity; and though, by the confession of General Kleman, he had it in his power to compel him in three or four days to surrender unconditionally, vindicated his character, justified his conduct, asserted his claims, and alleviated his misfortunes.

The letter of the directory, enclosing a decree against Wurmer, as a French emigrant, and authorizing Napoleon to enforce it, may be found in the 2d vol. of the Corr. inéd. (p. 53). His refusal to comply with it, is communicated in his despatch of the 3d of February 1798, published in the Moniteur of the 13th.

(5) This letter to Cardinal Mattei, appears to be dated 22d January, 175, and is published in the Moniteur of the 22d February.



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- (6) The proclamation, dated "Bologna, January 31, 1797," and the manifesto, dated the next day, are published in the Moniteur of the 17th February. The time of Victor's march to Imola is assertained by reference to Napoleon's letter to the directory of the 1st February. (Corr. Med. 1. 11, p. 439.) "I have caused Victor's division to march this morning for Imola, the first town in the States of the Pope."
- (7) Norvins (t. 1, p. 240) mentions this staggestion of Napoleon, and contrasts it with his assertion in his Memoirs, that the directory wished to just an end to the temporal sovereignty of the Pope; implying, that he tinged, as a reproach against his government, a design which he himself entertained and proposed. But the desire of the directory to overthrow the temporal dominion of the Pope, was originally conceived by them, was long charlehed, and was repeatedly expressed in their despatches; while this proposition of Napoleon was suddenly provoked by the intercepted despatches, irritating proclamations, and hostile conduct of the Court of Rome, was but once mentioned, and was voluntarily and immediately abandoned by its author.

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- (8) Napoleon's moral perceptions in war, were as clear and penetrating as his military glances. The distinction which he drew on this occasion, between the conduct of the Pavians and of the people of Faenza, and in favour of the latter, although it did not occur to his troops, appears to be perfectly just. In his notes upon Cæsar's Commentaries, published by Marchand (Précis etc. p. 52), he censures the Roman conqueror, for disregarding this noble distinction between justice and cruelty, in putting to death the senators of Vannes. "It is impossible not to execrate the conduct of Cæsar towards the senators ot Vannes. The people of Vannes had not revolted. They had furnished hostages, and promised to live in quiet. But they were in possession of all their liberty and rights. Doubtless, they had given Cæsar cause to make war on them, but not to violate the law of nations in relation to them, and to abuse his victory in a manner so atrocious."
- (9) "The laws of war would have authorised me in delivering up this unfortunate city to pillage; but how could I make up my mind to punish with such severity a whole city, for the fault of a few priests?" Report of Napoleon to the directory, dated the 4th February.—Moniteur of the 13th, 1797.

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- (10) The report above cited, the Memoirs of Napoleon (Montholou, t. iv., p. 9), and Jomini, (Traité des Grandes Opérations, t. viii., p. 569).
 - 11) Memoirs of Napoleon (Montholon, t, iv. p. 11), confirmed by notice:

from Faenza, Jinigaglia, Ravenna, Jesaro, and Ancona, published in the Moniteur of the 19th March, 1797.

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- (12) These statements respecting Ancona, found in Napoleon's Memoirs, (Montholon, t. iv. p. 12), are confirmed by his despatch to the directory of the 15th February, 1797. (Corr. inéd. t. ii, p. 540.)
- (13) See the return of ordnance and military stores taken at Ancesa, signed by General Dommartin, and published in the Moniteur of the 28th February, 1797.
- (14) Letter of Messrs. Tinet and Monge to the directory, dated the 14th February, and inserted in the Moniteur of the 28th.

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- (15) This letter may be referred to in the Corr. inéd. (t. ii, p. 539). It is addressed "For our dear son, General Bonaparte," who had a fortnight before been represented, on the word of his Holiness, as worse than the leaders of the Goths and Vandals.
- (16) See Memoirs of Napoleon (Montholon, t. iv, p. 14), the proclamation of the same, and the decree of the directory confirming it, published in the Moniteur of the 20th February, 1797. Also the despatch of Napoleon (Corr. inéd. t. ii, p. 541.)

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(17) From this observation it might seem that the acquisition of St. Pierre, recommended by Napoleon to the directory in his letter of the 29th April (See note ante ch. 7., was regarded solely as a means of facilitating the wish or design of the French government to obtain the mastery of the Mediterranean. But in that case, as the wish was never concealed, his language would have been more explicit. Besides, in reference to the object in view, he would never have thought St. Pierre more valuable than Sardinia and Corsica both together; the latter island containing, as he himself states (Montholon, t. iv, p. 62), "the three great roads of St. Florent, Ajaccio, and Porto Vecchio, capable of containing the largest fleets."

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(18) In a communication from Rome, of the 4th March 1797, published in the Moniteur of the 2nd of April, the following observations occur: "The most singular spectacle which has been exhibited at Rome for a long time, is afforded by the Generals Victor and Lannes, visiting the wonders of the arts, escorted by their hussars and dragoons. The people could not satisfy themselves with gazing at these broops. They admired their warlike appearance, and still more their humane and polished manners. They expected to see a species of savage: like the pandours, after the description that had been given of the French. They confessed they were deceived."

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(19) See the address of Monge, and the answer of the magistrates of Stm. Marino, in the Moniteur of the 6th March 1797.

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(20) In a letter of the 18th February, to the directory, Repoleon styles "I informed you in my last despatch, that the twelve regiments you have sent me, make only nineteen thousand men. The minister of war has just written to General Kellermann, to keep with him two thousand of them, and to send back a regiment of cavalry to the army of the Rhine. Thus the thirty thousand men you announced to me are reduced to seventeen thousand; a beautiful reinforcement for the army of Italy!" From this it would appear that the regiment of cavalry was not sent back. In his Memoirs (Montholon, t. iv, p. 29), the aggregate of these reinforcements is stated at nineteen thousand, without reference to the two thousand detained by Kellermann.

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(21) In speaking of the captors of Mantua, Sir Walter Scott utters, emerge other bold puerilities, this that follows:—" Their capidity was eviaced by their artists exercising their ingenuity, in devising means to cut from the wall and carry off the fresco paintings by Titian, of the wars between the Gods and the Giants, at all risks of destroying what could never be replaced. Luckily the attempt was found totally unadvisable." (v. iii. p. 262.)

If the desire of the French to devise means of removing these frescos was a proof of their cupidity, their refraining from the attempt, because it was found unadvisable, is a proof that their cupidity was restrained by an enlightened forbearance. In imputing their liberal desire to cupidity, the author of Waverley is both absurd and unjust, for besides that, Mantua was, as he admits, the citadel of Italy, and exposed, of course, to frequent bombardments; from the low and watery situation of the place, these frescos were liable to premature destruction. Beckford, who visited Mantua sixteen years prior to this siege, observed of the paintings in the Ducal palaces; --- "being painted in fresco, upon damp neglected walls, each year diminishes their numbers, and every winter moulders some beautiful figure away." (Beckford's Italy, letter 9th.) The truth is, the French artists, sneered at by the great novelist, wished to preserve, not to destroy, these famous Frescos. Unluckily for the sincere lovers of the Fine Arts, their laudable wish could not be gratified, and these master-pieces of Titian's rich and glowing touch, are now probably faded away among the things that have been.

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(22) The letter to Lieutenant Colonel Duvivier is too well expressed to be omitted altogether.

- "The directory has read, Citizen, with the most lively interest, the briliant details of the combat you sustained in presence of your troops, with a chief of Hulans who dared to defy you. Inflamed by your example, your squadron overthrew the corps of the enemy which was opposed to them, and it is thus that the valour of commanders like you ensures victory to their men."
- "Amongst the instances of generous courage in the war of Italy, which the government delights to remember and distinguish, is that one with which it now expresses to you its satisfaction." Language, elegant and spirited like this, is a better recompense and a stronger excitement, than the cold and lumbering jargon, the invariable whereas and resolved, of a congressional or parliamentary vote of thanks.

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- (23) The strong and well defined colours in which the portrait of Massesa is delineated, are not more beautiful than they are true to nature. On the opening of Wurmser's first campaign, when Massena was forced down from Rivoli to the Mincio by the torrent of Austrian numbers, it will be remembered, that so far from being discouraged, he wrote to Napoleon: "Send me seven or eight thousand fresh troops, and I will almost engage to retake my positions in the morning." The unskilful mode of his attack at St. Michel has already been alluded to.
- (24) So just was this observation respecting the military character of Augereau, that the very night after the great and well earned victory of Lonato, he wrote to Napoleon describing his situation as desperate. "I shall be attacked in the morning, by troops fresh and greatly superior in number. Our men are overcome with fatigue, and without subsistence. If you do not send me troops, it is impossible for me to maintain myself, however willing the soldiers may be to fight." "I beg you to tell me what I am to do in case I am obliged to retreat, and upon what point I must fall back with my men." Instead of being attacked on the next day, Napoleon had time to collect his whole force at Castiglione, and the day after defeated Wurmser.

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(25) For these characters, the Memoirs of Napoleon (Montholon, t. iii. pp. $227,\,316,\,$ and $466),\,$ may be referred to.

THE END.

TCH YBETWEEN D THE BRENTA ising ations of Bassano Barrane, Such Rivoli. 05:0 VICENZA





